

22

Second Series

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru

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A large, stylized white signature of Jawaharlal Nehru, consisting of the letters 'Jh' followed by a long, sweeping diagonal stroke.A small, stylized white signature of Jawaharlal Nehru, consisting of the letters 'Jh' followed by a long, sweeping diagonal stroke.

"So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote...the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being."

Indira Gandhi



**Selected
works of
Jawaharlal
Nehru**



AT THE INAUGURATION OF THE AIZAWL-LUNGLEH ROAD, CONSTRUCTED BY THE
VOLUNTARY LABOUR OF THE TRIBAL FOLK, 3 APRIL 1953

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Second Series

Volume Twenty Two

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FOREWORD

Jawaharlal Nehru is one of the key figures of the twentieth century. He symbolised some of the major forces which have transformed our age.

When Jawaharlal Nehru was young, history was still the privilege of the West; the rest of the world lay in deliberate darkness. The impression given was that the vast continents of Asia and Africa existed merely to sustain their masters in Europe and North America. Jawaharlal Nehru's own education in Britain could be interpreted, in a sense, as an attempt to secure for him a place within the pale. His letters of the time are evidence of his sensitivity, his interest in science and international affairs as well as of his pride in India and Asia. But his personality was veiled by his shyness and a facade of nonchalance, and perhaps outwardly there was not much to distinguish him from the ordinary run of men. Gradually there emerged the warm and universal being who became intensely involved with the problems of the poor and the oppressed in all lands. In doing so, Jawaharlal Nehru gave articulation and leadership to millions of people in his own country and in Asia and Africa.


That imperialism was a curse which should be lifted from the brows of men, that poverty was incompatible with civilisation, that nationalism should be poised on a sense of international community and that it was not sufficient to brood on these things when action was urgent and compelling—these were the principles which inspired and gave vitality to Jawaharlal Nehru's activities in the years of India's struggle for freedom and made him not only an intense nationalist but one of the leaders of humanism.

No particular ideological doctrine could claim Jawaharlal Nehru for its own. Long days in jail were spent in reading widely. He drew much from the thought of the East and West and from the philosophies of the past and the present. Never religious in the formal sense, yet he had a deep love for the culture and tradition of his own land. Never a rigid Marxist, yet he was deeply influenced by that theory and was particularly impressed by what he saw in the Soviet Union on his first visit in 1927. However, he realised that the world was too complex, and man had too many facets, to be encompassed by any single or total explanation. He himself was a socialist with an abhorrence of regimentation and a democrat who was anxious to reconcile his faith in civil liberty with the necessity of mitigating economic and social wretchedness. His struggles, both within himself and with the outside world, to adjust such seeming contradictions are what make his life and work significant and fascinating.

As a leader of free India, Jawaharlal Nehru recognised that his country could neither stay out of the world nor divest itself of its own interests in world affairs. But to the extent that it was possible, Jawaharlal Nehru sought to speak objectively

and to be a voice of sanity in the shrill phases of the 'cold war'. Whether his influence helped on certain occasions to maintain peace is for the future historian to assess. What we do know is that for a long stretch of time he commanded an international audience reaching far beyond governments, that he spoke for ordinary, sensitive, thinking men and women around the globe and that his was a constituency which extended far beyond India.

So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote. There is, as is to be expected in the speeches and writings of a man so engrossed in affairs and gifted with expression, much that is ephemeral; this will be omitted. The official letters and memoranda will also not find place here. But it is planned to include everything else and the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Indira Gandhi". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

New Delhi
18 January 1972

Chairman
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund

EDITORIAL NOTE

This volume of the *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, covering the second quarter of 1953, deals with several seminal events and crucial initiatives which marked, on the one hand, an increase in the pace of social and economic developments within India, and on the other, an increasing involvement of the country in matters of outstanding significance in the world community.

Yet it is truly remarkable that in the midst of the pressing tasks of statecraft, Jawaharlal Nehru was able to tease out of a busy schedule the time to reflect upon the larger issues which engaged humankind in India, and elsewhere, in the middle decades of the 20th century. In an interview with Dorothy Norman, the American author, he spoke of the distinctive worldview of the people of India, which shaped their attitudes towards this world and beyond. This conferred upon the people a certain detachment towards the phenomenal world, and an ability to view men and events with a commendable sense of tolerance and equanimity. Moreover, the culture of the Indian people also endowed them with great freedom in interpreting the past as it impinged upon the present. "I always thought of India, in particular, as something in the nature of a palimpsest—a manuscript first written upon long, long ago. And then, over the original writing through the centuries... people have attempted to trace what they thought was there to begin with. So that by now there has been so much writing... that no longer can one be entirely certain that what is offered to one as the original tradition is, in fact, identical with what existed in the beginning."

In Nehru's perception of India in the 20th century, Mahatma Gandhi stood as a towering figure, who had not only shaped the social and moral content of the struggle for freedom; but also held out to the people a sense of the objectives they were to pursue in the future. The secret of the Mahatma's greatness was his firm belief in the transformative power of Truth and Non-Violence. "In this age of utmost violence, it is strange to think of the man who talked always of Non-Violence. In this age of consuming fear, this absolutely fearless individual stands out. He demonstrated to us that there can be a strength far greater than that of armaments and that a struggle can be fought... without bitterness and hatred." The Mahatma had fought for Indian freedom through Non-Violence. Yet the strategy and tactics he adopted were applicable universally. "I think that the Gandhian approach can and will be applied to all the problems of the world today," Nehru observed.

That the vision of Gandhi, filtered through the discourse of modernity, guided Nehru in the steps he took to impart a new dignity to the people of India is vividly illustrated in what he had to say on various occasions in the period under review. Thus, in April 1953, on the 34th anniversary of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre, Nehru sketched a vivid picture of how the world

had changed in the 20th century, at the same time as he touched upon the challenges which lay ahead. The nations of Europe, he argued, had grown in prosperity and strength through the industrial revolution; as a consequence of which they had established domination over vast regions of Asia and Africa. Over the past 50 years and more, the people of India had fought a memorable battle non-violently to liberate themselves. After having won freedom in 1947, they faced the challenge of transforming the economy. A great effort at industrialisation was afoot. This relied heavily upon science and technology. "The salvation of India from the throes of poverty and misery lies in the proper development and harnessing of science and scientific industry," Nehru stated. No less important were the initiatives taken in the domain of land reforms and community development. The community development projects, Nehru believed, "... have a very vital significance. They should be a kind of dynamo... behind human beings in India, because ultimately all your self-improvement fails unless human beings function properly."

While the programmes of social and economic development were important in themselves, the period under review also witnessed major initiatives in the political domain. Around this time, steps were being taken to redraw the boundaries of the States of the Indian Union. Nehru fully realised that as early as 1920, the Indian National Congress had decided to redraw the territorial map of India, largely on linguistic criteria, to facilitate a democratic revolution in the country. But in the 1950s, there was a danger that regional and local forces might exploit legitimate linguistic sentiment to further narrow objectives. For this reason, he struck a note of caution when he addressed himself to the issue of the reorganisation of the States. The spirit in which Nehru approached this problem is best reflected in a resolution adopted by the Congress (personally drafted by him), which stressed the need not only to examine "cultural and linguistic matters, but also other important factors, such as the preservation of the unity of India, national security and defence, administrative advantages, financial considerations and the economic progress of each State as well as of the whole nation."

No less important was a resolution of the communal problem, as it affected the unity and integrity of the Indian Nation. This problem had a disquieting location in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Alone among the Muslim majority regions of South Asia, the people of Jammu and Kashmir had opted for union with India. Kashmir, therefore, was the most concrete symbol of the secular character of the Republic of India. Despite earlier commitments, however, the Kashmiri leader, Shaikh Abdullah, had developed some reservations about the place occupied by the State in the Indian Union. This was so despite the fact that a popularly elected Constituent Assembly had decided in favour of integration with India. In his dialogue with Shaikh Abdullah, Nehru sought to reassure him that Kashmir would occupy a place of dignity within the Republic of India. He wrote: "You told me that there were only two courses open for Kashmir: either full integration or full autonomy, whatever that autonomy might mean. I did not agree with you in this, nor do I agree with you even now, because there are many other middle courses. Nobody can guarantee the distant future. We live in an age of revolutionary change."

The Kashmir problem featured as much in the international arena as it featured in the national. The principal reason behind this was the aggression which Pakistan had directed towards Kashmir, shortly after independence; and her desire thereafter to wrest the State, as a whole, from India. In the period under review, the rulers of Pakistan adopted the policy of seeking the intervention of the Western Powers, in realising their designs upon Kashmir. Nehru was clear how such intervention ought to be handled. Kashmir was an integral part of the Indian Nation: once the Western Powers left the matter to be resolved through negotiations between India and Pakistan, there would be no difficulty in the two countries coming to an amicable settlement through mutual consultation.

Despite the Kashmir problem, the able stewardship of Jawaharlal Nehru transformed India into an important factor in world affairs, at this juncture. Here it may be pertinent to point out that Indian foreign policy, as spelt out by Jawaharlal Nehru, was unambiguously Gandhian in its basic formulation. There is a conventional view, articulated by more than one political actor, that so far as international relations are concerned, power "grows out of the barrel of a gun." As against this notion of power in the world community, Mahatma Gandhi had advanced the concept of "moral" power, and its ability to achieve what military power could not. Nehru's conduct of foreign policy, as practised after 1947, was a truly creative application of the Gandhian concept of power to the conduct of relations between sovereign nations in the world.

The despatches and speeches on foreign affairs incorporated in the present volume show clear evidence of the growing stature of India in the world, through an organisation of the external relations of the country on the basis of moral rectitude and equity, rather than on military might. Take the Korean War, for instance. As Nehru pointed out, in the destruction which it wrought, as also in the danger of nuclear war which it held out, the Korean War was a major threat to humanity in the early 1950s. True to her commitment to peace and non-violence, India acted as an honest broker between the belligerent powers. This stance won for her high praise, and her mediation was responsible in bringing hostilities to a successful conclusion. India was so successful in resolving the Korean issue, that in the face of growing differences between Great Britain and Egypt over the Suez Canal, there was a suggestion from the United States, that Indian diplomacy should once again play a useful role in defusing tension between an imperial Britain and a resurgent Egypt.

While the role played by India in the Korean War and the Egyptian crisis is not wholly unknown, the documents in this volume throw novel light upon Nehru's sensitive understanding of the rising tide of nationalism in Africa, and the manner in which this sentiment could be drawn into the liberation of the "Nations" of this vast continent. As Nehru pointed out in his letters and speeches, the upsurge of nationalism in Africa had, by the 1950s, reached an intensity which could no longer be contained by imperialism and racism. If the European Powers attempted to suppress this sentiment, then violence would inevitably raise its ugly head throughout the region. The accuracy of Nehru's prognosis was vividly reflected in the course of subsequent events in Africa. Perhaps the full story of the liberation of the peoples of Africa has still to be

pieced together by scholarly research. Yet Nehru's critique of this epochal transformation, as portrayed in 1953, combines sympathy with objectivity in a manner which scholarship would find it difficult to excel.

Finally, it is our pleasant duty to thank several individuals and institutions for their support and help. The Nehru Memorial Museum and Library has, as before, assisted in the publication of this volume by granting access to the papers of Jawaharlal Nehru. Shrimati Sonia Gandhi graciously permitted us to consult the collection of papers in her possession referred to as the JN Collection. The Cabinet Secretariat, the Secretariats of the President and the Prime Minister, the Ministries of Home Affairs and External Affairs, All India Radio and the Press Information Bureau, have allowed us to use relevant material in their possession. Some classified material has necessarily been deleted. Five letters published in *Two Alone, Two Together: Letters Between Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru 1940-1964* edited by Shrimati Sonia Gandhi have been included in the volume. One letter has also been included from the book by Shriman Narayan entitled *Letters from Gandhi Nehru Vinoba*.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AICC	All India Congress Committee
AIIMS	All India Institute of Medical Sciences
AIR	All India Radio
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BPNTUC	Bengal Provincial National Trade Union Congress
CS	Commonwealth Secretary
CWS	Congress Working Committee
DC	District Committee
DCC	District Congress Committee
DIB	Director, Intelligence Bureau
DPCC	Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee
ECA	Economic Corporation Administration
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FS	Foreign Secretary
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HC	High Commissioner
HMG	His Majesty's Government
HSL	Hindustan Shipyard Ltd.
IAF	Indian Air Force
IAS	Indian Administrative Service
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICS	Indian Civil Service
IG	Inspector General
IIT	Indian Institute of Technology
INTUC	Indian National Trade Union Congress
IPTA	Indian People's Theatre Association

JCOs	Junior Commissioned Officers
KISA	Kikuyu Independent Schools Association
KKEA	Kikuyu Karinga Education Association
KMPP	Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party
KMT	Kuomintang
KPCC	Karnataka Pradesh Congress Committee
MMTC	Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation
MDO	Minister, Defence Organization
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MEDO	Middle East Defence Organisation
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MLA	Member, Legislative Assembly
MPCC	Maharashtra Provincial Congress Committee
MRA	Moral Rearmament
NAI	National Archives of India
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCC	National Cadet Corps
NCOs	Non-Commissioned Officers
NEFA	North East Frontier Agency
NMML	Nehru Memorial Museum & Library
NNRC	Neutral Nations' Repatriation Commission
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PAC	Provincial Armed Constabulary
PCC	Provincial Congress Committee
PM	Prime Minister
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
PMS	Prime Minister's Secretariat
PsOW	Prisoners of War

P&O	Peninsular & Oriental (Steamship) Company
PSP	Praja Socialist Party
PTI	Press Trust of India
RAF	Royal Air Force
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SG	Secretary General
TISCO	Tata Iron & Steel Company
UK	United Kingdom
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UP	Uttar Pradesh
UPPCC	Uttar Pradesh Provincial Congress Committee
UPSC	Union Public Service Commission
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VC	Vice-Chancellor
WBPPC	West Bengal Provincial Congress Committee

1. An Indian Worldview¹

Only too often we assume that if we glimpse part of a truth about an event or moment, we have succeeded in discovering the entire truth about it. This is so whether in connection with nations or individuals. Both, however, are by far too complicated to sum up in any over-simplified manner.

If one mistakes a part for the whole, making generalizations therefrom, one is bound to fall into endless error. The very part to which one refers as though it were the whole, may indeed, even be in process of correction or change. Thus, unless one considers any single aspect of an occurrence in relationship to all of its other aspects—that is, relationship to the whole—one may well succeed merely in misrepresenting, rather than interpreting.

No single mind can entirely understand the whole of any nation, or even of any individual. One may express one's opinion about one phase or another. Yet all expressions of opinion based on partial observation necessarily must be of casual, rather than profound importance.

We are prone to judge things—even, at times, to be intolerant about them—because of our own preconceived notions. We are apt to find precisely what we expect to find wherever we go, without even attempting to see what is actually before us.

Often I find myself saying to those who come to India, especially to Americans, 'You will discover here precisely what you expect to discover. Wherever you go, after all what you see depends on what you bring with you, on what you carry within you.'

Let us say that you go to Banaras. There you can find the most disturbing conditions. I dislike this as much as anyone. Yet, if that is all that you see, you will not truly have seen Banaras. Certainly that is by no means all that I see when I go there. Rather, a thousand pictures come to the mind—pictures relating to the last thousands of years. I think of how Banaras already was a living cultural centre some 3000 years ago and of how, even that long ago, people came there from far and near to discuss new ideas. It was, one must remember, in Banaras that Buddha gave his first sermon.

India has a variety of faces. In describing none of them is one able to give a completely accurate picture of the land as a whole. In my own book,²

1. This important interview with Jawaharlal Nehru was recorded by Dorothy Norman, an American journalist and a friend of the Nehru family, probably during a visit to India in the autumn of 1952. Norman wrote a letter to Nehru on 16 March 1953, enclosing a scripted version of the interview, to which Nehru responded on 10 May, extending his approval of the text. JN Collection.
2. Nehru refers here to *The Discovery of India* (first published in 1946 by The Signet Press, Calcutta).

for example, I attempted to put down what I understood about the country at the time, I have no idea whether I truly understood India then, or whether I understand it even now. Just as I have no idea whether I understand any single individual.

Even when one looks in the eyes of most of one's friends, one finds that, one doubtless is looking into the eyes of strangers. One sees what one is capable of seeing. No more. Of course the trained observer will see more than will others. This is true also of the artist, but, even so, the botanist, the chemist—each will find something quite different from what even the artist will find.

It is dangerous to generalize about so vast a nation as India, one can say that, just as various parts of England or France or Germany or China differ from one another, so do various regions of India. On the other hand, one can say that despite differences between, let us say, North and South India, there is a bond between these two areas—a vast common background that has helped to mould both of them. But to complicate matters still further, one finds that, although at home, Indians from different parts of the country may seem to vary considerably, when one sees them in a foreign land they strike one as being surprisingly similar.

Pakistanis and Indians, for example, have, in large measures, spoken the same language and been moulded by the same forces for centuries. Yet, politics aside, if they go to a foreign land, it is difficult to tell them apart. But, even so, I still maintain it is difficult to make generalizations either about India or Indians.

In answer to the observation that there is a vast difference between the traditions of India and those of the West, it is not easy to give any simple reply. It is often maintained that the Indian is more "detached" than others. But then virtually every great philosopher, in every country, in every era, in every tradition, has spoken in favour of detachment.

One of the most important of India's traditional documents—the *Bhagavad Gita*—stresses detachment. But that is not at all to say that it favours inaction. It maintains rather that even when one must kill in battle, one must remain apart from the act one performs.

I cannot see how this differs from the normal ideas of civilization and culture held throughout the rest of the world.

In every truly civilized person there is always a certain amount of restraint. This is not to say that when one acts one is devoid of feeling about what one does. A civilized person behaves politely even if he wishes to shout. What is true about petty forms of behaviour is true about one's larger actions. Restraint and detachment are favoured in all developed cultures. One should not allow one's mind to get out of control. If one is civilized and cultivated, one is swept away by neither good news nor bad.

Let us say that suddenly one develops a hatred for someone. The cultured person will not permit this feeling to dominate him, to run away with him. When one begins to feel hatred for someone it is necessary to realize that one may not know fully about everything involved. One may lack sufficient knowledge about the person's background, about the motives that have impelled him to act, about the provocation for what has been done that may well have repelled one. One may not know what training the person has had, perhaps he has not had an opportunity to develop in a manner that would arouse one's approval.

As one becomes tolerant and restrained in arriving at conclusions one simply is demonstrating the ordinary, civilized aspects of detachment. Yet, even when one becomes detached in the deepest, most civilized sense of the word, this does not necessarily mean that one has become an ascetic or a hermit—that one is running away from life, or putting oneself physically away from life. It means rather to be in the fire, yet to remain cool.

It was Albert Schweitzer³ I believe, who, in comparing eastern and western philosophy, observed that the basic Indian idea is one of renunciation or avoidance, as opposed to western acceptance of life. This is only partially, but not basically, correct. I do not really see how one can talk about essential differences in this manner. For surely among the early Christians there were hermits, monks, nuns. There was the doctrine of renunciation. The fact is, simply, that you will find that there have been certain periods elsewhere, even as in India, when first one approach has been in the ascendancy, then another.

You might say that in India Jainism symbolized the doctrine of renunciation. Some people claim that Buddha also favoured this doctrine. In reality, however, Buddhism symbolized the golden mean—the middle way.

Buddha was against mere renunciation. After he died, of course, his followers took up what he said and made something quite different of it—something that did not necessarily have much to do with what Buddha himself had symbolized.

When one examines the most ancient view of life in India, one finds that a highly systematic way of thinking was followed. But, in no sense can this way be called simply negative.

According to the oldest Indian tradition one's life is divided into four

3. (1875-1965); missionary surgeon, awarded Nobel Peace Prize for 1952; won several national and international prizes and awards since 1949; author of, *Indian Thought and its Development*, 1936, *From My African Notebook*, 1939, *The Problem of Peace in the World of Today* (Nobel Peace Address), 1954, *A Declaration of Conscience*, 1957 and *Peace or Atomic War?*, 1958.

parts. There is the period that extends through one's adolescence, in which one is trained and educated for life. Next, one becomes a householder. All of this involves a full acceptance of life and its responsibilities.

During the third phase there is partial withdrawal. This is the period during which one becomes the elder statesman. One is respected and consulted, but one is no longer entangled in life in the same way in which one was involved in earlier phases.

Then finally, there is the period of complete withdrawal. At this point one gives up property. One does one's thinking at a level completely different from that of earlier periods of one's life. One might say that during this final period one becomes a hermit. But this is very different from being a hermit from boyhood on.

After all, by the third stage of one's life one's own children have grown up. It is then that one hands over responsibility to them, as well as one's property. It is at this point that one becomes free of property oneself.

All this is simply part of the flow of life. It is not renunciation in the superficial sense of the word. The person who hands over his property does not starve. And, as death is approached, there is no longer care, burden, worry, as at earlier stages of life.

As one approaches death one has detached oneself from binding factors. The form of one's life has been moulded with logic and there has been a sense of continuity. The next generation has taken over at the point at which it has properly been prepared to do so. Thus there is no sudden break at the time of one's death. In the final phase of one's life one no longer worries about what one has not done. What has been done is done. This is as it should be.

This has long been considered the ideal division of life by many in India. Some hold on to this tradition even now. But this is not to say that there are not many other ideas about how one should live—here, as elsewhere—or that there have not been many conflicts in our country with respect to the various ideas that have been held.

There always have been different concepts of how one should live. Indeed, there always has been great tolerance in India with respect to this very matter. There never has been any single dogma that has dominated our life. It has always been accepted that no one can know the whole of the truth.

There is no point in worrying too much about whether beliefs held by others happen to differ from one's own. Someone else may have got hold of some part of the truth that differs from the part in which one happens to believe oneself. Why not simply accept this possibility?

It must be remembered that Hinduism is neither a religion nor a dogma.

As a matter of fact, six different so-called orthodox philosophies⁴—each somewhat at variance with the others—have evolved in India under this one general heading. No single one, therefore, rightly can be called Hinduism to the exclusion of the others. Moreover, each of the philosophies that has evolved has flowered and faded in its time. One, for example, has been atheistic in character; another semi-atheistic. Buddhism, which might be called more or less atheistic, is itself an offshoot of Hinduism.

In general the Hindu does not aim to proselytize, even though the Buddhists did try to do just that. In some cases images have been worshipped in India, in others not. The important thing, in any event, is that, under the general heading of Hinduism, one can do as one pleases.

I admit that tolerance can have its bad as well as its good aspects. But, then, so can intolerance—as when a person thinks that he alone is right.

Many conflicting ideas have been and continue to be held simultaneously here, as in other parts of the world. There is a difference in outlook not only about traditional ideas, but about modern ones as well. Consider the concept of progress. There are those who believe that the individual—the good man—by his own goodness influences the environment around him, thereby raising it. There are those who maintain that on the contrary the good environment helps to ennoble the individual.

The first belief represents an old idea, the second a more modern notion. Obviously there is some truth to be found in both approaches. Just as there doubtless is some truth to be found in any number of differing philosophies.

Yet which is one to affirm or accept as final and all-inclusive?

Mere passivity in any domain—whether the intellectual, the cultural or the personal—cannot by any stretch of the imagination represent true vitality. Vitality can come only from an acceptance of—and being open to—a multiplicity of forces.

A race, after all, develops slowly. Generally speaking the Chinese (I am not now referring to present-day China, but to the Chinese over the ages) have been a vital people. They never have had a dogmatic religion. They have been a people of common sense. They have not gone to extremes. They have been fond of good things, but, in some respects, they may be said to have been callous to their neighbours. How, then, is one to characterize them in any simple fashion? How is one to speak of any group in terms that are static?

Surely in every civilization—age after age—first one set of circumstances and then another will have left its mark on a people, helping to form them. In every culture there is bound to have been accretion upon accretion of influences.

4. The six philosophical streams are: (i) *Nyaya* (ii) *Vaisheshika* (iii) *Samkhya* (iv) *Yoga* (v) *Purva Mimamsa* and (vi) *Uttara Mimamsa* or *Vedanta*.

I always think of India, in particular, as something in the nature of a palimpsest—a manuscript first written upon long, long ago. And then, over the original writing throughout the centuries, as the original characters have faded, people have attempted to trace what they thought was there to begin with. So that by now there has been so much writing over writing that no longer can one be entirely certain that what is offered to one as original tradition is, in fact, identical with what existed in the beginning.

India—perhaps China too—because of the vast, long periods during which these two countries have evolved—are less apt to be swept away by present events than are younger nations. Thus, somehow, the present is to be looked upon simply as one phase in a series of phases. It is to be seen in perspective against the complex panorama of the past.

The events of the present become less overwhelming if seen in such perspective and with a deep faith in the future.

The people always have endured in the past. Perhaps, in certain eras, there has been a failure to rise to great heights. But there is an inherent strength in the people that will continue to cause them to endure.

Naturally I wonder greatly about India. And naturally it is necessary to take our vast historical and cultural background into account, when considering what should be done here in the present. I repeat, however, that it is dangerous to oversimplify about this or any other country. For one is, after all, viewing a tremendous picture gallery when one considers anything so vast and complex as this nation or, perhaps, any nation. This is so as much with respect to the present as the past. None of it, one may rightly say, is simple.

2. The Conquest of Violence¹

Three days ago I met the author² of this dissertation for the first time. How she managed to reach me at a time when I was overburdened with work, is not quite clear to me. Somehow I managed to find a few minutes for her. I had no idea why she wanted to see me. But in the first minute or two I was interested in her talk and I found that here was no casual tourist or visitor but someone who had laboured to understand questions which had troubled my

1. Foreword to *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict* by Joan V. Bondurant (Princeton, 1958). New Delhi, 16 May 1953, File No. 9/148/53-PMS.
2. Political Scientist; Associate Editor of the *Indian Press Digest*; Researcher at the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

mind for many years past. I was naturally interested in her work and, in spite of heavy preoccupations, I took a copy of her dissertation and promised to write a few words about it.³

During these two or three days I have stolen a few moments from other work to look into this dissertation. I have not been able to read it in its entirety, but I have seen enough of it to feel that it is a serious and earnest attempt to explore a new field.

To many of us it is not a new field, for we have grown up in this strange complex of ideas and action which Gandhi let loose in India. We were hardly in a position to exercise a dispassionate judgement about them, for we ourselves became integral parts of these processes which changed us as individuals and changed the history of India. And yet, in some ways we are entitled to a hearing and our views may have some value, though they might not be expressed in the language of the scholar. We were not only intellectually in touch with these dynamic ideas but were emotionally aware of many things, which cannot easily be analysed or put down on paper. It is nearly three and a half decades now that I first came in contact with his strange personality and his stranger ideas. The effect was almost instantaneous, as if an electric shock went through the system. And yet, the shock was a soothing and, at the same time, an enlivening one. The mind struggled with these new ideas often put out without much method or logic. But the whole system reacted to them and grew under their impress.

Was it the personality of Gandhi that did this or the force of the ideas that he represented and translated into action? Was it the rare spectacle of a man whose thought and word and act were so closely correlated as to form one integrated whole?

The man has gone, though he lives vividly in the memory of those who knew him, and innumerable legends have grown up about him. The story of his deeds has become a part of the history of India. Many people swear by his name and exploit it for base purposes. The noble doctrine of Satyagraha is debased and used for wrong ends.

I suppose all this is inevitable. The truth or reality in the idea that he represented will no doubt survive and, I am sure, influence man's mind more and more.

In this age of uttermost violence, it is strange to think of the man who talked always of non-violence. In this age of consuming fear, this absolutely

3. In a covering letter to Bondurant, Nehru wrote on 16 May: "You have been a hard taskmaster and have compelled me... to attend to your book. Frankly, I would not have done so if I had not ... appreciated your labour to make people understand Gandhi's ideas about Satyagraha and his political theory. Perhaps political theory is hardly the word, because for him politics was not something apart from life but just one aspect of an integrated whole."

fearless individual stands out. He demonstrated to us that there can be a strength far greater than that of armaments and that a struggle can be fought, and indeed should be fought without bitterness and hatred.

I hope that Dr Bondurant's book will lead many people to think of this new dynamic that Gandhi brought into the political and social field. That dynamic largely justified itself in India, in spite of the weaknesses and failings of many who call themselves his followers. I do not pretend to understand fully the significance of that technique of action, in which I myself took part. But I feel more and more convinced that it offers us some key to understanding and to the proper resolution of conflict. We see conflict all round us in the world. That is perhaps not surprising. But what is surprising is that the methods adopted to end that conflict have almost always failed miserably and produced greater conflict and more difficult problems. In spite of this patent fact, we pursue the old methods blindly and do not even learn from our own experience.

Gandhi was never tired of talking about means and ends and of laying stress on the importance of the means. That is the essential difference, I think, between his approach and the normal approach which thinks in terms of ends only, and because means are forgotten, the ends aimed at escape one. It is not realised that the ends must inevitably come out of the means and are governed by those means.

Conflicts are, therefore, seldom resolved. The wrong methods pursued in dealing with them lead to further conflict. The mistaken belief still persists that violence can end a conflict or that war can bring salvation to the world.

Gandhi pointed another way and, what is more, lived it and showed achievement. That surely should at least make us try to understand what this new way was and how far it is possible for us to shape our thoughts and actions in accordance with it. Because I think that Dr Bondurant's book will help, to some extent, in making people think that I have ventured to write this foreword.

3. Mahatma Gandhi¹

Professor N.S. Phadke's² book in Marathi on Mahatma Gandhi has already

1. Foreword to the Hindi edition of *Mahatma Gandhi Charitra*, a short biography in Marathi by Narayan Sitaram Phadke (Bombay, 1951). New Delhi, 22 May 1953. File No. 9/148/53-PMS.
2. (b. 1894); eminent Marathi writer; taught at Poona University and Rajaram College, Kolhapur; wrote 66 novels and essays, awarded Padmabhushan, 1962.

obtained a deserving popularity. I am happy that a Hindi translation of this book is now appearing and I hope that it will reach a wider public.³

Mahatma Gandhi has already become a legend not only in India but in the world. That perhaps was inevitable. And yet this has its drawbacks, for in thinking of him as a legendary figure, he becomes someone whom we can distantly admire and pay homage to, but who need not influence our lives very much. To feel that way is to be untrue to him. He was a man who had perhaps directly influenced more human beings than anyone else.

His achievements are tremendous. But the biggest achievement of all was the way he influenced these people and made them better than they were. Therefore, we have to think of him not in a legendary way but as a man, the greatest amongst us, gentle and wise, a man of faith and, at the same time, a man of action. Above all, we have to think of the principles for which he stood and which he impressed upon India. Thus we shall, in a small measure, be true to him and his teachings.

This little book will carry his message to its readers and I commend it.

3. Apologising for the delay in writing the foreword, Nehru wrote to Phadke on 21 May: "I have sometimes written about Gandhiji but I have always found it very difficult to do so... I cannot write like a machine about subjects which move me greatly. Therefore it becomes peculiarly difficult for me to develop the mood for such writing."

4. Gandhian Approach to World Problems¹

India's foreign policy is the outcome of the background of Indian thought during Mahatma Gandhi's time and a long time before him. Events have rather justified that policy. As a result of that Gandhian background, a remarkable event had occurred—the agreement between India and the United Kingdom which resulted in Indian independence and in India's continued association with the Commonwealth.

I think that the Gandhian approach can well be applied to the problems of the world today. It does not mean giving up any principles, but it does mean trying to understand that the other party may not be all black, and that there are all shades between white and black.

1. Address to the Foreign Press Association, London, 11 June 1953. From *The Hindu*, *The Statesman*, *Amrita Bazar Patrika* and *National Herald*, 12 June 1953.

I prescribe the Gandhian approach as a formula for all the great and serious problems that exist in the world today. Gandhiji was not a weak man at all, not a person to give in to anything he considered wrong or evil. Nevertheless, his approach was friendly; even to a person who was his opponent or enemy, and so, curiously enough, he undermined the moral defences of his opponent, and weakened him and won him over.

Tremendous change is coming over Asia and Africa. The people have suddenly been brought out of a shell in which they have been because of economic or political conditions. They have a political consciousness, they want to better themselves. They are in a dynamic, almost explosive state.

I earnestly hope that events in Korea would lead not only to a settlement there in the near future, but would also help in relieving tensions all over the world.

This will be a very great thing, not only because it results in the stoppage of fighting but because it turns people's minds to the other approach. The Korean war is supposed to be a minor war, yet it resulted in, I think, about three million casualties. It is not a minor war because, apart from those casualties, I do not know how many died of hunger and strife. It is a big thing, especially if we can utilise it for the right purpose, that is, to apply that right approach, free of fear and hatred.

In China, a major revolution has taken place which, whether you like it or not, has made a tremendous balance of power in Asia or, if you like, the world.

In Africa, the whole continent is astir, so far as people's minds are concerned. It may not be recorded very much in your newspapers, but those who know Africa must know of these vast changes which are taking place.

Because of the vast change that has taken place in men's minds in Asia and Africa, people in these continents are not prepared to tolerate things which they were prepared to before.

I beg of you to try to understand something of the vast movements of the human mind which are taking place in Asia and Africa. The pace is fast and, unless one has sympathy with it and keeps pace with it, it may lead to results which may be undesirable. We must view these developments with the inner eye of sympathy and understanding and try to mould them in the right direction.

The Gandhian approach is wanted in this. Today we see that governmental force is becoming tremendously vast and we also see its limitations. When a person is prepared to suffer for his convictions, governmental force becomes powerless and he cannot be tackled in the old way of force.

India and Britain do not agree in many matters, yet we approach them in a friendly way and, because we approach them in a friendly and frank way, there is a larger appreciation of outlook and a much larger measure of

cooperation. I wish this principle may be applied to all grave problems that exist in the world today.

Every country has to take all necessary measures for its security. Nevertheless, security essentially depends upon an approach of friendliness and absence of rancour, without relying merely on military force and using the language of threats.

A touch of faith is good. It strengthens you, weakens the opponents at the same time, and brings greater hope of solving the world's problems, and, therefore, of peace.

GENERAL PERSPECTIVES

1. India and the World¹

As you know, thirty-four years have passed since the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy. It has become an old story and the fact is that the country has had to bear many shocks, some even greater and more traumatic than that one. Why then should we remember this day specially? It is not because we wish to mourn a tragedy, but because the incidents that occurred in the Punjab between the 6th and the 13th April were a turning point in the history of our nation, a time of awakening. It is from that period that all those things started happening under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi which were to change the face of the country. They started a new wave in the whole country and organized the people into a tremendous force to face British imperialism. There are some incidents which are in themselves historical. There are other types of incidents which are a reflection of the emotions of hundreds of thousands of people. In this sense, they are not merely historical but a mirror of the condition of the country. This period of April 1919 belongs to the latter category. I do not know how many of you present here today may have a personal experience of those times. It is obvious that there cannot be many and those who are less than 40 years can know nothing about it, or perhaps even those who are less than 45. Certainly the elders who are present here, people around fifty years and above, may perhaps remember something because it is only people who have seen these things with their own eyes and felt those emotions, can understand what happens when a nation takes a new turn.

Anyhow, I repeat that we must not regard it as a day of mourning but of happiness because that was the occasion when the nation awoke and moved forward as nations should and at the same time in a new way which became famous in the world as Gandhi's way. It is a different matter as to how far we have followed that path in our time. We have often been weak and stumbled many times but we tried our best to follow that path and ultimately it is obvious that it was by following that path that we succeeded and British rule was removed from here and the country became free and we became a democratic republic as was our goal. Our problems did not get solved fully by that. It is obvious that the problems of no country can ever be solved fully. The world is full of tensions, as you know. But we completed a long lap of our journey, first on the 15th of August, 1947 and after that on 26th January 1950, when we became a republic.

1. Speech at a public meeting on Jallianwala Bagh Day, New Delhi, 13 April 1953. From AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.

Now instead of reminding you of the events of the past and of the last thirty years, I should like you to turn your attention towards the future. We learn from past experiences and if we have the good sense we can benefit from them, but ultimately we have to go forward. Therefore it is better that we should look ahead. We should look ahead and around us and see what we can find because we can never hope to understand anything in its isolation. Suppose, for instance, you live in a village and something comes up which is very important for yourself and the village, but it may not be of national importance. Similarly we are bound by family ties, ties of our localities and villages and cities, which is all right. But when we have to consider any problem from a position of responsibility, we cannot do so from the point of view of our family or village, but from the national point of view. You must go a little further than that and look at it to some extent from the point of view of the world as well. When the world comes closer, as it does today, every country influences the others powerfully. If there is war even in a distant country, it is bound to affect us. What is the situation in the world today? There has been a change for the better in the last week or ten days and for the first time in many years, there is again talk of peace in the world and attempts are being made to stop or at least to de-escalate the war that is going on in Korea.² Nobody can say what the result will be but the fact that there is talk of peace is in itself unusual. For years we had been used to tension and suspicion between the big powers and the constant threat of war. We also knew that if there was another major war in the world, it would bring such terrible ruin as had never been seen before. We in this country are almost completely unfamiliar with a large war. That is why perhaps some people talk of war with great casualness, without knowing what the repercussions are likely to be. We have faced great difficulties in our country but a modern war has not been one of them. The last War came close to the borders of Assam, but no more than that. The city of Delhi has had no experience of bombs falling from the skies, nor has any other city in India, except perhaps Calcutta ten years ago. But that is an old story. In modern warfare, the weapons that are likely to be used are far more lethal and their effects are far-reaching. It is ten years since the last war ended and so we have no experience of such things. That is why we are able to talk of war very off-handedly and are prepared to go in for one. It is all rather childish. A war today can totally ruin the world. Therefore our policy has been as far as possible to prevent wars in the world. We try our best to work against war because the result of a war, far from being a defeat or victory, will be to ruin even the victor. So this has been our policy. Now our

2. On 11 April 1953, an agreement was signed at Panmunjon, between the Communists and the UN Command for exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war. The exchange was to be completed in 20 days, starting on 20 April 1953, in which 500 Communists and 100 allied men were to be returned each day in batches of twenty-five.

standing in the world is not such that whatever we say will be accepted. We simply do not have the strength to order anybody around. But we have put our views with honesty and integrity before the world and they have had an effect, especially on the small countries, and hence we have wielded a certain influence in world politics—not a great deal, but to some extent. In fact, we do not have large armies which can confront the big powers, though our armed forces are very good. But there is no comparison between our army and air force and those of the United States of America and the Soviet Union. As against fifty or hundred planes, they have ten thousand. It is not merely a question of numbers. It is obvious that we do not have all these powerful weapons like the atom bomb, etc., which you may have heard of, and which make the older weapons totally obsolete. And then, we have no great wealth with which to influence the affluent powers. If we have any influence at all, it can only be because what we say seems right and relevant to others.

Anyhow, this is a new development in the world today. The new turn that the policies of the Soviet Union and China have taken is causing a little perturbation in the world today—perturbation in the sense that they are not able to fathom clearly what could be behind it. Nobody can tell what lies behind it, but if it is true and points in the right direction, we must be happy about it because anything that leads the world away from war and tension and towards peace is a good thing. There are innumerable threats of war in the world today. Nobody can say that wars will be ended after this. That would be absurd. But if there is even a slight lessening of tensions in the minds of the people, it will be a right step and we will have some breathing space in which to bring the world and our country under control. Therefore, we have taken this new step on behalf of India and other countries have liked what we have done. I shall not go into too many details, for there is nothing to expatriate just now, but there is no doubt that the atmosphere in the world is much less dark now. How far it is so, nobody can say but we can hope and work for a better understanding. This is one part of the picture. As far as China and Korea and the Soviet Union are concerned, they are of great importance because, as you know, there are two great powers in today's world—one is the United States and the other is the Soviet Union. The rest of the countries of the world can come nowhere near them as far as strength is concerned. These two countries have made such rapid strides in the matter of military might as well as in other things that no other country can hope to compete with them. All others have become second and third-rate powers from the point of view of real strength, however capable they may otherwise be. Therefore if a big danger threatens the world, the responsibility for it lies greatly with these two powers and the responsibility for diffusing that danger also rests with them. So these new developments are important because they began to some extent in these countries. Yet, the danger is grave and nobody knows what may happen.

On the other hand, look at Africa and what is happening there. Elections are going to be held in a few days in South Africa.³ We have no interest in the election results, but our association with South Africa is an old one. The way Indians are treated there is an old story. I said "Indians" but the more correct term would be the people of Indian origin who are settled there because they are no longer Indians by law, but are the citizens of that country. They went originally from India two or three generations ago and are now citizens of South Africa. So legally we have no rights, but we do have the right to take an interest, for one thing because when they went originally from India, certain promises had been made to them by the then Government of India and secondly, it is absolutely wrong and improper that there should be deliberate injustice done to anyone because his colour is not white. The United Nations Charter guarantees the equality of races. Now it is not a secret that the Government in South Africa wish to treat Indians and the Africans as inferior human beings. They wish to give them no rights and to follow a policy of segregation everywhere, in trains and buses and houses. Now this is a very strange thing in today's world and we have always raised our voice against it. We had first protested in connection with the Indian settlers there but the matter has gone so far that the Africans, who have the greatest right to take an interest in the matter rose in protest. They have been brutally suppressed. It is a wonderful thing that the people of South Africa and the Indian settlers have often cooperated to do satyagraha, as they had learnt nearly forty years ago from Mahatma Gandhi, right there in South Africa, and have gone about it quite peacefully. In fact, it is surprising how they have managed to be peaceful in spite of everything.

Anyhow, Africa is a very large issue and I am not drawing your attention to it merely so that you may sympathize with them, but because it is very important and fundamental to the world today. If they are not solved, preparations for a new kind of war will start in the world, a racist war, which is an extremely dangerous thing, even more dangerous than national wars. Africa is not a country, it is a continent with many countries, large in size but not very heavily populated. The climate is deteriorating so rapidly there that danger seems to threaten the whole world. If you are familiar with the map of Africa—many of you may not be—in the north-west corner, there are two or three small countries under British rule, like the Gold Coast,⁴ Nigeria,⁵ etc.

3. Elections were held on 15 April 1953 and Daniel F. Malan's National Party, championing racial segregation, won with a thumping majority.
4. The British Government had approved of a revised constitution for Gold Coast (Ghana) in June 1952, which evoked a favourable response from most of the nationalist parties.
5. Elections took place for the regional legislatures in Nigeria between August 1951 and January 1952, under the new constitution adopted on 29 June 1951.

There has undoubtedly been some progress in those countries especially under the last Labour Government and though there is no freedom, they have moved to some extent in that direction, which is a good thing. If there could be similar progress all over Africa, we could have hoped that this problem will be solved soon, even if it takes ten or fifteen years. But what is really happening? I mentioned what is happening in South Africa. In Central Africa a Federation⁶ is being formed of many of the provinces, and there is no harm in that. But power is going to be retained in the hands of the British or a handful of Europeans, and the Africans are going to be given no rights whatsoever. Please remember that colonialism was bad enough, whether it was done by the Germans or the British and in a sense, there was colonialism in India and elsewhere, too, but even worse is that the rights over these colonies should be handed over to a handful of people there because even the few controls, that had existed earlier, like that of the British Parliament, have been removed. For instance, South Africa is an independent country and the sort of things that are being done by the South African Government would perhaps not be done in any colony. There are always some controls. Now in Central Africa, in the Federation that is being formed, all powers will be concentrated in the hands of the handful of English or German or other settlers who had gone there and forcibly taken away the land from the people. There will be absolutely no one to protect the Africans. In fact, the decisions that are being taken are against their wishes and in fact without their being consulted at all. This is absolutely wrong. On the third side, you see what is happening in East Africa, especially in Kenya. There is a terrible situation there and they are murdering one another. It is a beautiful country, with fertile land, especially the Highlands, where you can grow practically anything. The climate is excellent. Then people went from outside, the British and other Europeans, even British Army officers from India and settled there because in the beginning they got the land almost free. The poor people of Africa to whom the land belonged were merely removed and the land forcibly seized. You will be surprised to know how much land was seized and some people own a lakh or 50,000 acres each. They got the land at very nominal rates and without too much effort, their annual income from that land was easily ten or fifteen lakhs. The poor Africans who had been pushed out of their land were kept in certain reserves in the capacity of farm labourers, without any rights whatsoever. A great deal of the land has been kept lying fallow in case there are more European settlers in future. There is no one to protect the interests of the 50

6. On 23 March 1953, the British Parliament approved of a scheme to create a federation comprising Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi). The scheme aimed at ensuring control of the white settlers, while the Africans strongly opposed it fearing further loss of community land.

lakh Africans in Kenya. They are backward and uneducated. There is a tremendous urge among them to get educated and so they started collecting money even in their poverty, to build schools, which they did with their own hands, with very little help from the government. The poor people, in their enthusiasm to get educated and make progress, have built thousands of small schools.⁷ It is obvious that the more educated they became, the more vociferous they became and began to demand land and agitate for their right to vote, etc. Now I do not know who took the first step and who retaliated. It is said some Africans formed a secret society called the Mau Mau which decided to kill the British and other whites.⁸ It is possible that some people may have been involved in this. Certainly some white men were murdered and the retaliation was terrible. The guilty could have been punished, but as a matter of fact, vengeance was wreaked upon millions of people and they were put in camps, etc. and all sorts of things are happening. All this is very bad. It is obvious that the problem of Africa cannot be solved this way. Nobody can hope to get away with treating millions of people in this inhuman way and suppressing them brutally, either today or in the future. The question is becoming more and more terrible. The African question is becoming one of the world's most complex issues. It may take years to be solved. Africa is a very large part of the world and contains nearly twenty countries or more. It is obvious that our sympathies in this matter lie with the people of Africa. In fact, we told the Indian settlers there, who are generally traders or businessmen, quite clearly that we do not want any Indian to stay in Africa against the wishes of the Africans or to harm them or exploit them in any way. If the people of Africa do not like the Indians, we are not going to send our troops to suppress the people of Africa. Those Indians will have to come back home. The people of Africa have already been brutally suppressed. We do not want to have any part in that. We want to help them and we can do so in a thousand different ways, in educating them, organizing them, etc. But we must always remember that we are their guests and the country belongs to the people of Africa. In this connection, we have given nearly 70 scholarships to African students who

7. The independent schools movement in the Kikuyu territory was started in 1929, as a protest against the attempted homogenisation of education by European missionaries, which overlooked the cultural identities of the natives. By 1952, the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association (KISA) had an estimated enrolment of 270,000 children. After the declaration of Emergency, in October 1952, 184 KISA schools were closed down for aiding Mau Mau.
8. A revolt of the Kikuyu people of Kenya against the Colonial Government and white settlers led to widespread violence and killing. The Government declared a state of emergency on 20 October 1952 and the next day Jomo Kenyatta and six other Kenyan leaders were arrested for aiding and abetting Mau Mau. British troops were deployed for its suppression.

are now studying in India, in Delhi, Lucknow, Banaras, Bombay and Madras, so that they can go back and serve their country.

Well, I drew your attention to some of these international issues because we cannot isolate ourselves from them. Even when we were not free we used to look at the world situation but ever since we became free, we have been even more bound by it because it is not possible for us to isolate ourselves. These problems come up before us in the United Nations. When I go to the office every day, the first thing I see is a bundle of telegrams from our ambassadors all over the world, from England, New York, Washington, Peking, Moscow, Teheran, Cairo, etc. This bundle of telegrams contains information about any new developments in those countries and queries seeking advice from us regarding the course of action they have to pursue. So an independent country like ours gets drawn willy-nilly into the affairs of the world. Our country is a specially large one and whether we like it or not, we are drawn into world politics, inspite of the fact that we tried our best not to get entangled in it. But we had to take on that responsibility because it goes hand in hand with freedom. You must have seen during the Korean war that after great deliberation, we presented a proposal in the United Nations which was accepted by everyone except the Soviet Union and China⁹ and it is obvious that if they veto it, it cannot be implemented because they have played a big role in the Korean war. They have to be consulted in the matter. Therefore it was not implemented then because the Soviet Union and China especially had objected to one or two clauses in it and were even a little upset with us. We said that we are not trying to force anyone. We had merely presented a proposal for peace and even now it is our opinion that if it had been implemented, there would have been peace with honour for every country. But they vetoed it and we were helpless. But now there have been some new developments, either from China or the Soviet Union and if you read them carefully, there is very little difference between our old proposals and these new ones. There is a slight difference but it is nothing big, at least not on principles. Therefore India has been proved right in the step she had taken earlier. Our intention was not to criticize anyone. We were searching for a way to help in the matter. So a new atmosphere is being created and the first step towards it is the decision taken just a couple of days ago to exchange the wounded and the sick prisoners of war on both sides and to send them to a neutral country, which is a good thing. This itself shows that these questions are being looked at from a different angle and I hope that other problems too will be considered in Panmunjon in Korea where the talks are being held. The problem that

9. The Soviet Union rejected the Indian Resolution on Korea on the ground that it was "contrary to the Geneva Convention" on prisoners of war and the Chinese Communist Government termed it, "unacceptable."

remains is the mode of return of these prisoners. I hope that it will be considered and if a decision is taken, this war will come to an end. Now, even if the war ends, there cannot be any real peace immediately in Korea because even thereafter, politically the situation will continue to be complicated.

Anyhow, we have to proceed step by step and each step lightens the terrible atmosphere prevailing in the country today. As I told you, a war can destroy the whole world and even ruin us, whether we are involved in it or not and we certainly have no intention of going to war with anyone. But a war, if it comes, is bound to affect us. Apart from this, all the big tasks that we have taken up in this country will come to a standstill. Our biggest task after independence, it is obvious, has been to improve the economic situation in the country and to remove poverty and unemployment. These are big problems and cannot be solved immediately. It has to be done step by step by hard work. If you see the history of other rich nations you will find that they became wealthy only after tremendous hardships. Britain, which is a very rich country today, had an industrial revolution and carved out a mighty empire in the world. If you see their history of a hundred years, you will find that all sorts of atrocities were committed on the common people, the labourers, the working classes—it was so not only in Britain, but in other countries also. But they steeled themselves with discipline and made progress. It is something to be borne in mind. Now they are a rich country, which makes all the difference. The United States has progressed gradually over the last 150 years. They could start almost with a clean slate, which is very rare in the history of any nation. Now, after 150 years of scientific and industrial progress, they are a great power. Similarly in the Soviet Union, where a big revolution took place 35-36 years ago, you can see tremendous changes within 15 years of that. They had to face terrible difficulties in the beginning. They came out of them gradually and laid the foundations of a strong economy. What I mean to say is that there is no way in which the face of a country can be changed overnight or by magic. A country can become prosperous only by increasing production, for wealth cannot come from outside. Whatever a country produces, from its land and industries or cottage industries, constitutes its wealth. So the more a country produces, the greater its wealth will be. A rich country like the United States produces an enormous amount of goods. So much so that the country cannot consume all it produces. They have increased their production by inventing all kinds of new machines. After all, silver and gold do not really constitute wealth. Today the dollar is very powerful all over the world because American goods are sold everywhere and the United States imports very little. Take the other countries—China, for example, which is a very large country. There are tremendous problems before China. They too have the gigantic task of uplifting crores of human beings. We get all sorts of news from China. They give great publicity to some of the things they are doing. Please believe me, neither

China, nor India can progress by magic. They are working very hard and progressing step by step. Even now, in some areas, we are definitely ahead of them, in others, they are ahead. We shall see in future who marches ahead more rapidly.

So, the task before us is how to progress as a nation. As you know, recently a Five Year Plan has been drawn up. You may have heard discussions about it. I want you to read it carefully. You may not be able to read it fully because it is very long, but read it so that you get the general picture of a document which is being so widely discussed, because from that you can understand the problems which confront India. We must understand the problem first before we do anything or try to find a solution. The strange thing is very often people are very willing to express an opinion on every subject without even understanding the problem, or to shout slogans. This is not the way for a wise and mature nation to behave. What are we? All said and done, we are a mature nation and it is only by acting wisely that we can go forward. Are we a childish nation that makes a noise about everything? This is certainly not becoming of a great country like India which has entered the world arena in the capacity of a free nation and has been able to achieve a great deal even during the last five years. India wields a great influence in the world arena. How? It is not because of our military might or our wealth but because of our wisdom and maturity. The world respects us for the way we deal with matters in our own country as well as outside because after all, we are judged from our work and not by what we say. Why is it that people from other countries of the world are visiting us in great numbers to see what is happening in India? Sometimes we invite them, but many come uninvited. They come from Asia, Europe and America and in fact it has become a burden to look after them. We have to look after them and devote time to them because they are great leaders. Why do they come? They come because they hear reports of the rapid strides that India is making and also of the tremendous foundation being laid, of a new India in the making. So they come to see for themselves what is happening. Whoever comes, whether they come from the countries which are regarded as big powers or from the backward nations in Asia, all of them see with a sense of wonder what is happening here. They see that we are laying a strong foundation and not putting up factories here and there as mere show pieces. The problem is not of a few factories but of raising the standard of 35-36 crores of the world's population. It is a tremendous problem and anyone can see the enthusiasm and the desire to achieve results. India is teeming with activity and it is not merely something in the air by which we hope to reach our goal. The Five Year Plan has a big role to play. We have drawn it up keeping the entire picture of India and her resources in mind. Please remember that we can hope to do only as much as our strength will permit. Resources include many things. It means our material resources. Apart from money, though

money is also essential, we need steel and many other things because nothing can be done without them. If we do not have them, we have to produce them. Then we have to find ways of increasing production from land. For that it is essential to change the existing land laws so that those who actually work on the land may benefit and the zamindari and the jagirdari systems have to be ended.

The fundamental question that is to be asked—How did the countries of Europe and America become so rich? They have made tremendous progress in the last 150-200 years because they had found the key to success—science. This key has opened up many paths and so they made progress. Their strength grew in every way, economically and militarily. They made new weapons and all sorts of things happened. We have to find that key too if we wish to progress. Therefore, we decided even five or seven years ago that if India is to progress, it is essential to lay the scientific foundation for it. So we drew up plans to open big scientific laboratories all over India. We already had numerous small ones, but now we have opened big ones, to find new ways of progress on land and in our industries, etc. Yesterday I was in Roorkee where Maulana Azad inaugurated a new laboratory—the eleventh in the country.¹⁰ So our plan for opening new laboratories is now complete. That does not mean that we will not open any more. We will, but we had set out to open eleven big ones, which we have done and one big task has been completed. People who come from outside and see these laboratories understand the spirit behind them. They are not mere buildings but house thousands of our promising young men and women who are doing research and producing new things and helping in the progress of the country. This is a fundamental thing which impresses everyone with our far-sightedness. There is not much use in putting up stray factories here and there. If you ever have the time you must at least visit the scientific laboratories in and around Delhi.

The laboratory which was inaugurated yesterday is for the specific purpose of finding means of building good and low cost houses. Houses are extremely important. The old methods are too expensive. The problem is of not a few but of millions of houses all over the country. In and around Delhi alone, more than 50,000 houses have been built in the last two and a half years. They may not be very beautiful but they have come up, which is no small matter. We want to put up millions of such houses. The problem is that in the last few years the cost of construction has gone up three times. This is the problem all over the world. The world is in constant search of ways of low cost housing. We have to use the material that is available here, for there is no question of getting them from anywhere else. Therefore this laboratory has been opened to do research in this field.

10. For Nehru's address at the inauguration of the Central Building Research Institute at Roorkee, see *post*, pp. 169-170.

I gave you an example of what our laboratories are doing. Another big example is the river valley schemes—the dams that are being constructed and the power grids on the Damodar Valley, Bhakra Nangal, Hirakud, etc. In the South and in Bombay and elsewhere, there is tremendous activity. A big fertilizer plant has been opened in Sindri. We are building ships in Visakhapatnam, and aeroplanes in Bangalore. In Chittaranjan in Bengal—or between Bengal and Bihar—there is a big factory which is producing railway engines. Now it is obvious that railway engines are a very fundamental necessity in our country. In the past our factories used to produce cloth, which is a good thing, but it was not a basic industry. Now we are starting basic industries all over the country. I had been recently to a place called Ambarnath near Bombay where we are producing machines.¹¹ Now it is extremely important to produce machines because unless we do so, we will have to import them. So these are some of the fundamental things. A great deal has happened of which the country can justly be proud.

But I attach even greater importance to the scheme known as Community Projects—I do not know what it is called in Hindi—*Gram Vikas Yojana*. What is it? We have started it in 55 places all over India for the time being and in each place, the project covers 300 villages where the work of uplift will take place. It will include all kinds of things, like improving the quality of production, eradication and prevention of diseases, building of roads and schools, health schemes, etc. In short, the real meaning of these schemes is the welfare and uplift of the people so that they may achieve a better standard of living. Let me put it another way. We produce all kinds of goods in factories and in these village extension schemes, we shall be producing better human beings and raise their standard of living. This is a very fundamental thing. After all, a nation does not progress by numbers alone. Your population may be 36 crores but if they live like 36 crores of sheep or slaves as they were under the British, there can be no progress. If their mental and physical capacity increases and they learn to work better, those 36 crores can become a tremendous force. Therefore the real problem before the nation is always the betterment of human beings, mentally and physically. After all, this is the meaning of education, school and college and university education. It is a different question whether they function properly or not. We wanted to find a quick way of spreading this over the millions in India. So we started these 55 village extension schemes in different provinces. I am a little ashamed to say that the ones that were started in Delhi have not worked any miracles till now. Of the 55, fifty are working very well and the other five not so well. I hope they will also improve. But even of those 50, twenty or twenty-five are doing extremely well.

11. Nehru inaugurated the machine tools factory at Ambarnath on 13 January 1953. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, pp. 114-115.

So, this is a new thing that was started four or five months ago. Even in these four or five months, the experience that we have had has convinced us that the project is good. Complications arise in the manner of implementation. It is not something that can be done from above nor is it a matter of an official passing some orders. Ultimately it is the villagers themselves who must do it. If they have the enthusiasm and the will to work, it is a good thing. Otherwise, what can a handful of people do from above? For the first two-three months, we certainly trained, apart from a couple of officers, some village workers and put them through a course for two or three months. First of all, we specially selected the best people with keen minds and willingness to work, and trained them. After that we sent them back either to their own or to neighbouring villages and put them in charge of a few villages each. They were the real workers and their work was judged by the way they were able to induce others to work, how much work they were able to get done from others, how well they could organize the villages for farming and other things. This is how it was done and please remember that this is just the beginning. The real work has been going on only for the last couple of months and even during this time, we have been getting fairly good reports and we have seen for ourselves the excellent progress. The only regret is that work seems to be slack in four or five places, but I hope they will also improve. We have done it in 55 centres—that is, 55 centres are covering nearly 15000 villages. We want to extend it further and start centres in another 40-50 places this year, so that another 15000 villages may be covered. Apart from this, I would like to give a hint about another thing that is constantly on our mind. The problem is that though we would like to progress as rapidly as possible, ultimately we can go only so far as the people of India wish to go or, rather, have the capacity to progress. Please remember that we can pass as many laws as we like—and laws are certainly necessary—but no nation progresses because of mere laws. It can progress only through hard work. If nations could change by laws alone, we would immediately pass a law that India shall progress and she would have progressed. But they do not. Or, we can pass a law that everyone's income should be doubled. It cannot be done. Laws are necessary because they can remove obstacles. For instance, a law abolishing the zamindari and jagirdari systems is necessary because these systems are obstacles. But ultimately India will progress only when millions of Indians work for it.

So there is a constant search in my mind to see how these things can be done. That is why these community extension schemes were started. We got some help from the United States in money and material for which we are grateful to them. They gave us aid and we accepted it gratefully. But please remember that the main burden of the community extension schemes has fallen upon us, upon the country and either the Central Government or the State governments. The test of the success of this project is the enthusiasm and

interest shown by the common people wherever these schemes have been initiated. In the last few months, thousands of miles of road have been laid, innumerable schools and hospitals have been raised by the villagers themselves. It shows that the people are capable of doing these things but we sit waiting for the PWD to do them and it may take years for them just to draw up the plans. Here the work was completed in no time at all.

I am coming from the mountainous region in Eastern India, called the Lushai mountains. It was a difficult job getting there because roads are few and I had to travel the last 100 odd miles in the mountains by jeep where the road narrowed to a mere strip. It was an extremely difficult road. People came to see me there also, having travelled for weeks on mountain paths by foot for nothing else is possible there. I inaugurated a mountain road 52 miles long which had been constructed by the inhabitants of that region entirely by their own hard work.¹² They may have got a little help in dynamiting the rocks, etc., from us. The rest of the work was done by them. So you can imagine that if all villagers make an effort and try to improve their living conditions, the work gets done rapidly. No government can do it so fast. The cooperation of the people can take us very far.

I have told you about the Community Project. I wish to merely hint at another matter because the matter is still under consideration. We want to create a network of units of ten villages called the Extension Service not merely in selected areas, but gradually all over the country, to provide essential services. There will be an engineer, a doctor, a teacher, etc., to advise the people. Village workers will be trained and sent to work under them. We do not know yet how this scheme will affect the existing governmental organization, from the *Patwari* upwards. We want to change its complexion completely. This will be somewhat similar to the Community Project which we have tried out in a few places and we want it to spread all over India so that the administration at the lower levels may be tightened and become more effective. We want the people's participation in the improvement of their areas. Our trained *Gram Sevaks* will help them and above them will be the Extension Service which will provide the essential services to the villages. This will become a pattern and the details will be filled in later. The more cooperation we get from the people and the State Governments the easier our task will become.

I cannot give you all the details just now because the project is not ready yet. I do not want to go into more details but we have accepted it in principle and I feel that if it is done properly, it could be a revolutionary thing for the country. What is a revolution? It is childish to think that revolution means violence or making a noise. Sometimes revolutions are certainly violent and

12. Nehru visited the North East from 28 March to 5 April 1953. See *post*, pp. 221-233, 235-236.

even bloody, which is a different matter. A revolution means changing the entire social structure for the better, which includes the entire population of the country. The test of a revolution is something which contributes to the progress of a society and changes it rapidly. Laws help to a certain extent but ultimately a social revolution takes place only when its entire way of functioning changes for the better and people become more progressive and well off. Therefore if the picture that I presented to you just now brings about big changes in the social system and gives it a new direction, it is revolutionary, though it may be completely peaceful, without any violence or hooliganism.

Big problems confront the nation and the biggest is how a large country like ours with a huge population can make rapid progress by democratic principles, and whether it is possible for it to progress rapidly. Does rapid progress have to be necessarily accompanied by violence or that a few people should take over the country or indulge in prolonged fighting with all its evil consequences? Or, should we follow the example of some of the other countries which have, in the past, managed to prosper, by a handful of people at the top suppressing the common people? We cannot do these things and nor do we wish to. There is no example in the history of the world of a large country or even a small one, with complete democracy, making rapid progress by democratic methods. There is absolutely no example. You cannot take the example of England or the United States, because though they are called democracies, it is only during the last 10-15 years that everyone has got the right to vote. Even now in many of the countries of Europe, everyone does not have the right to vote as we do here. So the world is watching us with wonder and great interest as to how we solve these problems and it gets more and more convinced that we are succeeding. The world feels surprised and some of the countries which are not too friendly towards us feel bad because they expected and used to prophesy that once the British left, we would be at each other's throats. Anyhow, the British left and there was some turmoil after that, as you know. But we brought things under control gradually. There were many misguided elements in the country who created trouble here as it happened in Pakistan. If it happened in Pakistan, it is understandable because the fundamental policy of Pakistan is a narrow, communalistic one, the result of which you can observe in Pakistan today. You can see where communalism leads a country, for once this poison spreads there is no stopping it. It destroys everything. Believe me, if it spreads here, it will not be confined to Hindus and Muslims or Sikhs, but will spread to every little caste. This ancient weakness of ours will once again raise its head which is why our leaders, Mahatma Gandhi and others, have always emphasized the need for communal harmony and unity. They are absolutely fundamental, not only to the progress of the country but to her very existence as an independent nation. By a strange coincidence, you can see the perfect example of the terrible consequences of

internal dissensions and feuds in Pakistan. They have brought ruin upon themselves not because of the Hindu-Muslim question, but due to feuds among Muslims themselves who accuse one another of not belonging to the faith.¹³ Now I cannot decide who is a Muslim and who is not, nor am I interested. What is my relationship with you? There are a thousand points of contact but the governmental relationship is only one—that you and I are citizens of the Republic of India and all of us have equal rights. Whether we are Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians or anything else and to whichever province we may belong, from the governmental point of view, we are equal. Everyone has equal rights and the moment there is any change in that trouble spreads everywhere. Personal relationships based on religion, cultural tradition or familial relationship are a different matter. But the moment a nation slips from the fundamental principle of a secular State, we invite trouble. Pakistan was created on the principle of communalism and partition has proved disastrous for them. They are facing terrible problems. We feel a sense of sympathy for them. We cannot gloat over their misfortunes for, after all, it will not do us any good if Pakistan is ruined. Only narrow-minded people will like this. It is a strange thing that after this experience, voices are being raised demanding a secular State, for people are beginning to feel that the mullahs are ruining them. It is right that we should respect our religion but it is not proper to drag religion into politics. It is strange that after going through a bad experience, Pakistan is now trying to turn towards the principle which we in India have stood firmly by right from the start. If you read foreign newspapers, from the countries of Asia where this problem is acute—this question of communalism does not arise in the countries of Europe because they solved it nearly three centuries ago—India is always mentioned with respect and her policy, the policy of the Government of India of a secular State is praised. Recently representatives of some big Turkish newspapers had come here and wrote many articles in praise of India. Leaders who came from Iran and Egypt have also reacted the same way. The great leader of Egypt, General Nasser, has repeatedly said that he wants to adopt India's policy of secularism in Egypt also. In short, even the countries where people had refused to acknowledge our principle of a secular State have been forced by circumstances to accept that it works. As I said, even in Pakistan there is a demand for a secular State and that as far as possible they should go for the principles adopted in the Indian Constitution. Their earlier attempts at constitution-making had a communal bias. We took a very wise step which the world has recognised and even those who did not do so earlier have been forced to lean towards it. This is the situation elsewhere.

13. Anti-Ahmediya riots in Lahore, Sialkot, Karachi, Lyallpur, Bahawalpur and Rawalpindi in February 1953, led to imposition of Martial Law in many cities of Pakistan.

But there are some people right here in this country who lean towards communalism even now. These communalist organizations claim all sorts of things. Sometimes they want a Hindu *rashtra* or talk of a Hindu nation, etc. All of us want to propagate our culture—it is an ancient culture—and embrace the new culture too and have a synthesis of both, which is all right. But communalism is now wearing all sorts of strange garbs. It is an extremely dangerous way of thinking, for it is precisely this narrow-mindedness which had weakened India in the past. Now that we are independent and strong, it is our duty to combat this tendency. Throughout our freedom struggle, these communal organizations were nowhere in sight and the moment they find the field clear, they are removing their masks and coming out into the open and posing as great stalwarts and the upholders of our ancient culture and national honour. They make all kinds of demands, that we should do this or that to uphold our national honour, that we should immediately march upon Pakistan, etc. They talk as if they are brave warriors while the rest are cowards. It is strange that those who were absolutely silent during the freedom struggle are now prepared to mount an attack on everyone. No, they are not prepared to fight themselves but to give orders to others to attack.

All this is something that you should think about seriously. Another angle to it is that they have understood that it does not help to openly profess communalism because people are suspicious of it. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and other organizations deny that they are a communalist organization and claim that they merely wish to propagate Indian culture and create a strong Hindu nation. This is precisely the sort of thing that the Muslim League says in Pakistan, that though the Hindus are welcome to stay, they wish to strengthen the Muslims. So, if you change a few words here and there, our people here are saying the same thing that intensely communalist Pakistanis are saying. There is no basic difference whatsoever. It seems almost as if both are dyed in the same wool. Then the Jan Sangh has also jumped into the fray. They claim that there is no mention of communalism in their constitution. Anybody can make a constitution. But if you look at their activities during the last year and a half and their leaders, you will know what their past history was and whether they were communal in nature or not. I think there is no organization in India which is more communalistic and narrow-minded than the Jan Sangh and when a person becomes too narrow-minded, he cannot think of anything else. When they are themselves in blinkers, they naturally wish to blindfold others. What is all this nonsense? We must try to understand the fundamental issues. I mentioned some of the big problems that confront us in India today. We are making tremendous progress with the help of these community extension service and other things. People from all over the world come, go with curiosity to see what is happening in the country. Our minds are constantly teeming with ideas and a search for the solutions to our problems.

The problems are certainly not easy. We may make numerous mistakes. But our minds are filled with these tremendous economic and social problems. I talk to you and discuss these things with you. But I do not remember any of our friends in the RSS, Jan Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha or Ram Rajya Parishad ever talking about the great social, economic or political problems that the country faces. Have any of their leaders ever mentioned the country's problems? I am amazed at their mentality that they do not even care to mention the tremendous problems of the country, on which our very existence as an independent nation depends and instead keep repeating a few things over and over again. One issue they often raise is of the Hindus of East Bengal.¹⁴ Well, all of us are interested in their welfare and their difficulties. It is proper that we should take care of the refugees. There is no doubt about that. But it is one thing to help them and quite another to demand that we should go to war with Pakistan over this issue as if that would help the refugees in any way. Anyhow, now they have raised an even greater problem—of Jammu and the Praja Parishad. Now I have talked to you about them even earlier, about their good and bad points. But first of all, I want you to think what should be given priority in India and where these people wish to take the country, what their goals are, etc. The Praja Parishad shouts from the roof-tops about its activities. Remember that the Praja Parishad is only a name. It is merely another branch of the RSS which changed its name two to three years ago, but its thinking, its foolishness, its uselessness continue to be the same. Now if you take the broad facts, and tell me that there are two defects in the government, can I reply honestly that there are no defects in my Government? It is obvious that I cannot say that because the government is a complex mechanism. Leave aside the government, which is a big thing. If you say that there are defects and shortcomings in me, I will have to accept it. I try to control them and sometimes fail. So there are bound to be weaknesses and shortcomings in government and our effort is to try as far as possible to enlarge its good points and reduce the bad. Nobody can deny that there are defects. But the question is of priorities. It is a test of a nation as well as a human being as to what he considers the priority to be. There is a vast difference between an individual who gives first priority to honesty and another who gives it second priority. But you cannot rule out honesty.

Look at the picture of India. Take for instance the Five Year Plan that we have drawn up, keeping in mind all the major factors of our country, the different provinces, our resources, the capacity for production, the raw material available, trained personnel and a thousand different things. We may wish to

14. The Jan Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad had been raising the issue of discrimination against the Hindus of East Bengal and demanding stronger action against Pakistan Government.

do everything at once but we cannot do that. So we have to make a list of priorities and always in such a manner that doing one thing may make the next task easier. In short, wisdom lies in being able to choose our priorities. It is foolishness to chase unimportant things and forget the important ones. This is one thing which is very evident in the affairs of Jammu. Secondly, the way the Jan Sangh and the Praja Parishad and others publicize their activities by shouting from the roof-tops is absurd because what they say causes them harm. It is a broad fact that there is no individual among us who does not wish for a close association with Jammu and Kashmir. There is no question about it. It is only because of certain obstacles that we have not been able to do it fully so far. A nation or a government cannot do everything that it wants. Suppose, for instance, that we feel that the Indian settlers in South Africa are not being properly treated. There is nothing that we can do legally. We are helpless. We can either talk to the other government, put some kind of pressure, or resort to a military action. In my opinion, Indians were being treated unfairly in Ceylon.¹⁵ Yet we are trying to sort the matter in a friendly way because we have had long cultural ties with them and we wish to be friendly. But in our opinion, some of their laws were unfair. What was to be done? We could not pass laws in our Parliament which would apply to Ceylon. What I mean to say is that there are certain questions which, however much you may want to, you cannot solve unilaterally. There is a war in Korea. Now the United States is a great power and it is involved in that war. But the United States cannot pass a law regarding Korea in their Congress because Korea is not under their control. Now what the Praja Parishad or Jan Sangh people say may sound good. It is all very well to say, we should incorporate Jammu and Kashmir or that we should leave the UN and this and that. It may sound good, but our country does not have the capacity to do them because they are beyond our control. They concern Pakistan and the United Nations. All sorts of things come into it. We can launch a military attack if we want to, but that is different. It is not a joke to start such an attack. So no government has the power to do what these people demand. They can be done gradually by creating the right climate for it. We have been trying for the last five years and have had some success and there have been difficulties too. As far as Jammu and Kashmir are concerned, as we have said right from the beginning, we went there with the people's consent and ultimately the decision will be theirs. This is our principle which we have declared openly. When the Jan Sangh says we must do this or that they do not realize that the result is likely to be diametrically opposed to

15. Through an amendment bill in November 1952, to the Indian and Pakistani Resident Act, 1949, the Sri Lankan Government sought to confer citizenship on those members of the families of applicants who had been resident in Sri Lanka since 1939. This meant that about 300,000 people of Indian descent were to be extradited from Sri Lanka.

what they want. We wish to bring the people of Jammu and Kashmir closer to us. Remember that the relation is already quite close, legally and constitutionally. It is not a complete relationship as it is between India and the old Gwalior state or anyone else. But it is a close relationship in every way and as far as the world is concerned, they are a part of India already. We want them to come closer still. Whether it comes about or not is not very important, though we want it. But how can we do it legally? It will mess up things because in all our dealings with them from the beginning, we have made a few promises. If we break our word, it will affect the people of the state badly. I am not bothered about what others may say. If I am convinced that the people of Jammu and Kashmir do not wish for a relationship with India, we will not stay there by force. That would be against all my principles of a life-time, to stay in Kashmir by force. It is a different matter if Pakistan attacks. But I cannot do anything against the wishes of the people. Now, if you see, the kind of activities that the Jan Sangh and Ram Rajya Parishad and their off-shoots indulge in, it will result, first of all, in upsetting the people of Jammu and Kashmir with their communal bias. They would rather stay away from India under such circumstances. It is strange that the Praja Parishad and others should strike at the very roots of what they want to do. Now anyone can understand that it will create an emotional climate which will perturb the people and rightly so. What will be their future if the reins of government pass into the hands of the Jan Sangh? They are scared and even if they wish to come closer to India, it acts as a deterrent. So you must look at the problem from this point of view. Is this some kind of a joke that they wish to destroy what we have built up carefully and with great pains over the last five years? I cannot understand this at all except to conclude that the Jan Sangh and the Praja Parishad do not wish for a close relationship between Jammu and Kashmir and India. This will be the result of their activities, at least as far as Kashmir is concerned. It would mean also that Jammu and Kashmir will be divided into two. The moment we break up Jammu and Kashmir, I have no doubt whatsoever that we will be handing Kashmir over to Pakistan on a platter. Why do such a thing? Why don't these mature and grown-up individuals realise that this is foolishness? I cannot understand why they do such things unless it is because they are not bothered about Jammu and Kashmir. They are only bothered about criticizing and weakening the government and for that they are even willing to pay a high price even if Jammu and Kashmir are destroyed. They side with the Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir and try to stoke the fire of communalism among both the Hindus and Muslims for the doubtful advantage of weakening the government. All this may not weaken the government very much because there are other factors behind it. We established a democratic government here fifteen months ago and elections were held in which the Congress won with a majority. How can they be removed? Generally, elections

will be held after four years. Just because they have lost in the elections, they want to violate the principles of democracy. I can understand traders or workers starting a movement on some economic issues. But the issue is such that foreign powers cannot be concerned, whether it is the United Nations or Pakistan or England or America. All of them want to take a hand in the Kashmir issue but it is having the opposite effect. After all, one has to exercise some judgement. Similarly, once you start indulging in communalism, it breeds such narrow-mindedness that all thinking is clouded and it is not possible to consider any problem clearly and there is a strange irritation and sense of frustration. A good party should not become too elated by a victory or feel frustrated by a defeat. We must behave with dignity in both cases. Victory and defeat are part of the game. But there are certain things which concern a nation and should not be destroyed or damaged. What the Jan Sangh and others are trying to do today will damage Jammu and Kashmir in a very fundamental way and weaken its relationship with India. It will also harm India in a fundamental way in the eyes of the world. If you have any doubt about it, you need not pay attention to my views but read from the newspapers about the views of the other countries.¹⁶ Wherever it is taken note of at all, you will see that they are amazed at the movement launched by the Jan Sangh and the Praja Parishad. The only people who feel happy are India's enemies—Pakistan, for instance. This is also one way of gauging these things. As you know, the people of Delhi have not participated in this. But young boys have been brought in from Kanpur and Gorakhpur and other places and are now in your streets, garlanding themselves. Is this some kind of a joke? It may be amusing for a while, but then it begins to get boring. I know that people in Delhi and outside who have more money than they know what to do with and less sense, are spending a great deal. We too know where the money comes from. It is with this money that people are brought in from outside. It is possible that there may be some good people among them. I do not say that all of them have been bought. But even they lack sense. That is the difficulty. But the citizens of Delhi must realize that all this is against our dignity. It is not a big law and order problem, but I feel sad that it brings down our stature in the eyes of the world and that such things should happen apart from the fact that they create obstacles in the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir. As you know, for the last five years, the Kashmir issue has been before us and I am terribly interested in it. I have a special

16. For instance, Douglas Wilkie of the *Sun News Pictorial* of Sydney, referring to the Jammu agitation wrote: "Here, wealthy Hindus are strong enough to express violent resentment against the Nehru-Abdullah economic reform programme. They have been able to enlist to their support some of the reactionary Hindu relics in India. They combine the objection to secular democracy with a sort of noisy fist-shaking against Pakistan which is Karachi's best propaganda."

relationship with Kashmir. Even when the war was going on, I was constantly being consulted. So who can be more interested than I that we should have a close relationship with Jammu and Kashmir? But I know how to go about it and what the Jan Sangh and the Parishad want to do will break up that relationship and create tensions. Therefore for the first time in five years, I have a suspicion, I can tell you quite honestly, which I have never had before. Our case is watertight, legally and constitutionally but the thing that counts is the opinion of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and I had no worries on that score too. We had gone there at their invitation and I was convinced that they were with us. But for the first time I began to have doubts when these activities began to take place which could easily frighten the people and turn them against India. This is the result of the activities of these people who claim that they want a close relationship. The effect is just the opposite.

I have taken up a great deal of your time. This is not a big problem for our Government. But it is bad for our position in the world especially at a time when even communal Pakistan is looking towards India and regretting its own bias. The people of Pakistan want a Constitution like the Indian Constitution. I do not know what will happen but there is no doubt about it that the people of Pakistan are more friendly towards India than their Government. I do not know the reason for the change. Perhaps they are a little tired of their situation. But they realize that they have gone wrong somewhere when they see India making tremendous progress and there is no sign of progress in their country. They come here and see the *Gram Vikas* schemes and wish they could have them there. They look at our big industries and our big science laboratories. Recently for the first time a Science Congress was held in Lahore as it has been held for years in our country. The Chairman said in his speech that India has made tremendous progress in science and the Government and the Prime Minister helped a great deal.¹⁷ They felt that their own Government was useless and does not do anything. So what I am trying to show is that we have tried to do the right thing and though we may not have always succeeded, the mere effort to do so has had a good effect. Wrong means may bring some temporary benefit but ultimately it is definitely harmful. So we must see the path we have followed in the last thirty or thirty-five years. Since the 13th of April, 1919, till today, millions of us have made history in India which will be written about by historians later on. We have made history by our actions and our sacrifices. We must learn something from that and the biggest lesson

17. On 22 February 1953, Bashir Ahmed, Vice-Chancellor, West Punjab University, addressing the Pakistan Science Conference at Lahore, praised Nehru's personal interest in building eleven national laboratories in India, some of which ranked "among the very best scientific laboratories" in the world.

to be learnt is the unity of the country. We must not live in compartments and must get rid of casteism and communalism which have weakened us in the past and would undoubtedly lead to our downfall in the future. This is the lesson we must learn today. *Jai Hind*.

2. Unity in Diversity¹

I came to Belgaum eighteen months ago when the elections were about to take place² and I was touring the whole country. A great deal has happened in these eighteen months and a little more history has been made. So I want all my countrymen to understand these things because all of us are engaged together in the task of nation-building today. I am not talking of any single party—it is the entire nation which is bearing the burden of building a new India, by unifying her and putting her firmly on the road to progress. We fought for nearly thirty or forty years for our freedom and there have been many great leaders in that time. I am particularly reminded of that Congress session held here over which Mahatma Gandhi presided.³ So we fought and won freedom. But our task is by no means over. We have completed one great task and come to the end of one pilgrimage, but many more remain and the biggest of them all is the removal of this terrible poverty from our country, so that we too may become well-off like the other countries. Everyone must have work, they should become better-off and make the country stronger.

This is a tremendous task—to uplift 36 crores of people. As you know, we have the second largest population in the world. It is a very difficult task to uplift one-fifth of the world's population. How are we to do it? We have to do many things but the most important thing to bear in mind is the lesson taught to us during the freedom struggle, the lesson of unity. We shall become weak if we are divided and we can neither undertake big tasks nor face our external enemies. There are huge armies and big powers and terrible weapons in the world today and the weak will certainly fall. Weakness arises mainly from internal disunity. Many of you may have read the history of our country.

1. Speech at a public meeting, Belgaum, 28 April 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. Nehru had visited Belgaum on 25 December 1951.
3. The Congress held its annual session at Belgaum in December 1924.

There have been periods in our history when our country was a bright star in the firmament. Then followed days when the country fell and was in bondage. Why did this happen? There has never been lack of courage and bravery in our country nor of intelligence. We have had great scholars in our country. Then why was it that our country fell time and again? It was because of our ancient vice of disunity and the habit of fighting among ourselves. Whoever indulges in such things is bound to become weak. How did the British manage to get a foothold here? We were busy fighting among ourselves, and finding the seat vacant, they occupied it easily. They did not have to fight any great battles for it. Therefore the first lesson that we learnt during our freedom struggle was of unity and harmony. We founded, or rather our elders did, a great organization called the Congress and people of all provinces joined it, from Kashmir in the north to Kanyakumari in the south, irrespective of their religion, whether they were Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Jains or Buddhists. So this was the most important lesson and the better we learnt it, the stronger we became as a nation and finally we got Swaraj. We must remember that lesson for, if we forget it and think that our task is over, we shall become weak once again, no matter what we do and then nobody knows what calamities will befall us. So please do not forget this lesson for I see that many people seem to think that now that they have got Swaraj they need not do anything more except to sit back and relax and abuse the Government and the officers or to think that it is the Government which has to do everything. This is absolutely wrong. If the Government does something wrong, you can certainly criticize it or if an official makes a mistake, it is our duty to correct him. But remember that there is a great difference between being an independent country and being under the rule of some other power. When a country is not free and is ruled either by a foreign power or by a king, the responsibility for governing rests with that power, but it is free, the responsibility is ours and of everyone in the country. We can no longer sit back and hope that the officers will do everything. What did the bureaucracy do under the British? They had certain duties like the defence of the country, tax collection, prevention of crime, etc. But our tasks are different in nature now. We have to do all these as well as social welfare. It is a tremendous task and unless society helps itself, it is not possible for any government or bureaucracy to uplift it. The task of the bureaucracy and of ministers is to pass good laws and make arrangements to clear the way and to render all help. But when it is a matter of uplifting crores of human beings, they will have to learn to stand on their own feet because no one can help them otherwise, however good and efficient the bureaucracy may be. Therefore the burden of Swaraj and freedom has to be shouldered by all of you and not by a handful of men. The more we work together, the faster we shall march ahead. You must remember this.

I have been touring all over the country. If you were to travel 1500 or

2,000 miles, right to the borders of Burma, which is mountainous area, you will find a great difference between the people there and yourselves. But they too are the citizens of India. Whether you go to Kashmir or Ladakh where Buddhism is to be found, they are all part of our country. Or, if you go to the South, to Kanyakumari, near Ceylon, there may be differences in language, etc., but they are all parts of India. So we have to integrate all of them together because if they are regarded as separate parts, we shall be overtaken by weakness. Remember, you may live here in the city of Belgaum or in the State of Karnataka, with Kannada as your language. But ultimately what are you? You are not the citizens of Belgaum alone. If you go outside the country, people may not even be aware of Belgaum or Karnataka. But wherever you go, you will be treated with respect if you say you are an Indian because India is highly respected in the world. So you must always remember that you are the citizens of the Republic of India and it is for this that we are respected. Our safety lies in this and all our hopes for future progress are tied up with the fact that we are citizens of this great country. We have to work for her progress together. This is the first thing to be remembered. The moment you forget this, you will fall apart. As I said, if the people in our border provinces, near Burma or in the South or East or West sing a different tune, we will become divided into fragments. Where then will be our strength to work? It is possible that we may even lose our freedom altogether. Therefore the greatest task before us after freedom is the uplift of the people.

Why have I come here just now? There are many things which have brought me here but the most important was the drought in some parts of Karnataka and Maharashtra, following the failure of monsoons as happens very often in many parts of our country. It is very common to have insufficient rainfall, whether it is Madras or Rayalaseema or my province of Uttar Pradesh. It creates great difficulties. So what is the solution? We make arrangements to supply food, etc., and also to provide work to the people so that they may earn their living. But this is only a temporary measure. We have to make more permanent arrangements which will add to our ability to face droughts and scarcity. We must dig canals, etc., to provide irrigation so that failure of monsoons may not affect the people and also to make them better-off, to provide more work and to remove unemployment. All these things have to be done to face this problem.

As you know, just ten years ago, when most of us were in jail, there was a big famine in Bengal during war-time. In that famine, within a few months, 35 lakh people died, in just one single province. In one region of Bengal alone, 35 lakh died and the streets of Calcutta—even the leading streets of Calcutta where the rich lived—were littered with the corpses of starving humanity. Do not forget that this happened just ten years ago. We know that often there is failure of rains, there are earthquakes and other natural disasters that afflict us.

But have you ever heard of a man now dying of hunger? What happened just ten years ago may happen again. We have tried to face this in two ways. First of all, wherever this kind of thing is likely to happen, it becomes the responsibility of the government and the people to prevent it, whatever happens. For instance, your Government in Bombay has pitted its entire strength into facing this problem.⁴ I do not mean to say that all the sufferings of the people have been eliminated, for that would be a difficult thing to do immediately. But we have faced and prevented any starvation deaths. This is one thing which we have done. But the greater task is to make arrangements all over the country so that there may be work available and plenty of food for the people at all times and not only in times of crisis. This is a gigantic task and in this connection, you may have heard that a Five Year Plan has been drawn up. Of the five years, two have already passed. Priority has been given in the Five Year Plan to increasing food production as well as self-sufficiency in other goods as well, and also to eradication of unemployment. There are big schemes for building dams and canals and production of electricity.

You must understand this Five Year Plan thoroughly because it belongs to the country. Do not think that this will be the only Plan. We have to uplift every one of the 35-36 crores of people by these plans. Plans cannot be made on paper alone. They have to be implemented by the hard work of the people. I shall not go into it in detail just now, but I would like to tell you that we are going ahead with the Plan and we want that the work should be carried on in every district of India and that the people and the Government officials may participate in it fully.

Big nations do not progress by magic. You cannot change the country by chanting a *mantra*. It can be done only by the hard work of the people. So we have to change our country by our hard work and toil and by increasing the wealth in the country. Wealth does not mean gold or silver—those are merely the means of trade. It is goods that constitute wealth, whether they be food or goods produced in factories. Whatever we produce in the country constitutes wealth. So we have to change the face of the country. It is my opinion that if all goes well and we work according to Plan, we can change the face of the country entirely within ten years and raise her to a standard where she can compete with the biggest powers in the world. By that I do not mean a military confrontation. I mean a friendly competition in the matter of well-being, our production, etc. In this way we can maintain peace in our country and also help to establish peace in the world. Nowadays, as you know, there is a peculiar

4. The Bombay Government had opened free kitchens, free medical centres, free schools for destitute children, cattle-care centres and employment camps, where people were employed in constructive works. The total expenditure incurred by the Government upto the end of April 1953 was Rs. 22 lakhs.

situation in the world. In the last month or so it has taken a slight turn for the better and the world leans a little more towards peace, which is a good thing.⁵ But even now, nobody can predict when something may happen. Therefore we have to tread carefully and wisely. If our voice is to be heard with respect in the world, it can only be when people see how peacefully we are marching ahead on the path of progress.

Now take our neighbour, Pakistan. You see the kind of things that happened there recently.⁶ I do not wish Pakistan any harm. I want that there should be peace and progress in Pakistan. But you may have observed that Pakistan has suddenly become much weaker and is facing great food shortages.⁷ Only two or three years ago, we had food shortages while Pakistan had plenty. How is it that we have been able to wipe out the deficit and Pakistan which was surplus in food, is going hungry? They are in a bad shape and are importing ten lakh tonnes of food from the United States of America. So the ups and downs that a country goes through are something to ponder about. If we make mistakes, even the fruits of our right actions will be wiped out and within two or three years we can be in trouble. So we must be careful and march forward in unity and also try to influence the world.

India is regarded with great respect in the world today because they can see that we are trying to build, a new and great India out of our ancient country. This is the big task before all of us. It cannot be done merely by those who are in government in Delhi or Bombay or in Karnataka. We need the cooperation of all the people in this. That is why this Five Year Plan has been drawn up and along with it various village programmes which you may have heard about. In this way we hope to reach every village within three or four years. It is a gigantic task and if all of us do it together, we can go ahead.

Just now there is a great demand for a separate Karnataka province.⁸ As

5. By a series of concessions the Soviet Union changed its position on the Korean impasse and many other nagging issues where tension was apparent. In April 1953, the Western Powers were still suspicious about the Soviet motive and adopted a 'wait and watch' policy.
6. On 17 April 1953, Ghulam Mohammed, the Governor-General of Pakistan, dismissed Khwaja Nazimuddin and his Cabinet on the ground that they had proved "inadequate to grapple with the difficulties facing the country," and invited Mohammad Ali Bogra to form a new Government.
7. Pakistan faced serious food shortage in 1952-53. The *Dawn* attributed the cause to scanty rainfall and shortage of canal water supply affecting badly the *kharif* crop of 1952-53.
8. On 20 April 1953, the Karnataka Provincial Congress Committee passed a resolution demanding formation of a separate Karnataka State by October 1954. Hunger strikes were undertaken and the KPCC members threatened to resign, if this demand was not met.

you know, nobody is opposed to the idea, but when a demand is made in such a way that instead of solving the problem, it is likely to create new ones, then we have to be careful. If your province had been an island, we could have done anything. But it is not an island, it is surrounded by other people and other provinces. So we have to consider carefully what the effect of our actions is likely to be on our neighbours. If anybody thinks that the matter can be solved by hooliganism, please understand that it is the best way of putting an end to the idea of a Karnataka province. I would like to tell you very clearly what our policy has been in this matter so that you may also think about the problem. We have been in favour of a separate province of Karnataka for years but the question was how to carve it. The state of Mysore would have to be integrated with Karnataka which the people of Mysore were not willing to accept for a long time. That was not my fault. How could I force the people of Mysore to accept it? Now I am happy if they are ready to accept it. Our policy, in this as well as all other matters under dispute, has been to look for a solution by mutual agreement. But we have never been in favour of thrusting a decision on unwilling parties because it is not fair. We do not wish to run the administration of the country in this way. So the question was how to find a solution acceptable to everyone. The moment the solution was in sight, we accepted it in Andhra Pradesh too.

I would like to tell you that if you are under the impression that Andhra Pradesh came into being because of the hunger strike by one of our colleagues, Shri Sriramulu, you are mistaken.⁹ Let me tell you that Andhra Pradesh had been decided upon before his hunger strike. I had already said so and I may say that his hunger-strike almost prompted me to cancel the decision because I find it extremely odd that the politics of a country should be governed by hunger-strikes. Then why should you elect your representatives and send them to Delhi and Bombay, to Parliament and the Assemblies? You can sit at home and have a hunger-strike in every home. Politics can take care of itself. Is this some kind of a joke? Here, too, one gentleman in Hubli has said he will go on hunger-strike for the province of Karnataka.¹⁰ His intentions may be good. But I want you to think how impossible it is to run the politics of a country in this way. One goes on a hunger-strike for a particular thing and another will do it for the opposite. Then what is to be done? This is childishness and our

9. Potti Sriramulu died on 15 December 1952 after fasting for 58 days. Soon after, the Government of India set up the Wanchoo Commission which recommended the creation of a separate State, that came into existence on 1 October 1953
10. Shankaragowda Patil, President, Hubli Taluka Congress, went on fast from 28 March to 19 April 1953, demanding an assurance from the Union Government and Congress High Command, on the formation of a separate Karnataka State. He threatened to resume his fast if an assurance in this regard did not come soon.

national politics is not childish politics. The world has seen this. It has been shaped not only by our thought, but the thought of our elders from whom we have learnt a great deal. As they say in English, our politics is mature—it is not immature, childish. People will laugh at us if we allow such things to go on. Our innocent people may get carried away and try to create trouble as they did in Hubli.¹¹ The whole thing is wrong. Do you think they have done any good by all this? It is a fact that they have not. This is no way of doing things. If you or the country feels that my government is not doing the right thing, there are many courses open to you by which you can remove it and elect a new government. That is a different thing. But to create trouble and indulge in hooliganism will only put an end to a democratic way of functioning. Then a kind of fascism will emerge. You must understand this. We had recognized the linguistic principle for the reorganization of States even in the past. But remember that in no country is it so easy to draw a line and declare that two different languages will be spoken on either side. You have at least two languages in Belgaum and similarly in many other places. It becomes very difficult clearly to demarcate the State boundaries on the basis of language. It can be a guiding principle. Agreed that there should be a separate province for people speaking Kannada. But where do you draw the line? Secondly, you must remember that a reorganization of the States only on the basis of languages can certainly weaken the unity of the country. Then each little province thinks of itself as a separate province and there will be less intercourse between provinces. So we must consider this question carefully from different angles—language, culture, administrative and economic viability, etc. We can take a decision only after a careful consideration of all these things. It must always be remembered that a good end achieved by wrong means can cause great harm and upheavals. On the one hand we are trying to strengthen the unity in the country and if on the other, we allow things to happen which harm that unity, the country becomes weak. A large part of our country went when Pakistan came into being. Think of the tremendous difficulties we faced. Nearly 80 lakh people went over from one side to the other and even now the dispute has not been finally settled. So it is not a small matter to try to divide the country, even internally and it has to be done carefully, peacefully and by mutual agreement. Feuds and dissensions will cause great harm. So we feel that first the matter of Andhra Pradesh should be settled, because we cannot afford to take up too many things at once. Once that is settled, we will appoint a high-powered commission to go into the whole question of States

11. On 19 April 1953, at the meeting of the Karnataka Provincial Congress Committee, a crowd of 30,000 persons gathered and called for the immediate formation of the Karnataka State. The police resorted to lathi charge and firing to disperse the crowd.

reorganization and advise us. As I said, all these questions are interlinked and affect one another. The Commission will consider the matter in its entirety and its report will be placed before the people so that they may also see what is good for them and what will cause harm. Then we can take a decision after careful consideration. We must not do anything for one part of India in isolation because these issues are also closely linked. Therefore we want to consider the entire picture. Well, anyhow, I have told you this so that you may not think that the matter of Karnataka is being neglected. I am not touring Karnataka very much just now but I would like to tell my brethren in Karnataka that the matter is receiving our attention, but it will be done properly and not by riots and rowdyism.

I shall stop now because you are sitting in the hot sun. I hope that you will always remember the most important lesson of India's unity and our commitment to implement the Five Year Plan maintaining our religious and provincial unity.

3. India—The New Horizons¹

I wanted particularly to come to this meeting today because I am going out for nearly a month. So I wanted to bid you and the people of Delhi goodbye for a while. I thought this was a good opportunity to say something to you about the thoughts in my mind because, as you know, it is always my desire that you too should think about those problems which confront the nation. I am talking about the big problems—the small ones are always there before you.

I am leaving the day after tomorrow and shall spend a night and a day in Egypt and then go to London. What is the occasion for my visit? If you have been reading the newspapers, you would know that there is not only the Coronation but also a Prime Ministers' Conference which will take up many important problems. We are getting more and more involved in the problems of the world. We did not wish to because there are many tasks to be done right here in our country. In spite of that, we have had a say in the Korean affair and some other questions not because we wanted it but because the

1. Speech at a public meeting organised by Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee, Delhi, 26 May 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.

circumstances demanded it. Our stature is growing in the world and so the responsibilities also multiply.

I am going to London because of those big issues, not to participate in the festivities for the Coronation. Even participating in them is not wrong in my opinion and it would not lessen in any way our dignity—mine, yours or India's. The fundamental thing which many of our brethren do not understand is that India is now a free country. It is strange that many people do not comprehend it fully. They have certainly heard about it and it is often repeated, but their way of thinking and acting are still of the pre-independence period. Let me give you an example. Twenty-four years ago, the British Government had sent the Simon Commission to India to decide the future of India. We boycotted it and rightly so, in my opinion, because the decision was being taken by a foreign government. It was wrong and we did not accept it. So we boycotted it. Now since the Simon Commission has been boycotted, people want us to boycott Dulles when he comes.² There is no connection of any kind between the two. The latter comes from America. But the minds of these people have been frozen for the last 25 years, they have not grown. The world has changed and circumstances change, but not their minds. It is regrettable that some minds simply do not grow. They stay at the level of an adolescent's mind, whatever the age of the people. Now just imagine, when Mr Dulles came, some people showed him banners saying "Go Back." What does it mean? Dulles is the minister of a very large country of the world and he had come to hold talks with us. He was not here to give us orders. In fact, his visit was an honour to us because he was coming to consult us as one independent country with another. It does not mean that one was trying to dominate the other or that we should not meet. After all, how else can the affairs of the world be conducted? We have our ambassador in the United States. You may get annoyed with American policies and say that he should be recalled or that we should go to war with them. Such things are not done between two independent countries. They act according to their own beliefs and we must follow our path. We use our ambassadors to communicate our views to each other and try to make the other understand. Whether they understand or not is a different matter. The same people who say that Dulles should not have come also lay stress on the fact that there should be a big power conference in the world.

All right, if there is a big power conference, it means the meeting of the ambassadors of the great powers like the United States, Soviet Union, England

2. John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State visited India from 20 to 22 May 1953. The Communists, Socialists and some Congressmen organised demonstrations during his visit.

and some other countries. In my view, such a meeting to discuss the problems of the world would be a very good thing. So if this principle is right, then why wave flags saying "Dulles, Go Back" if he comes here? What connection does it have with politics or the world of independent countries? I cannot understand this. You must think about this. If an individual tries to put pressure on us, we could object. If someone comes to consult us or to ask us for our views, whoever he may be and whether we accept his views or not, it is obvious that we should welcome him. We are not concerned with his views. It is indeed strange that such things should have been done when Mr Dulles came here. Suppose one of our senior leaders or I go to his country and some people who do not like my policy or India's policy shout "Nehru, Go Back", it will only lead to all contacts being broken. The world cannot function in this way. This is, as I said, a sign of a childish mind. An adult can understand different points of view. But the difficulty arises when there are minds which were frozen 25-30 years ago and have not grown. I gave you an example to show that people do not understand fully how an independent country functions or how the ambassadors or ministers of independent countries function. Their minds are still thinking of what we did when the British were here. What we did then was proper at that time because we were fighting against the British Government. Now we are a free nation, a republic which is legally and constitutionally not under the thumb of any other country. We certainly have agreements with many countries. We accepted the Commonwealth connection out of our free will and pleasure. Why? You can imagine that ultimately we did so because such contacts are valuable to both sides, just as our being in the United Nations gives us some rights and responsibilities. Agreements between countries lead to trade relations and other contacts. We have many such agreements. We are getting different kinds of aeroplanes. If we get them from Europe, as we are doing, we have to come to an agreement with all those countries which we have to overfly. In this way there are all sorts of agreements and assurances between countries. You send a letter or a telegram outside India. How does it go? It is because we have various agreements with other countries. The world is linked today in hundreds of ways, and trade, etc. would come to a standstill if these agreements did not exist. By such agreements, each country voluntarily gives something to others in return for something else. Now, after due consideration, we entered into an agreement—not legal—with the British Government to be in the Commonwealth in our own national interest. The Commonwealth is a new kind of federation where we do not owe allegiance or loyalty to their Queen or their King. But taking into account various things, we thought it proper to be in the Commonwealth for it does not bind us legally in any way. For instance, it is not a treaty of the kind that we may sign with Afghanistan or Burma about trade, etc. This is not like that at all and we have full rights to walk out when we like. In my

opinion, the experience of the last three to four years shows that we have certainly benefitted by this and the world has also benefitted. In fact, I would say that this kind of relationship which has no ties, legal or otherwise, is a good thing. We hold consultations and take our own decisions. Now what can be a better relationship than this? Leave aside the Commonwealth, I am prepared to enter into such a relationship with any country. For instance, we have a very close relationship these days with Burma. They are our neighbours and though there are no legal ties, our relationship is a close one. It shows ignorance of the world situation and realities if we continue to think as we did when we were not free, and show anger and irritation.

Mr Nair³ mentioned that perhaps the Praja Socialist Party had passed a resolution saying that I should not go. I am going for a thousand different reasons, to hold consultations on the complex problems of the world and to attend the Conference, etc. But even if you take only the Coronation, representatives are going from practically all the countries and not only from the Commonwealth countries, because it is part of the international etiquette. There is to be a display of naval ships there on the 15th of June. We too have been invited to participate in it. Luckily, a few of our ships are there in the Mediterranean doing some exercises. We send them there to learn because they cannot be trained by sitting at home. They hold combat exercises etc. We do not have so many ships that they can undergo those exercises right here. We have one big warship and a few small ones. So we send them for practice to the Mediterranean or towards Africa or Ceylon or Indonesia every year. This year they were in the Mediterranean, so we accepted the British invitation and asked our ships to proceed there since they were so near, to participate in the naval display on the 15th of June.⁴ There was a great uproar over this and some of our parties, especially the Communists, protested violently. Unfortunately for them a few days later, they heard that the Soviet Union was also sending their ships. So they were in a dilemma and became silent. If the Soviet Union sends its ships, it becomes difficult to protest about our participation. So, these are matters of common etiquette between nations and do not denote any inferiority. Unfortunately, common courtesies are becoming rare among the countries of the world and the strange phenomenon called the Cold War is raging, which involves all the evils of war except an actual battle. So, keeping this in mind, I want to tell you that we try as far as possible, especially on behalf of India, to conduct our international relations in a civilized way, establish close relations with every country and not criticize

3. C. Krishnan Nair, President, DPCC, presided over the meeting.

4. The Indian warships that participated in the Coronation Naval display were, the cruiser *Delhi*, the destroyer *Ranjit* and the frigate *Tir*.

any nation. That does not mean that we agree with everything that the others say. We do what we think is proper. But we do not abuse others and try to say what we want to softly even if our views differ. This has been our tradition. As you know, there are two powerful adversaries in the world today, who are in a state of perpetual confrontation. We have tried to maintain good relations with both and at the same time, we have held firmly to our own views, in the United Nations and elsewhere. But we have put forth our views in a friendly spirit and made efforts to make others understand. It is possible that often our views are not acceptable to others and especially if they happen to be opposed to any particular country and then that country gets annoyed with us. But the anger disappears after a while and our contacts are re-established. So, we have followed this tradition of friendship towards everyone, even if our views differ. Therefore we participate in such functions in order to avoid any unnecessary tension so that we can hold on more firmly to our views and present them, showing at the same time that there is no ill-feeling. This is our policy which we have followed in the past too, even during our freedom struggle.

I have tried to make all these things clear to you. It was not my intention to speak about these things, but Shri Nayar turned my attention towards them by what he said. You must understand them and not get carried away by petty things, like protesting about participating in the naval display or my attending the Coronation, etc. These are matters of common decency and etiquette which do not make us inferior in any way. I feel that they should be observed so that the terrible, dangerous bitterness and fear and suspicion which pervade the world today may become a little less. If our behaviour towards one another is at least civilized, these tensions will reduce. Anyhow, these are peripheral matters. You know what the real problems are. I am going there not to attend banquets but to present India's views on important issues whenever there is an opportunity. I do not say that they will agree with me, but the fact is that respect for India is going up day by day in the world and whether people come to us or we go elsewhere, our influence has increased. You may have read of the developments in Korea recently. It is a long story. But we had presented a Resolution in the United Nations which was accepted readily by them but was vetoed by the Soviet Union and China.⁵ In fact, they were rather

5. The Indian Resolution, passed on 3 December 1952, proposed the release and repatriation of prisoners of war, who would neither be prevented nor be forced to repatriate, in accordance with the Geneva Convention (1949); a repatriation commission comprising Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland was to supervise the repatriation process; and a political conference was to be convened within 90 days of armistice to resolve the issues of the withdrawal of foreign troops and a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

upset about it and said some harsh things about India.⁶ But, we did not reply because that is not our way. We merely told them that there was a lack of understanding. They have the right to accept what we say or do or to reject it but it is wrong to suspect our motives or to say that we are doing something against our wish under American pressure or for the Americans to say that we are under pressure from the Soviet Union or China. So our resolution was accepted but since China and the Soviet Union had vetoed it, it could not be implemented especially as China is one of the participants in this issue. Whatever it is, it could not be implemented and the war has been going on. Then a few weeks ago, there was a strange proposal from China and North Korea for peace which was very similar to our previous Resolution.⁷ We were happy that China and North Korea were leaning in that direction and we expressed our happiness. We desire peace and are not bothered whether it comes about through our efforts or somebody else's. If the participants in the war are willing, then we are happy. So they put up this proposal but there were some obstacles. A few days later, there was yet another proposal from the Chinese Government which was known as the Eight Point Proposal.⁸ Now this proposal of China's is almost entirely similar to our resolution in the United Nations, except for minor changes. Almost 99 per cent of it is similar. Obviously we were happy about it. We felt that the United Nations had already accepted it and now the Governments of China and North Korea were coming close to it and so the really big obstacle between the two had been resolved. So we thought that peace was near at hand and we welcomed it. But there were again some complications, this time from the American side who did not like the proposal very much and I think less than a few days ago, there have been new proposals

6. While rejecting the Indian Resolution as an attempt "to hide behind the principle of non-forcible repatriation...", Vyshinsky stated on 24 November 1952 that the resolution was "not designed to end the Korean war but to perpetuate it," and was therefore "unsatisfactory and unacceptable." On 5 December 1952, the Beijing Radio observed: "It is clear that the proposal that unrepatriated prisoners be transferred to the UN means that they will in fact be delivered to the US forces. The Indian delegation, which has entered to act as a mediator, has already entered the Anglo-American Camp." Referring to Krishna Menon's inability to provide a single reason for opposing the Communist truce plan, the broadcast commented: "the Indian delegate's attitude shows clearly that the persons, who proposed the plan and those who supported it, do not want to end the war but intend to continue their hostile actions."
7. A six-point proposal, similar in content to that of the Indian Resolution, was put forward by the Communists on 26 April 1953.
8. An eight-point proposal, resembling the Indian Resolution and differing only regarding the period of confinement of the prisoners who refused repatriation, was submitted by the Communists on 7 May 1953 at Panmunjon.

from them.⁹ I will not go into whether they were acceptable or not but they were far removed from our resolution in the United Nations. So it looked as if this new turn of events would make an agreement remote because the United Nations had already shown the way and the Chinese resolution came close to it. Now yesterday there were several new proposals from the United Nations.¹⁰ I do not have the detailed reports yet before me to give my final opinion on it but the broad picture is before us. It has not been published in the newspapers yet. It is evident from it that the complications that were there in the previous resolution of the United Nations Command have been removed by making certain changes and their new resolution brings them close to India's Resolution at the United Nations. Anyhow, I am very happy. I have not studied it in detail and I hope the people concerned will make a detailed study of it. The more I see how little distance there is now between the proposals being made on both sides and the resolution placed by India in the UN a few days ago, the more I feel convinced that there is no particular reason for delay in finding a solution. When both sides have come so close after bridging such a wide gap, it is strange if there still are difficulties when they have to go but a step or two. Therefore I hope that the small difficulties will be sorted out speedily.

I have told you this long story because the problem is still very much there. Unfortunately, it has been our experience in the last two or three months since the Korean war started that we seem to come very close to an agreement and then some obstacle crops up. So I hesitate to say what will happen in the next few days. It is my great desire—I am sure you also share it—that the war should be over quickly because, for one thing, it has been a terrible war, causing great damage and apart from that, it has created tremendous tensions in the world. There is a constant anxiety in the minds of everyone lest the whole thing should escalate and lead the world to the brink of ruin. Therefore if there is an agreement, millions of people in the world will heave a sigh of relief and their burden will become a little less not only in relation to the war, but also from this constant fear of war which is gripping the world. The situation will improve and there will be a better and brighter atmosphere in the world and it will become easier to take up the big problems and try to solve them.

9. On 13 May 1953, the Allied Command put forward its counter proposals which required the repatriation commission to take custody of non-Korean prisoners only, to operate for a period of 60 days instead of 4 months, and to be headed by India, which was to be the only country authorised to bring armed forces to Korea.
10. On 25 May 1953, the UN proposed that the question of prisoners be put before the General Assembly in the event of a deadlock in the Commission. It also distinguished between Chinese and North Korean prisoners, who did not wish to be repatriated. The Chinese were to be sent to a neutral country while the Koreans were to be released to the custody of a neutral country in Korea.

These things cannot be done by magic. But even if we go gradually on the right path, it will help and sometime or the other, we will reach our goal.

There is a proposal, which had been mooted casually earlier also, from the British Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, that the Heads of certain big Powers should meet.¹¹ We liked the idea very much. That does not mean we wish to be included in that. We have no desire to get involved. But we liked the idea because it is better to meet informally and discuss things rather than sending long letters and telegrams. This is what Sir Winston had suggested that if they could meet informally and discuss things, perhaps the tension among the participants would be reduced and it would become possible to give serious consideration to the issues at hand. More detailed examination can come later, once the ice is broken. Several leaders of the Commonwealth who will be in London have also been taking a keen interest in this matter and I feel that meeting them would certainly be valuable for me at least because I can find out the present complexion of the world problems and put forth our views there. It is possible that they may find some use for them. After all, my views are not my personal opinions as Jawaharlal but are an expression of what India is thinking, at least in this matter. I can say quite confidently that that applies to other matters too. I cannot claim to speak on behalf of other nations, but I will certainly say this, that the majority of the countries of Asia also think like that. Therefore in these things we do not speak as individuals but on behalf of the country we represent. We are a poor country and cannot compete with other nations in wealth or in military power. We are surrounded by our own problems. But the voice of India or that of other nations of Asia have to be heard. Nobody can brush them aside. Their importance is growing. This is not something that I am imagining. If you read the newspapers, you will realize how their importance is growing. So, your saying or passing a resolution that Jawaharlal should not go, seen against this background seems an outmoded way of thinking which bears no relation to world politics or with its problems. You cannot handle questions like this nor is it the way an independent country functions. It shows an inferiority complex while facing others and a fear that we might be overwhelmed by them. It shows a fear that if we attend a conference our views may not be heard and others may dominate. This is a sign of weakness. I do not suffer from any such weakness. I have great confidence that the path we have followed in the past is the right one, though we may have made minor mistakes. But broadly speaking, it is the

11. On 11 May 1953, Winston Churchill called for a four-power conference to generate a climate of peace and suggested Soviet participation in it without any agenda. On 21 May, he announced in the House of Commons that President Eisenhower had expressed a wish to meet the French and the British Prime Ministers separately to sort out mutual problems.

right path. Day by day it is becoming increasingly evident that others in the world are beginning to accept it. People come to us from the United Nations and elsewhere because they feel that our advice will be well-considered and free from pressure of any sort or motives of personal gain. We neither wish to attack anyone nor to take undue advantage. We wish to maintain our freedom and the others are welcome to theirs. We do not wish to interfere. Our views are independent and so people are willing to listen to us and consult us. I told you about Korea and I hope that inspite of occasional setbacks the present situation will lead to a truce or an armistice. That does not mean that the problem is solved—it is an extremely complicated question. Thereafter the political questions will arise. But at least one big thing would have been achieved as the daily killing of innocent people on both sides will stop and the people of Korea will be safe.

Do you know what is the situation in Korea? It is deplorable that the population of that country, which was two crores, has been reduced by one third by this war. Many have been killed in battle and the rest have starved or frozen to death. Korea is a bitterly cold country and you cannot imagine what their winters are like. It is like being on the Himalayas in winter. In the course of the war, practically all the major cities of Korea have been razed to the ground by aerial bombardment and people left without houses to live in or food to eat. So they died like flies out in the open. Just imagine, almost one third of the population being wiped out is not a small matter. They have been ruined in many ways. So if the war stops it will be a great relief to them. This is the strange thing in the world today. People and nations claim to set others free. The result is a war in which the country to be freed is ruined. I am telling you all this to show how complicated the problem is.

Then there are other problems. Take the problem of Indo-China which has been there for some time.¹² Then you may have heard of the terrible tension in Egypt between the British Government and the Government of

12. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, known as Indo-China, were French colonies. During the Second World War, the Japanese occupied large parts of this area. Ho-Chi-Minh organised the Viet-Minh movement against the Japanese and established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945. Ho-Chi-Minh's government was recognised by the Soviet and Chinese governments. But France continued to lay its claim on this territory and set up Bao Dai, the Emperor of Annam as the head of the State of South Vietnam, which was still under its control, in 1949. Bao Dai's Government was accorded recognition by the UK and the USA in 1950. In the context of the cold war and the delicate balance of power situation in Indo-China, this set off a protracted war between the two super powers. In mid-April 1953, Viet Minh troops along with the Laotian guerrillas, captured large parts of Laos; but in the first weeks of May, the Franco-Laotian troops recaptured most of the annexed territory.

Egypt.¹³ I told you that I shall be in Cairo the day after tomorrow and will meet the Prime Minister, General Nasser. It is possible that on way back from England I may stop there for two or three days to discuss various problems.¹⁴ It is obvious that we desire a peaceful solution to the problem in Egypt and that its freedom should be maintained so that they may progress. We are in a dilemma because we too have a responsibility in the matter. It is easy for the Praja Socialist Party or the Communist Party to pass resolutions criticizing this country or that. They feel that only they are wise in the country and the Congress and everyone else is bad. They want to get elected. This is no way of going about things.

We must see what our fundamental principles are. We have two fundamental principles as far as foreign affairs are concerned. One is freedom for all countries and removal of colonialism. Colonialism is wrong and harmful and prevents countries from growing. Just as we desired freedom, others too would want to be free. We sympathize with such aspirations on the part of any country because we feel that freedom is necessary for world peace. The second principle is linked in a way to the first, fighting against racialism. The worst example of racialism is South Africa where it is openly said that everyone there does not have equal rights. The majority have no vote and a few million whites—I do not remember that exact figure—rule over millions of Africans. In a sense this principle was established by Hitler and even during the War, voices were raised in protest against it. In fact the Second World War was fought against it. But Hitler did not adopt the principle so openly as the Government in South Africa is doing at the moment. Unfortunately there was an election and the voters accepted the principle because they were all white. This is being done not only in South Africa but also in other parts of Africa. It is very wrong, not only on principle, but also because it contains the seeds of war. If people think that the poor, afflicted masses in Africa who have been under subjection for centuries can be suppressed, it is certainly possible to do so with guns and cannons but it cannot be done forever and their rights will have to be given some time or the other. What are their demands just now? They do not want much. In fact, they ask for less than what we did. Their demand basically is for land. Their land has been snatched away by people from Europe who have become wealthy landowners owning thousands of acres of land. The Africans have no land. In fact, a good part of the land is being

13. On 22 March 1953, General Nguib demanded unconditional evacuation of British troops from Egypt. Negotiations between the two countries reached a deadlock on 6 May 1953, and were adjourned indefinitely. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 17, pp. 541-544.

14. Nehru stayed in Cairo from 23 to 25 June 1953.

held aside for future settlers. The people of the country have no share in it. This is sheer injustice and cannot go on for long.

Now these are the questions before us. It is easy to denounce these things loudly but we must take a responsible attitude. Our sympathy is evident and we express it quite openly. But our work is not over with passing resolutions or shouting slogans. We want to help in solving this problem by advising both the parties and by trying to make them understand the problem whenever there is an opportunity.

I am leaving the day after tomorrow. You may have read in the newspapers that apart from conferences and the Coronation, I shall be holding talks with the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and Ceylon. The newspapers are saying that agreements have already been reached and that we are merely waiting to sign them in London. This is not true. It is true that our Ambassador¹⁵ there has had long talks and made some headway.¹⁶ The fact is that both the Government of Ceylon and we feel that it would be a good thing if some sort of an agreement could be reached. To that extent it is true and I hope that all these things will produce results and some decision will be reached in London or after we come back. There will be so many pressures on our time in London that long talks may not be possible. But I shall certainly meet the Prime Minister of Ceylon and go over the ground covered so far and try to find a way. So it is wrong to think that a solution has been found, but it would be correct to say that efforts are being made on both sides to move forward in the matter.

So far as Pakistan is concerned, as you know the problems are large. Those problems were born the day Pakistan was created and we became independent, and instead of dwindling they have been growing and throwing out new shoots. The problems are complicated but even so the real question is how to handle them. Our complaint was that the atmosphere in Pakistan was not quite conducive to solving any problems. Their newspapers carried such distorted accounts about India that it made the situation more difficult. It is obvious, if we pause to think about it, leaving aside old history, that there can be only one opinion about the outcome of the problem between India and Pakistan. They should come to an agreement which would be advantageous to both sides. Some misguided people on our side make demands for an attack on Pakistan, which is childish and shows their ignorance.¹⁷ No problem can be

15. C.C. Desai.

16. It was reported that a tentative proposal regarding the status of 10 lakh Indians in Sri Lanka was agreed upon by both the Governments.

17. Since the resumption of the agitation for complete merger of Jammu & Kashmir with India in November 1952, the Praja Parishad, Jan Sangh, RSS and Akali Dal leaders demanded "strong action against Pakistan."

solved in this way, in fact, it only creates more problems. It is wrong to think that these things can be done in isolation because the world today is closely interlinked. If a few people demand such things in our country, there are even more in Pakistan who want to fight. In such an atmosphere, it is very difficult to find a way out. I have no doubt that there is a slight difference in the atmosphere now and this leads me to hope that we will be able to go forward more easily towards solving our problems. The problems are difficult. So please do not think that they can be solved immediately by some magic. But it is a big thing and gives us confidence that we are trying to work in a different atmosphere on both sides. I am willing to admit that ever since there has been a new Prime Minister in Pakistan, the views that he has expressed in this regard shows his sincere desire to succeed in this matter.¹⁸ When I wrote to him, his reply was that he would make full efforts to cooperate. So, anyhow, I will meet him in London and have talks.¹⁹ But it is obvious that in the short time that I shall be in London, there will be so many conferences and other matters to attend to that long or detailed talks will not be possible. I do not think I have met him so far, and even if I did ten or fifteen years ago, I have forgotten. But if we meet and are able to talk even informally, with confidence in each other's motives, we can make great progress. More detailed talks can be held later when we get back. I am prepared to go willingly to Karachi whenever necessary or he could come here. This is an important matter which is bound to have a far-reaching effect on both the countries for they have been rudely shaken and uprooted by the events of the last five or six years.

Now the problems are large. There are the Kashmir issue, the refugee problem and the canal waters dispute. Then there is the Bengal question. I have told you the major issues. There are numerous minor ones. If you take the Kashmir issue, it has become terribly complicated and is no longer confined to Pakistan and India, but has become an international issue. The UN is in it and many powers are interfering in it personally even now. I had been to Srinagar for two days and returned only yesterday. The newspapers published long reports about my visit and have called it a secret mission, etc., which is

18. On 21 April 1953, in a message to Nehru, Mohammad Ali had said that "it would be his Government's earnest endeavour to promote friendly relations between the two countries."

19. Nehru and Mohammad Ali met in London on 5, 6 and 12 June 1953 and discussed several bilateral issues such as, the future status of Kashmir, the working of Nehru-Liaquat Agreement of 1950 on minorities, and evacuee property. Nehru also accepted Mohammad Ali's invitation to visit Karachi for a detailed discussion on these issues in July 1953.

absurd.²⁰ The fact is that I went there to clear my mind a little before going to England to take on fresh burdens. My mind has been harassed with the problems here. So I went there for a couple of days to refresh my mind by gazing at the snow-covered mountains.

Now, what am I to say about the Kashmir issue? It is a complicated matter. I am certainly willing to say one or two things which I have mentioned to people from other countries who have come to me. Whenever this matter was mentioned, I said that one thing was increasingly becoming clear and that it is obvious that everyone wants me to do something about the Kashmir issue. I am far more concerned with this and am myself very keen to solve it. But I am equally convinced that external interference has complicated the issue further and if they stopped interfering, it will become much easier to solve it. It is possible that these countries may be doing so with the best of intentions. But even so, the outcome has not been happy because it has created more complications. So I have told them that if they wish the matter to be solved, they will help tremendously by not interfering in it and to leave it to India, Kashmir and Pakistan. This is one thing. Secondly, Kashmir is not a piece of property to be handed over to anyone. They are a free people and we went there to protect them because there was an attack. The Government of Kashmir is stable and fifteen months ago there was an election to the Constituent Assembly and so the Government there has the formal sanction of the people, as in the case of our Parliament. So I have no right to come to any decision on my own on their behalf. It is necessary that the Government of Kashmir should decide about these things after consultations with the elected representatives of the people.

Now since I mentioned Kashmir, there is another issue related to it. You may have seen this in your city too. For instance, there is a Jan Sangh movement for the last two or three months in Jammu and elsewhere.²¹ I had mentioned this earlier too and there were great discussions on the subject. The first thing I wish to do is to congratulate the people of Delhi, all except a few—for having kept themselves aloof from this movement. In spite of instigations, our shopkeepers and others have kept aloof. Everyone in India knows that the movement was started not with the help of the people of Delhi

20. For instance, the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* published a report that: "Nothing is definitely known yet about the purpose of Prime Minister's visit to Kashmir but it is believed that he is likely to discuss important matters pertaining to the state with Kashmir leaders."

21. On 9 February 1953, the Working Committee of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh decided to resort to "peaceful civil disobedience" to press for the complete accession of Kashmir with India. The All India Hindu Mahasabha, Ram Rajya Parishad and the Akali Dal also decided to lend support. An organised agitation was launched on 5 March.

but others who had been brought in from outside by paying them money. It is absurd to try to launch a false movement like this but it is worse that such efforts should be made to solve a matter which has become an international issue, by launching a movement in Delhi or Pathankot. This is something that my mind is unable to grasp. I protest against the misuse of the word 'satyagraha' by such absurd movements. It is a grand word taught us by a great man and now we are reducing it to a vulgar level, by perpetrating all sorts of absurd and uncivilized acts. What is the meaning of calling this a satyagraha? Only today I heard that stone-throwing is becoming very common. What is this nonsense? How can they hope to influence national policies? All they do is to make us feel ashamed in the eyes of the world. They also complicate matters further instead of making them easier. If you go to Kashmir and meet the people, you will know what effect such things have on the population which consists of 95 per cent of Muslims. What will their emotions be when they see the activities of all these communal organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad and Jan Sangh and what not? How can they still have friendly feelings towards India? They are bound to lean the other way. The Jan Sangh leaders say that they want to establish close relations between India and Kashmir. I have no objection to that but are they going to achieve it with or without the consent of the people of Kashmir? We have said right from the beginning that it is the people of Kashmir who will take the final decision. We went at their invitation—we would not have gone otherwise and we will not stay there if we are not welcome because we do not wish to rule at the point of a gun or bayonet. Leave aside what we want, it cannot be done in any case because it is an international issue now. So the question is which way the people of Kashmir will lean and what their decision is going to be. If any of us frightens them by our behaviour, they will be forced to turn against us. Anyone can understand that the Jan Sangh agitation is helping our enemies in Pakistan. The Pakistani newspapers are always full of such news, even more than our own.²² So this is something to be considered seriously as to whom or what we are trying to help. I am really amazed. But I would like to draw your attention to something even more important and that is, these communal parties are taking all these wrong steps because their thinking is basically and fundamentally wrong. Communalism is absolutely wrong, whichever way you look at it. You have seen one side of it in Pakistan which

22. For example, *Dawn* of 23 October 1952 had reported that Muslims in India would soon be exterminated by fanatic Hindu elements. On 19 December 1952, it observed that war could be the only way out to resolve the Kashmir issue. And finally, on 12 April 1953, it reported that Nehru had refused to discuss Kashmir issue with Nazimuddin.

is founded on communalism by the effort of the Muslim League and it continued to follow that principle openly. What was the result? You can see the condition of Pakistan in the last two or three months and what difficulties they are facing, politically and economically, with internal feuds multiplying, martial law being imposed in Lahore and all sorts of things happening.²³ There were many reasons for this. But there is no doubt that the fundamental reason which weakens Pakistan is the fact that it is a communalist state. Therefore a new voice is being heard increasingly more often against communalism and demanding equality.²⁴ More and more, their attention is drawn towards India which is progressing so fast while they remain backward. We are putting up big science laboratories and there is a general atmosphere of progress everywhere. You may perhaps criticize us for moving too slowly. I agree with you that we should move faster. But our entire thinking is geared towards progress and to building a new India. In Pakistan there is nothing except slogans against India and about Kashmir, etc. Communalism does not take anyone very far and so these voices are being raised in Pakistan against it. The atmosphere is changing—I do not say that everyone has changed, but suddenly they have realized that the thinking in their country is not right and so day by day the people are moving away from communalism, so much so that some people are demanding that Pakistan should become a secular State, secular in the sense of religious freedom and equality of all religions in the eyes of the law. So, you see, after five or six years of experience, they are beginning to take a hold on themselves. It is their fundamental way of thinking and the communal bias which have led to their downfall.

The same is true of our communalist organizations. Though they are opposed to Pakistan, mentally and intellectually they are tarred with the same brush. What is the result? Since their thinking on these matters is wrong, the steps they take are also always wrong. If you take any individual, generally you find that he takes some right steps and some wrong, even if he is not very intelligent. But the communal organizations have the capacity to take the wrong

23. Following anti-Ahmediya riots in Lahore, Sialkot, Karachi, Lyallpur, Bahawalpur and Rawalpindi in February 1953, martial law was imposed in several districts of Pakistan from 6 March to 15 May 1953. It was officially announced that during riots in March and April, 50 persons including a police officer, were killed and 182 injured. In Lahore alone 36 persons were killed and 149 injured. On 11 May, death sentences were passed against two leaders of anti-Ahmediya riots, Maulana Maududi, President, Jamait-i-Islami and Maulavi Niazi, Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly. They were subsequently sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment by the Chief Martial Law Administrator of Lahore.
24. Suhrawardy, Convenor, Jinnah Awami League, reportedly stated that the state of politics in Pakistan showed "growing fascist tendencies", and that the Governor General's action had brought into prominence "the unrepresentative character and moral decrepitude of the Constituent Assembly and the Muslim League."

step at every point because their thinking is wrong. An individual learns from others' experience or his own, or by reading, etc. It does not require great intelligence to understand the harmful effects of communalism, after what happened in Pakistan and India and when you see it being applied to something like the Kashmir issue, you feel even more amazed at the deformity of their thinking which leads them to do everything wrong. It is a good thing generally to have different opinions in a country. I do not want that everybody must have the same views. This is the distinguishing feature of democracy and at the same time, even if there are twenty different point of view, it is no problem. What I mean is that if there is an attempt to create obstacles in one another's way, a nation cannot go forward at all. Democracy means deciding things by taking the majority opinion. Whenever necessary, the decision can be amended. This is in regard to internal affairs. As far as international affairs are concerned, the method is different. I do not mean that everybody should hold the same views but on the whole a consensus of opinions should be attempted in international affairs. If we speak with different voices in international affairs, our country will have no influence because it would be difficult to make out what our views are. Therefore when a country or countries speak out international matters, even if there are different viewpoints within the country, we have to speak with one voice to the outside world. Our strength lies in that.

As I said, I am going abroad. When I say something abroad or even here about our foreign policy, my voice is heard because it is felt that I represent the majority opinion of India. That is where my strength lies. It is not my personal opinion. It is the common tradition not to let our differences show in international affairs. We can certainly speak out on some important principle, but nothing should be done which affects our policy outside adversely.

I am not bothered about this agitation in Delhi or elsewhere. But what upsets me is that it is fundamentally wrong. Secondly, in foreign affairs, it is obvious that apart from its effect on the Kashmir issue which becomes more complicated, this agitation may have an adverse effect—people being brought to Delhi from UP and garlanded here, etc. It is absolutely wrong and I want you to realize this. I have come to you to ask for your good wishes before leaving day after tomorrow. The problems are difficult and the burdens on me are great. But everything becomes easy if I have your sympathy and love and confidence and if at least on these big international issues on which India's voice is being heard increasingly more often, we may not speak with different voices. But the Kashmir issue spoils everything. Now whether I speak to the Prime Minister of Pakistan or talk about Korea, the Kashmir issue draws a black line across everything, though it may not be important. Therefore, it is wrong and I want to tell the people who are indulging in this foolishness how

they are spoiling India's reputation in the world. It is a different matter that India may have the strength to bear it. We spent almost an entire life-time in opposing British rule. But that does not mean that we have enmity towards the British. This is what Mahatma Gāndhi had taught us and as soon as we became free, we established friendly relations with them. Similarly I do not wish to have enmity with any Indian even if he opposes me. But I consider it my duty to point out his mistakes. I want everyone who is on the wrong path to understand that what he is doing is wrong and harmful, from whichever angle you may look at it.


I have talked about the affairs of the world—Korea, Egypt, the question of Iran, our problems with Pakistan and Ceylon, South Africa and other parts of the African Continent which is in a great turmoil, the Moroccan issue, the Tunisian issue and perhaps the most dangerous of them all, of Germany. The internal problems of Germany are such that they can set alight a conflagration at any time. These are all big problems. But ultimately the real problem before you and me is the building of new India. I have no desire to strut about on the world stage. It is absurd. If we have some stature in the world and are regarded with respect, it is only because of Mahatma Gandhi, who left his mark on the world and even men of small stature like us grew in his shadow. The fact that we are independent also adds to our stature. But ultimately we will count for something only if we solve the problems of our country. The greatest of them is the problem of poverty and unemployment. It is a tremendous problem involving millions of people and the mind is constantly trying to grapple with it and understand it a little better. Our comrades in the Socialist Party and others criticize us. I accept their criticisms and am prepared to examine any idea or way that they may show us. We are prepared to consult them. Our minds are not closed to new ideas. We have drawn up a Five Year Plan which is a very good thing and should be implemented properly. You may say that it will take a long time under the Five Year Plan for India to progress. I agree with you to some extent and would like to reduce that period by consulting you and with your help. But you must realize that it is absolutely wrong to say that since you consider the pace to be slow, we shall not move at all or that we shall stay where we are. I cannot understand that. Some people criticize us. Well, our Communist brethren sing an entirely different tune for they do not want us to succeed at all. Their success lies in hooliganism so that they can bring everything to a standstill and have the field to themselves to do what they like. You can imagine how difficult it is for intelligent men to accept that India should first be ruined in order that she may progress later.

Take this other criticism that we are not moving fast enough. You are welcome to think of ways to improve the speed. But if you are not prepared to move at all, you cannot reach your goal anyway. At least we are moving in

that direction, even if gradually. The greatest problem before us is to build a new India which means uplifting the 36 crores of her population. It cannot be done at once. We can certainly learn from the examples of the Soviet Union and China or Japan and Germany. But please remember that if the Soviet Union has made progress, 36 years have gone by since their Revolution and it has gone through tremendous difficulties in these years. Now you are not prepared to undergo one-tenth of the suffering and hardship that the Soviet Union did after the Revolution. They went through tremendous hardships and millions of people were ruined. All these things happened but we can certainly learn some lessons from them. China is a huge country and we can learn from them too. It is possible that we can learn something from them and perhaps teach them something too. It would be wrong to think that we are superior to the others or that there is nothing to learn from anyone. This is the thinking that ruined us in the past. The world went ahead and we were like frogs in the well. So we became backward. It is wrong. We must always keep our minds and eyes and ears open to learn from other countries. This is one thing.

Secondly, we must not commit the mistake of copying others blindly. That is absolutely useless. No nation can progress by copying, whether we copy the United States or the Soviet Union. We can learn from everyone but our feet must be firmly planted in our own soil. Only then can we benefit from what we learn from others. The problems of every country are different. Our way of thinking and our life-style, etc. are quite different. For instance, the Soviet Union is three or four times as large as India in size but their population is half of ours. So the whole problem becomes different. When a nation is twice as large as India and has one-third the population, the problems are bound to be different. There they have large empty spaces and here we are over-populated. Therefore we must think of our problems from our point of view and learn from others' experience to find solutions to our problems. To refuse to learn from others or to copy them blindly are both wrong. Sometimes we talk ill of ourselves and praise others unthinkingly. Many things are happening in the country at the moment which are praiseworthy. I am not praising my Government but the people of India. The way they are working is indeed praiseworthy. So it is strange that we should look towards others all the time and instead of appreciating our efforts, we criticize our people, sometimes even when we go abroad. This is a strange pastime with us Indians.

The biggest problem before us is to build India and make her strong, which means making the lives of the common people in India better off. We have to do this step by step and the fact is that it will never be fully accomplished in my life-time. But I want that at least a big step towards that goal should be taken so that we feel reassured that sometime or the other the goal will be reached.



AT THE OPENING CEREMONY OF THE CENTRAL BUILDING RESEARCH INSTITUTE
ROORKEE, 12 APRIL 1953



AT THE RAILWAY CENTENARY EXHIBITION
NEW DELHI, 13 APRIL 1953

4. An Asian Vision¹

William Clark²: Good evening. This week more than perhaps ever before, our thoughts are on Asia and we have the exceptional good fortune to have in the Studio tonight one of Asia's most prominent statesmen, the Prime Minister of India. Mr. Nehru, I am extremely grateful to you for coming here and I speak on behalf of us here, and on behalf of the wider public who are watching us. I am particularly grateful as I believe, this is your very first appearance on television.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Yes, this is the first time I am facing this ordeal. In fact I know very little about television except what I have heard about it.

Donald McLachlan³: Prime Minister, when you return to India, people will be asking you what you thought of the Coronation. What are you going to tell them?

JN: Well, I have to tell them a great deal, but principally that it is very impressive in many ways. The most impressive thing to me, apart from its being a great spectacle, was the crowds here, and the way they behaved, and one begins to like more and more the London crowds and their fortitude in inclement weather and their insistence on enjoying themselves, whatever might happen.

1. BBC Television Press Conference, London, 12 June 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Also from *India News*, London, 20 June 1953.
2. William Donaldson Clark (1916-1985); London Editor, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1946-49; Diplomatic Correspondent, *Observer*, 1950-55; Editor of "The Week" in *Observer*, 1958-60; Director, Overseas Development Institute, 1960-68; Director of Information and Public Affairs, IBRD, 1968-73, its Vice President, 1974-80; and independent Director, *Observer*, 1981-84; author of, *Less than Kin: a study of Anglo-American Relations*, 1957; *What is the Commonwealth?* 1958; *Number 10*, 1966 and *Special Relationship*, 1968.
3. Donald Harvey McLachlan (1908-1971); on editorial staff of *The Times*, 1933-36; Assistant Master, Winchester College, 1936-38; Assistant Editor (Foreign), *The Economist*, 1947-54; Deputy Editor of the *Daily Telegraph*, 1954-60; Editor, *Sunday Telegraph*, 1961-66; Visiting Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford, 1960-68; Member, General Advisory Council, BBC, 1961-65; author of, *Room 39: A Study in Naval Intelligence*, 1968; *In the Chair: Barrington-Ward of The Times*, 1970.

McLachlan: But is there going to be no criticism in India of your having come to the Coronation?

JN: There was when I came and there will be, no doubt, when I go back, but I do not think it will amount to much.

H.V. Hodson⁴: Mr. Nehru, we all understand very well indeed why India decided to be a Republic and is in the Commonwealth. What I think is a remarkable thing is why there is so little resentment in India towards the British regime in view of our past history. It seems to us India is a most wonderful and magnanimous country. Can you explain this remarkable phenomenon?

JN: Well, partly, we do not, I suppose, hate for long or intensively, but chiefly, I think, because of the background that Mr Gandhi gave us during all these past decades.

Kingsley Martin⁵: After all, you were in prison yourself for sixteen years and do not seem to have any resentment about it at all. You may say the same about almost all popular people in India. It is an astonishing thing, really.

JN: I think it is a good thing for a person to go to prison and face trial.

Hodson: And to the Prime Minister for seven years, I was going to ask, looking back on those seven years and remembering all the hopes that were expressed at the time when India gained her independence, do you feel that they have been years of satisfactory achievement, or have you any disappointment, Prime Minister?

JN: Both. I think we have certainly achieved much, and there has also been a lack of achievement; we have not done what we wanted to do. So it is both satisfactory and unsatisfactory.

4. Henry Vincent Hodson (b. 1906); Assistant Editor of the *Round Table*, 1931, Editor, 1934-39; Assistant Editor, *Sunday Times*, 1946-50, Editor, 1950-61; Provost of Ditchley, 1961-71; Editor, *The Annual Register* (of world events), 1973-88, Consultant Editor since 1988; author of several books including *Slump and Recovery*, 1929-37, 1938, *Twentieth Century Empire*, 1948, *Problems of Anglo-American Relations*, 1963; *The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan*, 1969 (reissued, 1985); *The Diseconomics of Growth*, 1972.
5. Editor, the *New Statesman and Nation*.

Hodson: Could you elaborate that a little? What have you been disappointed in?

JN: It is rather a big question. There are so many things in India.

Hodson: Can I give you a lead about democracy and the progress of political democracy in India.

JN: Well, generally speaking, I would say that politically we have advanced the unity of the country. We have put an end to all those princely states; we have had the General Elections, which were remarkable, on a tremendous scale; and we have built up a good democratic structure. But the trouble with us was chiefly on the economic side. I believe we have made progress. I should like the progress to be much faster.

Clark: May I ask Mr Prime Minister, whether or not you consider that the economic progress has been fast enough to keep up with the very sharp increase in population? In other words, is there any possibility that India will be more or less self-sufficient in food in the course of time?

JN: There is not only a possibility, but I should imagine a certainty, and not in the course of time, but in the near future in the course of a year or two.

Martin: ...You have said in the past that you wanted to make India a secular democracy in which minorities will live in peace.

JN: Yes.

McLachlan: ...Do you feel that you have achieved that? That fanaticism has gone down now and you feel on top of that problem?

JN: Well, we are on top of it but I cannot say that we have put an end to it, and we have to face it even now, often enough. But the last elections showed that the Indian people generally do not like it.⁶

Clark: And caste?

JN: There are plenty of castes which interfere with politics in the sense, in

6. In the General Elections of 1951-52, while the Congress won 363 out of 489 seats, the Hindu Mahasabha won four, Jan Sangh three, Ram Rajya Parishad three and Akalis four.

elections a person may choose to vote for his caste man, that is it. It is still there, unfortunately, we try to fight it.

Hodson: You have all these circumstances, the caste divisions, the economic poverty of India and the contrast between riches and poverty in India. Is not communism given a great opportunity there, and is it not a real danger that it will seize the imagination and appeal to the people of India rather than western democracy with its slow and elaborate forms?

JN: When you talk about communism, well, you may mean many things. You may mean a vague communistic appeal, which has considerable effect. But if you talk about the Communist Party as such and its functioning, then it has a very limited appeal.

McLachlan: I think what we mean Prime Minister is that communism, by its ruthlessness and speed, produces economic results, so it seems faster than the democratic system. Is that your view in India?

JN: It may. It might also produce disruption and chaos. In fact in order to achieve other results, it, for the moment, tries to create disruption.

Q: Have the Indians, who think about these matters, not been impressed by what China is trying to do?

JN: Yes, we have been greatly impressed by China, by what is happening in China. Personally, although I admire much that has happened in China, I think, we have done a good deal too, which might be admired in China.

Q: You are satisfied that your methods are as good as the Chinese methods?

JN: How can I compare them? They are different. They are being done in different planes.

Q: That is the comparison which we are all expecting to be made in Asia?

JN: Yes. The comparison will be made in regard to results achieved.

Hodson: Is there then some sort of rivalry between China and India for the leadership of Asia, or of those peoples outside the two countries in South East Asia?

JN: There is no sense of rivalry nor is there any occasion for it. I do not know about the distant future.

Martin: Could one possibly put it this way? I think most people feel that the land problem is after all the big test issue of nationalism in Asia and now the Chinese have solved their own problem very dramatically. Well, it seems to us that India has made some headway here, but not so well, not to say so dramatically solved. Well even in India, most people feel that India is slow on that problem. Can you give us any lead on that, Mr Nehru?

JN: That is perfectly true. We are slow, partly because of the democratic processes being slow, partly because our Constitution, laying stress on individual rights and liberties, has been so interpreted by the courts that many of our legislative measures are held up by the courts.

Hodson: Apart from that, Prime Minister, would you say that the methods used in China are absolutely against the spirit of the Indian Constitution and society as it now is?

Clark: Coercive methods, you mean?

JN: Some methods no doubt are, but I cannot say that of all methods. I should imagine that the land problem there was solved without too much coercion, with a large measure of consent of the peasants concerned.

Q: Tell me Prime Minister what I think is worrying many of us in a way about your democratic system, which is a matter of great admiration in this country, and that is that there does not seem to be an opposition; that there does not seem to be someone playing as the leader of the opposition to you for instance; and what do you feel will happen if you were to retire? Do you have a successor in the Congress? Do you have a successor in the opposition?

JN: Now what do you mean by that there is no opposition? In our Parliament, in the House of the People, there are five hundred members, and we are three hundred and fifty. The opposition consists of a hundred and fifty. It is true that the opposition is split up in four or more parties. There is no one major opposition party. We have not got the two-party system. We cannot impose that, it develops or does not.

Q: Would you welcome it, Prime Minister?

JN: Yes. On the whole if there is a big enough party which thinks in terms of office, we would welcome it because otherwise these opposition parties become totally irresponsible. They have no hope of office so they can say and do just what they like. But there is today a good opposition and a very good opposition both in Parliament and outside. We have continually to face it.

Hodson: If then, Prime Minister, you do not see any immediate danger from communism inside India, do you see any threat to India externally, from Communist pressure and expansionism either immediately through Afghanistan, Tibet and so on, or through Communist conquest, if you like, of South East Asia?

JN: Whatever the internal position might or might not be, I see absolutely no danger—external danger—to India, from Communist or any other source.

Martin: What about relations with, if not danger from, Pakistan? Are you more hopeful now of patching up difficulties? You have been seeing the Prime Minister of Pakistan from time to time, I believe, recently?

JN: Yes. Our relations have improved greatly. Our psychological approach to each other is much better. And I think that we shall gradually solve most of our problems. It may take a little time to solve all of them, but I think we are on the right path.

Q: Has the assistance of the United Nations been considerably useful in resolving the difference between India and Pakistan?

JN: I am afraid, not. It has not proved helpful with all the will in the world. These problems should be dealt with directly without the help of third parties.

Clark: But Prime Minister, I think what we were getting at a moment ago about the fear...that if there is...a truce in Korea...the Chinese may expand elsewhere, not perhaps directly with India, but there is the danger that they might expand elsewhere in South East Asia and be a threat on your flank. Do you think that there is a danger of that sort, danger of Chinese expansion down into Indo-China, Siam and say Burma?

JN: I think that is a wrong view completely. I do not think China ever since this change over there, has had any desire to expand. They have got enough problems of their own and so far as India is concerned we have the most friendly relations with them.

Clark: What about Korea, that seemed expansion to some of us?

JN: Well, till the 38th Parallel was crossed in Korea, there was no sign of Chinese activity. It was only after that was crossed, and China, I have no doubt, feared invasion of its own mainland. And they told us so when it was on the point of being crossed that now they are threatened all round. Remember there are plenty of people saying "let us invade China and put an end to the People's Government there." So in sheer fear, I think, they reacted and once they reacted, well, of course, they got entangled in it.

McLachlan: Prime Minister, is not there a danger in the countries of South East Asia from the Communist, I beg your pardon, from the Chinese policy of regarding Chinese abroad as still their own citizens and not encouraging them or even allowing them to become full-blooded citizens of, let us say, Malaya?

JN: Yes, perhaps, there is. But that has nothing to do with policy. It is the innate Chinese characteristic to survive wherever they go.

Martin: Do I understand you, rightly, Mr Prime Minister, that what you regard as the big thing in Asia, and for that matter, now in Africa, is the growth of a great national feeling? As I understand from that speech of yours—what you think is the most important is the growth of the national feeling and the fear that the Chinese may make use of that. Would you say something about that?

JN: I think, in the perspective of history, one of the biggest things that has happened and is happening is this awakening or upsurge in Asia and to some extent in Africa. It is a tremendous thing. It develops differently in different parts of Asia. But it has upset completely world order. China has gone one way and India another way. We arrived at a peaceful settlement with Britain, with Burma, in South East Asia. Everywhere it has a different face. But the main thing is an enormous upsurge. In a sense, after three or four hundred years of, well, more or less European domination, Asia is coming into its own, sometimes rightly, sometimes wrongly, and one has to understand that, appreciate it, understand it, and not merely get angry with it or dislike it. Of course, to some extent, in a different way, the same applies to Africa.

Clark: Do you think, Mr Prime Minister, that the Europeans are understanding what is taking place in Africa or are they making the same mistakes which have been made in Asia over the last—shall we say, three hundred years?

JN: I am afraid they are actually making those mistakes. Africa, please remember, is a continent. It is a most tragic continent. For hundreds and hundreds of years the people of Africa have suffered terribly. Maybe they are not so developed as others because they have not had that opportunity. Given the opportunity, no doubt they would. I am deeply distressed at what is happening in Africa, whether in the North or the East or the West. In fact, the only bright spot in Africa, if I may say so, is the Gold Coast, and partly Nigeria.

McLachlan: You are not suggesting, Prime Minister that there is one solution and one criticism to be made about all parts of Africa? Is not the problem different in something like a dozen parts of that continent?

JN: The problem is different but the approach is the same, an approach, friendly and sympathetic to the Africans.

Hodson: Is there not a direct contrast between these countries like the Gold Coast and Nigeria where Europeans could not make their permanent homes and countries like the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Kenya where there is not only a settled European community but people who have—and had for generations—no other home?

JN: Of course, the problems are different. But, however many Europeans may live there, they are outnumbered tremendously by the African population. Either they cooperate, that is, giving some kind of cooperation, or they try to suppress each other. If the Europeans try to suppress the Africans, undoubtedly a day will come when the Africans will suppress the Europeans and push them out because they outnumber them so much.

McLachlan: Mr Prime Minister, with regard to this very difficult problem at the United Nations, I think it is right to say that India and other Asian nations have from time to time expressed very strong views about British and other European policies in Africa. Do you think by doing that you assist race relations or make them more bitter?

JN: Well, I do not remember that we have said much about British policies in Africa. We have said a great deal in the United Nations, I mean, we have said a great deal about the situation in South Africa.

McLachlan: And in North Africa—in French North Africa?

JN: Yes, in Morocco and Tunisia.

McLachlan: Do you think that helps the French to solve their problems with the Africans?

JN: That is a curious question.

Q: The French do not think so.

JN: Well, I think it is a curious question—my being told that you must not say that way when the evil is happening, lest the evil may become worse. As a matter of fact, since by some circumstance I became Prime Minister of India I have to hold myself in check all the time, as to what I may say. Otherwise, I would shout out from housetops what is happening all over the world and in Africa, North, South and East. I would not remain as quiet as I do now.

Martin: You feel a difference, don't you, Mr Prime Minister, in what you say about countries in which there are Indians and others? It seems to me there is a slight difference in your status in relation to countries where there are Indians?

JN: Do you mean in Africa?

Martin: Well, I was thinking about Kenya. For instance, the Kenya situation, where there are twice as many Indians as Europeans.

JN: Yes. What we have told the Indians there year after year, is that they must cooperate with the Africans. They must not exploit them or take advantage of them and that we will not support them in their demands for any privilege which goes against the Africans. "If you cannot get on with the Africans you have to get out of Africa"—that is what we have told the Indians.

Martin: But inside the Commonwealth Conference and so on, you do not discuss or deal much with the South African situation? You regard that as a matter for the United Nations rather than the Commonwealth, do you?

JN: Not directly.

Clark: Prime Minister, what role do you see for the Commonwealth in the world today? You have spoken about the United Nations, you have spoken about India's role in Asia and in the world. What role do you see for the Commonwealth, coming as you are straight from the Commonwealth Conference?

JN: I think this development of the Commonwealth is of great significance. I cannot say yet what future form or shape or importance it may have. This kind of free association of people from different countries with different interests, different outlooks, yet meeting together and in a friendly way trying to understand each other, is a very great thing. And that is why I would not like to bring up any question there which, first of all, changes its role, makes it into a kind of super State, and secondly, which almost, might break it up.

McLachlan: There is a very vital question, Mr Prime Minister. Forgive my return to what I asked you just now.

JN: Yes.

McLachlan: You spoke very eloquently of the rights of the Indian Prime Minister to express a moral view of what is happening in other countries.

JN: But I said something else, that as Prime Minister I do not. I have to restrain myself. I said if I am not Prime Minister I would do it.

McLachlan: ...Do you think that within the Commonwealth individual members should express views about the internal affairs of others publicly? Is that healthy or not in your view?

JN: Are you talking about member governments?

McLachlan: Yes, about member governments.

JN: Well, normally speaking, member governments should not. But it is very difficult to draw a line like that. Take, for instance, the question of South Africa which was publicly raised in the United Nations. The United Nations has passed resolutions proposed by us and the South African Government has repudiated and bypassed those resolutions. Now, are we to remain silent about that? Obviously, we have to say something. Courtesy and drawing room manners are very good. But when a fire is raging you cannot function as if you are in a drawing room. Well, a great danger has threatened the world. It is not a question of several individuals being concerned. When some policy is being pursued which may endanger the whole of Asia and Africa, then it may become a very wrong thing to remain completely silent about it. One does as Prime Minister. If I was not Prime Minister I would not be silent.

Martin: Now, may I ask a sixty-four thousand dollar question? Has the Prime Minister any idea about whether Russian policy, Russian attitude

towards the world has really changed? How does he interpret these recent changes in Russian internal and external policies? Is that too difficult a question?

JN: Yes, it is difficult in the sense that one cannot say anything definite. But my own view, and very definite view, is that there has been a change, a marked change, and that Russia definitely desires, shall I say, peace, for whatever period it might be—I cannot say, for ever.

Hodson: You do not suggest that they have abandoned their ideal of world revolution under communist supremacy over the whole world?

JN: I cannot say. But I would put it this way, that their ideal of a world revolution, they might think, would be furthered much more by their showing internal results in Russia than by indulging in an adventure which might lead to war and upset everything.

Hodson: On that basis, you might be hopeful of some results from the Big Four Conference?

JN: I certainly think that the time is ripe for such a conference and that it should lead to results.

McLachlan: The Four-Power Conference could hardly tackle the question of Asia adequately without the presence of governments like India, could it?

JN: Asia? You mean the Far East?

McLachlan: The Far East and Southern Asia.

JN: The two Asias have to be represented there as the Asian countries are concerned.

McLachlan: So after a Four-Power conference you would expect something larger in which India might take part?

Hodson: Or, would you regard the United Nations machinery as being adequate once the will to use it were present?

JN: Well, I do not know. The United Nations has undergone considerable transformation since it was established and, as you know, people argue as to

whether it can continue in its present form or not. It started as a universal body to which every independent country could belong—every independent country. Now, some of the biggest and independent countries are not allowed in it. It seems to be completely opposed to the very conception of the United Nations—China not being in it, for instance. It is not a question of liking China or the Chinese People's Government. It is a question of recognising facts and realities. If you do not, well, it is the United Nations which suffers, not China very much.

Clark: But do you think it will be possible to bring China in and perhaps after the truce in Korea? What stands in the way now—I would have thought very little.

JN: I hope it will be possible and I believe that the pressure of opinion will bring that about. It may take some time, not immediately after the truce.

Clark: If you were to be present at the Bermuda Conference, what do you think should be pressed on Mr Eisenhower? The admission of China. What sort of settlement do you see is at all possible in the Far East? It must be one of the subjects discussed at Bermuda.

JN: You do not expect me to say what I would expect to happen at Bermuda except that, perhaps later, the question of China coming into the United Nations has to be raised. In fact it is odd—is it not?—that, say in the Korean truce negotiations or in the political conference to follow, China is bound to be there. There is China, there is the USSR, the USA, the UK and there are other countries. They move to consider problems. What more? Recognition is there when dealing with major problems in this way. And it seems odd after that to say, "Look we won't allow you to discuss other matters coming into the United Nations."

Hodson: Do you believe, Mr Prime Minister, that Anglo-American, British-American, British Commonwealth-American, if you like, agreement and concord have a very special value for the defence of our common ideals of democracy?

JN: Yes, certainly.

Hodson: And that to aim for that has a value of its own, and that it may require sometimes some compromises from our side with policies which we do not see hundred per cent eye to eye with on the other side of the Atlantic?

JN: Well, Mr Hodson, politicians are always compromising, they have to. But there is a tendency, if I may say so, for leading statesmen in Europe and America to look at the world from Europe and America. If you look at the same world and the same principles from, let us say, Delhi or Karachi, the world looks a little different. Geography counts. Take the question of China. China is a distant country to most people in Europe and America. China is a country having a two thousand mile frontier with India. It is a different picture for us, immediately.

Hodson: I certainly agree that your contribution from Asia is an invaluable one. I just wanted to suggest.

JN: Well, that is as I say, that is the value, one of the significant features of the Commonwealth Conference, that these different viewpoints come up, may be, if you like, slightly clash, but in a friendly way, I believe, and lead to a better understanding. This kind of free association of people with different interests and outlook, yet meeting together and trying to understand each other is a very great thing. I may not like to bring up at such conferences any questions which change their role and try to make the Commonwealth into a super State or break it up.

McLachlan: Prime Minister, you have had one problem for some years which has tested your ability to compromise. May I ask whether the persistence of United Nations in the difficulties between Pakistan and India, have on the whole been helpful?

JN: I am afraid not.

McLachlan: The United Nations has not helped?

JN: It has not proved helpful, with all the best will in the world. I think because in the nature of things these problems are more easily dealt with directly than through third parties.

Martin: Is not that case partly due to the fact that both sides at the beginning of the Kashmir dispute, so to speak, staked out a legal claim, for the whole of the prize and that neither really believed, that they could ever have the whole. That is to say the situation is actually to some extent a *fait accompli* with Pakistan in the north and the rest in Indian hands. There must be some sort of compromise, must not there?

JN: Incidentally that is true. But you must remember that the initial reason for

going to the United Nations was a very simple issue—Pakistani aggression. I accept what you say but you must look at the question as a whole. It is a complicated issue which cannot be disposed of by simple formula.

Martin: You mean, United Nations is not good enough for legal discussions.

Clark: That I am afraid is all that we have time for now tonight. Mr Nehru, I would like to thank you on behalf of ourselves and of the public, both for the questions you have answered as Prime Minister and also a few asides as Pandit Nehru. I would like to thank you very much indeed and to welcome you to England at any time you wish to address us again on television. Thank you.

JN: Thank you. I have not found the last half hour quite so bad as I expected it to be. In fact it has passed rather rapidly. I am surprised that it is over. Perhaps because your questions were so interesting that I got involved in them. Anyhow it has been a pleasant time and I thank you for it. And I wish those who may listen to this later on, good night.

5. Challenges of Development¹

It is inevitable that in India, as in other countries, there should be a popular urge for change and that people should refuse to tolerate bad conditions. This urge has received added impetus after independence which has aroused great expectations. All this had let loose new forces requiring careful handling if they were not to become a source of trouble.

While the critics have painted a dark picture of internal conditions and criticised India's foreign policy for its alleged failure to make friends, it is impossible to ignore the broad facts of India's position. In the whole of Asia India is the only country, China being a special case, where there is security, and where vast schemes are in operation. There is in India a sense of activity, of building up and of construction. There is ordered political life and organised attempts to bring about economic progress. India's position in the United

1. Speech at the fifth meeting of the Conference of Heads of Indian Missions in Europe and the USA, Burgenstock, 19 June 1953. JN Collection.

Nations is becoming increasingly important. Her point of view is listened to with increasing understanding and respect.

The Five Year Plan, by itself, is a great work. It has taken, however, a pessimistic view of the food situation. In that respect it is already out of date. The food position is good although it is as yet not possible to analyse the factors contributing to the improvement. The improvement is reflected in the Food Ministry's high credit with the Ministry of Finance.

The Community Development Projects are doing well. Thirty per cent of them have made excellent showing, thirty per cent are good, thirty per cent tolerably good and only ten per cent are bad. There is an evidence of a remarkable rivalry between villages in road building.

India's credit is high. She has put into her sterling balances considerably more than what she has withdrawn. The credit of the States is however weak. This has led to considerable amount of argument between the Central Finance Ministry and the States. It is of course understandable that the States should show impatience with the Centre when faced with pressing human problems. At the Centre financial problems lack that pressing human element.

Despite these achievements many problems remain. Of these the land problem is by far the most important. It needs tackling urgently. Vinoba Bhave's movement for Bhoodan cannot solve it. While the Government have given support to this movement, they have not passed on their responsibility for the land problem which must rest with them. The significance of Vinoba Bhave's movement is that it is creating a good psychological atmosphere.

Another problem is about the rate and pace of development. Even in regard to the Five Year Plan, there is a gap of three crores between availability and the real need. India has to find this money. Foreign assistance, particularly from the US, has been received. But foreign assistance, even without strings, breeds moral obligations and induces a sense of dependence and lowers morale as is evident in Europe. Consequently, the real answer to the problem is to increase the rate of investment from internal resources. This means increase of savings. At the same time, it is necessary to bear in mind that increase of production without ensuring full employment and the consequent increase of purchasing power and consumption would not be of any use from a wider social and political point of view. The orthodox economists fail to see this social element when they talk of increasing production as an end in itself. Full employment is a basic element in economic planning.

There are various political parties in India. The communalist parties are supported by reactionary forces. They have no plan or programme of their own. The Communists, who have lost some ground since the general elections, have potential scope for development. But their ideas are too much coloured by Moscow. They have no proper leadership. They have become unpopular on account of the violence of their tactics. The Indian Communists, unlike the

Chinese, do not appear to grow out of local conditions. The socialists are an unreal, vague and inchoate mass. Jayaprakash is becoming too much obsessed with religion.² The Congress is a force in the country but it is tending to be complacent, and less dynamic in ideas. There is a need for introducing new blood. With this end in view, I had initiated negotiations with Jayaprakash. But nothing came of it, though it was useful.³ The Congress has also decided not to oppose Acharya Kripalani.⁴ There is evidence of more cooperative attitude on the part of the KMPP-Socialists.

One cannot close one's eyes to the working of disintegrating forces which were kept in check while struggle for independence lasted. Opposition to Britain was a great force for unity and integration. With the removal of Britain, disintegrating forces began to play. The agitation for linguistic provinces was an instance of it. The Government has now appointed a commission to study reorganisation of the States without any reference to linguistic criterion. After all, cultural, economic, administrative and security aspects are of paramount importance. It is interesting to see how even the evident requirements of administrative uniformity create social and political problems. Rajasthan is an instance of it. The new machinery of administration is too impersonal and takes no account of individuality and local distinctiveness.

These are then some of the problems. Forces of disintegration are at work. But at the same time there are forces making for integration. One must do one's best to help the growth and development of these forces.

2. A distinct change in Jayaprakash's political philosophy was noticeable since he undertook a fast in July 1952 to cleanse his soul. He disowned his affiliation to "the goddess" of dialectical materialism and claimed that "man must go beyond the 'material' to find incentives to goodness." At a public meeting in Hyderabad, on 8 May 1953, exhorting the people to join the *Bhoodan Yajna*, he said, people should donate freely because nothing would accompany them when they died and what mattered really was their *Karma*.
3. Nehru-Jayaprakash negotiations opened in February 1953 to discuss the possibility of PSP cooperating with Congress, both at Parliamentary and popular levels. Jayaprakash proposed his famous 14-point programme as a condition for cooperation which Nehru found unacceptable.
4. On 5 May 1953, the Congress Parliamentary Board instructed Anup Lal Mehta, Congress candidate for by-election to the House of the People from Bhagalpur-Purnea constituency, to withdraw his candidature in favour of J.B. Kripalani, the PSP President.



ADDRESSING STATE DEVELOPMENT COMMISSIONERS
NEW DELHI, 18 APRIL 1953



DISTRIBUTING CLOTHES AT A RELIEF CENTRE
MANGI TALAB, SHOLAPUR DISTRICT, APRIL 1953

6. Resurgence of Asia and Africa¹

First of all, may I express my deep gratitude to you for your welcome and for the kind words that you have said which, because of the kindness of your heart, have been, if I may say so, rather exaggerated so far as I am concerned. Secondly, through you I should like to express my heart-felt gratitude to the Government and people of Egypt for the extraordinary friendliness with which they have treated me now and on every occasion that I have come here.

I do not wish to take up your time with formalities. No doubt, you expect me to say something about current issues. Well, I would gladly discuss them in so far as I can or answer your questions to the best of my ability. But there are one or two things that I should like to place before you; one is this, that I happen to occupy a responsible position in my country. The other day I was speaking at what is called a Television Conference in London.² A number of Pressmen were asking me questions for the television. Four of them were recorded. One of them asked me: Do you think it is right for Ministers of one country to interfere in what happens in another country, in the domestic affairs of another country? I said that I agreed that Ministers should not interfere in what happens in other countries; normally speaking. They should observe the best of drawing room manners wherever they go. But I added that when there is a fire, then it is rather absurd to imagine that you are sitting in a drawing room. Also I said that since I became Prime Minister I had applied great restraint on myself, and largely succeeded. If I had not been Prime Minister I would probably shout out many things from the house-tops.

The other point I should like to say is this: It is nearly forty years since I entered Indian politics, or politics, and from rather small beginnings, I took a rather more intensive part in political affairs; so much so that not only I, but tens of thousands of my countrymen upset the whole scheme of their lives in acting up to their political convictions. Now during the course of these forty years, I was, of course, intensely involved in Indian politics and affairs, but I was always interested in the politics and affairs of other countries, more especially countries that were more or less in a like position, partly because my sympathy went to them, partly because I wanted to learn from them. I thought that we could profit by each other's experiences, and I also began to

1. Inaugural statement at a press conference in Cairo, 25 June 1953. *Jawaharlal Nehru, Press Conferences, 1953*, Information Service of India, New Delhi, 1954, pp. 18-36. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 215-216, 361, 416-418, 470-472 and 526.

2. See *ante*, pp. 63-76.

think that it was difficult to understand any single question unless one had a picture of the whole world in front of him. I wish to lay stress on that because the conviction has grown upon me that no question today, however local it might be, can be separated from dozens and dozens of other questions that agitate the world.

I need not go into the reasons for this. You all know it. But few people realise how the world has completely changed in the course of a few generations. If I may give a rather obvious example, the world of, let us say, 150 or 200 years ago, that is the world of, the pre-industrial age, had not changed much for the previous two or three or four thousand years. It had changed, of course, but one test of change, I would like to put to you, is communications and transport. Whether you travelled in Egypt 2000 years ago or whether you travelled 200 years ago, it took you exactly the same time to go from one place to another, and the fastest you could go was on horse-back or camel-back. There was no faster means of communications; and that applied to the whole world. And now this business of communications has changed so rapidly that it has altered the whole texture of the world; communications in every way, not only the steamship or the railway or the aeroplane or the telephone or radio or television or radar, the whole thing has been telescoped; the world has been telescoped.

Now this again makes one problem impinge upon another. I gave you the example of communications and transport. That is just an example of the changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution which began, well, 170 years ago or so, and which changed first of all England, more or less Western Europe, parts of America, and so on it has gone on spreading. And one of the major facts of the age is that Industrial Revolution is affecting Asia and Africa. These are basic facts. The countries that are strong in the world today are strong because they have profited by science and the Industrial Revolution. The conflicts of the world today are essentially conflicts which derive from the extension of the Industrial Revolution.

Oddly enough, the two major countries of the world today, from the point of view of power, that is, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, are both strong because of the growth of industry plus other factors. Both worship at the shrine of technology in different ways. They are in conflict—it does not matter. But they are nearer to each other than you imagine, not politically I mean, but economically, not economically in the normal sense, but in the sense of worship of technology. So that one has to face this world and try to understand what it is, what is the basis of power and strength in it, what are the weaknesses in it. We cannot talk the language we did fifty years ago. It has no application today. It has no meaning.

Some countries of the Western world who were great colonial powers, say in the 19th century, still continue to talk the language of colonialism. Although

in effect, their colonialism might be considered a thing of past history, it may carry on, it may carry on as a hang-over but the age of that type of colonialism is past and cannot be revived. Now I do not say that some fresh type of colonial domination may not arise. But the old type is over. I am not going to refer to examples where it is fighting what I would call a rearguard action. It is fighting, it is holding on here and there, but it is a rearguard action. Historically speaking, it is over.

Another major fact, I think the major fact of the age, is the development of this industrial civilization which has given great power to countries which is perhaps not matched, if I may say so, but the growth of their minds or character. I am not talking of individuals. I am talking about the background of industrial civilization. That is, we have not perhaps, as a world, gained the good sense to use the new power to advantage. Instead, we use it mostly for destruction. We stand on the verge of what is called the atomic age, which brings enormous power to the country or group that possesses it—unthinkable power. And you have no idea—none of us have any idea—of what progress has been made in regard to this atomic age because it is all dead secret. But I can tell you with great confidence that considerable progress has been made. So far as destructiveness is concerned it can really annihilate parts of the earth's surface if used.

That is the background today. We have to face that background and in that background or any background, the weak go to the wall. It is only the strong, either strong in material means or strong in spirit or something, that carry over. But if you are strong in both, it is well and good. You must be strong in something. And you see as a result of these two successive World Wars the emergence of two mighty nations in power—in the sphere of culture other nations are great too—but from the point of view of physical might, these two nations, the USA and the Soviet Union face each other in hostility. And the major question of the age is whether that hostility can be resolved and a policy of live and let live be followed without interference with each other or whether it will lead to a conflict which will engulf the world. That is a major question of the age before which every other question is relatively secondary, because that will ruin the world, if such a thing occurs.

Now the second point—it is an obvious point to you as it is to me, it is a point which really I have to repeat in Europe or America, a point which Europeans and Americans perhaps do not fully appreciate—is another major fact of the age. That is the emergence or re-emergence of Asia, and I would add Africa too, or parts of Africa, and the tremendous ferments continuing in these great continents. Now, Asia, as you know, is a vast continent and it is not right to speak of it in some generic term. Things happen in different parts of Asia, but the common feature is that during the last 300 years or so, Asia—and when I say Asia, I include, of course, Egypt and those countries nearby

which played a very important part in human development, and human history all the world over—but during the last 300 years or so, gradually they came under European domination. Again, because ultimately of various factors, but essentially because of the growth of technology that was given birth to by science, which strengthened them and made them more powerful, more wealthy; they produced wealth which gave them better arms, and so on and so forth. So the whole of Asia, more or less the whole of Africa, came under European domination, either political or economic or both.

Well, that period of the domination of Asia and Africa is also, historically speaking, passing and it has passed to some extent. And Asia, the countries of Asia and Africa, are emerging again and, therefore, you sort of look back to the period 200 or 300 years ago or whatever the period was and pick up old threads. These are major facts. I may express them in a different way. The major sentiment in Asia is a sentiment naturally against colonial domination—against colonialism. It is so, because for the last two or three hundred years they have suffered from it. Naturally they react to it. In reacting to it—it is perfectly understandable—they are apt to forget the other major changes that have happened in the world by these industrial processes, by the atomic age, coming into the field, by the fact of communications becoming so swift, by the fact that problems are interlocked today, no single problem can be separated. We are apt to forget that, and if we forget it we do so at our peril, because then we do not understand a problem. The problem cannot be isolated today.

Some of our friends here may have gone either as representatives of your country or as Pressmen to the United Nations. Now, I think the United Nations with all its faults is a great organisation and an essential organisation, where countries can meet and confer together and, if you like, even quarrel together. Because otherwise, you get no common forum for countries. Therefore, I think it is necessary and essential, although I do not like everything that the UN has done. I think sometimes it has gone in the wrong direction. But that is by the way. But now in the United Nations you will find that many problems that come up are seldom discussed on the merits of those problems, because the countries there are thinking, at the back of their minds, some major problems. They will be thinking, “Oh, will this problem be to the advantage of the Soviet Union or to the advantage of Western nations?” They will not think of the problem on its merits. They will be thinking of it in other terms. Therefore it is the other problem that is decided, not this problem. Unless you bear that in mind you will not understand why difficulties arise.

Therefore, the strongest urge still in Asia and Africa is basically the nationalist urge against foreign domination. But together with that I may associate of course the urge against racial discrimination which has accompanied usually European colonial domination, that is, the white races of Europe considering themselves superior and behaving as such. I do not mind what

they consider themselves, but behaving as such even in law—of course, the supreme example of that patent thing is in South Africa—that naturally no self-respecting nation can tolerate. So conflicts arise. And so long as this racial discrimination policy is followed in any country it will always sow the seeds of conflict and those seeds may well grow and poison the whole atmosphere. Now, in the whole of Africa today, leaving out Egypt for the moment, other parts of Africa, these racial feelings, racial conflicts, are growing and that is a bad outlook, if they are allowed to grow. Because then nobody will act reasonably. Passions are aroused and then every party misbehaves.

Now the second urge, and a very powerful urge, is the social urge all over the world. It affects us in Asia and Africa more because economically speaking we are underdeveloped nations. We are poverty-stricken nations. And now that a measure of freedom has come, any country, take India, take Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, other Asian countries like Ceylon, a certain political change has come. They have gained political independence that has resulted immediately in liberating all kinds of forces which had been kept down under foreign domination. Now those liberating forces in men's minds create powerful urges, for change, for advance, powerful demands, that is to say, people in the mass are not prepared to put up with their poverty and unhappiness any longer.

It is not easy to change by magic everything, but the fact remains that these liberating forces that have been let loose have to be understood, have to be dealt with and have to be satisfied to the largest possible extent. That is to say, that unless the common man is not bettered, or does not feel that he has been bettered all the time, well, the common man just does not tolerate things as they are. He may for a short time. He may have put up with those things for the last 1,000 or 500 years. That does not matter. Today he does not put up with them. Today he does not like the differences that he sees with his eyes, the very rich and the very poor, so that this social urge is one of the dominant urges of the world today, everywhere, but it applies in special force to countries which are underdeveloped, where conditions for the common man are poor and very backward, and we have to face that problem all over Asia or Egypt, or elsewhere.

I wish to place before you this background of world conditions and problems so that you may deal with individual questions as far as you can in that context and not just something hanging from there that has nothing to do with something else....

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

I. THE ECONOMY

(i) Industry and Labour

1. Labour Dispute at Hindustan Shipyard¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: Sir, yesterday a question having been raised in this House about the Visakhapatnam Shipyard,² you were good enough to suggest that this matter might be discussed informally. In accordance with your advice, I discussed this matter with some leaders of the Opposition, and thereafter, with some of our senior officials connected with this Shipyard, and especially the Secretary of the Production Ministry³ and the Managing Director of the Hindustan Shipyard Limited.⁴ And I sent the Managing Director of the Hindustan Shipyard and the Secretary of the Production Ministry to see some of the leaders of the Opposition to explain to them the facts. As a result of these talks, a suggestion was made, that in order to avoid hardship and delay in the settlement of the dispute, an independent mediator should be appointed, whose decision would be final and binding on both parties, and would not be subject to appeal. This would be presented as an agreed settlement before the Adjudicator appointed by the Madras Government.⁵ The Government understand that the labour union is agreeable to this procedure being adopted. If such a request is made to Government by the union, Government would consider this sympathetically in consultation with the Board of Directors.

1. Statement in Parliament, 24 April 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report, Vol. IV, Part II, 22 April to 11 May 1953, Cols. 4981-4982.
2. On 23 April, S.P. Mookerji moved an adjournment motion stating that 3,600 workers of the Hindustan Shipyard Limited, Visakhapatnam, had struck work since 22 April, protesting against the summary discharge of 813 workers, who were declared surplus by the Company.
3. A.K. Chanda.
4. R.L. Gupta, ICS.
5. On 11 May 1953, an agreement was reached between the management of the Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL) and HSL union, to refer the matter of retrenchment to Justice Mehrchand Mahajan of the Supreme Court. Justice Mahajan was to adjudicate on (a) number of workmen to be retrenched; (b) terms to be offered to them; (c) pay and emoluments of workers for the period of strike. The agreement was signed by K.R.P. Aiyangar, Director, HSL and Lanka Sundaram, MP, President, HSL union.

2. To Harekrushna Mahtab¹

New Delhi
May 6, 1953

My dear Mahtab²

I am returning to you the enclosed paper.

I am afraid it is quite impracticable to put all State-owned industries under the Ministry of Production as suggested. That will completely upset work in many places. What future developments might be, I cannot say.

Our present policy is to have these big industries as semi-autonomous corporations. In these corporations, we are associating the various Ministries concerned, i.e., not only the Ministry of Production, but other Ministries also and we have laid down that there should be full cooperation between these Ministries.

That is the alternative suggestion that has been made in the resolution sent to me.

The principal problem before us at present is how to utilise some of these State industries, and more especially Defence industries, for civil production also, so that their capacity can be used to the utmost.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Secretary, Congress Parliamentary Party.

3. Explosives and Steel Projects¹

Shri G.D. Birla wrote to you a letter on the 20th April. I referred this to the Finance Minister² who apparently consulted the Minister for Commerce & Industry³ also. He has replied to me. You might send an answer to Shri G.D. Birla informing him that the matter was considered by the Finance Minister. You need not refer to the Income-tax investigation business, but say that the

1. Note to M.O. Mathai, 8 May 1953. JN Collection.
2. C.D. Deshmukh.
3. T.T. Krishnamachari.

Explosives Project⁴ has been undertaken by Government itself and is far advanced. As regards steel,⁵ we have gone also far in investigating it and are likely to come to decisions soon. If any further difficulty occurs, we shall be glad to discuss the matter with Shri Birla and others.

4. J.H. Randall of a British firm, had written to Birla that two well-known armament manufacturers were interested in collaborating and manufacturing explosives and propellents in India.
5. Birla had written that some German financiers had expressed their desire to invest in a steel project in India. He enquired: "if the Government's policy is that whenever any such proposal comes from foreign countries for collaboration with Indian capital...we should examine it carefully...from the point of view of good of the country, then I may pursue the matter."

4. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
May 8, 1953

My dear Bidhan,²

T.T. Krishnamachari has already addressed you on the subject of some of your textile mills contravening the definite orders of Government in regard to the production of *dhotis*.³ These decisions of Government were taken after full consideration. We can understand some lapse of time in shifting over to a new type of production or some slight variation in the production fixed.⁴ But completely ignoring Government orders, and in fact exceeding even past production in this respect, is something that can surely not be put up with. A

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to Nabakrushna Choudhury, Chief Minister of Orissa and to the Minister of Commerce and Industry.
2. Chief Minister of West Bengal.
3. A significant increase in production of cotton textile industry in 1952 led to availability of 14 yards of cloth for per capita internal consumption against 11.8 yards in 1951, leading to a fall in price of cloth below the ceiling fixed by the Government. On 30 September 1952, the Government restricted production of *dhotis* by mills to 60% of actual production in 1951-52, in order to support the handloom industry.
4. A representation by the West Bengal Government, on 18 December 1952 had, pointed out that since the Bengal mills were specially equipped with white looms, suitable for production of *dhotis*, they might be allowed to produce more than the stipulated quota as a matter of compensation. The Government of India, in March 1953, increased the ceiling on production of *dhotis* in Bengal from 60% to 80% of the actual production for 1951-52. Nevertheless, some Bengal mills were reported to have openly violated the ceiling.

very large number of mills have adjusted themselves to the new conditions. It would be grossly unfair for them to suffer by our allowing some mills to contravene the decisions of Government. We feel therefore that it is important that action should be taken against the mills that have deliberately gone against Government's orders. We may, to begin with, choose only the principal offenders and not pay much attention to border-line cases. We may even take special factors into consideration. But, allowing for all this, where the offence is obvious and deliberate, action has to be taken. I hope you will do so.

Yours affectionately,
Jawahar

5. To Mahavir Tyagi¹

New Delhi
May 10, 1953

My dear Mahavir,

I enclose a letter from Hanumanthaiya, Chief Minister of Mysore State.² You will see that he refers to Hindustan Aircraft Factory and wants us to buy up the Mysore Government share. I do not myself see why we should do so and it is desirable that the Mysore Government should be financially interested in this. However I should like your reactions.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(420/56-PMS. A similar letter was written to Jagjivan Ram.
2. Hanumanthaiya wrote on 6 May 1953, that Mysore Government had invested Rs. 75 lakhs in the Hindustan Aircraft and Rs. 25 lakhs in the Indian Telephone Industries. The former was no longer a Joint Stock Company and had been taken over by the Defence Ministry. He requested Nehru whether a sum of a crore of rupees could be returned to the Mysore Government.

6. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
May 10, 1953

My dear Bidhan,

I have received a copy of your letter sent to Hariharnath Shastri about the INTUC in Bengal. I have also received some other papers. I am unable to form in very detail or correct opinion about the situation in Bengal in regard to his matter. But I am distressed at various developments and the fact that the Congress should have called upon Congressmen to withdraw from the INTUC.²

As you know, our general policy has been to give the INTUC complete freedom and at the same time to cooperate with it fully. That is the only big labour organisation in India, which cooperates with the Congress. The Congress as such has no labour organisation: The conflict with the INTUC is, therefore, very regrettable. The result is to strengthen the communist trade organisations. It has been after very hard work that the INTUC has managed to stand up to the communist unions. Therefore, to weaken the INTUC is in any way unwise.

Our attempts have been to come in the labour field with the INTUC and the Socialist trade union organisation to come together. That was the most effective way of facing communist unions and, to some extent, progress has been made in this respect. The Railwaymen's Federation, which is highly important from every point of view, is now associated with the INTUC, much to the annoyance of the communists.

All this movement has now received a check by the developments in Bengal. I am not competent to judge whose fault this may be, but the result is bad.

Apart from this, it does seem odd that while Congressmen cooperate with the INTUC in every State in India, in Bengal they should be ordered to withdraw cooperation.

In these matters I attach some value to the opinion of Gulzarilal Nanda and Khandubhai Desai.³ They have been distressed at this development also.

Yours sincerely,
Jawahar

1. JN Collection.

2. On 2 May 1953, the West Bengal PCC passed a resolution at Garbeta, Midnapore, asking Congressmen to dissociate themselves from the Executive Committee of BPNTUC, which included PSP members. The WPCC alleged that the PSP had "joined hands with the Communists in contesting the forthcoming North Calcutta bye-election, and had described the Congress as a reactionary organisation." Atulya Ghosh stated in the meeting that Congressmen could not work with the BPNTUC leaders who had a distinct political ideology hostile to that of the Congress.

3. President, INTUC and member, House of the People.

7. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
May 12, 1953

My dear Sri Babu,

I wrote to you sometime ago about labour disputes in Jamshedpur and roundabout.² I had a visit today from Ghandhy,³ General Manager of the Tata Iron & Steel Company, and he spoke to me about the situation there. Our Labour Minister, V.V. Giri, is also concerned about it.

You have probably seen the note on the labour situation which Ghandhy has prepared.⁴

I have had a talk with Khandubhai Desai also and he knows all about it. It is clear to me that this situation, if it is allowed to develop, will break up all our labour organisations in Jamshedpur and leave a clear field to the communists. I am amazed that this irresponsible behaviour should be indulged in by some of our labour workers without thinking of the consequences.⁵ I cannot allot blame, but the general impression I have gathered is that the group represented by Vyas⁶ and Mukherji⁷ appears to be aggressive. They are

1. JN Collection.

2. In February-March 1953, 6000 workers of TISCO went on strike demanding wage-hike and reinstatement of retrenched workers. The strike spread to neighbourhood factories, where INTUC was the only recognised Union. The workers alleged that the INTUC leadership had failed to effectively take up their demands and passed a motion of no confidence against the Union leadership.

3. Jehangir Jivaji Ghandhy was Director, Tata Industries Ltd., Jamshedpur, since 1946.

4. Since 1949-50, TISCO followed a policy of 'wage-freeze' and 'retrenchment', while pushing up the 'minimum per worker production quota'. Between 1951 and 1953, around 6000 workers had been retrenched while average production had gone up by 3 tons per worker.

5. Any early solution of the workers' demands was directly impeded by "bitter factional fights among the Congressmen and INTUC people." Michael John, the Union leader, belonged to Labour and Finance Minister of Bihar, Anugrah Narain Sinha group and those demanding his removal were backed by Sri Krishna Sinha group. By April 1953, the latter group had managed to oust John from three factories.

6. Mohanlal P. Vyas, Executive Council member, INTUC.

7. Kalipada Mukherjee (1916-1989); General Secretary, Eastern India Railway Works Union and Assistant Secretary, Bengal Branch of AITUC; joined INTUC in 1946; went to England on a British trade union scholarship to study trade union movement, 1951; member, West Bengal Assembly, 1952-57; organised National Union of Jute Workers; President, West Bengal PCC and President, Bengal Branch of INTUC, 1962-71; member, Rajya Sabha, 1972-78.

out to capture the leadership of the INTUC from John.⁸ More especially, I do not see why Vyas, a share-broker, comes into the picture. He is apparently a Gujarati Congressman and he should work in the Congress. But interfering in labour politics in this way and breaking up the INTUC is a very serious matter.

I should like you to take some personal interest in this matter and see to it that this unfortunate development is nipped in the bud. Otherwise, it will have the most serious consequences for Jamshedpur.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. Michael John (1903-1977); Member, AICC; President, Indian National Iron and Steel Workers' Federation, Colliery Mazdoor Sangh, Indian National Mineworkers Federation, INTUC (Bihar and Orissa branches); courted imprisonment for political and trade union activities, 1941, 1942-45; Member, Bihar Assembly, 1946-52; President, Central INTUC, 1952, 1953, 1960-61, 1961-62; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1957-62.

8. To V.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
May 12, 1953

My dear V.T.,²

I have some old papers lying with me about the possibility of our acquiring shipping. I was rather shocked to find that we had spent about a hundred crores in payment of freight charges for foodgrains. I suppose that was inevitable. But the point obviously arises that if we could have applied some of the money to the purchase of ships, we could have saved some part of the charges and built up gradually a mercantile marine.

I am sending you these papers so that you might have them examined in the Planning Commission,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Member, National Planning Commission.

9. To A.P. Jain¹

New Delhi
May 19, 1953

My dear Ajit,²

Your letter about Faridabad.³ I notice that efforts are being made and have partly succeeded in giving employment, but the problem is far from solved.

You say that your considered view is that big industries should be set up by Government in Faridabad. I do not know what you mean by big industries, but big industries cost big money. As for Defence, they are manufacturing most things they want or are setting up plants. I do not know what you mean by articles required by Defence. If you have any particular thing in view in regard to Defence or other Ministries, you might suggest it. But any large sum of money will be difficult to fit in with our Plan.

Your sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No.29(197)/50-PMS.
2. Union Minister for Rehabilitation.
3. Jain had written that despite substantial concessions offered by the Government, no big industrialist was prepared to invest in Faridabad, resulting in acute unemployment.

10. To V.V. Giri¹

Camp: Srinagar
May 23, 1953

My dear Giri,

Your letter of the 14th May reached me a few days ago. I have been so terribly busy that I could not give full attention. It is a long letter and raises very important issues.

My first reaction to this letter was one of surprise that you should not have written or discussed these matters with me at a much earlier stage. Apart from the special questions which you have mentioned, I have been distantly following the argument that has been going on as between what is called compulsory arbitration and other processes. I have vaguely gathered that there was some difference in approach to these problems between you and the leaders of the INTUC. I read about the labour conferences that you had convened

1. JN Collection.

without knowing much, as to what they were about. It seemed to me that it would have been desirable for you as well as the INTUC people to discuss these matters informally with me and others before a definite line was taken. That, perhaps, would have avoided some controversy.

This applies to the questions you have raised in your letter also, namely, your differences of opinion with the Railways and Defence Ministries. These matters have not come up before me at all in any shape or form, though I have vaguely heard about them.

I am no expert in labour matters and obviously I have to rely on the large experience which you have or which some of the leaders of the INTUC or other trade union organizations possess. Therefore, I move a little warily and seek advice. But, as you know, I have been deeply interested in labour questions and all my sympathies had been and are with labour. I would hate to do anything which puts labour in a disadvantageous position or which even makes labour think that they are not having a fair deal with Government.

I think you are right in saying that some of our colleagues perhaps do not appreciate the labour point of view as much as they might and that they look upon these questions more from a purely governmental point of view. I do not think they lack sympathy with labour, but the emphasis is rather different. I should personally like that emphasis to be the other way. I am quite clear in my mind that any government such as ours must carry the broad majority of labour opinion with it.

There is a certain difference which has to be borne in mind. Both in the political and the labour and industrial field, conditions have changed somewhat because of the coming of independence. In a political sense labour can exercise more influence in one way. That is right. But if labour thinks of Government as a hostile party, then, to some extent, Government reacts in the wrong way also. We seem to suffer from a hangover of the old days, both politically and industrially. But I am inclined to agree with you that there has been a tendency in Governments, both Central and State, to look upon labour as some troublesome force which occasionally makes a nuisance of itself. This is so certainly in so far as communist activities are concerned.

You have raised many questions about which I cannot write at length because they require full consideration and consultation. I would like to discuss these matters with you as well as with the representatives of Railways and Defence Ministries. I should also like to discuss the broader labour questions with you and Khandubhai Desai, Gulzarilal Nanda and Hariharnath Shastri. Indeed, separately, I would like to discuss them with Jayaprakash Narayan also. I think these informal discussions should take place before we put up these matters before the Cabinet. I am afraid I cannot do so for some time as I am going away to Europe. On my return, let us pick up the threads. I fear there is little chance of our finding time during the next session of Parliament

for a major Bill on labour relations.² That session is going to last barely six weeks and we have a very heavy agenda already, including the Estates Duty Bill . Therefore, we have time to consider these matters fully. It is far better to convince each other before we argue these questions in Cabinet.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Giri proposed to move an Industrial Relations Bill suggesting that, no employee who had been in service for not less than a year, could be retrenched until he had been given one month's notice in writing or wages for the said period of notice and gratuity at the rate of fifteen days of average pay for completed number of years in service. This was aimed at preventing the widespread retrenchment of workers resorted to by the Government and private sector during 1952-53.

11. Nationalization of Air Transport¹

On the occasion of the nationalisation of air transport in India, I send you my good wishes.² This is a great step forward both from the public point of view and that of Government. It is our objective to develop State enterprises to serve the public. Indian air services and transport have made great progress under private enterprise and we should be grateful, for the good work that has been done and, more especially, to the pioneers in India. The time has now come for this new step to convert this great undertaking into public enterprise. I welcome it and wish it all success.

1. Message of good wishes sent to Jagjivan Ram, London, 9 June 1953. JN Collection.
2. The Air Corporation Act 1953, nationalising the air transport services in India, received the Presidential assent on 28 May 1953 and came into force on 1 August 1953.
3. J.R.D. Tata, Chairman, Tata Industries, started the first air transport company, Tata Sons and Tata Aviation Department, in 1932. Besides the Tata group of companies, the other companies in operation during 1950s were: The Indian National Airways Ltd, New Delhi, Air Services of India Ltd., Bombay, Deccan Airways Ltd, Begumpet, Airways (India) Ltd., Calcutta, Bharat Airways Ltd., Calcutta, Himalayan Aviation Ltd, Calcutta, and Kalinga Airlines, Calcutta.

I. THE ECONOMY

(ii) Food, Famine and Relief

1. Famine Conditions and the People¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: The vast crowds that have gathered at the public meetings I have addressed and the multitudes who have thronged by the road-side waiting for me have come as a great revelation to me. In my 1,100 mile-tour I have seen popular enthusiasm as never before. All this has for me a great significance.

I am not thinking in personal terms. For a moment I am a focal point to the people. I may be a symbol to them but that is a small thing. I do not think I will see such types of popular demonstrations in such large numbers in any part of the world at any time.

There may be large gatherings at celebrations on popular occasions like football finals, but this sort of eruption on a countrywide scale as seen here is something quite unique, something new, and not found in any country in the world. It is something much more than a demonstration. We are not concerned with what is the basis of it. There is something elemental about this most popular movement. The mere fact that this is taking place is highly important and significant and on the whole it is a very hopeful sign of the vitality of the people.

This kind of thing does not take place if people are spiritless, and the vast meetings show abounding vitality. No revolution in a country has seen such a great movement of the people as were seen during my tour. You have been reporting my speeches. In my speeches I repeat things and sometimes I have noticed some of you giving undue emphasis to my oft-repeated statements taking them out of context. For example, my reference at a public meeting at Ahmednagar to India's non-alignment with any power bloc in the event of war was taken out of context and played up.² There was no need for me to make a statement on the world situation at that meeting or at any other meeting here of peasants and workers. I emphasized the economic conditions in the country and the need to wage war on poverty. The real thing to notice was not what

1. Press conference, Jalgaon, 3 May 1953. From *The Times of India*, *The Statesman*, *The Hindu*, *The Hindustan Times* and *National Herald*, 4 May 1953.
2. At a public meeting in Ahmednagar on 1 May 1953. Nehru had said: "The world situation is such that any war among major powers will certainly react on other nations. India has to safeguard against any economic repercussions by strengthening herself and becoming economically strong."

I said, but the whole background of my tour in which I played a small part, and the people of Maharashtra played the major part.

The people's function is more important and I would like observers to bring that out. There are people in movements. You talk of revolution. Nowhere in the world had an economic revolution taken place without toil and bloodshed. In Russia it took 25 years and a lot of blood. In the USA it took more time. No revolution of any type has ever witnessed such a movement of people as was seen during my tour. I think people can do a lot if their energies are canalised to constructive work in the development of the nation. It is a tremendous thing to canalise the vitality and enthusiasm of these people into constructive channels. By a modest estimate I directly addressed over a million people during my tour and met another million people by the roadside.

Some accounts of incidents during my tour as shown in newspapers are remarkable in that they are unknown to me. One incident says that I bodily threw out an MLA, who tried to prostrate himself before me.³ That is quite extraordinary news to me. I have not done any such thing. The other incident is about my visit to the Ahmednagar fort.⁴ The report said that Mr Morarji Desai insisted on saying that I stayed in Room No. 8 and not in the one I was staying in. Morarji Desai did not insist but on the other hand said: "why was the wrong room mentioned?"

Mr Morarji Desai meant it only jocularly when he said Pandit Nehru was making a historical mistake. I showed the party the correct room, room number one, and took them to it.

I am interested in facts and figures, but I am much more interested in the general impression I gather, including the general look of the people. That is most important.

The general impression one gets here is the efficiency with which problems are dealt with. No one without a factual and detailed survey can give a complete opinion. I have been to various scarcity areas in Rayalaseema, Bihar and the eastern districts of Uttar Pradesh. The general impression I get here in Maharashtra is that the people here are much better off than the people in any

3. Another version of the incident reported in *The Hindu* of 4 May 1953 stated that Nehru apparently lost his temper, when several Congress workers were trying to touch his feet, and shouted: "What do you think I am? Are you going to make me a God?"
4. *The Times of India* of 2 May 1953 had reported that during his visit to the Ahmednagar Fort, Nehru was surprised to read a tablet put up in room no.8 saying that "Mr Nehru lived here." On his protesting that he did not, Morarji Desai was reported to have said in a lighter vein: "You are distorting history. We have consulted all authorities before coming to this conclusion." Nehru retorted: "History cannot change so soon.... I am the authority to say where I lived." Later, on investigation it was found that the confusion had arisen due to renumbering of the rooms undertaken afterwards.

other scarcity areas I visited. The condition of Gorakhpur in Uttar Pradesh, which is a scarcity area, is worse than here. The basic poverty of the people there is worse than here. The only emaciated persons I saw during my tour of Maharashtra were in the free kitchens. So far as large numbers of people are concerned I did not notice anyone emaciated among those engaged on scarcity works. The people here are fine peasants. I am impressed with their very fine behaviour. They are sturdy and strong. They are a magnificent people generally, who stand up to difficulties courageously and do not whine or get overwhelmed and surrender to them. That is my general impression.

Another impression I got was that there was efficiency in dealing with problems at Governmental level as well as on the popular side. There has been a great deal of cooperation between the two sides—district famine relief committees and Government.

Large parts are inflicted by famine or scarcity conditions periodically. That is to say people live on the doors of scarcity most of the time. This kind of situation must be done away with. The situation is not only to be dealt with temporarily, but as far as possible, by some more permanent cure for it. That becomes part of the much larger part of a much larger problem—that of raising the economic condition of the people, increasing rural production and irrigation facilities. I am glad to notice that every type of relief work here by the Government is connected with or has been linked with some permanent project, some permanent improvement. I have noticed some works which were undertaken 30 or 40 years ago to meet famine conditions and neglected thereafter. Those works have now been taken up.⁵

We must be prepared for famine conditions and apply our energy to solving their basic causes. A permanent solution to this problem would be to attain greater production of food through better irrigational facilities and a higher economic level, so that people could meet bad times.

Finally apart from the background of scarcity, you gentlemen who have been travelling with me noticed the vast gatherings of people who have come to my meetings and the equally large number of people who met us on the road-side. All this has for me a great significance.

Q: Did the big meetings at Sholapur, Karad, Ahmednagar and Sabra, take place in the strongholds of leftist rivals of the Congress Party?

JN: Positively and negatively, in essence, these meetings and the reception accorded to us indicated forces, which are bigger than those comprising petty

5. The Government of India had sanctioned a loan of Rs 54.75 lakhs for development of 12 minor irrigation projects and Rs 111.3 lakhs for development of major irrigation projects to the Government of Bombay in February 1953.

political movements, whether of leftists or rightists, whatever you might call them. These are powerful forces, which should be used in building up the new India. Without meaning the slightest offence to leftist movements I feel that they really play about on the fringe of the problem. Sometimes others also play about the fringe.

Q: Was it not personal affection that drew large crowds?

JN: Personal affection is a remarkable thing. Personal affection of the crowd is a great thing. It is not for individuals. It is a symbol of something the people hold in their minds. The discipline of vast gatherings everywhere was fine. I do not blame the crowds when they come and try to occupy open spaces and such open spaces should not be kept at public meetings.

Q: Will the Centre give further aid to the Bombay Government to deal with scarcity conditions?

JN: I cannot answer questions regarding a loan or immediate aid from the Centre as half a dozen States put identical demands. Conditions in Rajasthan were worse than in Maharashtra and the Centre had to give thought to all. The Government of India has half a dozen other scarcity problems in other States. They have to look to all these with equal earnestness. There is now pretty serious scarcity in Bikaner.

The question of famine can be solved. A permanent solution is through greater production, better irrigation, soil conservation and a higher economic level which can enable people to tide over a bad season or two.

2. To C. Subramaniam¹

New Delhi
May 8, 1953

My dear Subramaniam,

I have seen a statement issued by you to the press about the financial condition

1. JN Collection.

of the Madras State.² I know that that condition is not good and that you deserve all the help that we can give you. But, while you no doubt realise the condition of Madras, perhaps you have less appreciation of the condition of many other parts of the country which is also very serious. Any concession that we frame would also apply elsewhere.

Of course you would prefer a grant to a loan. Everybody does, so would other States. But what exactly becomes of our Five Year Plan and the careful allotment of the resources that we have made. If we decide to put aside this Five Year Plan, it is another matter. But that will be a serious affair.

I can understand helping any developmental or productive schemes, that is an investment which should yield results in some way or other. If it is an investment of this kind, then this kind of work should be met by loans, whether directly from the people or from the Centre. I can also understand our having to meet acute conditions of distress in any part of the country where these occur and trying to help to the best of our ability. But personally I think that the only right way to meet these conditions is by developmental work, except in the cases of relatively few individuals.

I rather regret public statements of the kind you have issued. Because, if we have a public controversy, it will do neither the State nor the Centre any good.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. In a statement on 6 May 1953, C. Subramaniam, the Finance Minister of the Madras Government, had observed that the resources of the State had been overstretched, due to adverse weather conditions and a consequential failure of the crops. Various forms of relief measures and tax remissions had cost the Madras authorities about 17 crores by 31 March 1953. Indeed, Madras had experienced a failure of seasonal rains for six consecutive years. Subramaniam, therefore, asked for an outright grant instead of a loan.

3. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
May 10, 1953

My dear T.T.,

This morning as I opened the newspapers I was astonished and distressed to

1. C.D. Deshmukh Papers, NMML.

read a statement you had made immediately on arrival in Madras.² I enclose a cutting from the *Times of India*. This occurs in other papers too and is given great prominence.

We have been trying to avoid public arguments and criticisms between Ministers of the Central Government and the State Governments, because such arguments can do no good and only create conflict and illwill. For you to say on arrival in Madras that Madras expenditure on famine relief "is a bogey raised by the State Government to get more money from the Centre" is surely something that will immediately raise passions all round and lead to public controversy. It is tantamount to attacking the bonafides of the Madras Government. That Government will react strongly to it and probably the press and the people will take this up also. Instead, therefore, of your visit being helpful in dealing with the difficult situation, it will create fresh complications.

I am not, for the moment, going into facts, whatever they might be. Even if the facts were as stated by you, this kind of approach cannot be helpful. In fact it would be legitimate criticism to say that you have arrived with a closed mind and are going to travel round not to find what the situation is, but merely to confirm an opinion previously arrived at. That surely is a wrong and unfair approach and is bound to be resented. Your final judgment of the situation will be criticised as vitiated because of a pre-conceived opinion.

It is a difficult enough matter to keep this vast country with its variety and different pulls to hold together and cooperate. Everything that comes in the way of this adds to these difficulties. Our State Governments have to deal with immediate issues and more directly with human beings and their problems than we in the Central Government. Each one of them, no doubt, tends to emphasise its own difficulties, and it is the business of the Central Government to look at the entire picture and judge accordingly. These differing viewpoints have to be coordinated as far as possible and in as friendly a way as possible. The State Governments have an enormous responsibility to shoulder, so has the Central Government. Neither can discharge that responsibility without a large measure of understanding of the other's position and difficulties. There is no question of the State Government being subordinate to the Central Government, although the Central Government has certain functions which it must discharge, even though the State Government might not like this. Even

2. In a press statement on 9 May, Krishnamachari had dismissed the Madras Government's account of expenditure on famine relief as "a bogey to get more money from the Centre," even after the State had been treated on a preferential footing. He refused to accept C. Subramaniam's contention that conditions prevalent in Madras were exceptional, since the Centre had received pleas for similar support from Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Bharat, Saurashtra and West Bengal.

in doing so, we have to retain the goodwill of the State Government and have to approach the question accordingly.

A number of our State Governments are headed by top-ranking men in India who are certainly in no way inferior to Ministers of the Central Government. I am not merely referring to Rajaji, who has an outstanding position in the political and public life of India. There are some other Chief Ministers who, even if they were not Chief Ministers, occupy an outstanding position. We have to deal with them as colleagues and comrades, as indeed we try to do, whether governmentally or in the Congress Organisation. Many of them are members of the Congress Working Committee, which, in theory and practice, can lay down broad policies for us, subject to the All India Congress Committee or the full session of the Congress approving of them.

There can be no doubt that in several States a very serious situation has arisen on account of scarcity or famine. That has been the immediate responsibility of the State Government, and no Government today can afford to see the consequences of famine without doing its utmost to meet them. When I toured Rayalaseema, I was greatly distressed to see the condition of large numbers of people there. There could be no doubt that they were famished. Much was being done to give them relief. Whether this was enough or not, I could not say. What was being spent on this relief was also a matter for calculation and I could not state what this figure was. My general impression was that conditions in Rayalaseema, so far as the look of the people was concerned, were worse than the conditions I had seen in some other scarcity areas of India. Certainly they were worse than what I have seen in Maharashtra and probably worse than in parts of Bihar. I imagine that the Bikaner area is likely to be worse than any area of Madras, but this is guess-work.

While a State Government may give undue emphasis to its own plight and demand more than it is, in all the circumstances, entitled to, one can understand that demand and one has to judge it sympathetically even though one cannot wholly agree with it. In fact the approach has to be one of sympathy and not of condemnation and criticism.

In your statement you have said that you refused to believe a statement made by the Madras State Finance Minister, C. Subramaniam. Perhaps Subramaniam's statement was not quite correct or was exaggerated. But was it wise for you on arrival immediately to condemn what a State Minister had said?

I travel about a good deal and meet Ministers of State Governments, as well as leading Congressmen. I deliver speeches all over the place. I avoid, as far as I can, uttering a word which might irritate or come in the way of a cooperative and friendly approach. Even when I go to my own province or my own city of Allahabad, I put myself in the hands of the State Government, in

so far as any public activity is concerned. I do not bypass them even when I go on a private visit.

I am disturbed by this development and I am therefore writing to you immediately about it. I hope that you will be able subsequently, in private interviews and in such statements as you might make, to minimise the possible ill-effects of what you said on arrival.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
May 10, 1953

My dear Sri Babu,²

Your letter of the 7th May about the grant of financial assistance from the Centre towards famine relief measures.

I am afraid it is difficult for me to go into these matters myself in detail, nor is it my province. Naturally, I want to help you to the best of our ability, but I want to help other States too who are in great difficulties. We have to make our resources go as far as they can and to apportion them as fairly as possible. I am sending your letter to the Finance Minister.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1 JN Collection.

2. Chief Minister of Bihar.

5. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
May 12, 1953

My dear Rajaji,

Your letter from Patna has just reached me.² As soon as I saw the report in the *Times of India*, to which you refer, I wrote to T.T. Krishnamachari.³ I was greatly shocked by that report. I have just received a telephone message from him to say that the report in the *Times of India* is completely wrong and that a fairly correct report of what he said has, appeared in the *Hindu* on the 10th May. I have seen this report and it is certainly a much better one.

The Times of India is at war with all of us at present and deliberately publishes distorted versions of events.

I can quite understand how pained you must have been to read the report in the *Times of India*. Indeed, it has upset me completely, but in this matter we must accept T.T. Krishnamachari's version. I shall be seeing him soon when he comes back.

I did not know that you were coming to Patna and was a little surprised to read of your visit. I find from the evening papers that you had a somewhat exacting time with the students but you won ultimately by your patience.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. In his letter of 11 May, Rajagopalachari had described Krishnamachari's press interview at Madras as the "height of indecorum" and an insult, adding: "I wonder if I have become a testy old man or whether I have a good cause to be extremely angry."
3. See *ante*, pp. 101-104.

6. To G.S. Bajpai¹

New Delhi
May 12, 1953

My dear Girja,²

I received today an account of the collections made in Maharashtra in the course of my tour there.³ The total amounted to about Rs. 1,03,000/-. A

1. JN Collection.
2. Governor of Bombay.
3. Nehru toured Maharashtra from 28 April to 5 May 1953.

considerable part of the money was collected by the District Famine Relief Committees or the Taluk Congress Committees. Indeed some of the cheques were in the name of the Congress President of Maharashtra, Deokinandan Narayan.⁴

Deokinandan Narayan had suggested to me that this sum should form a separate fund reserved for water relief, which is so badly needed in parts of Maharashtra. He has suggested that three persons should be put in charge of it: B.S. Hiray,⁵ Firodia⁶ (ex-Speaker of Bombay) and himself.

Today I met about twenty Member of Parliament from Maharashtra. They also endorsed this proposal.

I have written about this to Morarji Desai⁷ and if he is agreeable, I shall also agree.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. (1899-1968); teacher, National School, Jalgaon, 1921-25; joined Congress in 1921; General Secretary, Maharashtra PCC, 1923; Member, Reception Committee and Finance Secretary, Faizpur Session of Indian National Congress, 1936; President, MPCC, 1952-54; member, CWC, 1952-54, Rajya Sabha, 1952-64.
5. Minister for Revenue and Agriculture, Bombay, 1952-56.
6. Kundanmal Sobhachand Firodia; a strong Tilakite; began practice in Bombay as a lawyer in 1910; Secretary, Nagar District Conference, 1916; Secretary, the Bombay Provincial Conference held at Nagar, 1916; took prominent part in famine relief in 1918 and 1920 and worked as a Secretary of the Committee; President, Ayurveda Mahavidyalaya since 1917, one of the promoters of the National School at Nagar; took leading part in the collection of Tilak Swarajya Fund and toured Nagar district with Mahatma Gandhi in 1927; Chairman, Nagar Central Cooperative Bank, 1930; President, City Municipality, Ahmednagar, 1940; Speaker, Bombay Assembly; on the Editorial staff of *Sangha Shakti*, an organ of Congress in Nagar.
7. Chief Minister of Bombay.

7. The Five Year Plan and the Food Problem¹

Question: How is the Five Year Plan in India getting on?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I think India is getting on better than most of us expected

1. Press conference, London, 8 June 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Also from *India News*, 13 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference, see pp. 130, 174, 189-190, 358-359, 396-399, 407 and 448-450.

in regard to the Five Year Plan. An important factor in this connection is popular response and very considerable enthusiasm on the part of the people which is a very helpful sign. We have had to contend against scarcity and difficult food conditions which have led to many of the States spending their resources in order to meet the crisis, with the result that their resources for development are somewhat limited, but one very important factor in India today is her success on the food front. It is a very basic thing. You will be interested to learn that when we drew up our draft Five Year Plan the chapter on food looked forward to heavy imports of food within the next three or four years. By the time the draft was ready for consideration it had to be reversed for the better. It is already out of date since we revised it and we have gone further ahead than the Plan hoped we might, and it is quite possible that in the course of another year or so we might be self-sufficient in food, which is a very considerable achievement...

I. THE ECONOMY (iii) Land Reforms

1. K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
May 8, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

I enclose copy of a letter from Morarji Desai.²

In my letters to Chief Ministers as well as in personal interviews, I lay great stress on expediting land legislation because I think this is of the highest importance. I am told by them that the delay is not due to them, but to the Government of India where Bills are kept for months at a time before they are passed for the President's assent. I do not know why this delay should take place, specially in such highly urgent matters affecting land reform. It may be necessary for close attention to be paid to Bills that come from some of the

1. JN Collection.

2. On 5 May 1953, Morarji Desai mentioned about "a good deal of delay in obtaining and communicating the President's assent" to some of the Bills abolishing outmoded land tenures.

small States where they have not got adequate machinery, but the bigger States are careful enough and, in any event, whatever suggestions we have to make ought to be made within a few days and the matter finalised.

Could you please look into this matter personally and have it finalised? Not only the Personal Inams Abolition Bill is held up,³ but so are six other Bills abolishing out of date land tenures.⁴ I do not think it is at all right that State Governments, which are responsible to their Parliaments and their electors and have to keep their promise to them, should be held up in this way.

I should like you to enquire from your Ministry how many other Bills from other States are pending. This will apply both to Home and States.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Desai reiterated that the Personal Inams Abolition Bill was introduced in the State Legislature after obtaining the administrative approval of the Government of India and was passed on 21 August 1952. It was submitted by the Governor on 20 September 1952, for the consideration of the President. The Government raised various objections, to which the replies were given, and the Bill was left unattended to. The delay had resulted in considerable financial loss to the Government of Bombay.
4. He further mentioned that in respect of six other Bills abolishing outmoded land tenures which were passed by the State Legislature in the previous budget session, the communication of the administrative approval of the Government of India had been delayed pending the "decision on certain points raised in the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Bill."

2. To C.C. Biswas¹

New Delhi
May 9, 1953

My dear Biswas,²

I have received complaints from several States about the great delays in our passing some Bills which are referred to us. In particular, I had a letter from Morarji Desai about the Personal Inams Abolition Bill which was passed by the Bombay State Legislature as long ago as August 1952. It has been with us now for 8 months. This seems to me a very long time. And it has very bad

1. JN Collection.

2. Union Minister for Law and Minority Affairs.

consequences in the State. It upsets their budget and public reaction to our not keeping our promises is widespread.

But I really do not see why we should delay these matters at all. Unless there is something obviously wrong in a Bill, we should pass it. We need not trouble to look into every word and phrase. The State Government, especially a State like Bombay, has competent lawyers and draftsmen and can generally be relied upon. All we have to do is to see that there is nothing patently wrong and, indeed, to consider the point referred to us and not everything.

Because of this Personal Inams Abolition Bill, I understand that a number of other Bills from Bombay are also held up because they are waiting for a decision on the Inams Abolition Bill. This is very unfortunate.

Could you please look into this matter immediately? And also find out what other Bills are held up?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Abolition of Jagirs¹

I enclose a letter from the Chief Minister of Bombay.²

I do not know what the Government of India intends doing in this matter. Whatever we might do, there appears to be no reason why we should ask the Bombay Government to postpone their contemplated legislation. I have been pressing State Governments to go ahead with this type of land legislation and even if we cannot proceed all over India simultaneously, we should not come in the way of a State. Pledges have been given to the public in most States and it is embarrassing for the Governments of these States not to be able to fulfill them.

I suggest, therefore, that the necessary permission should be given to the Bombay Government.

1. Note to the Minister of States, New Delhi, 21 May 1953. JN Collection.

2. The letter, dated 20 May 1953, was in regard to abolition of jagirs in the merged areas of the State.

I. THE ECONOMY

(iv) Community Development Projects

1. Building New India¹

Before one tries to answer a question, obviously one has to frame the question. One must have a fairly clear idea of the question to which we are seeking an answer. I find that all of us—whether we are politicians or others—are trying to find answers to questions which have not been framed. Of course, one can say, broadly speaking, we want India to advance; we want India to produce more; we want more employment; we want to put an end to unemployment; we want a higher standard of living. Everybody can say that.

Nevertheless, to do that there must be some understanding not only of present-day forces at work but of historical tendencies, see past background, the racial background, and so on. They help. Nobody can be an expert in everything, but it is as well to see things in perspective. Otherwise we get lost in the wood. Whether it is in Parliament or elsewhere, one is entangled in hundreds of petty things. They may be important by themselves. For a villager a thing in his village may be very important: it concerns his life. Nevertheless, it may not be important from an all-India point of view. Most of us have a somewhat narrow outlook, parochially-minded, worried about little things. This is inevitable, but one should see things in the larger perspective. Today more than ever that perspective has become essential because of the various elements. We are not isolated; one cannot be isolated.

I was reading a little book yesterday by Arnold Toynbee²—*The World and the West*. It is interesting and five or six chapters have been devoted to "Islam and the West", "India and the West", "The Far East and the West" and so on. He considers the impact of Western civilization on those various areas. He considers Russia, that is, Communism, as some kind of Christian heresy. Just as the old Greek Church was heresy for the Roman Church. It was very different from the normal Western Church. Toynbee describes Islam also as a Christian heresy in the sense that the Islam of the Mediterranean countries had a

1. Speech at a meeting of the State Development Commissioners, New Delhi, 18 April 1953. JN Collection.
2. Arnold Joseph Toynbee (1889-1975); taught at Balliol College, Oxford, 1912-15; Professor of History, London University, 1919-24; Director and Research Professor, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1925-55; author of, *A Study of History* (12 vols), published between 1934 and 1961, edited, *Survey of International Affairs*, covering the years, 1920-46, and chose, *The World and the West* (1953) as subject for the 1952 BBC-Reith Lectures.

somewhat Greco-Roman background. Anyhow, he regards the Islamic countries as separate, having a world of difference, influenced somewhat, no doubt, by other countries and influencing them also, but living its own life, with its own roots which are pretty deep. So he discusses the impact of different civilizations. The impact was resisted in China. In India the story was different somewhat.

Then came the impact of what might be called Western technology. What was that? We might say it was the entire Western culture generally plus technology. Oriental culture on the whole resisted the cultural impact successfully. It did not want to be uprooted. The impact of Western technology, however, could not be resisted because of the inherent power of technology. Take Russia. Russia before Peter the Great was defeated on several occasions in wars by this or that country because of the superior technology of those countries. So Peter decided to westernize his country in a wholesale way, not merely technologically but in other ways too. He did that in order to preserve his country.

Let us take Turkey. Turkey became weaker and weaker but because of the old reputation of the Ottoman Empire, though for a hundred or two hundred years it was very weak, yet the foreign powers were afraid of it. Ultimately Sultan Abdul Hamid decided to have a westernized army. So westernization in Turkey began with the Army, with the result that revolutionary tendencies arose in the Army. New ideas came through the Army and Kemal Pasha and others represented that revolution. It was the military officers who represented it and Kemal Pasha went all out for westernization—hundred per cent.

In India the process of westernization came rather differently. We were overwhelmed by British power and the process came while we were under British power. It developed slowly and gradually. In China, on the other hand, they were not overwhelmed that way. Nevertheless, they had to start westernizing from the technological point of view.

I mention all this because without a background of these things, we are apt to be overwhelmed by present-day problems. For example, communism or the fear of it, both of which can be an obsession. In Russia the Communists are in the midst of a vital experiment which has partly succeeded. It is a living thing and because it is Russia's own experiment, she can change it. Communists in other countries are not indulging in any experiment; they are only indulging in some dogmas and they go on repeating them again and again. Insofar as Russia is concerned, those dogmas are realistic. They fit in there. But insofar as they are repeated elsewhere, they are not realistic; they do not fit in, because the conditions are different, and insofar as the conditions are different, the dogmas are artificial.

That is why I have often said that the average Communist outside Russia is apt to become very reactionary in thinking, although he considers himself very revolutionary in thinking. Revolution does not consist in breaking

heads. In fact, such breaking of heads may bring about a reactionary change; it may bring about a counter-revolution, as represented, let us say, by Hitler.

We have to examine what is the revolutionary change that we require, and what are the forces at work. We have to encourage those forces, allowing them to go as far as possible, taking care that they do not reverse the march and bring about a counter-revolution or bring about absolute chaos. Both these results have occurred in history, and one has to avoid them. I mentioned Hitler. Hitler's is a clear case of certain revolutionary tendencies coming into conflict. There you had the Communists on the one hand, and the Social Democrats on the other, neutralising each other, and a counter-revolutionary force coming in—that is, Hitlerism or Fascism—and sweeping the board, till it was liquidated in the Great War. We must not be lost in those extremes.

I referred to Arnold Toynbee. There is something in what he says; but not a great deal. I do not think there was a terrible deal of difference in the background of that so-called medieval period between the average Indian and the average European. Of course there was a difference. I am not denying that, but there was no very great difference. The average Greek in those times coming to India, or the average Indian going to Greece, would not have been surprised at the things he would have noticed in the country.

The change that has come almost on the technological plane, however, has made a vast difference between the West and the East. It has made a difference not only in the way people live, but in their hearts even. Necessarily, because ultimately your method of living controls your thinking. The way you live affects your thinking. It is controlled a good deal by the job you do. The vast majority of the people are engaged in production of some sort, whether it is agricultural production or industrial production. And they are conditioned by their work. The agricultural man, the peasant, is conditioned by his daily work. As agricultural conditions change, the condition of his mind changes too. As industrial conditions change, there is a change in the mind of the industrial worker.

Technological developments bring about huge changes. Today we take trains, aeroplanes, radio, etc., for granted. But we have not yet got what is called an industrial background. Whether it is good or bad, it is a fact. That background exists in America, which is the world's most highly industrialised country. Its background is technological and industrial, so much so that the machine begins to become almost human in the way in which it works and while this happens, the human beings become more like machines. I am not considering the good and the evil of it. I am just trying to analyse what is happening.

The basic fact is that the tremendous pace of technological advance that has forced itself upon the people, whether they like it or not, because technological advance represents power. It represents military power. If you have not got it, well, you cannot protect yourself; you become a subject or a slave country. That is why Abdul Hamid of Turkey in spite of all hatred for

the western civilisation, adopted western military methods. Japan did it deliberately. It did not take western culture but it took western technology and western warfare methods and it became a great power. It is this technological development which has changed the entire face of the world.

Most of us are not conscious of this when we see the technological advances made by America and Europe; we do not realise what all this means. In a sense, our minds function in an agricultural or pre-industrial age. The pace of change is so great that we begin to wonder.

I want you to realise this extraordinary fact that while all these technological and other changes come out of the mind of man, nevertheless, the mind of man very often lags behind them. There was the French Revolution over 160 years ago with its war cries of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity and it was based on a generation or two of previous mental preparation of the people. The Industrial Revolution followed which was in fact a much bigger thing in the way in which it changed the entire outlook of the people; but even when the Industrial Revolution had advanced in Europe for 60 or 70 years, the minds of men were still concerned with the French Revolution, not realising that the world was changing rapidly under the impact of the Industrial Revolution. I am pointing it out how events were marching in those days and, are now marching more swiftly than men's minds. We have to be very wide awake about it. First of all we should try to understand them—not necessarily to accept everything, not necessarily to be blown off our feet but to try and understand them, because if we did not do so, whether we like it or not, we may be thrown off our feet, we may be submerged in some wave.

Perhaps these are more than what is required to be said on this occasion, which has no direct relevance, but I am saying all this to make you think, to broaden your outlook. It amazes me that while mighty problems are cropping up, in the world, mighty forces are at work and tremendous technological changes are taking place, change that I find in our country, is on the communal plane which is fantastic nonsense to me. It shows the utter immaturity of the individual or the group that talks and argues in that way. It has no relation to the present-day world, I mean the talks about Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communalism. It just shows that they are completely backward in their thinking, in their minds. They never grasp the march of events in the centuries past and in the era they live in. Our country as a whole will be doomed and will continue to be a backward country as in the past while other countries will go ahead.

Everybody will agree, even the rank communalist, that we must be technologically advanced, we must have a modern, up-to-date army, we must have the latest aeroplanes, even the atom bomb. But it is not realised that the latest types of aeroplane and armies are the outcome of a certain mind, of a certain mental approach. You cannot have the medieval mind and have the latest type of aeroplanes too. You cannot have modern development, modern

technology with a medieval mentality behind it, which is represented in many ways in India but which is represented more than in anything else, by what is called the communal outlook. Of course, any kind of narrow outlook is bad in itself.

I shall give you another instance showing the very vivid changes that have been taking place in the world on account of technology, and that is in regard to transport and communications. The centenary of Indian Railways is at present being celebrated.³ In some other parts of the world, the Railways might have started a few years earlier, say one hundred and fifty years ago. Before that, what was the swiftest means of transport or communication? A fast horse. One hundred and fifty years ago it was the same means as existed a thousand years ago and two thousand years ago. It was the swiftest means in Akbar's time or even later, right up to the time of the British. Even the British at first were sending urgent messages on fast horses. Now comes in the technological development and we got not only the railway, but also the telegraph, the telephone; we got the automobile, the aeroplane, the radio and other things.

There was an unchanging world for thousands of years. Then suddenly these developments began, about 150 years ago. The changes came one after the other and the pace increased. They affect our daily lives. Obviously, therefore, they affect all our organizational structures. They affect ultimately our thinking. So you will see how we go on changing with the pace of technological development. The last War ended six or eight years ago. It is said that every weapon used in the last War is out of date completely because technology in the meantime has advanced. Technology has affected human life.

It is a truism to say that the world is passing through a great crisis; that India is passing through a very crucial period of her existence. That is natural after a hundred and seventy years of British rule. Foreign rule may have had its advantages by bringing us into contact with new ideas, new things, but, obviously, there were many disadvantages too. Foreign rule attempted to perpetuate artificial things; artificial social structure and artificial economic conditions. Foreign rule in India kept going the Indian princes, the princely Order. Had the British not come here, I do not know what would have happened. Probably some big empires might have grown and faded out. But it is dead clear that we would not have had 600 princely States. The mere fact that the moment the British went away, all these Indian States collapsed is amazing. The whole world was astonished. They collapsed because they had no basic strength. Whatever strength they had was the strength of the British Empire which was protecting them. That protecting structure gone, they collapsed.

That is how foreign rule keeps giving artificial things in a country. When that foreign rule is removed, we try to find a new equilibrium—a new order.

3. The Centenary of the Indian Railways was celebrated on 16 April 1953.

That is a painful process, the old things disappearing and changes taking place in the social and economic structure. Normally, of course, all this happens through war and bloodshed but the fact is that we have brought about some of these changes in a relatively peaceful way.

The effect of the removal of foreign rule meant releasing all kinds of new forces, which were suppressed earlier. The question before us is how far we can utilize those forces in the right direction. If we do not so utilize them, they go in the wrong direction. It is no good our getting angry with those forces, or disliking them. That is silly. It is just like your getting angry with the cold wind outside.

Here in India we have a remarkable circumstance of a certain leadership continuing, a certain organisation—the Congress—continuing after the changeover and thus preventing any relapse into chaotic conditions, thereby also moderating the pace of the changeover. It is good up to a certain extent; it may become bad if it goes too far.

These forces that have been released owing to upsurge of freedom relate to all kinds of fields—social, political, economic and the rest. We have to go through a number of changes in all these domains. In other words, we have to bring about a revolution on many fronts. If we had the time everything would have been taken up step by step. We have not got the time. And if we do not succeed, events will overwhelm us.

Leaving out social and other matters, economic questions are always dominant. If we have to survive as an independent country—and we must remember that independence does not survive by itself, it must be continually nurtured—we must have strength. Strength today is ultimately economic strength. We talk about our armed forces. They are there; quite good. But in the equation of defence, the armed forces are only a small part; if you like, 25 per cent. The remaining 75 per cent come from other things. They are the industrial production of the country which supplies the armed forces with weapons and all the rest of it comprising the economic strength of a nation. Thus even from the point of view of survival, it becomes a thing of urgent necessity that we should advance economically. Again you can only satisfy the forces that have been released through independence by bringing about higher standards of employment, etc. If you do not do that, chaotic conditions will come. So it becomes a basic and urgent thing to tackle this problem on the economic plane, which ultimately means tackling it on the human plane.

It seems a simple equation, does it not, that we want greater production, which means greater wealth? I am taking it for granted, of course, that there will be more equitable distribution of wealth. That is essential. We cannot have wealth concentrated. That will not bring about higher standards or satisfaction for the people or indeed real progress for the people. So, with greater production we want more employment. Now, it is obvious that more

employment should lead to greater production. It purely becomes a question of how to join up the two. That is not a very easy matter. But there should be no insuperable difficulties.

Money in an internal economy should not finally come in the way. But it is dangerous if you play about with money too much. Thereby you upset the prices and bring about inflation and all that, which is dangerous. So, we have always to take care that whatever we do in money matters, inflation does not come in because that upsets everything and more especially planning. The extreme examples in this connection are what happened in Germany and what happened in China.

We have got a great deal of unemployment in our country. We have to do something now which the British Government did not think it was responsible for. If we have a famine or scarcity in any part of our country, we cannot give the excuse that we have not got enough money to give out. We may not be able to deal with it adequately, but we cannot say—and no Government can say—“We are very sorry; there is no money; people have to die.” We may beg, borrow or steal, we may become bankrupt, but we cannot allow our people to die like that. So in any sense we are responsible, negatively speaking, for people not dying of hunger. We do not, however, yet consider ourselves positively responsible for people being in good health. But we should do it. And the real responsibility of course should be the positive responsibility to have healthy citizens having work and producing.

We must realize that the public conception of the Government's responsibility also grows. The British Government only ten years ago saw 35 to 40 lakhs of people die of sheer starvation. It was terrible and today, if one person dies of starvation, there is a great hullabaloo in the country. It shows the difference in outlook. If one person dies—it may be due to old age—the newspapers at once display the news that he died of hunger! It shows the mental approach and it shows the assessment of the public in regard to the Government's responsibility. The obvious way, the simple way of dealing with this situation is then we must have enough food.

Of course, we have enough food in the country. The difficulty is not the lack of food but the lack of purchasing power; that is sheer poverty. How to meet such a situation? We should make purchasing power available by creating work. The money that is put in goes round and round and promotes industry and other things. We talk about mass production now. In this, of course, one should always remember what Gandhiji said, i.e., “Mass production which does not benefit the masses is no good”. Anyhow, mass production can only succeed if there is mass consumption. For mass consumption there must be purchasing power. If we want our industry to go ahead we have not merely to produce the goods but the people should have the purchasing power to buy them. Our industries, our merchants and others had hardly ever thought of the

masses of India as their purchasers except, maybe, in terms of some foodgrains, kerosene oil and one or two other things. They do not think that way. They think only of a relatively limited class which is their purchasing class, whereas an American thinks of the whole mass of the American population as prospective customers. Thus our industrial progress cannot take place unless there is purchasing capacity.

So, the simplest way of reducing our difficulties, of meeting scarcity conditions or famine conditions, is to throw in more purchasing power by creating work, honest work—not the kind of famine relief work—that results in the industrial machine functioning. Remember that every rupee thrown into this economic machine functions several times over. It is not functioning as a rupee but is going round and round producing all kinds of things. That is what Roosevelt did in 1931 when America was in the throes of a terrible depression.

You have the Five Year Plan. Its idea is excellent. But it does not go far. It does not go as far as circumstances demand. There are two ways of making a mistake. One is going too cautiously; the other is trying to go so fast that you lose touch with the ground and the facts. Some people talk about nationalization. It is good. I have no doubt that we aim at nationalisation. But it is a part of hundreds of processes. If we nationalize every factory in India, the immediate result will be a tremendous fall in production and efficiency. In India we have not much technological personnel. There will be a collapse of the whole industrial apparatus.

We are told nationalization can be brought about by expropriation. If we expropriate then there is no financial burden. We are not going that way. Expropriation means conflict. There was the Russian Revolution. For about ten or fifteen years, there was no progress there, because of internal conflict, civil war, and what not. An enormous price they had to pay. Here, if we have to pay, to nationalize, all our resources go into compensation. There will be no progress, even from the technological point of view. We should devote all our energy to that which we have to build.

In this process the Community Projects Scheme and the Extension Service Scheme⁴ have a very vital significance. They should be a kind of dynamo behind the Five Year Plan, or, if you like, a kind of dynamo behind human beings in India, because ultimately all your plans fail unless human beings function properly. And both from a psychological point of view and also from the point of view of community living and raising the level of technological advance, they are very important. I am not thinking of introducing the latest

4. Formulated in April 1953, the National Extension Scheme, inaugurated on 2 October in all the States, was to cover one-fourth of the total rural population in the plan period and the whole country in ten years. The scheme was to reorient the farmers' outlook and carry to his doorsteps modern methods of agriculture.

types of big machines, certainly not now at any rate. I mean technological advance in a small way but in a widespread fashion. We have to improve the technology of the people, not in the sense of training one or two persons to a very high degree. The masses of people should improve their technical approach to agriculture and other things.

Take cottage industries. I think that the development of village and cottage industries is essential in India. I do not think there is any basic conflict between big industries and cottage industries in India. In my mind, there is none. There is a big field left unexplored. Even if in the next ten years, say ten million more people are engaged in big industries, it will not make a big difference, because many millions will be left over. And apart from improving agriculture, there is quite a large field for small industries.

Small industries or cottage industries—apart from artistic industries—will only flourish if their technique is advanced. I am dead sure that unless we can improve the technique of cottage industries they cannot survive. Therefore our minds should function in that way—improving the technique in small ways; not having huge machines. An all-round improvement of the technique not only in individual cases but in a broad manner is essential for raising the general level of the life of the community. Take a small field. If you want to increase the production in that field, you can do so many things—you can have more water, more manure, fertilizer and all kinds of things. And with all these, you can increase the yield of that field from 10 maunds to 60 maunds or even 70 maunds. But I should be content if the all-India average went up from 10 to 15 maunds and that will make a world of difference to us. So we want to increase the average yield in agricultural production and in industrial production and we want to increase the average of human competence and community standards.

Doing that is far more effective than throwing up just one or two show-pieces. The whole purpose of these Community Centres and Extension Schemes is to raise the general level of the average man of the country. In that sense, as conceived, it is not only a tremendous thing, but a tremendously revolutionary thing. And it is of the highest moment not only to us but to others whether we can succeed in doing this in a peaceful and cooperative way, because people always thought of progress in other terms, in terms of breaking heads, in terms of violence, and all that, which do lead to changes but which are followed by a tremendous price one pays and by delay. It is not a quick change. There is a hiatus when you have to make good the loss of the revolution apart from the physical loss.

So, if in these three years that are remaining in our Five Year Plan you can achieve this through your Community Centres, etc., I have no doubt that we shall have made good as a nation. And having made good to that extent, the pace of progress becomes much faster. Apart from the fact that you are in

a better position materially to progress, you have the advantage that psychologically you are better fitted to go ahead; you will be able to face the situation much better. People must have faith in themselves, not a feeling of frustration.

Some time ago we had a very high class American expert⁵ whom we sent for to advise us about public administration and also to look into the Community Centres. He was employed by the Ford Foundation. He came and submitted a report. You must read it because it is a first-rate document from a first-rate man coming from America, with no revolutionary ideas in his head, but just a competent man who has dealt with the subject not from the point of view of this 'ism' or that 'ism' but purely from the point of view of an expert in the subject. It is very interesting. It reveals some good things about us, and in regard to some others it is critical.

Among the good things he says about us is that India is among the twelve most advanced countries in the world, administratively considered. India is one of the twelve countries from the point of view of an efficient and not corrupt administration. Which are the other eleven countries, I do not know.

Then, having showered praise in many ways, he criticizes our administrative services. He says they are good as individuals and they will do a good job, but he points out a fact which is obvious but not often said, that the whole nature of the work of the services today is different from what it was in the past. The whole training they received during the British days was for particular jobs. They did those jobs well. Now, they have to deal with the vast social undertakings. There is democracy; there are various economic and social problems. We become, or try to become, what is called a Welfare State. Well, that requires a completely different outlook and a completely different approach and we have to give that approach to ourselves. That is what he points out.

Speaking about responsibility he observes that our whole system is one in which nobody seems to be responsible. There are committees and commissions and all kinds of things where no single individual is responsible for good work or bad work. Everybody passes on his responsibility to somebody else. For proper execution, individual responsibility must be fixed. India, in spite of all the criticism of our friends and opponents, does stand out as something solid on all these moving and changing scenes. But there are quite enough disruptive forces and tendencies at work. The one tendency which I find here—which is of course under control but which is fatal in itself—is the tendency towards communalism, Hindu vs Muslim, or Muslim vs Hindu, or Sikh vs Hindu, and this goes lower below, to caste levels, and all that is terrible. One of the basic disruptive forces in India is the caste system. It becomes narrower and narrower. One has to beware of such movements. Basically they are wrong,

5. Paul H. Appleby.

medieval, narrow-minded and not only do they directly injure but what is more important, they lower the standard of our mass-thinking activity.

So we have to work hard to produce results which will be appreciated by the public, otherwise this solidity can easily disappear. Democracy itself, the type of democracy we are dealing with is a very novel thing in the world, you must remember. It is by adult suffrage, which is a new thing in the world; adult suffrage in a country like ours of over 360 million people. You cannot neglect the masses. You have to look after them.

It is a tremendous challenge to us, whether we can do it or not. I think we can do it. And among the other things we are trying to do, this thing—Community Programme along with the Extension Scheme—is something with revolutionary content in it. We can carry it out. It is up to all of you to carry it out.

2. To the Chief Ministers¹

New Delhi
April 27, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

In my last fortnightly letter I referred to the National Extension Service, which was being thought of as a permanent expansion of the community development programme. The Central Committee for the Community Projects has now accepted this proposal for a National Extension Service, subject to a further examination of some financial aspects of it. Your Government is being addressed separately in this matter and requested to examine the proposals, more particularly in regard to the trained personnel available and the pace of progress.

I would commend this matter to your personal attention, because it is of the widest significance. I hope that your Government will give thought to the various questions raised in this connection and send us, as early as possible, their replies and reactions.

There is one other matter to which I should like to draw your attention. This relates to the Community Projects. As I stated in my fortnightly letter, we have, on the whole, done rather well and in a number of cases we have done remarkably well. There are unfortunately a few States which have remained backward. No Community Project can make progress unless the State

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was also sent to S.K. Dey, Administrator, Community Projects Administration, 1952-56.

Government is directly interested in it and unless a capable Development Commissioner is appointed. If the State Government is not interested, then even the Development Commissioner can do little. The question then arises of whether it is worthwhile our wasting time, energy and money over a project which is making no progress at all because of lack of local interest. I think we shall have to consider this very seriously in regard to these backward projects. If the next month or so does not produce results or promise of results, then the right course appears to be to wind up that particular project and concentrate energy elsewhere.

One particular matter deserves special attention. The whole Community Projects Administration has to function with efficiency and speed. It has to get out of the ruts of our normal administrative routine. For my part, I would like our entire administration to get out of those ruts, but for the moment I am considering the Community Projects only.

There are a number of delays which come in the way of our work. There is also the question of making a person responsible for the work entrusted to him. We should avoid these delays and we must fix responsibility. Very often, sanction for petty expenditure has to be obtained from headquarters or from the State Government. This could easily be avoided by giving authority to the Development Commissioner up to a certain limit. As Dr Appleby has pointed out in his report, this business of sanctions is very often a cause of delay. The odd thing is that we pay little attention to the scrutiny of the work done. Most of our energy is spent at the sanctioning stage previously. I suggest to you, therefore, that your Government should authorise the Development Commissioner to go ahead with his work and give the necessary sanction for normal expenditure within the budget of the project. Your Government will of course see to it that this has been properly spent and results obtained.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Unemployment and Development¹

My Government is fully alive to the unemployment problem in the country and I will do everything in my power to overcome the situation. I will not rest

1. Speech at a public meeting, Sholapur, 30 April 1953. From *National Herald*, *The Hindu* and *The Statesman*, 1 May 1953, and *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 2 May 1953.

content unless every man, woman and child in this country has a fair deal and attains a minimum standard of living.

The unemployment situation can only be tackled through greater production and creation of more wealth. For this, the people must cooperate fully with the Government in the implementation of the Five Year Plan. The completion of the Five Year Plan may not in itself solve the unemployment problem but by that time the country will be economically firm and there will be more and more opportunities for employment with new industries coming up.

Although I have read the memorandum, I do not want to say anything about it for the present.² The unemployment problem is recognised by us as the gravest of issues facing us. We do not want to have hungry men nor people without employment. Unemployment cuts the throat and stabs the stomach. But first things must come first.

Today's problem of India is lack of finances. Government cannot undertake schemes and plans of gigantic nature, such as removal of unemployment without sufficient funds. What Government is able to spend today comes from the people in the form of taxes and levies. Money cannot fall from heaven, but has to be created. No nation can become wealthy without hard work and initiative.

Today people in this country have begun to think that they are clever enough and there is nothing more for them to learn from the outside world. America and England are rich not because they took our money. They might have carried away some wealth, but their happy position today is due to their people's national consciousness, enthusiasm and sincere effort to lift up their nation. They produced more, learnt more and utilised their superior knowledge in inventing and producing new things. This brought them wealth.

Industries and surplus production of food are always power in the hands of a nation. Merely building factories and trying to make money out of it is of no use. The country should have industries to manufacture capital goods. Today for all our needs of capital goods we look up to others. But in a short span of six years of our independence, we have achieved a substantial result. The country is now having a factory to build aircrafts, industries to produce enough fertilizers and workshops turning out railway engines.

Five or six years is too short a time for judging a nation. Wait for another ten years and you will see that our Plans will change the entire picture of the country so completely that the world will be amazed. But it all depends upon people's willing cooperation and unity. The day is not far off when the country will have economic plenty, employment for all and achievement of a minimum standard of living.

2. A memorandum was presented to Nehru on behalf of the Janata Party, a joint front of the Left parties including the Communists and the Peasants and Workers' Party, on this occasion.

The Community Projects are doing a tremendous work in the country. Although in a small scale these projects are becoming a dynamic force for the economic revolution in the country, the Government has decided on a scheme for national extension of these projects. I want my Government to be in direct touch with workers and people in rural areas. I do not want to work through State Governments or red tape. The needs of the rural populations have to be quickly known and measures speedily taken to meet them.

Russia is a progressive nation today. But her economic revolution just after the First World War had cost much blood. India will have her economic revolution peacefully and in a systematic way. You may adopt any idealism, socialism, communism or Gandhism. But one thing is certain, that you will achieve no ideal without ability to earn more wealth.

I promise that I shall not rest content unless every man, woman and child in the country has a fair deal and has a minimum standard of living. But in this we have great problems to overcome. Everyone of the 35 crores of people has to help solve these problems and work with the Government. The people should come and tell me in what way they want the Five Year Plan to be implemented. I will certainly take their advice, if found sensible and wise and make changes accordingly.

In the present world situation in which nations instantly quarrel with each other. India cannot afford to become weak. The greatest cause of weakness is parochialism and communalism. Some talk of treating Muslims in the same way as the Hindus were treated in Pakistan. This is an utter nonsense and I shall not tolerate such talks. If somebody else does something wrong we need not follow that example. I want every Indian citizen whether Hindu or Muslim to live happily enjoying all the rights conferred on him by the Constitution.

Some others talk of linguistic States. There are demands for linguistic States in India. This is not the time for such talks when we are faced with more important problems. You will not get any such demands based on linguism, if the Government finds that it is not in the larger interests of the country. If we find that any further division of the country is against the interest of the country you will have no further linguistic States. But at the same time we have agreed to set up a commission to examine the overall issue of linguistic States, taking India as a whole after watching the progress in the proposed State of Andhra. The commission will be a high-powered one and consist of very responsible people. May I remind you that when one goes out of the country no one will know him if he says he is from Samyukta Maharashtra or Karnataka. But a foreigner will readily recognise if one says he is a citizen of the Indian Republic because India has attained a position of respect and importance in the world.

4. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
May 18, 1953

My dear T.T.,

Thank you for your letter of the 18th May, with which you have sent me your survey of the conditions in the southern districts of Madras. I have, as a matter of fact, read nearly the whole of your report. I can form no opinion about the particular schemes recommended by you. But I entirely agree with you that we should do everything in our power to help in relieving the hunger, thirst and unhappiness of those people, more particularly by projects which will bear fruit in the future also.

You refer in your report to a Community Project in Dindigul. You might draw Gulzarilal Nanda's² attention to this.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Union Minister for Planning.

5. To Gulzarilal Nanda¹

New Delhi
26th May, 1953

My dear Gulzarilal,

Rajan Nehru² came to me today and spoke to me about some permanent Youth Camp which you had mentioned to her. She said that you wanted people to have a year's course of training there. I do not quite understand this idea and I think it will be very difficult to train anybody there. I should have thought that the longest period of training should be three months and usually less.

I gather that the US people and even the UK people distribute their documentary films and sometimes lend projectors also to people here and that these are shown in the villages. While other countries do this, we are extremely slack and go on asking as to whether we can afford it or not. I think this is very false economy. More and more I think that films are absolutely the best

1. File No. 43(38)/56-64-PMS.
2. Social worker and wife of R.K. Nehru.

means of effective propaganda and education. I do hope that you will take this matter in hand and ask Keskar³ to go ahead.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. B.V. Keskar, Union Minister of Information and Broadcasting.

6. To B.V. Keskar¹

New Delhi
May 27, 1953

My dear Balkrishna,
Your letter of May 27 about film publicity.

You know how keen I am to develop our film publicity. In fact the more I think of it the more value I attach to it. Quite apart from the Five Year Plan, I think that it is of urgent importance that we should approach the public through films in regard to many matters. It is a process of public education.

Thus far, the rural public has not been invaded by the commercial films and yet there is a hunger for them. If we do not try to fill this vacuum, I have no doubt that commercial films of the worst type will go there.

I think that you are mistaken in imagining that the Community Projects Administration is American organised or controlled. In this matter, we are keeping the Americans at arm's length and it is we who will choose the films and use them. If you like you can discuss this matter with S.K. Dey. I am entirely against American participation in this as in other forms of publicity. But the Community Projects Administration will not bring this about.

In any event, we have to deal with Community Projects and prepare films for them. If you don't, the vacuum will be filled by the wrong kind of outside films. Therefore, I see no particular harm in linking our Planning Commission programme with the CPA, provided we make sure that this does not get mixed up with American participation.

I can do little about this matter now before I go, but I shall certainly press for more and more film publicity when I come back. As I have said above, I look upon this as the major attempt at educating our millions.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 43(38)/56-64-PMS.

II. VOLUNTARY EFFORTS

1. Programme of Bharat Sevak Samaj¹

Our first Five Year Plan has become the foundation on which we shall build the new India of our hopes and aspirations. That Plan itself, since it first saw the light of day as a tentative plan, has undergone many changes. No doubt, in future also, it will expand and improve as our experience grows. Already vistas open out.

But in any event that Plan is the basis and, in spite of criticism and sometimes even opposition, I venture to say that it is not the plan of a party, but something that has been placed in all faith and humility before the nation for all to participate in it.

The Plan measures and appraises the resources of the State, but in any living movement there are other and even more important factors which make a difference and accelerate the pace of progress. The greatest of these factors are the people. The success of the Plan depends upon the enthusiastic cooperation of the people of our great country, and therefore public cooperation and initiative play a crucial role. Already, we can see the important part of public cooperation in the implementation of innumerable public works. The response of our people is heartening and exhilarating.

This has to be strengthened and expanded till almost every individual in the country will find something to offer, in the service of the nation. To facilitate and organise this public cooperation on a voluntary basis and on the widest scale is the main function of the Bharat Sevak Samaj. The work of the Samaj has not yet proceeded beyond the preliminary stage in many places. But it is evident that there is need for an organisation of this type and there are indications that the response to it will be large and cumulative.

The Bharat Sevak Samaj has chalked out for itself a minimum programme, in which manual activity like the building of roads, tanks, etc., figures prominently. The Samaj proposes also to tackle the evils of corruption and adulteration of food and drugs. The programme embraces community organisation especially in Community Project areas, work camps for students, slum service, anti-malaria work and social education, as well as the spread of knowledge about the economic situation and the Five Year Plan. It is out of this understanding that effective work comes.

The programme of the Samaj has to be carried out mostly with the help of voluntary workers. Considerable funds will still be needed for organising

1. Appeal for funds for the Bharat Sevak Samaj, New Delhi, 24 April 1953. File No. 40(244)/52-PMS.

the work of the Samaj and carrying its message to every nook and corner of the country. I appeal, therefore, to all those who can afford to help to send their contributions for the work of the Bharat Sevak Samaj. These contributions may be earmarked for special objects according to the choice of the donor. Cheques may be sent to the Treasurer, Bharat Sevak Samaj. Every contribution will be acknowledged by a receipt from the headquarters of the Bharat Sevak Samaj.

2. Strength of the Bharat Sevak Samaj¹

Make the Bharat Sevak Samaj a strong and vital organisation so that it can bring about big results in the life of the country.

I have felt that there is a vacuum in India at the present time. There is a demand for this vacuum to be filled. I want to know how far the Bharat Sevak Samaj can fill that vacuum.

We want the Bharat Sevak Samaj to grow in a spontaneous way. There is life behind a thing which grows spontaneously and is not hemmed in by too many rules and regulations and official red tape.

I am not interested in your list of names or yourselves. I am keen to know what is the tempo of work that you are able to create in your areas. You, who will come forward for work, should not expect any reward or office. You should come with a spirit of service and with no other consideration. Then alone can the Samaj be made a strong and vital organisation so that it can bring about big results. I want that you should not consider yourself to be big people in your area. Do not think you are big officers. You are no officers. Your status and position will be determined by your work. If you have life, then you will work and go forward. If there is no life then you will be swept aside whether you are conveners or not.

You should spread the idea in the country that we can make a new India by using our hands and feet. People can do manual work for an hour every day or devote some time to it every month. We should propagate among the people the dignity of manual labour, which is the very foundation of all progress. The basic thing to be tackled today in India is to uproot the idea from the minds of the people that manual labour is a low, undignified thing. This is a very bad idea. It is not only a bad idea, but it is the very basis of our whole society. We should change this basis. It can be done by bringing about revolution in our ideas. The sooner this is done, the better will it be.

1. Speech at a conference of the conveners of the Bharat Sevak Samaj, New Delhi, 7 May 1953. From the *National Herald* and *The Hindustan Times*, 8 May 1953. Extracts.

There are some people who are too eager to give advice to others who try to be in the forefront. They sometimes would even hold flag and make a show of leading an organisation. Their aim in doing so is obviously to get some fame. Such people we come across everywhere. Even here, some people always show themselves up at a function when Jawaharlal comes. If Jawaharlal is not there, they are also not there. There is no remedy for this.

The Bharat Sevak Samaj is not an organisation of any party. Everybody can come in it and work. There is, of course, a provision in its constitution which keeps out people of a communal bent of mind. You should not lay too much stress on rules and regulations. Ordinarily, we have too many regulations and directions. But in this organisation there should be no limitation. We should have such a system that people work spontaneously.

In this organisation, there are a lot of Congressmen. Congressmen should take full part in this organisation and in an open manner at that. Congressmen should not try to work in it from behind the scenes. The Congress is not a secretive body. In fact, Congressmen have every reason to be proud of their organisation and themselves. The Congress has a glorious record of achievements in India where it had brought about an upheaval. Its record of work will go down in history. Why should Congressmen—then fight shy of working in the Bharat Sevak Samaj? They should associate themselves with this organisation in a formal manner. Congressmen, however, should remember that their work in the Bharat Sevak Samaj is not to be undertaken in any party spirit or for advancing the aims of any party. We should try to remember this because we do not want the idea to go abroad that this work is being done to advance the interests of any party....

3. To A.V. Baliga¹

New Delhi
May 19, 1953

Dear Dr Baliga,²

I have your letter of the 17th May.

1. File No. 2(600)/51-PMS.
2. (1903-1964); leading surgeon and educationist; joined the Indian national movement in 1920; joined K.E.M. College as Professor in 1933 and was Honorary Professor in the Bombay Medical College till his death; visited USSR in July 1951 and took the initiative to form a Preparatory Committee for an Indo-Soviet Cultural Festival; formally joined Congress in 1957.

We will gladly give all the help we can to take full advantage of the Bhoodan campaign. But it is not clear to me how we can do so and I rather doubt if it is desirable for a voluntary movement like this to be mixed up with a Government organisation, though the Government should certainly help. As a matter of fact, the State Governments are giving all help. They have passed legislation to help the movement. I understand that Acharya Vinoba Bhave has his own way of dealing with this land and in some places it is either being distributed or formed into a cooperative.

However, I am prepared to consider this matter fully. I am sending your letter to the Planning Commission for their consideration.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To Gulzarilal Nanda¹

Camp: Srinagar
May 23, 1953

My dear Gulzarilal,

The Bharat Sevak Samaj is supposed to be a non-Party organization and at the same time it is supposed to have no dealings with communalism. It is perhaps sometimes difficult to draw a clear line as to what is communalism or, at any rate, as to who is a recognised communalist. But that line is clear enough when an organization carries on an agitation, called *Satyagraha*, like the Jammu agitation. Both Government and the Congress have declared themselves strongly against this. If so, why should we be soft to any organization connected with this particular agitation? Why should we not make it perfectly clear that there is no place in the Bharat Sevak Samaj for any persons connected with these intensely communal organizations and agitations, such as the Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Ram Rajya Parishad?

I think we should take up a strong line about this matter and inform all the branches of the Bharat Sevak Samaj accordingly. This may result in some leading personalities being affected, such as Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee.² I do not mind that. Indeed, I think it is desirable that we should make it clear that Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee and his kind have no place in the Bharat

1. File No. 49(244)/52-PMS.

2. President of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh.

Sevak Samaj. We need not do so directly by name, but indirectly by reference to the organizations.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Bhoodan and the Land Problem¹

... Question: How do you explain the Bhoodan Movement? Can land gift movement solve the land problem in India?

Jawaharlal Nehru: It was started by Mr. Vinoba Bhave. It is a movement for free gifts of land from those who possess it for distribution to landless labour. This kind of movement does not solve the land problem. Nobody expects it to be solved in that way. But it helps and it has helped very greatly in creating a certain atmosphere for far-reaching land reforms. The main thing is that it creates that atmosphere out of which it is easier to go in for radical land reforms. Obviously the reforms must come by any means. We have practically put an end in large parts of India to the big estates. We have made a Constitution which is an excellent Constitution, but it gets in our way very often. We have changed it slightly and now we may have to amend it still further. So the delay was caused really by our Constitution and interpretation by the law courts in regard to compensation. The problem of big estates has been largely solved. But then that is only the first half. Other parts will be tackled soon. Landlords have to be absorbed in industry etc. In the unpopulated areas, the soil is not good or something like that. And with the extension of our river-valley schemes and canals, large areas have opened out. So while I am entirely for the limitation of population, the problem is not quite so desperate as some people imagine it to be....

1. Press conference, London, 8 June 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Also from *India News*, 13 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 106-107, 174, 189-190, 358-359, 396-399, 407 and 448-450.

III. EDUCATION

1. To C.C. Biswas¹

New Delhi

April 8, 1953

My dear Biswas,²

There were questions today in Parliament about our having legislation to get all books published in India sent to a number of national libraries.³ This matter has been pending for a long time and you will remember that we discussed it once or twice. I think we should go ahead with this. I do not myself see where even the difficulty comes in in regard to compensation. If it comes in, we shall face it then. No publisher dare raise that point.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 40(249)/52-PMS.
2. Union Minister for Law and Minority Affairs.
3. Govind Das had asked: "Does the Ministry of Education know that the New York Public Library and Washington Congress Library received three copies of whatever is printed in America? Do the Government of India have any such plan so that copies of books published in India could be sent to the libraries of Calcutta and Delhi?" The Minister for Education had replied that the Government was considering to move a Bill to that effect.

2. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi

May 7, 1953

My dear Deshmukh,

Your letter of May 7 about the money passed by the American Congress for expenditure on exchange of students, professors etc.²

The Secretary of the Ministry of Education has not seen me or discussed anything with me; nor has anyone else from the Ministry of

1. JN Collection.
2. Deshmukh had pointed out in his letter that under the India Food Emergency Act 1951, a sum not exceeding 5 million dollars out of the interest paid by India to the US, was made available by the US Congress to their State Department for expenditure on exchange of students, professors and other technical persons between India and the US and for the supply of technical books and laboratory equipment to the universities and research institutions in India.

Education.³ Yesterday, a file came to me from External Affairs I think. Probably this originated in the Ministry of Education. I made a note on this file and it is probably to this that you refer.

I have no copy of that note with me, but I stated that I did not like the US Government or their representatives to have direct dealings with our educational institutions. Even if they control the money, they should distribute it through our Ministries. I do not know exactly what the US law is on this subject,⁴ but I see no difficulty about their distributing these funds through our Ministries.

However, it is true that I do not know all the facts and I shall await the inter-departmental discussion. I do not at all like the way American officers and others are spreading out all over India. Occasionally they misbehave. Even apart from this, they produce an impression of having partly taken charge of many activities in India which normally Government should do. I think we should hold them in check somewhat.

While the funds belong to the US State Department and can only be spent with their approval, surely our approval is at least as important if not more and the agency for disposing of these funds can well be ours.⁵

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Deshmukh took exception to the fact that the Secretary, Department of Education, had already discussed the matter with Nehru while the inter-ministerial discussions were on. Further, Nehru was supposed to have said that "these funds should be administered by the Government of India".
4. Deshmukh further stated that the India Food Emergency Act "definitely" made those "funds available to the Department of State for expenditure on purposes specified in that law." The State Department was therefore, accountable to the US Congress and was not expected "to act against their own laws and to place these funds at our disposals."
5. He had suggested that what India could do was to make sure that the State Department did spend these funds only on those schemes which India considered to be of considerable benefit to its economy.

3. Indian Students Abroad¹

I am sending you a book sent to me by Mr Krishnayya. This might be useful to students and others going to the USA.

2. I am also sending you a letter by Mr Krishnayya about the difficulty of

1. Note to the Secretary-General, MEA, 10 May 1953. File No. 40(88)/ 49-PMS.

Indian students in the USA. I do not know if it is possible or desirable to hold examinations in Washington as suggested. But I do think that our present rules are inadequate. Some technical difficulties come in the way of our employment of very bright young men who have studied abroad and who may be slightly overaged. I think that our service rules are much too rigid. I am told they are more rigid than they were in British times, and, as a consequence, we cannot profit by obvious ability which is available. This is a larger question which I think has to be examined later in all its aspects. Dr Appleby² in his report has pointed out the extreme rigidity with which we work here as well as the class distinctions that seem obvious in the service. I propose to take up this matter separately.

3. Meanwhile, the letter of Mr Krishnayya should be acknowledged.

2. Paul H. Appleby (1891-1963); consultant to the Government of India on public administration in 1952; had pointed out in his report, submitted in January 1953, that in the scheme of administrative hierarchy there was too much of "diffusion of responsibility" and that the personnel were arranged self-consciously in "too firm classes" and too many "special services". Consequently, there was "too little sense of one public service and too much jealousy."

4. Learning the Tibetan Language¹

I agree. We should keep in touch with Dr Raghu Vira² and ask him for full details and how long it would take for a person to go through the course. We might, before sending a man to a frontier area, try to see how much he can learn at a place like Nagpur. A language is best learnt in the territory where the language is spoken. But a previous acquaintance with grammar and structure of the language makes it easier to pick it up later and makes that knowledge more methodical. Therefore, it might be desirable to try this experiment for a while. We need not insist on people learning a language in Delhi and indeed they cannot do so in regard to Tibetan. But for the moment we should not go too far and investigate possibilities.

1. Note, 10 May 1953. JN Collection.

2. Scholar, linguist, and founder Director of International Academy of Indian Culture, Nagpur.

5. Policy on Use of Languages¹

In August 1949, the Working Committee clarified the policy of the Congress in regard to the question of language in India.² The Committee would like to draw the attention of State Governments and Pradesh Congress Committees to its resolution passed on August 5, 1949.

It is the considered policy of the Congress, which has been adopted in the Constitution of India, that Hindi, as the national language of the country, should be encouraged and, at the same time, the great Provincial languages should also be encouraged in their respective areas and should normally be the medium of work in those areas. In regard to education, the medium in the primary schools should be the mother tongue of the student and every effort should be made to provide facilities for this purpose wherever enough students having a particular language as the mother tongue so desire. Thus, even in an area having a particular language as its basic language, arrangements should be made, wherever possible, for primary schools in other languages provided a sufficient number of pupils are available.

In the tribal and like areas, education should be imparted in the earlier stages through the language of that area.

The Constitution of India has enumerated the principal languages of India in the Eighth Schedule attached to it. Among those principal languages is included Urdu. The Committee regret that attempts are sometimes made not to give due place to Urdu even for those for whom Urdu is the mother tongue. It must be remembered that Urdu is a language of India, which took birth and shape in India and is spoken and written by a very considerable number of people in India.

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru for the Congress Working Committee, New Delhi, 16 May 1953. JN Collection.
2. The resolution of 5 August 1949 on the language question provided that (i) for administrative purposes regional languages were to progressively replace English; (ii) for educational purposes instruction should be provided in mother tongue at the primary level; (iii) an all-India language should be studied as a second language at the secondary level; and (iv) a provincial language should be studied at the university level.

6. Regulation of Study Abroad¹

I have seen CS's note dated 28th February. There is no question of our encroaching on personal liberties, but where the personal liberty means our providing exchange in a foreign country, we have some responsibility in dealing with the matter. There is no reason why we should encourage a large sum of money to be spent abroad by people who are not likely to profit by it. Nevertheless, I see the difficulty in providing a suitable test.

2. As a matter of fact, I have attached less importance to the money aspect of this question than to other aspects. I would very much dislike the test being a money test. I know many cases of persons practically 'without money, but with plenty of enterprise, going abroad and doing much better than the monied ones. I would, therefore, dislike laying down any rule which comes in the way of the young man or young woman of enterprise.

3. I do not particularly fancy laying down of a rule which requires a certificate from the District Magistrate. This would probably mean a reference by the District Magistrate to the police authorities of his district and some kind of a police enquiry. That would not be a good thing at all. What we might say is that the person concerned should produce some certificate from a responsible authority to indicate that he or his guardian has adequate financial resources, etc. The responsible authority may be the Vice-Chancellor of the University or Head of the Educational Institution or District Magistrate or any other reliable person.

4. I suggest that nothing need be done at present in this matter. SG is going to London and proposes to discuss this question with the educational authorities in India House.

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, New Delhi, 20 May 1953. JN Collection.

7. To Morarji Desai¹

New Delhi
27th May, 1953

My dear Morarji,

I wrote to you once about the National Cadet Corps and more especially about the junior division which you have decided to close down in Bombay. I have read your letter in regard to this matter and this was also considered at the meeting of the Central Advisory Committee of the NCC.

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Mahavir Tyagi, MDO.

I am afraid I do not agree with you in this matter and I am sorry that you are closing down the junior division. The more I see of the NCC, the more I like it, both the senior and the junior divisions. I visited one of their camps this morning near Delhi. Since the beginning of this month they have dug nearly thirty miles of a canal and done the work very well indeed. Each one of them does six hours hard digging every day. What is more, their health has improved, inspite of the heat and they have put on weight. Not only are they physically better, but I think they have improved in other ways also.

The main problem has been that the NCC is rather costly and we have tried hard to reduce its expenditure. To some extent we have succeeded. We are looking into this matter further.

We are also examining a scheme for what we call an auxiliary cadet corps which will be something in addition to the NCC and which will be far less expensive.

One of your objections to the NCC was on the ground of giving military training to boys and even girls. I suppose you thought that this might develop a wrong mentality. Perhaps in some cases this might be the result, but generally speaking I do not think there is the slightest danger of this happening. In a sense, the military mind is very much there and the RSS and the like movements profit by it and give a wrong turn to it. If we do not take any steps ourselves, people drift in these wrong directions. That is the negative aspect, but positively, I am quite sure that this training is of great advantage to our youth. I do not think physical exercises, however good, can take the place of this. We may call it military training because there are some common factors. But it is a sort of training which I would like every boy and girl to have. Our own information is that in every school or college where we have the NCC, there has been a marked improvement in general discipline and behaviour. I am sure there is an improvement in general efficiency. It is true that some people are attracted by the uniform, but that is hardly the reason to condemn a very good movement.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. Trained Youth for Nation-building¹

I shall be going away in two days from London. It always pleases me to come here. First of all, London is still a very big nursery for our students. More students come here than to any centre outside India, and it does make a vast

1. Speech at a meeting of Indian students at India House, London, 13 June 1953. *India News*, 20 June 1953.

difference to us and to our future in India as to what these young men and women do after they return. The High Commissioner mentioned the question of employment.² That of course is important. It is important from our personal point of view, even more so from the national point of view, because we cannot afford to waste anything in India—waste money, even more so talent or experience. It is absurd for the country, either officially or otherwise, to spend a great deal in training people and then not utilising their experience. It is difficult to adjust all these things, it is true, in a period of transition; it is also difficult to fit it in the new order of things. Actually we want more and more engineers and technicians and scientists and the like.

And remember this, that a really first-class man is always wanted. It is the second and third rate men that may for the moment not be in demand. But the first-rate man is always in demand in every country. But we want all classes of trained people, but more particularly we want people who are prepared to face a certain hardship, a certain inconvenience, a certain isolation in serving our rural areas, tribal areas, mountain areas and the like.

Looking at this question purely from the point of view of the individual, I can tell you that there may be no better training for that individual than to spend a year or two on that type of life and work in those areas. We are considering in India of having a rule made that the Government will not employ any person, in its medical services to begin with, who has not previously, for perhaps a year, served in a rural or tribal area. I hope that that may apply to other forms of work, because it is very important for us to develop that type of pioneering spirit which unfortunately has been missing from our background of hundreds of years; not for thousands of years, because a thousand years ago our ancestors had tremendous pioneering spirit. In South East Asia, West Asia, and even Rome and Greece you see evidences of the pioneering spirit of our forbears. They went there in days of difficulty, when it was dangerous to travel across the seas, and carried Indian art, dance, architecture, culture to all these places. You go to the Gobi desert, and see the remains of ancient cities, and you find remains of Indian culture there. What happened suddenly to make us shrink into our shells and become afraid of the outside world?

As soon as a person shrinks it is a sign of fear. As soon as a person, individual or group, suffers from fear complex, he cannot grow. He becomes smaller and smaller. Fear is the most inhibiting thing. Fear and hatred are the two factors which drain away the energy of an individual, group or nation and prevent them from growing. If you look at this in the broad context of the world, it is fear and hatred that are the base of all our problems. If I may refer to animals, it is a well-known fact that no wild animal will ever attack a man

2. The High Commissioner, B.G. Kher, welcoming Nehru said, "...many of you are still anxious and want to know what to do, how to live. That is a problem, and that is a matter on which Mr Nehru may care to say a few words."

except when it is afraid and it usually gets afraid because the man gets afraid. The man's fear somehow creates a psychological atmosphere of fear in the animal and so it attacks in self-defence. You can apply that analogy to international relations today. Anyhow, our people became somehow strangely inhibited, they lost their creativeness. We became just writers of glossaries and commentaries instead of creating things; we just became imitators without any creative spirit. Our architecture became very rigid.

You can judge a nation by its language. Take the Sanskrit language, at the time of the Vedas. It is just amazing to see the power of the word. Come to the classical period; the writings of Kalidas are lovely beyond words. And the Vedic language, two or three words to a sentence, concentrated power. Three or four hundred years later, sentences took a whole page: I think it was Milton who said: "Show me the language of a people and I will tell you what those people are; whether they are strong or weak, clear-minded or confused."

You can judge of a people not only from their language. Once a race is a living race, its mind expands, its fingers become deft. But a period of shrinking came upon us. It is no use blaming the English or any other power. They were the better people, they were more adventurous, stronger, because their minds had gone ahead in science and other things; they were not afraid of risking. A person who is afraid of risking cannot go ahead, because he will never take risk; but if you do not go ahead in this world you remain static. We have turned the corner and we want to make good, and we are going to make good. But that making good is not a matter of resolutions or slogans, but of hard, concentrated, organised work, of building up a new India in a thousand ways, in hamlet, town, factory, in the field, to make progress all along the line, on every front of national activity, not just leaving everything to haphazard enterprise. We have made the Five Year Plan, etc., and I think the Five Year Plan is a very great achievement. I do not mean to say that that Plan is a perfect one. But I say that whatever criticism you may have to offer must now and in future be based on the Plan. That was an essential thing which had to be done. On that foundation we can build, we can build more, we can go ahead faster, but without that all else is empty nonsense.

Can you imagine a greater and more exciting adventure than building up of this mighty nation of ours, building up in fact 350 millions of people? It is a tremendous thing. I go about India, and often I am depressed at some things which I do not like, slackness, conflict, squabbling. But as I go round I see the process of building up going on, whether it is a factory or the Sindri project or Hindustan Aircraft, or so many other things, river valley schemes, community centres: I tell you all this fills me with excitement. It is an exciting adventure. I said the other day that Mother India is in labour, producing, building. We have to go through normal and abnormal labour pains in the process, but it is a process of creativeness. Building is creating a new country

on the basis of the old. That is a tremendous adventure, which calls us, more especially the young. I have only a few years to work and then the burden of work and responsibility passes to others, to men like you, men and women here and in the Indian universities. They have to shoulder this burden. It is not a question of getting this or that job, but it is ultimately a question of how many among you have the guts to go ahead and take big jobs. There are many vacant jobs all over India and all over the world for the men who can occupy them in the sense of responsibility and big work to be done.

So I want you to feel this excitement in building up India and not be afraid of doing any type of work and not calling any work low or humble, because the desire to do the work well will put you more in touch with the common people. Isolation from other people is a dangerous thing, something that developed previously, through our own fault, not so much the British. Our caste system classified society. The British classified it still further in a different way. In every service we have class I, class II; it is all based on classes. Obviously, people have different degrees of capacity. So one has different degrees of responsibility. But rigid classification is bad. It is not easy to get rid of it. Also this idea that the white-collared worker is superior to the manual worker is a ridiculous idea. There is nothing really so good for the individual and the social group as hard manual labour, and every person who indulges in merely intellectual labour without some manual work, I think, loses thereby much of his intellect, probably not remaining as healthy as he might. There is a psychological aspect, so that you must put yourself right with the millions of your people who do hard physical labour. And that is the virtue of the voluntary Community Centre Scheme and our National Extension Service, which is coming. I want you, whatever your training may be, to go in for these things, and for a year do some hard work. The other day in Delhi we had our National Cadet Corps, young men and women from the universities, 200 of them who were set the task of digging a canal. It was the hottest part of the year, from the middle of May onwards, and most of them came from cities and had hardly done any physical work. After the first two or three days many of them appeared to be casualties. But they persevered. I saw them in the third week and, apart from the fact that they had dug 30 miles of canal, which was a good effort, the amazing thing was that they had got over their earlier troubles, they were much fitter, and almost every one had put on weight. Psychologically they were very much happier, the happiness that comes from work done, something you cannot get otherwise. So that I want you to approach this problem when you go back. Do not wait. There is plenty of opportunity. It will do you good. You will gather first-hand experience of India which you will not get from books.³

3. Kher thanked Nehru for his address, and asked who would accept the challenge laid down by him and do one-tenth of the work Nehru had been doing.

IV. CULTURE

1. To S.K. Belvalkar¹

New Delhi
April 12, 1953

Dear Dr Belvalkar,²

Thank you for your letter of the 9th April. I am happy to know that the Critical Edition of the *Santiparvan* has now been printed. I have followed with much interest the great task that you have been carrying on and I congratulate you on the success so far achieved.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17 (34)/48-PMS.
2. (1880-1967); eminent Indologist; one of the founders of Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, and its Honorary Secretary, 1915-18, 1927-33; General Editor of BORI's Critical Edition of the *Mahabharata*, since 1943; Editor *Bhishmaparvan* (1947), *Shantiparvan* (4 vols, 1949-56) and concluding four *Parvans* (1957-59).

2. International Art Exhibition¹

I send my good wishes to the 2nd International Contemporary Art Exhibition.² I hope this will be fully representative of the best in modern Indian art. I believe that there is much life in modern Indian art and it deserves encouragement. At the same time, I have a feeling that we are still rather tied down to formal and somewhat lifeless models. I suppose that our art schools are partly responsible for this. It has been a pleasure and a surprise to see how children, who have not been too much pressed down by art schools, express themselves in a vigorous manner. We will not make much progress unless we encourage life and vigour and enterprise in art.

1. Message to the second International Contemporary Art Exhibition, New Delhi, 17 April 1953. File No. 9/148/53-PMS.
2. The Exhibition of paintings and graphic arts was inaugurated by President Rajendra Prasad at the All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society Building, New Delhi, on 5 May 1953. About thirty countries participated in it and each country contributed 20 of its best paintings by contemporary artists. The exhibits were to remain in Delhi for a month and then to be taken to Calcutta, Mumbai, Chennai and a few other cities.

3. To Syed Mahmud¹

New Delhi
April 22, 1953

My dear Mahmud,

You spoke to me the other day about the History of the Freedom Movement and I gave you some of my ideas on the subject.² I am very anxious that we should not adopt wrong lines of approach in this matter.

First of all, the whole conception of writing history has to be thought of in new terms. The old histories may have their value, but very few of them, and none so far as India is concerned, are written from the point of view of this new approach which deals with social problems and social forces at work. Any history of the struggle for freedom in India must proceed on these new lines and not lose itself in a multitude of odd facts and dates.

I was surprised to learn from you that it was suggested that this proposed history should be a many-volume affair and should go far back in point of time. I think that it should be a concise and relatively brief volume which should in effect begin with the post-Mutiny period. There might be a preliminary chapter dealing with the period since the coming of the British up to and including the War of Independence of 1857. That would just provide the background. The 1857 struggle, important as it is, has no real relevance from the point of view of the new developments that took place afterwards. 1857 marks the end of an epoch and the last effort of some feudal chiefs in India to regain their independence. It does not represent any new force, but an expiring old force.

Gradually after the 1857 struggle, new forces became evident. They are seen in various religious and social movements and then in the political sphere leading to the starting of the Indian National Congress. All this period also should be dealt with at not too great length. The object should be to trace the beginnings of these new forces, the rise of a new middle class and its impact on political and economic events. Naturally, some individuals will stand out, but the approach should not be individualistic.

The development of these forces should be traced. From the upper middle class political consciousness percolates to the lower middle class. That is roughly the period of the early twentieth century when Lokamanya Tilak comes upon the scene and the Bengal agitations play an important part. The terrorist movement in Bengal is a small facet of this, without any large significance.

1. File No. 40(60)/49-PMS.

2. On 2 January 1953, the Government of India set up a board of editors under the Chairmanship of Syed Mahmud to prepare a History of the Freedom Movement in India. The board comprised 11 members, including eminent scholars and historians.

The 1914-18 War produces powerful effects on the Indian scene, both politically and economically and leads to the Rowlatt Act, Jallianwala Bagh, etc.

We then enter the Gandhian Era in Indian politics. That really is the important phase of our struggle which has to be dealt with at some length and with a good deal of insight and awareness. There is the intellectual approach, of course, to it, but it is quite essential that the approach should be also imaginative and should bring out not only Gandhiji's leadership, but all these new forces that were simmering in India and to which Gandhiji gave shape and point.

Gandhiji's methods of struggle will, of course, have to be dealt with.

The whole point of this survey would be to bring out the significant features of this period in India. The impact of Western culture and technology on India, the reactions to it, the conflicts, the adaptations, the synthesis of all this and so on. It is in this background that the growth of the struggle should be seen in social and economic terms even more than in political terms.

This is, in brief, how I view this matter. It seems to me that such an account of history should not exceed one volume of, say, 500 or 600 pages and this volume should be written by one person who applies an integrated outlook to the writing of it. We may have other volumes later giving details or appendices with odd facts, etc. That will be some kind of source material. But the real history should not go beyond one volume and should be concise and should hold together.

I think that we should concentrate merely on the collection of material at present. No effort should be made to start the writing of the book. Of course, the collected material can be arranged, tabulated and notes written on it. That itself is a very big task. After all this has been done, the question of writing should be taken up. Meanwhile, of course, we can think of who the person should be for this work of writing. He must possess many qualities which are rarely joined together. Apart from the normal ability for historical writing and looking at things in proper perspective, he must have an economic and social sense strongly developed and, above all, he must have imagination. Preferably, a person who has participated in the struggle itself and who has thus had personal experience of it, should be chosen. But then it may be very difficult to find such a person. Obviously, the man or woman chosen must be capable of writing well, concisely and vividly.

Anyhow, the point I wish to urge now is that you might concentrate on the collection of material at this stage only.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Puppet Dance Drama Show¹

Last evening I saw a performance at Rashtrapati Bhavan by the Little Ballet Troupe,² which has been organised by Shanti Bardhan³ and Abani Dasgupta.⁴ This was a puppet dance drama giving a rendering of the *Ramayana* story. I had heard much in praise of this previously. I found that that praise was justified. Considering the limited resources available to the organisers, it was extraordinary, what a good show they put up.

This performance was greatly appreciated by all present, but perhaps, more especially, by the children. It seems to me that this medium is particularly suited for children as well as for rural audiences. I do not wish to exclude urban audiences.

I should like to congratulate the organisers of this puppet dance drama. I think they are deserving of encouragement and support.

1. Note, New Delhi, 25 April 1953. JN Collection.
2. The Little Ballet Troupe of Bombay came to Delhi to present their latest composition, a live puppet dance drama rendering scenes from the *Ramayana* at the Railway Centenary Exhibition open-air theatre from 17 April 1953.
3. (1915-1954); dancer; trained in Manipuri dance style by Guru Amubi Singh; was with Uday Shankar at Almora, 1940-43; produced 'Voice of Bengal', 'Spirit of India' and 'India Mortal' for IPTA; founder-director and chief choreographer, Little Ballet Troupe, Bombay 1952-54; produced 'Discovery of India' at the Indian National Theatre, 1947, its revised version for the Artist Renaissance Group 1948, and 'Ramayana' and 'Panchatantra'.
4. Dasgupta composed the music for this programme.

5. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
May 5, 1953

My dear Maulana,

I spoke to you this morning about the answer given by Keshava Deva Malaviya.² In this answer he said specifically that the Peacock Throne and

1. JN Collection.
2. In answer to a question by P.L. Kureel in the House of the People on 4 May 1953, Malaviya said that "the Government of India are trying to get back as much of the jewels, art treasures and antiques of historical importance as possible which were removed from India during the British regime."

the Koh-i-Noor are among the historical articles which are under consideration of Government. That appears to me to go much farther than what you told me.

So far as I know, there is no Peacock Throne anywhere. The Koh-i-Noor is certainly now among the crown jewels of the United Kingdom.

This answer has naturally created some kind of a sensation in England. We have had an enquiry from our High Commission in London. I enclose a telegram I am sending them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
May 9, 1953

My dear Syama Prasad,
Your letter of the 7th May.²

I have personally no objection to the proposals made by the Prime Minister of Ceylon³ in regard to the relics. As I told you previously, if the Mahabodhi Society agrees, I shall also agree. I am, however, enquiring from the Ministries concerned.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 5-38/53-A.2(C-1) MEA.
2. Mookerjee wrote that the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka had made a request to him for a permanent loan of a small portion of the Buddhist relics available at Sanchi and a similar request had been made by the Mahabodhi Society of Sri Lanka. He further added that Sri Lanka was largely responsible for bringing back the relics to India from England and it was difficult to say "no" to them as India had already allowed a small portion of the relics to be sent to Myanmar as permanent loan.
3. Dudley Senanayake, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, 1952-53.

7. Reproductions of Indian Paintings¹

I am certainly interested in our producing reproductions of famous or typical Indian paintings. But if this is done, it should be done well and I think that the responsibility should be that of the Education Ministry. I am afraid any reproductions made in India will not be good enough. However, we can investigate others.

I am not particularly enamoured of Faber's collection, though some of them might be included.

Mr Ukil² of the All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society knows something about this, but he has unfortunately broken away from many of our prominent artists and others. Therefore it would be desirable to have a larger consultation.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 10 May 1953. JN Collection.
2. Barada Ukil; noted art critic and organiser of art exhibitions; founder Chairman of All-India Fine Arts and Crafts Society, New Delhi.

8. Bodh Gaya Temple¹

I am very happy to learn that at last the management of the Bodh Gaya temple, sacred to Buddhists and Hindus alike, is being handed over to a new committee of management in accordance with the law passed by the Bihar legislature.² This Committee will have representatives of both Buddhists and Hindus and will look after this famous place of pilgrimage and worship in accordance with the wishes of the people concerned. This matter has been pending for a long time and had given rise in the past to much litigation. That was most unfortunate. I am happy that ultimately a settlement was arrived at by consent. I hope that in future there will be full cooperation among all those concerned with this famous temple.

It is specially auspicious that this act of transfer should take place on a day which is sacred to innumerable people all over the world. On this day I offer my homage to the memory and teachings of the Buddha, and I earnestly trust that his message of peace will guide us in our labours.

1. Message for the new management committee of the Bodh Gaya Temple, New Delhi, 12 May 1953. File No. 2(271)/48-PMS.
2. In January 1953.

9. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
May 17, 1953

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Thank you for your letter of the 14th May with which you have sent me a copy of your letter to the Commander-in-Chief, Army.²

What you have written to the Commander-in-Chief certainly deserves consideration, and I hope that the matter will be enquired into. I rather doubt, however, if it is possible or desirable to replace altogether foreign music by our own in so far as military bands are concerned. While Indian music has made great progress in its own particular domain, there is little in it in the way of orchestral or band music. Recently some attempts have been made. They have not been remarkably successful. From the popular point of view, the success obtained has been largely with cinema tunes, which though catchy, are hardly high class.

The question, therefore, is of developing orchestral and band music in accordance with the rules and conventions of Indian music. That is a very wide and difficult question. It is not merely a question of adopting a tune.

The genius of Indian music and the genius of European music differ greatly and it is doubtful if one can be grafted on to the other.³ No doubt, one could learn from the other to some extent and be influenced by it. But, so far as I know, experts do not think it desirable to mix these two completely different types. This is not a question of purely martial music but rather of music suitable for orchestras and bands, more particularly for bands on the march. Even the modern Indian orchestras, the very few that exist, use Sitar, Veena, Sarangi, Tabala etc. It is a little difficult to imagine people marching with these instruments and playing them at the same time. Indian music, as developed, is essentially what might be called chamber music or folk music. It is very good from that point of view, but how it can be applied to an orchestra or a band is not quite clear. What has happened recently is, as I have said above, the adaptation of some film tunes, and they are not good enough for a serious performance, though occasionally they might be used.

1. File No. 109/53, President's Secretariat.
2. Rajendra Prasad had written to Commander-in-Chief, Rajendrasinhji that for the past two years an attempt was being made to introduce Indian tunes which could not be played successfully on the instruments used for foreign tunes. He advised that Indian army music should be developed on the basis of Indian music. Instruments should be adapted and if necessary, even changed, to suit the new requirements.
3. He thought it worthwhile making a comprehensive investigation with the help of people who knew Indian music to take advantage of "our old martial tunes and conform them with modern conditions, grafting here and there from foreign countries on the stalk of the Indian origin."

While Indian music should be encouraged and developed in every way, it would be a pity for us in India to get out of touch with the type of music that has become almost universal in the world and which has produced some of the highest forms of art. Indeed, it is a pity that European music is fading out with great rapidity from India. That I think is bad in itself and it is also bad because its influence on Indian music will then cease. There are at present only one or two proper orchestras left in India which play European music with some measure of success.

My own impression is that band music as played is popular with our people. You will remember the Retreat is played not only by one band but mass bands. This is most effective and greatly appreciated. It is not quite clear to me how this can be replaced by some form of Indian music.

It is interesting to note that a fair number of private bands exist in almost every major city of India. They are not good at all, but they appear to supply some public want and they have grown up by public support. They play some kind of European music.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. To Nirmala Joshi¹

New Delhi
June 29, 1953

My dear Miss Joshi,²

Indira gave me your letter of June 9th in which you asked about the awards to be given for folk dancing.

I think that there should be a running trophy and each individual participant should be given a small token medal. I also think that the best troupe should be given this trophy, as suggested by you, taking into consideration the various points you have mentioned.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. (1915-1981); trained in classical music; organised the first music conference in Delhi, 1936; founder of the first music and dance school in Delhi, the Hindustani School of Music, (later renamed Sangeet Bharati) 1937; founder, Bharatiya Kala Kendra, 1947; organised folk dance festival during the first Republic Day celebrations; actively involved in rehabilitating the folk dance forms, such as *Chhau*, *Odissi*, *Kuchipudi*, *Manipuri*; Executive member and first Secretary of Sangeet Natak Akademi, 1953-60; instrumental in setting up regional academies and the National School of Drama, Delhi.

V. REORGANIZATION OF STATES

(i) General

1. Assurances at Governors' Conference¹

I am surprised at this correspondence. As a matter of fact, no assurances of any kind were given or could be given at the Governors' Conference, because such assurances can only be given after the matter has been considered by the Cabinet and some decision has been taken. In any event, the Governors' Conference is hardly the place for such undertakings being given. Nor is it of much importance what is put down in a record of the proceedings of that Conference.

What was stated by me was that it was my intention to consider the question of having some kind of a Commission for the reorganisation of provinces on an all-India basis and that this question will come up for consideration much later after the Andhra Province was well established. That was and is my intention. It is not an assurance because much depends upon developments and other matters. I might add that I did not use the words "Linguistic Provinces". I referred to "Reorganisation of Provinces".

Regarding the administration of justice, it was, I believe, stated by the Home Minister that we were all thinking of improving and simplifying judicial procedure. There was no question of appointing a commission for this, nor do we intend doing so. But we certainly intend taking some action in this matter at a suitable early opportunity. We have not determined what procedure to adopt or what steps to take. But the idea of appointing a roving commission does not appeal to us.

I do not think it is necessary for the proceedings as drafted to be amended or added to. This note of mine may be kept for reference and a copy of it might be sent to the Governor of Madhya Pradesh.²

1. Note, 11 April 1953. File No. 225/52, President's Secretariat.

2. B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya.

2. A Congress Resolution¹

The Congress clarified its policy in regard to the reorganisation of States by a resolution passed at the Hyderabad Session.² The Working Committee welcomes the decisions taken in regard to the formation of an Andhra State and trusts that the people and the States concerned will cooperate to make this a success.

The Committee welcomes the indication given on behalf of Government that a high-powered Commission will be appointed, after the establishment of the Andhra State, to consider the reorganisation of States. Any such reorganisation should take into consideration as laid down in the Hyderabad resolution, not only cultural and linguistic matters but also other important factors, such as the preservation of the unity of India, national security and defence, administrative advantages, financial considerations and the economic progress of each State as well as of the whole nation.

The Committee regrets that a matter affecting the whole of India, in regard to which a policy has been clearly stated, should be made the basis for separate and often mutually hostile agitations. Such an individual approach is not only likely to lead to harmful results but is likely to create conflict and ill will and to delay the reorganisation desired.

In particular, the Committee deprecates and disapproves of the attempts made to bring about political decisions of high importance by resort to hunger strikes. The reorganisation of States can only be successfully brought about by the largest measure of cooperation and goodwill of all concerned. The Committee have noted with regretful surprise the occasional tendency of a State or a Pradesh Congress Committee to act in a manner which is hostile to other States and to other Pradesh Congress Committees. This is completely opposed to the manner in which Congressmen and Congress Committees should approach any important problems.

1. Resolution on Reorganisation of States, drafted by Nehru for Congress Working Committee meeting, New Delhi, 15 May 1953. JN Collection. The Resolution was passed the next day.
2. On 17 January 1953, the Congress passed a resolution, which approved of the steps taken by the Government of India regarding the formation of a separate Andhra State and drew special attention to the factors to be taken into consideration in any reorganisation of States, such as "promoting the unity of India and discouraging separatist tendencies, national security and defence, financial considerations and economic progress" of the whole nation as well as of the States. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, pp. 247-249.

V. REORGANIZATION OF STATES

(ii) Andhra

1. To S. Nijalingappa¹

New Delhi
April 6, 1953

My dear Nijalingappa,²

On my return yesterday to Delhi I received your letter dated 30th March and connected papers. We shall give full consideration to these before any further decision is taken.

I presume you have seen Justice Wanchoo's Report³ in which he has suggested that the whole of Bellary District should be attached to Andhra State.

I have been surprised and grieved with the kind of things that are happening in the name of the formation of the Karnataka State and more particularly in regard to Bellary Taluk.⁴ As you very well know, I am not opposed to the formation of the Karnataka State and it may be formed in the proper course. But grave doubts are coming to my mind about the future of the State when I see the complete lack of discipline among many of those who are advocating such a State. Here we are considering these matters and trying to give our best attention to them. We are doing this at a time when the most urgent and vital matters are upsetting the international situation and when most of our energy is being diverted to development schemes in the Five Year Plan. Even so, we shall proceed with this consideration of Bellary Taluk as well as the larger consideration of the reorganisation of States. Is it thought that this is going to be helped by people fasting or uprooting rails and stopping trains or by resigning from legislatures? I confess that all this

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to the Home Minister.
2. Member of the House of the People and of the Congress Working Committee; President, Karnataka Provincial Congress Committee.
3. K.N. Wanchoo had recommended the inclusion of eleven districts and Alur, Adoni and Rayadurg taluks of Bellary district in the proposed Andhra State and the rest in the residuary Madras State. The question of Bellary taluk was to be decided later. For Nehru's statement in the House of the People on 7 February 1953, see *Selected Works* (second series) Vol. 21, pp. 264-268.
4. The question of Bellary taluk and town which had a mixed Kannada, Telugu and Hindustani speaking population, was to be decided later as the Kannadigas and the Andhras both claimed this major centre of trade and commerce and district headquarters. Nehru received innumerable memoranda in this regard from both sides. Demonstrations were taken out, rail traffic disrupted, and many Congressmen in Bombay and Mysore Legislatures resigned from their seats to press their cause.

distresses me greatly because it shows that some of us have no sense of proportion.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Towards the Formation of Andhra State¹

In considering the formation of the Andhra State, Cabinet came to certain decisions. One of these decisions related to the Bellary District, which consists of ten taluks. Cabinet decided that six of these taluks, which are predominantly Kannada in population, should form part of Mysore State and three, namely Adoni, Alur and Rayadurg, which have a definite Telugu-speaking majority as a whole, should form part of the Andhra State. In regard to the tenth taluk, namely Bellary Taluk, Cabinet postponed decision in order to obtain further facts which would enable them to decide finally.

2. Cabinet also decided that after the formation of the Andhra State, one or more Boundary Commissions should be appointed by the State Governments concerned, with the cooperation and over-all supervision of the Central Government to consider the rectification of boundaries between the States concerned, where any change or realignment was considered necessary having regard to the populations of *firkas*, etc. or other reasons.

3. The question of Bellary Taluk thus remains to be decided. In this taluk Kannada-speaking people form a considerable majority and, generally speaking, the surrounding areas are also largely Kannada-speaking.² In Bellary town, the total population is 70,322. This is divided up as follows:

Kannada-speaking	:	18,419
Telugu-speaking	:	24,882
Other languages, chiefly Hindustani	:	27,021

1. Note, 17 April 1953. JN Collection.

2. According to Lakshmi Shankar Misra's report, the population of the taluka was: Kannada-speaking—89,925 (52.52%); Telugu-speaking—43,317 (25.29%); others—37,984 (22.19%).

4. The town of Bellary has served not only as the headquarters of the District of Bellary but also as a regional centre for some of the Rayalaseema Districts and a number of regional offices are situated in the town. The somewhat higher percentage of Telugu-speaking people may be partly due to the presence of these regional offices as well as, perhaps, of the Police Force, etc.

5. It is necessary that a very early decision should be taken about the Bellary Taluk as a number of administrative questions, in regard to the formation of the Andhra State, can only be finally decided after such decision about Bellary Taluk is taken. At the same time, Cabinet are of opinion that it is desirable that there should be a fuller investigation into the relevant factors before this final decision about Bellary Taluk is taken. Such relevant factors are, among others, principally the wishes of the people and the desirability of arriving at a decision which will be largely acceptable to them. There can be no complete agreement on this issue because there are different viewpoints and there are a large number of people who are neither Telugu-speaking nor Kannada-speaking. But the decision should carry the great majority and thus be conducive to a stable administration. For the purpose of this investigation, Government should appoint an officer, who should be requested to carry out this investigation as rapidly as possible on the broad facts and report to Government.

6. Generally speaking, any minor divisions or rectifications might be considered by the Boundary Commission to be appointed after the formation of the Andhra State. Any decision now taken should not be a bar to this detailed consideration by a Boundary Commission. But if the officer appointed for the enquiry is of opinion that a particular rectification or re-alignment in regard to the Bellary District is desirable, having regard to all the circumstances, he may recommend it. He should keep in mind that at this stage broad decisions have to be taken which will generally meet with the approval of the people concerned and be conducive to the necessary administrative changes being carried out without delay and in order to make the areas of the States concerned compact and homogeneous.

7. Cabinet would like this enquiry by the officer appointed for the purpose to be concluded by the 15th May.³

3. Lakshmi Shankar Misra, Chief Justice of Hyderabad High Court, appointed to conduct this enquiry by the Government of India on 21 April 1953, submitted his report on 18 May 1953.

3. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
April 20, 1953

My dear Rajaji,

I received your message some days ago about Bellary² and the necessity for speeding up the decision on the temporary capital of Andhra.³

We have given a good deal of thought to this Bellary matter. I agree largely with what you say. But we have to deal with a delicate situation in which, unfortunately, people's passions are involved. We have, therefore, decided to ask a Judge to go down to Bellary Taluk and report to us within a fortnight. This will not delay matters much and it will prevent people ascribing political motives to us. Generally speaking, we do not want him to go into minor matters, which should be left to the Boundary Commission which will come after the foundation of the Andhra State.

The Judge we have chosen is Lakshmi Shankar Misra,⁴ at present Chief Justice of Hyderabad. He is on leave now. He has been in Hyderabad for the last six months. Normally we would not have chosen a person from Hyderabad, but this man is really a Lucknow man and was previously a Judge here. Probably he would be able to go down in about a week's time. We shall let you know. Meanwhile, I have had a talk with him and given him some papers to study. He will come back here in about three or four days for further talks

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to Kailas Nath Katju and Y.N. Sukthankar, Cabinet Secretary.
2. Rajagopalachari in his telegram of 15 April 1953, had expressed his misgivings about setting up of a Boundary Commission regarding Bellary taluk issue. He 'earnestly advised' Nehru to go by taluks 'as a whole' and leave the rectification of boundaries and re-assignment of villages inside a taluk to a Boundary Commission to be set up after the States were formed.
3. Some Andhra groups had been demanding that Madras city be made the temporary capital of the proposed State, to which Rajagopalachari was strongly opposed, as he feared that the city would become a battleground and the troubles would spread to other Tamil areas where a sizeable Andhra population lived. In fact in March 1953, it was reported that the Government of India was ready to accept Wanchoo Commission's recommendation that Madras be the temporary capital of the State but what clinched the issue was Rajaji's reported threat of resignation from premiership, if the Government did so.
4. (b. 1895); began law practice in England; Reader, Faculty of Law, Lucknow University, 1926-34; Puisne Judge, Awadh Chief Court, Lucknow, 1943-47; Judge, Allahabad High Court, 1948; Senior Judge in Charge, Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court, 1951-52; Chief Justice, Hyderabad High Court since November 1952.

with me and Katju⁵ and then he will go direct to Bellary.⁶ We are giving him an adequate staff from here. So you need not trouble to provide him with any assistance. But you will be good enough to inform the local authorities in Bellary about his visit so that they can give him such help as he requires. This will be chiefly in relation to accommodation and transport. Possibly also some one who might translate, where necessity arises.

I hope that we shall come to a final decision about Bellary Taluk by about the middle of May.

As regards the decision about a temporary capital for Andhra State, I have spoken to Sanjiva Reddi⁷ and he agrees that this should be taken early. I think that a meeting for this purpose might well be held in the third week of May, or say somewhere between the 20th and the 25th of May.⁸ The proper procedure would be, as suggested by you. That is, for the Speaker of the Madras State Assembly to convene the meeting and to nominate the Chairman. Even this process of nomination might be automatic, that, according to some fixed rule. As in our Constituent Assembly, the oldest member can be asked to preside. The oldest member is obviously Prakasam.⁹ I suppose he would be as good a Chairman as any for this particular meeting. Sanjiva Reddi was agreeable to this.

If the Speaker agrees to this procedure, I think that he might first consult informally the three or four leaders of various groups among the Andhra MLAs regarding the date and the Chairman. Having fixed these matters, he can have notices issued. That is all that he has to do and the nominated Chairman will then take charge of the meeting.

Sanjiva Reddi and, I believe, others are anxious that they should be permitted to decide about the High Court also being in Andhra.¹⁰ I have told him that the formal decision can only be made after the new State Assembly meets. It is open to them informally to consider this matter and if there is general agreement, that will simplify matters. Perhaps, even some preparatory steps to that end might be begun. I suppose the real object in this is to have either the capital or the High Court in the Rayalaseema area.

Could you, therefore, kindly mention this matter of the meeting to the Speaker? If he thinks it is necessary, I can write to him on the above lines.

5. K.N. Katju, Union Minister of Home and States.
6. L.S. Misra visited Bellary from 1 to 8 May 1953.
7. President, Andhra Provincial Congress Committee.
8. The Andhra Legislators of Madras Assembly met from 30 May to 5 June 1953, to decide about the temporary capital of the proposed State.
9. T. Prakasam, leader of Praja Socialist Party and leader of the United Opposition Front in the Madras Assembly.
10. Sanjiva Reddi met Nehru on 20 April 1953 and urged that the High Court of Andhra should be established inside the new State and not continue in Madras, as recommended by the Wanchoo Commission. See also *Selected Works* (second series) Vol. 21, p. 268.

We have, as you know, appointed Sukthankar¹¹ to your Committee of Officials to consider the question of Services.¹² We have given him an assistant, Bapat, also.

There has been some heart-burning because the Partition Committee you have appointed consists of members of your Cabinet only.¹³ A Cabinet Committee, of course, must necessarily consist of Cabinet members. But whatever decisions the committee may arrive at must be such as are likely to be approved of by the subsequent Andhra Government. If this Government does not agree to those decisions, then we have to start *de novo*. Hence it seems necessary that the decisions should have the approval of the prospective government and the prospective Members of the Legislature. At any rate, a sensation should be created that they are in the picture and are being consulted. If they get rubbed up the wrong way, then even a good thing might be objected to.

I suppose that after the decision about a temporary capital is made, your Cabinet Committee will have to take steps to give effect to it. Clearly that is a matter in which the prospective government will be deeply interested and they should have a hand in it or, at any rate, some people whom they trust. All this points to the conclusion that we should try our best to proceed with as large a measure of consultation and cooperation as possible. This will lessen future difficulties. Your committee, of course, cannot go about consulting everybody. But would it not be possible for your committee to coopt two or three persons from among the leading Andhra MLAs? Or, even if they are not formally coopted, they might be consulted and kept in the know.

The Partition Committee that was appointed in 1949-50 consisted of both Ministers and others.¹⁴

I would like you to consider these matters.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. Y.N. Sukthankar, Cabinet Secretary, Government of India.

12. A four-man committee of officials was appointed by the Government of Madras to look after the implementation of partition of the Services and other related matters between Andhra and Madras. These officials were: S. Venkateswaran, T.A. Verghese, O. Pulla Reddi and V.K. Rao, the latter two being Andhra members of the civil service.

13. This Committee of six ministers, A.B. Shetty, C. Subramaniam, M.V. Krishna Rao, N. Sankara Reddi, M. Manickavelu Naicker and S.B.P. Pattabhirama Rao, was appointed by Madras Government to monitor and supervise the work of the four-man committee of Officials on partition.

14. This committee consisted of P.S. Kumaraswami Raja (Premier, Chairman), M. Bhaktavatsalam, K. Madhava Menon, B. Gopala Reddi, N. Sanjiva Reddy (Ministers), Kala Venkata Rao, T. Prakasam and T.T. Krishnamachari (others).

4. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
April 21, 1953

My dear Rajaji,

I wrote to you last night about various matters connected with the formation of the Andhra State.² Today I had an interview with M.V. Krishna Rao,³ one of your Andhra Ministers, who had come here for the educational conference. He was worried about the reaction of the Andhra legislators regarding the formation of your Cabinet Committee on partition. He pointed out that it was quite possible that the Andhra Government later might not agree to some of the decisions that might be taken previously by this Committee and that, therefore, it was very desirable to keep them in the picture right from the beginning. In fact, he wanted some of them to be made members of this Committee so that they could share the responsibility for these decisions.

I feel he is right and it would be wise to do so. In fact, the right course would be for the Andhras to form some kind of a shadow Cabinet as early as they can and for this to be consulted at every step. After all, they are likely to be the Government of Andhra State and will be charged with the responsibility of carrying out many of these decisions. If they do not agree or if they feel that they are being bypassed, it will be difficult to get their agreement later.

I hope, therefore, that you will give thought to this matter.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. See the preceding item.

3. Minister, Education, Harijan Uplift and Information, Government of Madras.

5. To B. Ramakrishna Rao¹

New Delhi
April 21, 1953

My dear Ramakrishna Rao,

I have received your two letters dated 18th and 19th April.

It is true that I am going on a tour of certain areas of Maharashtra. My

1. JN Collection.

tour begins on the 28th April from Belgaum and then on to Ratnagiri, Sholapur, Ahmednagar and a number of other places, finishing up at Jalgoan. I am not going to Aurangabad or any other place in Hyderabad State on this occasion. I should, of course, like to go to Aurangabad, but there is no point in my rushing past it and that will, therefore, have to wait for a future occasion.

I am sorry that you have to postpone the Land Reforms Bill.² Nothing is more important, I think, than land reforms and there is great urgency about this matter.

About the demonetization of the Osmania currency, we know that at your request we postponed this question to a large extent for two years.³ Now Dr Malkote⁴ has been discussing this matter with our Finance Minister and I hope that further relief can be given.

I receive from time to time reports about Hyderabad. Some of them come from your critics; some from independent observers. No doubt, the picture painted by your critics is exaggerated. Nevertheless, I do not feel quite happy about the state of affairs. A general complaint is that group or caste politics are emerging and are being encouraged, that is, the Lingayat group, the Reddy group, the Harijan group, etc. This is not a healthy development.

But what I am most concerned with are the complaints frequently made of some kind of corruption in the administration. Such complaints are made everywhere. Many of them have often little basis, some have basis. The only rule one can apply is to investigate each complaint where there appears to be the slightest basis. More particularly, if a complaint is made against any Minister or senior official, there must be the fullest explanation available. No complaint against a Minister should go unanswered before the public. The public must be satisfied that every such complaint is immediately looked into and dealt with properly. A mere denial is not enough.

While we discuss high policies, what is of even more importance is a conviction in the minds of the people that the Government and those connected with it are people of integrity. The moment there is doubt about this, the Government loses its foundation.

2. The Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Land Bill was referred to a 17-member Select Committee on 9 April 1953 amidst strong opposition. The opposition alleged the Government wanted to expropriate the property of landlords for distribution to the landless for immediate political gains. So on 15 April, the Speaker, K.R. Vaidya, postponed consideration of the Bill till August, for a second reading of the Select Committee.
3. The Osmania currency, introduced towards the end of 19th century by Salar Jung I, the Prime Minister, was in circulation in Hyderabad State and was worth about Rs. 40 crores. It was to be withdrawn from circulation on 1 April 1953 at the rate of Rs. 100 Indian currency = Rs. 116-10-8 Osmania currency. According to an official estimate, its complete withdrawal from circulation would take two to three years.
4. G.S. Melkote, Finance Minister, Government of Hyderabad.

I receive complaints from time to time about irregularities and charges of nepotism or even corruption. I do not send them all to you, but I would like to impress upon you that no complaint should remain unanswered. Where necessary, it should be considered by the Party or by a committee of the Party. In regard to important matters, the Cabinet should be kept informed.

I mention below one or two special matters that have come to my notice. One relates to the case of a Customs official named Reddy who is charged with embezzlement of about thirty thousand rupees at Khammam and the charge is under enquiry and that the man was suspended by the Customs authorities. Later he was reinstated while the enquiry was going on. This appears to be improper.

Then there is a case of Chenna Reddy of issuing a licence for selling *khalli* (groundnut oil cake) to Lakshmi Niwas Ganeriwal who was contesting an election on behalf of the Congress. Later all these licences were rescinded under some general order of the Government of India. But the fact of giving a licence to a member of our Party on a special occasion naturally has led to objection.

Then there are cases of land being acquired at a very cheap rate by some people and contracts being given in a way so as to suggest some measure of nepotism.

There are some other cases that have been brought to my notice and about which I know nothing. My point is that every such allegation has to be dealt with and refuted.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
April 24, 1953

My dear Rajaji,

I have your second letter of April 23rd.²

It is not our desire to sub-divide taluks, but after long discussion in Cabinet

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Home Minister.

2. Rajagopalachari had suggested some changes in the draft order regarding the enquiry by Justice L.S. Misra about the fate of Bellary Taluk.

it was decided not to make this too rigid. Personally, I hope that it may not be necessary to make any such sub-division.³

I do not understand what you mean by our leaving out the wishes of the people.⁴ I am not referring to the people of any village or small area. It seems to me that the major consideration is the wishes of the people over that entire area.

We do not propose to issue anything more to the press about Justice Misra's visit to Bellary. Our further instructions to him are private. We are changing them somewhat from the draft that was sent to you. Therefore, so far as the public is concerned, the press note already issued from Delhi will remain.⁵

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Rajagopalachari had written, "if you have finally rejected my earnest advice that there should be no subdividing of Taluks to be undertaken at this stage, there is no point in my pressing it again in this connection."
4. Rajagopalachari had observed that since it would be impossible for Justice Misra to decide the Bellary issue on the basis of the "wishes of the people", as suitable machinery to ascertain the same was not available to him and the time-limit imposed on him was too short, there should not be any reference in the order regarding this factor, i.e., the wishes of the people.
5. The Government press note announcing Lakshmi Shankar Misra's appointment as the one-man Commission on the Bellary taluk was issued on 21 April 1953.

7. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
April 24, 1953

My dear Rajaji,

Thank you for your letter of April 23rd regarding the meeting of the Andhra Members of the Madras Legislative Assembly to select the temporary capital of the Andhra State.²

1. JN Collection. Copy of this letter was sent to Home Minister.
2. Rajagopalachari wrote that as advised by Nehru, the Speaker of Madras Assembly had agreed to convene a meeting of the Andhra members of the Assembly. He suggested that 31 May 1953 would be a convenient date since the poll for the bye-election to the Council of States, caused by the death of N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, was to be held on 30 May, when most of the MLAs would be in Madras.

I think that the 31st May would be a suitable date. As you say, this will simplify questions of travelling allowance, and by that time I am sure that the final decision about the Bellary taluk will have taken place.

As for consulting the leaders of the various groups, that is entirely for the Speaker to determine. He may or may not consult anyone. But I would suggest that it would be advisable to see some of them informally and tell them of the date fixed. This is a courtesy which is appreciated.

As regards the person to be appointed Chairman, I have already indicated an automatic rule which might be applied. If, however, Shri Prakasam would prefer to be free to participate in the debate, the other member, namely, Shri Koti Reddi, who has continuously been a member of the Madras Assembly for the longest period will be appointed. Perhaps, it would be better to offer the Chairmanship to Shri Prakasam first.

I am sure that a decision about the Bellary taluk will be taken before this meeting. If notices have been issued previously for the meeting, the members representing the taluqas of Adoni, Alur and Rayadurg should be invited.³ That is the present position.

In regard to Bellary taluk, I would suggest that that member be informed that such a meeting is being held and that in the possible event of a decision being in favour of Bellary going to Andhra, he would be invited.⁴ That is to say, no formal invitation need be sent, but intimation might be given to him previously.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The Speaker of Madras Assembly had asked whether the members representing these three taluks should be invited to the meeting. Rajagopalachari suggested that they ought to be invited.
4. The report on Bellary taluk was expected before the meeting.

8. To N.C. Chatterjee¹

New Delhi
May 4, 1953

Dear Mr Chatterjee,

Please refer to your telegram of the 30 April about a Boundary Commission. It is not strictly correct to state that any so-called Boundary Commission is going to be appointed. What I have stated is that after the Andhra State had been fully established, Government proposed to appoint a high-powered commission to consider various problems of reorganisation of States in India. I cannot at this stage say what the exact terms of reference will be.

I regret that I cannot agree to public issues being decided on the basis of people fasting.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

9. To Ramananda Tirtha¹

New Delhi
May 4, 1953

My dear Swamiji,

A few days ago I was surprised to learn that you had issued a statement to the effect that all Congressmen in the State had agreed that Hyderabad City belonged to the Andhras.² I do not know what the occasion was for making this statement. In any event it seems to me to be very ill-timed. I should also doubt very much how far a sweeping statement of that kind can be correct. You know that I have expressed myself on several occasions on this issue

1. File No.P-9, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. Ramananda Tirtha, President, Hyderabad PCC, replied on 11 May 1953 that what he had said was that Hyderabad City formed a part of the Andhra region and this assertion was based on a CWC decision of 1947, which declared Hyderabad and Secunderabad to be a separate provincial unit and specified that the word 'Andhra' be prefixed so as to remove any doubt about the geographical relationship of the two cities with the Telengana region. The imminent formation of Andhra State, he added, had encouraged several Congressmen to seriously consider the future of Hyderabad State and the Hyderabad PCC was going to decide the issue at a meeting to be held on 2 June 1953.

and deprecated any such statements being made.³ To make this statement on the eve of the formation of the Andhra State appears to me to be peculiarly unfortunate.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. In January 1953, during the Congress session at Hyderabad, Ramananda Tirtha, as Chairman of the Reception Committee, had called for the dissolution of Hyderabad. Nehru in his Presidential Address had rejected the idea as premature and unsound. Earlier in July 1951, when Kaleswara Rao raised this issue at a Congress meeting, Nehru asked him not to indulge in "loose talk" and warned that if he continued in this vein, they might not even get the Andhra Province.

10. To Balvantray Mehta¹

New Delhi
May 11, 1953

My dear Balvantray,

I enclose a letter from Swami Ramananda Tirtha, in reply to what I had written to him.² I had pointed out that it seemed to me improper for him to make the statement about Hyderabad belonging to the Andhra region. It seemed to me that this was a peculiarly unfortunate moment for him to do so.

In his reply he refers to a meeting of the Hyderabad PCC to be held on the 2nd June³ when, apparently, this point is going to be considered. I do not know why it is necessary for the Hyderabad PCC to consider this point at this stage. I do not wish to come in its way. But they should realise that it is unwise to deal with such matters at this stage.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No.P-9, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. See the preceding item.
3. The general body of the Hyderabad PCC passed a resolution on 3 June 1953 welcoming the CWC resolution of 16 May 1953, and supporting the appointment of a High Power Commission to look into the reorganisation of States on linguistic basis. It called for the dissolution of Hyderabad State and integration of the three linguistic groups of the State with the three contiguous areas of Visalandhra, Samyukta Karnataka and Samyukta Maharashtra. The resolution also appointed an eleven-member sub-committee to draft a memorandum on these lines. This memorandum was to be submitted to the High Power Commission on its appointment by the Government of India.

11. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
May 18, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

Justice Misra came to see me this evening and I glanced through his report.² He also had some maps which are very helpful. I think he has done his work with thoroughness and efficiency and we should have no difficulty in accepting his recommendations.

It seems to me very important that we should come to a decision about Bellary with the greatest possible speed. Every day's delay means rumours and excitement. Both the Telugus and the Kannada people are emotional and get worked up easily. Therefore the sooner we announce our decision the better.

In any event, we must decide before we leave for Kashmir on Saturday next. There is a Cabinet meeting on Friday morning, 22nd May.³ That should be the last date for us. If possible, I would even prefer Cabinet to consider it on the 20th morning. I do not see why this should not be done. We need not follow the normal procedure of taking some time to circulate the report. If possible, I should like the report to be given to Ministers at the Cabinet meeting itself the day after tomorrow morning. This will also prevent leakages.⁴ The Cabinet can then come to a decision then and there, or, if more time is required, we shall postpone the decision to the next meeting on the 22nd.

It is not necessary for the appendices to the report to be circulated nor should copies of the maps be prepared. One set of them is good enough for reference.

I suggest that you might have copies of the main report made tomorrow.

Apart from other reasons for urgency, an additional reason is that elections are taking place in the course of the next few days down South.⁵

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. L.S. Misra, in his report submitted on 18 May 1953, awarded the whole of Bellary taluk to Mysore.
3. The Cabinet reviewed L.S. Misra's report on 20 May 1953.
4. Earlier, the recommendations of Wanchoo Commission had leaked out much before its publication.
5. The Madras Assembly by-elections were scheduled to take place between 7 and 16 June 1953.

12. To Ramananda Tirtha¹

New Delhi
May 22, 1953

My dear Swamiji,

Your note. Since I saw you, I have had a long reply from Ramakrishna Rao about the various complaints made.

I shall of course keep in touch with him, but I think that you should draw his attention to any serious matter. There is a tendency to bring in trivial complaints. That does no good.

I do not particularly like the look of things in Hyderabad. I am not for the moment referring to the manner in which the Government is functioning but rather to the cleavages that appear to be developing. If this kind of thing is not stopped, Hyderabad is likely to go to pieces.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

13. To Balvantray Mehta¹

London
June 11, 1953

My dear Balvantray,

I am told that the Hyderabad Pradesh Congress Committee has passed a resolution advocating the disintegration of Hyderabad State and amalgamation with Andhra. At this meeting Shriman Narayan² is reported to have said that this matter will be referred to the High Power Commission. This may well be considered by that Commission. But it would have been better not to make such a promise.

I think it is very improper of Swami Ramananda Tirtha and his colleagues to go on agitating for this disintegration of Hyderabad when they know very well what our views are on this subject. I should like you to inform him of this.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. General Secretary of the Indian National Congress.

V. REORGANIZATION OF STATES

(iii) Karnataka

1. Fasting for Karnataka¹

I am certainly not going to give any statement or any assurance.² I think the behaviour of many people in the Karnataka has been very bad in this matter.³ I have met Nijalingappa and a number of people from the Bellary Taluk today and spoken to them plainly. It is fantastic that Government's policy should be determined because of fasts undertaken.

I think you should write to the Karnataka PCC.

1. Note to Balvantray Mehta, 9 April 1953. File No. G-31/1953, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. G.V. Hallikeri, Secretary, Karnataka PCC had informed that Shankargowda Patil, President, Hubli taluka Congress, had gone on an indefinite fast from 28 March 1953 seeking an unequivocal assurance from the Union Government and Congress High Command, on the formation of a separate Karnataka State by 2 October 1954.
3. Since January 1953 Congressmen from various parts of Mysore State were undertaking protest-fasts demanding unification of Karnataka. They organized fasting-camps which created an atmosphere of tension leading to sporadic acts of violence.

2. To S. Nijalingappa¹

New Delhi
May 10, 1953

My dear Nijalingappa,

I have received your letter of the 7th May, which I have read.² As you know, the question of Bellary has been referred to Justice Misra and he will be,

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Balvantray Mehta.
2. Nijalingappa wrote that popular feeling was disturbed over the fate of Bellary taluk. While the allotment of Alur, Adoni and Rayadurg talukas to Andhra, had already created discontentment, the setting up of a Commission to decide the fate of Bellary taluk, which was predominantly Kannada-speaking, had given rise to a feeling that Kannadigas were being persistently discriminated against by the Congress High Command. He pleaded that the Commission could take the 1951 village-wise population census into account and apportion the Kannada and Telugu speaking areas to respective States before 1 October 1953.

presumably, reporting to us in the course of the next four or five days. I must wait for his report.

As for the larger matter of the Karnataka Province, I have sought to make this perfectly clear everywhere. We intend appointing a high-powered Commission to go into the reorganisation of States. This will be done after the establishment of the Andhra State and not before. It is not possible for us to take any individual State separately. That will not be to the advantage of either that State or the adjoining States. Indeed it is practically not possible for us to do so. Anything in regard to the Karnataka State obviously affects all the surrounding States and all these matters have to be taken into consideration and one of them cannot be isolated from the other.

You accuse me of not understanding or appreciating the Kannada viewpoint.⁴ I think I understand it and appreciate it quite well enough. Perhaps I could say that you are not appreciating or understanding the larger viewpoint of India. It surprises me to see the approach to this problem which has been adopted by some of our friends in the Karnataka. That can only delay matters. I have to look at things from the all-India point of view. Otherwise I am not worthy of the place I occupy either in the Government or in the Congress.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Nijalingappa observed that despite previous assurances by the Congress Working Committee, certain remarks by Nehru during his tour of Maharashtra and at the Hyderabad Congress, had led the Kannadigas to think that Nehru was particularly "unsympathetic" to their cause. Nijalingappa also wrote that he failed to understand what stood in the way of solving the Karnataka issue and added that the loyalty and patience of the average Congress worker in Karnataka would be "sorely tried" by further delay.

3. To S. Nijalingappa¹

New Delhi
May 18, 1953

My dear Nijalingappa,

Your letter of May 15 has just reached me.²

I have previously written to you on this subject and I have nothing further to add.³ The Working Committee, as you must have seen, have passed a Resolution on the subject of redistribution of States.⁴ This was more or less in line with what has been stated informally on behalf of Government. With all the best will in the world, nothing more can be done at present. What may appear to you completely simple does not appear to us so easy and it takes time to do these things.⁵ In any event, we are quite clear in our minds that we can only tackle this subject now on an all-India basis.

The Karnataka Pradesh Congress Committee has evidently lost all perspective and sense of proportion, the type of resolutions that it passes are quite novel for a Congress Committee.⁶ I do not think it is furthering the cause it has at heart by adopting such methods. I am really surprised at the lack of wisdom that is being shown.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 7 (99)/48-PMS.
2. Nijalingappa urged that instead of setting up a Commission for linguistic reorganisation of States, it would be better if the cases of States which could be demarcated readily were taken up first. Karnataka was one such State. The setting up of a Commission in this regard was being construed by the public and opposition parties as an excuse to defer the whole issue. It was, he clarified, under such circumstances that the KPCC was forced to pass a resolution on Karnataka.
3. See the preceding item.
4. For the text of the Resolution, see *ante*, p. 149.
5. Nijalingappa wrote that a united Karnataka which was "easy of solution", may be formed by adding the three Kannada districts of Madras State, four of Bombay State and Coorg to Mysore. Since the issue of capital and head of the State had been agreed upon, it just needed the political will and desire on the part of the Government to implement it.
6. On 20 April 1953, the KPCC unanimously passed a resolution demanding that a Karnataka State be formed before October 1954, and that an "unambiguous and clear statement touching it" be made by the Government of India by the end of October 1953. Further, if the demand was turned down, the members of the KPCC would in the first instance resign their membership and members of the the State Legislatures and of Parliament from Karnataka would follow suit.

VI. GENERAL

1. Prohibition—a National Programme¹

For a long time past prohibition occupied an important place in our national programme. When the Constitution of India was drafted and passed, the policy of prohibition was mentioned as one of the guiding principles of our policy. Some of our States have given effect to it fully, some partly and some have proceeded more slowly.

Conditions differ from place to place and those responsible for the governance of each State have to decide on what steps to take and when to give effect to this national policy. Naturally all these steps should be carefully thought out so that each step should be firmly taken and any untoward consequences avoided. But it should be remembered always that we have to go in a certain direction as laid down in our Constitution.

There has been a good deal of controversy over this issue, more especially because of financial difficulties. Financial consequences have to be borne in mind. But if, from a social point of view, a particular reform is considered desirable, then financial considerations have a secondary place. We may well consider the best method and the most suitable steps to bring about that reform, but the direction should remain the same.

The major consideration should always be the good of the masses of our people. I have little doubt that the masses of our people profit both in the short run and in the long run by a policy of prohibition.

I send my good wishes, therefore, on the occasion of Bombay State observing a Prohibition Week.

1. Message for Prohibition Week being celebrated in Bombay, 5 April 1953. *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 7 April 1953.

2. Scientific Research and Development¹

The salvation of India from the throes of poverty and misery lies only in the proper development and harnessing of science and scientific industry.

The criterion of a country's maturity as well as of its capacity to progress is whether it concentrates on primary matters or fritters away its energies on secondary and unimportant issues. In India today our primary and paramount task is to better the lot of 360 million people. It is a mighty task and a magnificent adventure and surely it cannot be achieved unless the millions themselves cooperate wholeheartedly.

The job before every true Indian is to help in bringing about a speedy advancement of the standard of living of the 360 millions in the country. It is not easy to give a new face to so large a country which contains one-fifth of the world's population. Perhaps the only way of doing this difficult job is to bring about a temper of science so that it takes away the rut of sluggish habit, and brings about an era of blissful prosperity.

The completion of the chain of 11 national laboratories, the map of which we made a few years ago, is, to my mind, a very great and historic step in the advancement of our country. Scientific research is the only sure way by which science can be harnessed for the best of public use, and for the betterment of the nation. Many other countries have beaten us in such development, and although we cannot make up the work of countries in a few years, there is this distinct lesson to learn that humanity can only be lifted out of misery by science and its proper use.

If we do not use science we will be a backward country, and a third-rate nation. Even though we have completed this chain of 11 national laboratories, we must not be content with this achievement. In fact this is only the first step in the difficult ladder of progress which we have to climb; it must always be our endeavour to increase the pace of development of the country.

It is a dangerous thing to assume that whatever we are doing is enough. To my mind, complacency is a dangerous thing—the person who is complacent naturally falls out of the race. I want that we should be impatient, and dissatisfied with the pace of our progress, so that we always have the desire to increase the tempo of our work. But we must also remember that we have to change this impatience into activity and not froth and foam as many people are tending to do these days. It amazes me that certain narrow-minded people even in today's circumstances raise issues which disrupt the country's unity

1. Speech at the opening ceremony of the Central Building Research Institute, Roorkee, 12 April 1953. From the *National Herald* and *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 13 April 1953.

and have no bearing whatsoever on the primary issue of the nation's advance. Such people are the real stumbling blocks in the nation's path to peace and prosperity. But our hurry to increase the pace of development should not be such that we stumble and fall, thus bringing to a standstill all the work in the country, and jeopardising its very stability.

We have made these national laboratories basically to improve science and adapt scientific methods which will suit our country's needs. In the Central Building Research Institute which is the last in the chain of the 11 national laboratories, methods of building construction will be discussed, so that we can make good houses speedily. In the past few years costs of construction have increased considerably, and it is imperative to investigate how we can reduce these costs.

This is not a new school or college but it is a basic thing from where waves of knowledge will emanate to improve India and better the living conditions of our people. I am always pleased to see advancement going on in the country, but there is a definite cause to worry and find out as to when the millions of Indians who live in our villages will benefit from these projects. So we must see that we do justice to this money—which is public money—the money of the people of India.

We have now to see how we can attack the roots of poverty, so that we can sweep it out—from every house and from every home.

There must be a two-pronged attack on India's poverty, ignorance and backwardness. On the one hand, we should build up laboratories, river valley projects, factories and hundreds of things and on the other a movement must start from lakhs of villages for their own improvement. Soon the plan for this attack would be before the people probably part by part.

With the Five Year Plan in operation it is definite that the country's economy is being planned in a way which emphasizes all these points. The Bhakra-Nangal, Damodar and Hirakud projects are forerunners of the nation-building undertakings.

I congratulate all who are connected with the construction of the building of the Central Building Research Institute. I rejoice today.

3. Women in Nation-building¹

I greatly regret that I am unable to attend the Jubilee Session of the All-India

1. Message to the Jubilee Session of the All-India Women's Conference, New Delhi, 23 April 1953. Press Information Bureau. The conference was held on 4 May 1953.

Women's Conference which is going to be held at Poona. I should like, however, to send my greetings and good wishes to it.

The All-India Women's Conference has done pioneer work during the twenty-five years of its existence and this work has gradually borne fruit. I have long been of opinion that a country's progress can best be judged by the status of the women in that country and the opportunities given to them. In law the status of women has been more or less guaranteed by the Constitution, but in social practice, there is no doubt that a great deal remains to be done. Law helps and is important, but something much more than legal changes are necessary to bring about basic social changes. Indeed, the legal changes usually follow widespread public opinion.

I wish that there were more women in our Legislatures and engaged in other forms of public activity. Nevertheless, even those that are so engaged have often done credit to their country. Women have represented us in delegations abroad and have distinguished themselves in the work entrusted to them. Because of this, the reputation of Indian women abroad is high. I have no doubt that, given greater opportunities, many more of them will distinguish themselves.

But I am not interested merely in a few women occupying high posts and positions of responsibility. I should like the mass of our womenfolk to progress in many ways. They have the capacity to do so, given the opportunity. We should provide that opportunity. I hope that the All-India Women's Conference will always think of these masses of women in India and not confine its activities to a selected few at the top.

I have referred to social customs. Any real change can only come about when some of our social customs are changed. The Hindu Code Bill was a brave attempt to make some changes. Unfortunately, it was held up on many occasions. Perhaps, this was partly due also to the fact that we attempted to bring one big consolidated measure. We are trying to get over this difficulty by separating it into parts and I hope that, before long, these parts will become law.

While it is right that we should lay stress on this legislation passing through, we must remember that social changes must come from below and cannot be merely imposed from the top. Therefore, constant propaganda and approach to the people are necessary. That is one of the functions of the All-India Women's Conference.

We have undertaken a great task in the First Five Year Plan. That Plan may talk about great production, more industrial growth and such like matters, which are so important. But ultimately, any planning must envisage better men and women, healthy in mind and body, intelligent and self-reliant. To build up a new India of such citizens is the great adventure in which we are all engaged.

I hope that the All-India Women's Conference will participate with all its strength and energy in this adventure.

4. The Army and the People¹

Indian soldier owes allegiance to the entire country and not to any particular part from which he has hailed. The Army should have uppermost in its mind the service of the country. You must help in maintaining the unity of the country, thus enabling it to progress.

Where there is no unity, there will be no advance of the nation. The army can do a lot to achieve this unity among the people.

The Army has not only the responsibility of protecting the country from external aggression, but also prevent internecine quarrels leading to weakness of the nation. Their help will be particularly valuable at a time when India is faced with gigantic problems like economic backwardness and unemployment.

The Army should also help in educating the people to understand the problems of the country. Government has not created compartments in your sphere. Although you are not allowed to take part in politics, you can give a helping hand to the Government specially in dealing with the unemployment problem. You should go to the scarcity areas and help the people with your experience and knowledge.

The Army has done commendable work in some part of the country where shortages have hit the people. The army men should remember that it is the people whom they are serving. Their assistance to nation-building activities can be a great contribution to the country, which is also faced with financial problems.

In short, my appeal to you is to serve the people, protect the country and maintain the ideals we are following.

1. Speech at a gathering of soldiers of the Indian Army at Ahmednagar Fort, Ahmednagar, 1 May 1953. From the *National Herald* and *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 3 May 1953.

5. Social and Economic Programme¹

The Congress has, from time to time, laid down a social and economic programme for the nation. Since the attainment of independence, economic and social progress have become matters of urgency and the pace of such

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru for the Congress Working Committee, New Delhi, 16 May 1953. JN Collection.

progress has to be swift enough in order to yield adequate results. The Congress has welcomed the First Five Year Plan as the basis of national advancement.

The Working Committee welcome the new proposal for a National Extension Service which, they hope, will speedily cover nearly the whole of India and bring relief and opportunity of progress to the very door of the peasant and the worker.

In the opinion of the Working Committee, every effort should be made to quicken the pace of progress, more especially in regard to land reform and industrial growth. In terms of the recommendations of the Planning Commission, immediate steps should be taken to complete the collection of land data and the question of fixing ceilings on land holdings with a view to stepping up agricultural production, and, as far as possible, making land available for redistribution among the landless labour, should be given early consideration.

The major test of the success of any Plan is the measure in which it deals with the problem of unemployment. In a Welfare State, there should be practically no unemployment and opportunities for work should be available to all those who desire it. The Committee recognise that the problem in a vast country like India is of great magnitude and cannot be fully dealt with in a short period of time. Nevertheless, the aim of social and economic progress must be the attainment of full employment and the pace towards this goal should be as speedy as possible. The existence of unemployment is not only a social evil but also is a burden to the nation and comes in the way of fuller production, as this potentially productive labour power is wasted.

The problem of unemployment should, therefore, be tackled on all fronts and, more particularly, by the organised growth of cottage and village industries as well as by other productive and developmental schemes which utilise this labour, increase the purchasing power of the people and add to general production.

Every effort should be made to add to the volume of investment for developmental purposes and compulsory savings should be progressively introduced. State insurance should be extended to rural areas. Foreign trade should be gradually brought under State control.

The Committee welcome the Estate Duty Bill and are of opinion that taxation policy should have for its basic aim the reduction of economic inequalities.

Legislation relating to social reform, such as is envisaged in the various parts of the Hindu Code Bill, should be expedited. The legal system should be revised with a view to making it less cumbrous, less costly and less dilatory.

The Services have now to face new problems connected with the establishment of a Welfare State. They should, therefore, be reorganised from this point of view.

6. The Growth of Population¹

... Question: What steps are you taking to check the growth of India's population? Is any check being put on the rate of increase of population in India?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Well, we would like the growth of India's population to be checked. And I do not say that there is complete unanimity on methods of checking it, but even our Planning Commission has supported this, and we are carrying on some enquiries and some experiments to that end. But I think it must be realised that no marked effect is likely to be produced in the near future. While India's population ought to be limited, I think that the idea that it was growing at a tremendous pace is wrong. The pace of growth is all right. Of course, in the totality the population is large; it becomes large number of big country but the pace is not very big and it is likely to go down, I think, because of other reasons including, to some extent, birth control and the rest. Also, there are large tracts in India which are totally unpopulated still. Apart from the Gangetic Valley and Southern India, Travancore, Southern Madras, India is not a heavily populated country....

1. Press conference, London, 8 June 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Also from *India News*, 13 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 106-107, 130, 189-190, 358-359, 396-399, 407 and 448-490.

7. Progress of the Five Year Plan¹

...Question: How much do you think is the economic progress of India under the Five Year Plan?

Jawaharlal Nehru: We have done well on the food front, better than any of us had expected, and if you read the chapter on food in the Five Year Plan, you will find that we have already accomplished, practically speaking, what the

1. Press conference, London, 10 June 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Also from *India News*, 13 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 289-290, 327-329, 400-402, 408-411, 451-452 and 489-491.

Plan set out in the course of two or three years.² And so it is quite a possibility, and indeed a probability, that we shall be practically self-sufficient in food within a measurable distance of time, say, two years, three years, four years, may be, subject to any catastrophe occurring which is difficult to provide for.

But we want to go ahead on the industrial front much more rapidly even, if I may say so, more rapidly than indicated in the Five Year Plan. Now, there is a big gap between our estimated resources and what we want to do. That gap can be filled by foreign aid in the shape of loans or what we may raise internally. Now, we are perfectly prepared and happy to receive foreign aid, in that way, but we have made it perfectly clear that that cannot affect our domestic or international policies. We will not allow it to affect it and that remains our policy. If foreign aid is not forthcoming in adequate quantity, even so we shall go ahead with our Plans and we shall have, well, to go in for greater austerity in all kinds of other things, but we have to make good, anyhow internally. And, in fact, anyhow we have to make good, even if foreign aid is coming in. We want to go further ahead. So we have to explore all kinds of means of raising resources in the country. You must have seen, recently, a loan was floated.³ And it was a successful loan, which shows that the response in the country is much better than it used to be. The response in the country to plans of development has also been good. The response, on the popular side, I mean to say, not financial response, other response is also remarkably good. The money required is for investment, that is, for productive schemes which will produce things. We do not want free gift of money. We want loans for investment purposes which we will repay. We can get money from an international bank or other bank....

2. Viewed against the background of several lean years, owing largely to the scarcity conditions in Bihar, eastern UP and Rayalaseema districts, the period 1952-53 emerged as a year of considerable achievement on the food front. The overall output of cereals was 47.6 million tons, 5 million tons higher than the previous year, and of pulses was 6.6 million tons.
3. The Planning Loan Bond for Rs. 750 million floated on 8 June 1953 was fully subscribed.

(I) INTERNAL SITUATION

1. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
April 6, 1953

My dear Mr. President,

Yuvaraj Karan Singh, Sadr-i-Riyasat of Jammu & Kashmir State, has been invited, in his capacity as Chancellor of the Srinagar University, to attend a conference of Commonwealth Universities to be held in Cambridge some time next month, I think, though I am not sure of the date.² He is desirous of going there and I think it will be a good thing for him to pay a visit abroad. Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah, Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir State, also likes this idea.

The question will arise about some one to act for the Sadr-i-Riyasat during his absence from India. No doubt, Shaikh Abdullah will make some suggestion which will be placed before you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 58/53-President's Secretariat.
2. The Congress of Universities of the Commonwealth was to be held in Cambridge from 13 to 17 July 1953. The Congress was the seventh of the series organised at quinquennial intervals since 1912 by the Association of Universities of the British Commonwealth, formerly known as the Universities Bureau of the British Empire.

2. Fundamental Rights and the Delhi Agreement¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: If the honourable Member remembers that Agreement,² it was said that the Fundamental Rights will be applied subject to certain

1. Discussion in the Council of States, 10 April 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (Council of States) Official Report*, Vol. III, 9 to 22 April 1953, Cols.2587-2591.
2. H.N. Kunzru asked whether the Fundamental Rights of the Constitution of India, would be extended to the people of Kashmir in accordance with the Agreement of July 1952.

exceptions.³ Some of them are noted and there might be some other variations. That is the position in regard to the Fundamental Rights as stated in the Agreement and I presume that will be given effect to.

H.N. Kunzru: What I want to know is whether the Fundamental Rights provided for in the Indian Constitution will be applied with or without any modification as they are by an extension of the Indian Constitution or by their inclusion in the Kashmir Constitution, which the National Conference is engaged in.

JN: I cannot say exactly in what form it will be done because the Constitution of the Jammu and Kashmir State will, in a sense, be, if I may say so, for that State an extension of the Indian Constitution because that State happens to be a State in India. And how far those Fundamental Rights will be enumerated in that Constitution, will have to be decided. But the main point is that they are subject to certain exceptions, among the exceptions the principal one being the acquisition of land and secondly with regard to the compensation for land. These are the two exceptions and these will not be included at all here or there.

H.N.K: Did the Prime Minister, who negotiated the Agreement, understand, when the Agreement was made, that the Fundamental Rights with certain modifications ... will be applied to the people of Kashmir or not, or did he understand that provision will be made for the conferment of Fundamental Rights on the people of Kashmir in the Constitution of Kashmir?

JN: I just answered that the question as to the form in which the Fundamental Rights will be conferred has yet to be decided. That is a matter for consideration. The point is that those Fundamental Rights with certain exceptions will be applied there.

H.N.K: Does the Prime Minister realise that this point which appears to him to be apparently a minor one is really a very important point?

JN: It may be a very important point, but we did not decide at that time as to the particular form which it will take.

3. The Delhi Agreement provided that the Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Constitution of India would apply to Kashmir, except that agrarian reforms including expropriation of landlords without compensation, would not be retarded and that the application of Fundamental Rights should not hamper essential security measures against infiltration, sabotage or espionage by an enemy.

S. Mahanty: May I know if the Government is aware that the non-implementation of the major provisions of Indo-Kashmir Agreement like Fundamental Rights, Citizenship or Supreme Court etc., has given rise to a large discontent and is really the basis of the Jammu satyagraha?⁴

JN: Yes, Government is perfectly aware that certain mischievous elements have exploited the situation and are behaving in a disgraceful manner.

S.M.: But the question is whether the Government is aware of it, and if so, is the Government going to see to the immediate implementation of those provisions?

JN: No, I cannot understand this question. The Government's position is this that the people of Kashmir will decide for themselves what they like. If the Government of India does not like it, then we take such steps as we like. The Government's position has been that it is for the people of Jammu and Kashmir State to decide their future. We do not compel them in anything.

H.N.K.: Has the Prime Minister seen a report in the newspapers that the Kashmir National Conference has decided that the Fundamental Rights will be conferred on the people of Jammu and Kashmir State in the Constitution which it is drafting?⁵

JN: I have not seen that particular statement. I do not quite know, what inference I am to draw from it.

H.N.K: If the report published in the newspapers is true, is it not clear that the people of Kashmir will not have the same guarantee in respect of the exercise of Fundamental Rights as the people of the other States will have?

4. The Praja Parishad agitation was initially launched against the adoption by the Kashmir Constituent Assembly of the recommendations of the Land Compensation Committee and the Basic Principles Committee, recommending respectively, abolition of landlordism without compensation and the termination of the hereditary rule of the Maharaja. Later its main demand was for the total implementation of the Constitution of India in Jammu and Kashmir State.
5. The Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights and Citizenship was appointed on 7 November 1951 under the Chairmanship of M.A. Beg. It was reported on 7 April that the Committee was considering recommendation of Fundamental Rights, similar to those operative in the Indian Constitution, with some exceptions, one of which was the curtailment of the right to property.

JN: That is quite possible.

H.N.K: Sir, the Prime Minister said the point I had raised was an important point, but that still remained to be settled and I ask him whether he has seen a report in the newspapers that the point had been settled by the National Conference?

JN: I have not seen that.

3. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
April 19, 1953

My dear Shaikh Sahib,

I understand that a large group of the MRA people, headed by Dr Frank Buchman,² is in Kashmir now. A number of prominent people in India have associated themselves with the MRA.³ But as a Government we have kept studiously aloof from them, because there is definitely a political trend to their activities and we do not wish to be associated with it. I am writing to inform you of this so that their activities in India might not have created any misunderstanding in Kashmir. I do not wish you to take any particular steps about this, but I would not like you or your colleagues to be intimately associated with the MRA. They have a habit of exploiting prominent people.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Frank Nathan Daniel Buchman (1878-1961); American evangelist; Head of Religious work at Pennsylvania State College, 1905-15; extensively toured and gave lectures for Hartford Theological Foundation; established Moral Re-Armament Group (MRA) in 1938.

3. Also known as the Oxford Group or the First Century Christian Fellowship, it became an international movement which preached "world changing through life changing" and allegedly cultivated only the rich and the influential. Buchman took a strident anti-Communist position and openly admired Hitler.

4. To Bhimsen Sachar¹

New Delhi
May 8, 1953

My dear Sachar,

Thank you for your letter of 6th May. I am very glad to learn of the progress made by your community efforts.

You refer to the continuing agitation at Pathankot. I gather that Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee has been touring in the Punjab to further this Jammu agitation. I should like to have a report about this tour of his, what he said and what the effect of it has been. I understand that he intends breaking the rule about permits by trying to enter Jammu.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

5. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
May 8, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

I have just received the following telegram from Syama Prasad Mookerjee from Ambala:

Below is the text of the message I have just wired to Sh. Abdullah. Message begins: After completing my Punjab tour I intend proceeding to Jammu on 11th from Pathankot. My object is to see for myself the conditions in Jammu and also to contact representative people there. I am anxious to explore the possibility of creating conditions which may expedite a peaceful settlement and restoration of good feelings and understanding among all concerned. After surveying situation in Jammu I would welcome an opportunity of meeting you as well. Kindly communicate your reply at Jullundur on Sunday before noon when I propose leaving for Amritsar. Message ends.

For your information I should state that I have intentionally not applied for any permit to enter Kashmir since it has been systematically refused

1. JN Collection.

by your Government to several people including Members of Parliament and State Legislatures who differ from your Kashmir policy.²

It is a copy of a message he has sent to Shaikh Abdullah. There is no need for me to answer it.

You will notice that he proposes to enter Kashmir without a permit. I have no doubt that he should be arrested if he does so.³

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Earlier V.G. Deshpande, General Secretary of the Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha, had been refused permission to enter Kashmir.
3. Syama Prasad Mookerjee along with seven others were arrested at Lakhimpur customs post, on 11 May 1953, under Section 3(i) of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Security Act. Earlier the Superintendent of Police, Kathua, had served a warning asking them not to remain in the State, which Mookerjee refused to comply with.

6. To Govind Ballabh Pant¹

New Delhi
May 12, 1953

My dear Pantji,

We shall have probably to give more thought to the Jan Sangh agitation about Jammu. This pernicious affair has gone on long enough and is becoming a running sore. In Delhi there are very few persons who have participated in it. Most of the people coming here to offer the so-called satyagraha are from the UP. I am told that among those arrested here for this purpose have been 700 persons from the UP.²

I do not know what exactly to suggest to you. But we propose to consider this matter in its larger aspect before long.

I understand that you have forbidden meetings about Kashmir. This means forbidding meetings both which encourage the agitation and those discouraging it. In Delhi only the meetings encouraging the agitation have been forbidden. Other meetings take place daily. I do not see why we should put all meetings on the same level whether they are in breach of the law or condemning a breach.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. The agitation spread rapidly in Delhi and Punjab during March-May 1953 with the help of outside volunteers. Regular demonstrations were held in the Capital and leaders courted arrest.

7. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
May 16, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

I shall be leaving for England in less than 12 days and I shall be away for a little under a month. I shall not worry much about other matters, but one thing certainly will be in my mind all the time and this is the Jan Sangh agitation. I do not like the look of it at all and I think it is bad for this kind of thing to continue indefinitely. This produces a sensation of Government's helplessness. It is just possible that when I go away, attempts might be made to intensify the agitation.

I think, therefore, that we must take an overall view of the situation very soon and take such other strong and effective steps as may be decided upon. I noticed in today's papers that Chatterjee and others have been arrested.' This step should be followed with appropriate other steps. Half-hearted action does not produce adequate results. The question of banning some organisations might be considered. There is an alternative to banning the full organisation. Only the executive committees can be banned. Anyhow, this matter should be given immediate consideration. Unfortunately the way Syama Prasad Mookerjee walked into Jammu has produced a widespread impression that we are rather soft with him and it is only the Kashmir Government that is hard.

Any such action about banning etc., should be taken early and should not get mixed up with an election campaign that will come later.

Then there is the question of newspapers like *Pratap* and *Milap*.²

The sentences given to the so-called satyagrahis are astonishingly light and do not deter at all. They come out after a month and play the same game again.

This has also to be viewed from the point of view of other States which are supplying these volunteers.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. These two newspapers were notorious for their anti-Muslim position. Since January 1953, the Government of India had been seriously contemplating measures to deal with such newspapers. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, p.279.

8. Jammu Agitation¹

The Committee have noted with deep regret that, in spite of condemnation in Parliament and all over the country, certain communal organisations have continued to carry on what is called the "Jammu Agitation". To describe this agitation as "satyagraha" is not only an utter misuse of that noble word and doctrine but an insult to the nation. The purpose of this agitation has become increasingly clear and it is evident that it has little to do with the Kashmir issue, which it seeks to exploit and in effect harms in many ways. The technique of the agitation has become increasingly violent. It represents an attempt on the part of the most reactionary, bigoted and communal elements in the country to obstruct the economic and social progress of the country and come in the way of India's integrity and advancement which are opposed by the reactionary vested interests represented by these communal organisations. These organisations have no programme of social or economic reform. From time to time, they try to raise agitations on such issues as the Jammu agitation, cow protection, refugee problems and Indo-Pakistan relations, thus seeking to exploit unthinking people for their wrong ends and divert their attention from the major problems of the country.

The Committee would like to warn all Congressmen as well as others against this functioning of reactionary forces, appearing under different guises and trying to delude the people. Reaction and communalism cannot be tolerated in any form and must be combated.

"The Committee hope that the Central and State Governments will take adequate steps to deal with this challenge to India's peace, integrity and progress.

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru for Congress Working Committee, New Delhi, 16 May 1953. JN Collection. This resolution was adopted on 17 May 1953.

9. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
May 17, 1953

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

... I was surprised to see in the newspapers that you had gone to visit Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee at Nishat Bagh. I find, however, that this report is not true, I suggest that you contradict it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

10. To Bhimsen Sachar¹

New Delhi
May 26, 1953

My dear Sachar,

I am writing to you on the eve of my departure. I shall be away for a month, but my mind will be here all the time. In particular, I shall be thinking of this wretched and mischievous agitation carried on by the Jan Sangh. I do not know what course it will take, that is, whether it will fade out or be continued. I am not very worried about the law and order aspect but I am worried about the slow poison spreading in our body politic.

Therefore, there must be no slackening in dealing with this. The way Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee was dealt with when he entered Jammu territory, should be a lesson to us. That was badly done and an impression was created all round that he entered Jammu with the consent and almost approval of the Government of India. I am told that even facilities were offered to him for transport.

Anyhow I want you to deal with this matter with extreme firmness in future. If the courts come in the way later, we shall have to deal with that then.

The Jan Sangh agitation in the Punjab, in the UP and elsewhere depends largely on the flow of funds from certain well-to-do persons. Insofar as we

1. Bhimsen Sachar Papers, NMML. Extracts.

can, we should try to stop this. In particular, those who are suspected of giving funds should be made to realise clearly that Government is displeased with them and they can expect no favour from Government in their business or otherwise.

I have heard that sometimes your Ministers attend parties and banquets given by noted Jan Sangh or Hindu Mahasabha leaders or members or even stay with them. This is improper. When there is this kind of conspiratorial revolt against Government, we should keep away from those connected with it in any way and do so more or less publicly....

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
May 26, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

Most of the Jan Sangh prisoners are being collected in one or two jails, notably the Yole jail. I do not like the idea of putting them all together. Many of them are wholly ignorant of politics. They will get an occasion to be indoctrinated and trained. Could they not be spread out and sent to their respective Provinces?

I feel that if this Jan Sangh agitation continues, we must come down upon it with a heavy hand. No slackness should be permitted and all our officers should be made to feel this....

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

12. To Govind Ballabh Pant¹

New Delhi
27th May, 1953

My dear Pantji,

I am going away tomorrow morning. Before doing so I want to draw your attention to two matters.

One is that of Jan Sangh Jammu agitation. According to our figures, about one thousand so-called volunteers have come from the UP to Delhi, that is just about 50 per cent. of the total. The UP is thus much the bigger sinner in this respect and I think something should be done to check this. We have found that whenever money runs dry with the people who are agitating, volunteers drop off. It is thus largely a question of money. And it is usually known where the money comes from. Anyhow I should like you to consider this matter, and see what more can be done to check this vicious agitation. This is going to be one of my worries when I am away. We should not slacken or relax at all in this matter...

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

13. Religion in Politics¹

... Question: What steps are you taking to deal with communalism in India? Did the last General Elections come as a blow to communal elements?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Yes, the last General Elections, a year and a half ago, came as a great blow to the communal elements in India. After that, after some months, they went in search for something, which they could take up, which might be a popular slogan, which would give them some position in

1. Press conference, London, 8 June 1953. AIR tapes. Also from *India News*, 13 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference, see pp. 106-107, 130, 174, 358-359, 396-399, 407 and 448-450.

the public life. They tried to take up first of all the question of refugees from the eastern Bengal....

Q: What steps are you taking to deal with communalism in India?

JN: So these communal elements took up that problem. They took up another thing, the prohibition of cow slaughter. Not that they are interested in many of these problems particularly, but just something of which they get popular approval. Then they took up what is called the Jammu agitation. It is still in a way going on. I think, on the whole, the Jammu agitation has discredited them greatly, because looking at it even purely from India's point of view it is not doing any good to India and it is doing good only to, well, our critics. Or it is doing good to Pakistan, like that. So it is rather absurd that the elements in India, which are most against Pakistan, should indulge in an agitation, which is helpful to Pakistan. That is the main point.

Q: Is communalism in India a mixture of religion and politics?

JN: Communalism, the way it is used in India, is a mixture of religion and politics. And the religious groups functioning on the political plane as such are not on the religious or cultural plane. It is, and it is a communal outlook. Pakistan, of course, from communal point of view is an extreme force. In fact, it is totally based on it and in the last six months, eight months, they had to face the consequences of it with the result that there has been a powerful reaction in Pakistan against it, and there are many voices raised in Pakistan now in favour of what we call a secular State. That is one reason why India and Pakistan are now psychologically nearer to each other. I would not say that communalism as such is dead and done with. I do not exaggerate this and that communalism is as such. You see it is. It may be upon the thinking people but some limited ones based on religion can always be such people. And thus, of course, there is caste system, casteism, peculiar bane of Hindu society. It is something poisonous. It does no good ... Now, suppose, instead of one party having majority we had, as might, may happen in any State, dozens of small groups, manoeuvring their position all the time, each group trying to oust the other and all that, the result will be no stability in the Government, no policies pursued, just this manoeuvring, intrigues going on which normally throws up the wrong kind of person at the top.

Q: Can you have such a thing?

JN: Can we? Certainly....

14. To G.S. Bajpai¹

London
June 11, 1953

My dear Girja,²

Thank you for your letter of the 9th June.

Sometime before I left India, I saw the report in the *Searchlight* of Patna which you have forwarded to me. I did not take the trouble to read it all. But I gathered the general import of it. This report was drawn up by a committee consisting of Baig and Shamiri. This gave rise to all the trouble in the Working Committee of the Kashmir National Conference, which disagreed with it.³

There was a report in the Indian press, which I myself saw before I left India, to the effect that the Working Committee had decided to implement last year's agreement between the Government of India and the Kashmir Government. But this does not take us very far and there is little doubt that Shaikh Abdullah is not at all clear in his own mind. It is because of this that Maulana Azad recently went to Kashmir. I imagine that nothing much will be done till I return. After that, we shall have to face this irritating problem.

I have had some talks with Senanayake and Mohammad Ali. I shall meet them again before I leave. These conversations have not led to any results yet. So far as Pakistan is concerned, it was not my intention to go far in these conversations at this stage. All I can say is that Mohammad Ali is certainly keen on an agreement on various issues.

I am gradually approaching the end of my stay in England. This has been a very hectic period with innumerable official functions and I feel rather exhausted. Tonight there was an unusual function—a dinner given by Harrovian MPs and Members of the House of Lords in my honour. This was a private affair and Winston Churchill attended and proposed my toast in highly eulogical terms. Indeed he has been very friendly throughout.

I have met a good number of editors and journalists, both separately and together. On the whole, there is a great friendliness to India and appreciation

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Governor of Bombay.

3. The eight-man sub-committee, appointed by the National Conference Working Committee on 18 May 1953 submitted following alternatives on 9 June to resolve the Kashmir issue: (i) overall plebiscite for the whole State to decide whether the State should accede to India or Pakistan or remain independent; (ii) independence for the whole State; (iii) independence for the whole State with joint Indo-Pakistan control over foreign affairs; and (iv) the Dixon plan with independence for the plebiscite area. Abdullah was said to have shown his preference for the first two options, while Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and G.M. Sadiq differed substantially.

of our efforts for a Korean truce. The fact that I have laid no stress at all on our part in this business, has been particularly marked and appreciated.

It has become terribly difficult to move about in London. There are not only tremendous crowds everywhere but thousands of huge buses and char-a-bancs, full of country-visitors, block up all the streets. A five minutes' journey may well take 45 minutes and that too with the special help of the police. London has been very gayly decorated, though not always with taste.

I was at first afraid that I might have to hurry back to India before the appointed date because of the Korean truce. But this is unlikely now and I shall stick to my date of return which is, I think, the 30th of this month.

News from Nepal is disturbing and I am afraid we shall have to play a more active role there.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

15. To K.N. Katju¹

London
June 12, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

...I am afraid that we are going to have plenty of trouble in Kashmir because of the internal conflicts there.² This makes it exceedingly difficult for me to have any reasonable talks with Mohammad Ali here. In any event I had no intention of discussing matters very fully with him here. We have had preliminary discussions and we shall meet him again in India or Pakistan or possibly both. He is prepared to come to Delhi but begs me to go to Karachi for at least a day previously, as this would strengthen his position. I have generally agreed to this. But we have not fixed any dates.

The Ceylon matter has not proceeded much further and we are stuck up....

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Between March and June 1953, a rift developed between two groups within the National Conference. Shaikh Abdullah's championing of the idea of an independent Kashmir and his reluctance to implement the Delhi Agreement fully, alarmed some of his political colleagues such as G.M. Sadiq and G.L. Dogra. This rift came to a head in August 1953, when Abdullah was dismissed and arrested and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad took over as Prime Minister.

16. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
June 28, 1953

My dear Shaikh Sahib,

I sent you a telegram and brief letter this morning suggesting that you might come here about the 3rd July. I further suggested that you might bring with you some of your colleagues, as for instance Bakshi, Beg and Maulana Masoodi.² Of courses, if others could come also, such as Sadiq, I would be glad. In fact, I would welcome even more of your colleagues coming here. I am personally acquainted chiefly, apart from those mentioned above, with Dogra, D.P. Dhar and two or three others.

I should like to talk to all of you together, but more particularly to you. I wish I could come to Kashmir for this purpose, but I fear I cannot leave Delhi after my long absence. Within a week I shall have to go to Agra for the AICC meeting for about three days. Even after that it will be difficult to go away from Delhi. Apart from the heavy work here which has accumulated, the international situation is such that it requires constant attention. India, almost against her will, has been dragged into this international picture and we cannot escape our responsibilities. Some fate or circumstance have been pushing India forward in international matters even though we have tried to avoid pushing ourselves. The fact is that what India says or does counts today very greatly in international affairs and more especially in regard to Asia. Even in Europe our help is sought by Foreign Ministers and others. I am alarmed at this addition to our responsibilities because I want to devote myself to our internal problems. But I see no escape.

If possible, I can try to come to Kashmir late in this month. That is subject to developments here as well as internationally. But, in any event, I should like you to come as early as possible here and before I go to Agra, so that we can have a full talk. Nothing is more depressing than confused thinking in any vital matter. One can face any problem however difficult, but there is no hope when there is confusion in one's mind. I have, thus far, kept my mind fairly clear on the Kashmir issue in spite of its difficulties. That did not mean that I had an easy solution up my sleeve, but that did mean that I was clear about the line of activity we should pursue. But lately I have not at all

1. JN Collection.

2. Abdullah did not come to Delhi for the 3 July meeting but sent Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and Mirza Afzal Beg. He replied on 4 July: "I would have certainly come down myself to Delhi but Bakshi and Beg will explain to you why it is not desirable for me to leave Srinagar at present."

been clear as to what you have been thinking, and naturally that has a powerful effect on my own thinking. The long talk we had in Srinagar during my last visit³ in May brought no light to me from you and only led me to think that you are yourself not quite clear.⁴ I requested you then to keep any decision pending till my return.

As I have already written to you, my talks with Mohammad Ali were vague and general. Much of the time was taken up by subjects like canal waters, refugee problem and East and West Bengal issues. I referred to Kashmir and said that this was obviously a complicated matter and not particularly easy of solution suddenly. We shall have to approach it with care and caution and with goodwill. The main thing was the goodwill. I added that of one thing I was quite clear that there should be no external interference and that this matter should be decided as between the Governments of India and Pakistan and Kashmir. I made it clear that I could not commit myself to anything without reference to the Kashmir Government, who would represent their people in this matter. Kashmir was not a piece of property to be bandied about between India and Pakistan. It was the chief concern of the people of Kashmir and they had to be consulted at every step. I also said that any decision should upset present conditions as little as possible. The more upset there was, the more it would bring unfortunate consequences in its train.

I then said that there were two main courses open to us: one was to follow the line which Graham and others had thus far followed and agree about the conditions for an armistice, number of forces, etc. This had not led us anywhere thus far. The second approach was to explore other avenues.

Mohammad Ali replied that he agreed with my general statements and would like me to take the lead in the matter and put forward precise suggestions. He added that his own position in Pakistan was not too strong a one. He was a newcomer and had to function under some limitations. He was anxious, however, to find a way to a solution of our problems and he would do his utmost to that end. But he hoped that I would realise his position which was not as strong in his country as mine was in my country.

The question of our further meeting was mentioned. Maulana Azad had

3. From 23 to 25 May 1953.

4. Abdullah replied that he did not understand how Nehru had got the impression that he lacked clarity about his objective, as he had "now been in intimate touch with Kashmir and its people for the last 22 years" and had never therefore been hazy in regard to the objective and there was, therefore, no question of confusion in his mind.

written to Mohammad Ali that it would be better for him to come to Delhi than for me to go to Karachi. Mohammad Ali said that he would gladly come to Delhi but it would help him greatly if I paid a previous visit, however short and even if it was for a day, to Karachi. He could later come to Delhi for longer talks. He stressed this as this would strengthen his position in Pakistan. I told him that I was perfectly prepared to go to Karachi on a short visit if that helped, but I could not say when I would be able to do so as I would have plenty of work to do in Delhi on my return. So, the matter was left and no date has been fixed. I should like to go there some time towards the end of July. Our Parliament begins on the 3rd of August.

Of course, even when I go there, it does not mean that any decisions will be arrived at then. That depends on many circumstances. I rather doubt if that meeting will be anything more than a further preliminary discussion of our main issues.

I had till recently a fairly clear idea of what you thought in this matter. I know that during the past three or four years doubts have arisen in your mind and we have discussed them. We did not agree about some things and, on one or two occasions, I even told you that I did not wish to come in your way if you differed from me in any vital matter. If so, we naturally have to think what our separate courses of action should be. However, we generally agreed about the policy that should be pursued and there the matter rested.

You will remember that when I went to Sonamarg last year, I wrote a note which I sent you analysing the Kashmir problem in the hope that this might lead us to clear thinking.⁵ This note was discussed by us in Srinagar later and I gathered from you and your colleagues that you agreed with that analysis and conclusion. Recent developments have, however, led me to think that you have either changed your mind completely or are not clear about your thinking.⁶ This necessitates our understanding, as clearly as possible, what we respectively think. If one cannot agree, one should at least know precisely what the difference is. That difference appeared to me considerable when we talked at Srinagar last. But it seems to me that I could not get a grip of what you had in your mind, except negatively. You told me that there were only two courses open for Kashmir: either full integration or full

5. For Nehru's note of 25 August 1952 to Shaikh Abdullah see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.19, pp.322-330.

6. It was widely reported in the press that Abdullah was championing the cause of an independent Kashmir at the behest of the Americans and thus was reluctant to implement the Delhi Agreement in full. His public declarations promising autonomy to each cultural unit in Kashmir and his insistence on the rights of Kashmiri Muslims in services gave rise to a measure of uncertainty about his intentions.

autonomy, whatever that autonomy might mean. I did not agree with you in this, nor do I agree with you even now, because there are many other middle courses. Nobody can guarantee the distant future.⁷ We live in an age of revolutionary change. I am coming from Egypt where repeatedly changes have taken place in the course of last year, and I rather doubt if these changes have come to an end. So also in Pakistan where possibly further changes may be in store.

So, no one can guarantee the distant future. One takes one step at a time and it seems to me that the step we should take now about Kashmir is definitely a step in between the two courses you had suggested. However, it is not my purpose to argue this matter in this letter or even later. We have argued enough and must accept each other's present conclusions and then discuss the future on that basis. If that future unhappily leads to divergence with all its consequences, we fashion our respective courses accordingly.

You know that the question of Kashmir has had not only a logical appeal for me but also a strong emotional one. But I can suppress my emotion, if necessary, if logic demands that. Thus far, I have proceeded on a basis of friendship and confidence in you and have been vain enough to expect the same approach from you. Whether that is justified now or not, it is for you to say. Individual relations should not count in national affairs and yet they do count and make a difference.⁸

To me it has been a major surprise that a settlement arrived at between us should be by-passed or repudiated, regardless of the merits. That strikes at the root of all confidence, personal or international. No treaty would be worth the paper it is written on, if it was to be repudiated soon after. So far as I am concerned, no power in this world could make me go back on the

7. Abdullah replied: "You have spoken about guarantees. We certainly believed that the terms of the Indian Constitution provided adequate guarantee But I would point out to you the discrepancies that we come to notice from time to time in the attitude of the Government of India in regard to this position. When Article 370 was devised, we felt assured by Sardar Patel that the Instrument of Accession would be the final basis of the Indo-Kashmir relationship. Subsequently, when the Delhi Agreement came up before the Council of States on August 5, 1952, Shri Gopalswami Ayyangar stated that Article 370 was not a permanent feature of the Indian Constitution and 'when the time was ripe' the provision could be wiped off the Constitution. This clearly shows that even though assurances were given to us ... such assurances came with a good deal of mental reservation."
8. Abdullah replied: "I agree that personal relationship between individuals should not be a consideration where larger national interests are involved. Friendship and sentiments are worthy of respect but they should not come in the way of dispassionate appraisals of one another's difficulties."

pledge that I gave in that Agreement. If my Parliament or my people in India repudiate that, they repudiate me. That was my approach. Of course, a new situation requires a new approach. But even that new approach would have been for me something following the implementation of that Agreement and not something which upset it. My honour is bound up with my word.

It is because of this that I have been surprised at recent happenings in Kashmir, which seemed to imply that that agreement should not be acted upon and should be repudiated.⁹ If that is so, then any other agreement could also be repudiated and there is no fixity or certainty about agreements. We are now facing a curious international situation in Korea where an armistice had almost been arrived at when President Syngman Rhee upset the whole business. Syngman Rhee at least could say that he was personally no party to the agreement and yet world reactions have been powerfully against him.

The personal equation apart, I do not like the consequences in India, Kashmir or the world of an agreement being broken. Good can never result through wrong methods.

But quite apart from that Agreement, we have to consider the problem in its larger context. The Agreement did not put an end to the problem. It is about that larger context that I should like to talk to you, precisely and definitely, without too much argument on either side. We are intelligent men, you and I, and do not need repetition of what has been said.

Such information as I gathered during my visit to Kashmir in May and subsequently has distressed me greatly.¹⁰ Whatever approach we might make to the solution of our problems, there are some basic considerations. Ultimately every solution of an international or national problem depends upon a balance of forces. Those forces need not necessarily be military. They are represented by disciplined organisations. In India, a major force has obviously been the National Congress which has held the country together. If this Congress had not been there, the country would have disintegrated, despite great leaders.

9. For instance on 12 April and 15 April 1953 at Jammu and on 18 April at Srinagar, Shaikh Abdullah hinted that he was being forced to reassess the Delhi Agreement due to the growing incidents of communal activities in Jammu and India. He openly criticized the Central Government for not being able to quell the spread of communal activities and insisted that the State had acceded on only three subjects and had complete autonomy in all other matters.
10. It was widely rumoured that in early May Adlai Stevenson and Chester Bowles met Abdullah and encouraged him for an independent Kashmir. Further, in a Working Committee meeting of the National Conference, on 18 May 1953, Abdullah put forward his views about an independent valley, which was opposed vehemently by G.M. Sadiq and G.L. Dogra.

Your strength in Kashmir was ultimately based on the great organisation you built up, the National Conference. Of course, you had your personal popularity and appeal also which were considerable. But essentially it is the organisation that gives strength and not the individual. Indeed the individual acts through the organisation if results are to be achieved.

What I have felt lately has been that your Government is very far from harmonious and in fact pulls in a number of different directions, that your organisation is also disintegrating in the same way.¹¹ If this process continues, I have little doubt that Kashmir would relapse into utter backwardness, so far as political life is concerned. It takes much time to build up organisations and discipline the people. Gandhiji for over a quarter of a century slowly built up our organisation and taught it discipline, cooperative working and the capacity for sacrifice. He attached little value to public demonstrations but always laid stress on the discipline of an organisation. The people of Kashmir have been trained, to some extent, by you and your organisation but not nearly enough and a disruptive tendency is always dangerous. If these tendencies towards disruption and disintegration of the organisation continue, then politically Kashmir will count for very little, regardless of other questions, and regardless of its relationship to India or its autonomous position or its relationship with Pakistan. It will then become a mere pawn for others to play with. That would be a tragedy.

In this world today, we are surrounded by the most difficult problems. Never before was so much maturity of thought and wisdom necessary as it is today. Much is said about democracy. But democracy can only function successfully with self-discipline and some maturity of thought and action. Otherwise, it gives place either to totalitarianism or to subjection to somebody else.

I am therefore gravely disturbed, not so much about the political future of Kashmir but rather about the internal conditions that tend to disrupt Kashmir, both politically, and what is more important, organisationally and internally. This kind of thing used to lead to something in the nature of civil war. That will not happen in Kashmir because of various circumstances but a psychological civil war is as bad from the point of view of bringing about disintegration. No one wins in that and everyone loses.

My Government has stood, as you have so consistently stood, for a secular

11. Abdullah replied: "I have not been able to understand your reference to disruptive tendencies both in the administration and in the organisation. All I can say is that it is baseless and probably the result of incorrect information given to you. I may, however, assure you that so far as the basic principles are concerned, there is no difference of opinion among us in Kashmir."

democracy.¹² I do not know what your feelings are on this subject now.¹³ But I fear the tendency in Kashmir is away from it.¹⁴ Unfortunately that will have its reactions in India as such tendencies in India have their reactions in Kashmir. On my part I am pledged to that ideal and I shall adhere to it to the bitter end, if necessary, and if my people throw me out. It will grieve me that anything is done in Kashmir which tarnishes that ideal and weakens those who stand for it. Whatever we might do, it is the least that we owe each other that we should try to understand each other and then decide on such courses of action as we might deem proper. It is always painful to part company after long years of comradeship, but if our conscience so tells us, or in our view, an overriding national interest so requires, then there is no help for it. Even so we must do it with full understanding and full explanation to each other and not casually.¹⁵

I have written rather a long letter to you. This was not meant to be argumentative for I think that the time for lengthy argument is over. Such argument only confuses the mind. The time for clear understanding has come. It is for this reason that I would beg of you to come here at an early date with as many of your colleagues as possible.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Bakshi, as the letter deals with problems and approaches in which he is obviously interested also.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

12. Abdullah wrote: "Muslims may rightly feel that in spite of you and many others, the ideals of secular democracy are not much in evidence in so far treatment to Kashmiri Muslims is concerned. I derived my strength from what I supposed was an assurance that the State's accession with India would result in a fair deal to all sections of the people. But unfortunately that goal has not been achieved."
13. Abdullah retorted: "May I say, this is an unkind cut. Time alone will prove my faith in the principle for which I have consistently fought all these years. My idea about secular democracy is not cramped or narrow-minded. I believe in justice for all sections of the people and my attitude is conditioned by realities and not by wishful thinking."
14. During the period of November 1952 to June 1953, Abdullah was continuously accused by a certain section of the press of communalism, of intentionally breaking up Hindu majority districts for electoral purposes, of making Urdu a compulsory subject for all, of filling up key posts with Muslims, and of promoting Muslim interests at the expense of Hindu minority through sweeping land reforms etc. It further charged the Shaikh of planning to establish an independent Kashmir, evidenced by his insistence on a separate flag, constitution, Head of the State and his reluctance to comply with the Delhi Agreement fully.
15. Abdullah replied: "I may, however, assure you that whatever lot may be in store for us, never can you expect me to abandon my respect and affection for you."

17. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
June 29, 1953

My dear Shaikh Sahib,

Dr B.C. Roy has sent me a copy of his letter dated 24th June which he addressed to you in regard to Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee.

As you know, some people are exploiting Dr Mookerjee's death for their political advantage and making all kinds of wild allegations.² In Calcutta there has been a big and emotional reaction. All kinds of demands are being made for enquiries, etc., into the cause of his death.³

I do not myself see what more could have been done in the circumstances, except to inform people of the illness a little earlier than was done. Very few people know the conditions in which Dr Mookerjee was kept in Srinagar. Those conditions were almost ideal as he lived in a house near the Nishat Bagh and later could even walk about in the Nishat Bagh. Most people probably think that he was locked up in some prison or lock-up.

I think it is important that a full statement should be issued by you about these conditions—where he was kept, how he was kept, the freedom he had to go out in the Bagh and a detailed account of the persons he met in the last ten days. I gather he met Sardar Hukam Singh,⁴ Trivedi⁵ and others. He sent a telegram to his mother to say that he was well and not to worry. Apparently, Prem Nath Dogra also met him. All these facts should be put together and published.

I gather Maulana Azad suggested this to you three days ago. I do hope this will be done very soon as delay leads to all kinds of suspicions.

The main reason for my writing to you, however, is to make a suggestion in regard to Dr Roy's letter to you. The suggestion is that you should invite Dr Roy himself to come to Srinagar⁶ and have a look at the place where Dr

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to Abul Kalam Azad and K.N. Katju.
2. On 27 June 1953, V.M. Trivedi, S.P. Mookerjee's Counsel and Guru Dutt Vaid, a co-detenu, alleged that proper medical care had not been provided to Mookerjee and this negligence of the State had hastened his death on 23 June in Kashmir.
3. Jan Sangh called for a bandh on 15 July 1953, to be observed as Syama Prasad Day, demanding a high level impartial inquiry into the circumstances to Mookerjee's death. This demand was supported by various other leaders such as Purushottamdas Tandon and Jayaprakash Narayan.
4. Prominent member of the Shiromani Akali Dal and, Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-67.
5. V.M. Trivedi, Mookerjee's Counsel.
6. In his reply of 4 July 1953, Shaikh Abdullah informed that he had already sent a telegram inviting B.C. Roy to Kashmir.

Mookerjee was kept and to meet the doctors who have been in attendance on him. Some such move on your part would be helpful and would put an end to all kinds of false allegations that are being made. You could telephone to Dr Roy inviting him or send him a telegram.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

18. To Karan Singh¹

New Delhi
June 29, 1953

My dear Yuvaraj,

I have just received your letter of the 26th June. I returned on the 27th afternoon as my plane was held up in Bombay because of bad weather in Delhi.

Since my return I have tried to gather as much information as I could about the position in Kashmir. Dr Mookerjee's death was indeed sad, more especially because he was under detention.

The situation in Kashmir is a bad one and has to be taken in hand. But this requires a good deal of care. I have written a long letter to Shaikh Abdullah which is quite frank.² I have asked him to come here with some of his colleagues on or about the 3rd July.

My talks with Mohammad Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan, were very vague and general. I am likely to meet him about the end of July.

I think you are right in postponing, for the present, your visit abroad.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. See the preceding item.

19. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
June 29, 1953

My dear Bidhan,

I returned on the 27th afternoon. I was held up in Bombay owing to bad weather in Delhi.

I have received copy of your letter dated 24th June addressed to Shaikh Abdullah regarding Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee's death. This death is, of course, most sad and unfortunate. You, as a doctor, are in a better position to express your opinion about it than I am. But from such facts as I know, it hardly seems to me that there was any marked neglect on anyone's part. Probably you are right that immediate intimation should have been sent to his family or to you. If the doctors had suspected anything serious; no doubt that would have been better. But the serious development came very late and the end came suddenly. From all accounts, he had been apparently keeping well. I do not know if you have been told where he was kept in Srinagar. He was not kept in prison. He was kept in a house by the Dal Lake near the Nishat Bagh. For technical purposes this was called a sub-jail, but it was really a very pleasant place and was a private house. It was an ideal place for anyone to stay in the lovely climate of Srinagar in May and June. Later, at his request, he was allowed to go out into the Nishat Bagh, one of the Moghal gardens.

During the last ten days or so he had many interviews and he appeared to be quite well. He saw Sardar Hukam Singh repeatedly and had long talks with him. He saw his lawyer, Trivedi, he met Prem Nath Dogra of the Jammu Praja Parishad several times. I believe he sent a telegram to his mother to say that he was keeping fairly well and there was nothing to worry about.

All this no doubt made people to think, including the doctors there, that there was nothing serious the matter with him and they must have been taken unawares. Nevertheless, it would of course, have been much better for them to have communicated immediately if any serious symptom was visible.

It would be a good thing if you could yourself go to Srinagar for a day or two and look at the place where he lived and see the doctors there and ask them such questions as you may consider necessary.

Yours affectionately,
Jawahar

1. JN Collection.

20. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
June 29, 1953

My dear Bidhan,

I received today your letter of the 26th June about Kashmir affairs.²

2. I gather that Mouli Chandra Sharma, Secretary of the Jan Sangh, is in Delhi now and that he has had talks with some people regarding Kashmir.³ Of course I would like this Praja Parishad or Jan Sangh movement to be withdrawn and I have no objection to issuing a statement. The statement will naturally be worded according to my own thinking. I shall explore the possibility of this.

3. As a matter of fact, for over a month now, there has been talk of a withdrawal of this movement and Dr Khare and others openly recommended it. I am told that Syama Prasad Mookerjee had also advised in favour of a withdrawal and probably, if he had lived, the movement might well have been withdrawn within a few days or so. His death, apart from the other sad consequences, has had this unfortunate result of making it slightly more difficult for others to withdraw the movement at this stage.

4. During the last two or three weeks, the Kashmir Government gave every opportunity for people to see Dr Mookerjee to discuss this question. Sardar Hukam Singh saw him several times, Trivedi his lawyer saw him and the Praja Parishad leader, Prem Nath Dogra, was specially allowed to see him several times. All these people realised fully that movement was doing a great deal of harm. In fact, even before his arrest, Dr Mookerjee practically confessed that to me. But reasons of prestige and the like prevented them from withdrawing

5. It is difficult to speak openly about the injurious results of this movement. It has made the Kashmir problem far more difficult than it ever was. Before this movement was started, I had little doubt in my mind that the final decision about Kashmir would be in our favour, however long it might take. But this movement has upset all my calculations and weakened our position in Kashmir terribly. I am for the moment talking about the Kashmir Valley only. As you know, the people in the Valley are over ninety per cent Muslim. The reaction of the Jammu Praja Parishad movement on them has

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to Abul Kalam Azad and K.N. Katju.
2. Roy had written that Mookerjee's death had raised a great public furore in Calcutta and that any permanent solution of Kashmir issue could only be possible if the Praja Parishad movement was called off and an agreement between India and Pakistan was reached.
3. Roy further mentioned that on 26 June 1953 he had a talk with Mouli Chandra Sharma regarding the future of the Praja Parishad movement who felt that non-implementation of Delhi Agreement was at the root of the movement.

been very great. They have become frightened of the communal elements in Jammu and in India and their previous wish to be attached to India has weakened. Indeed, at the moment, all the hostile forces against us are dominant in Kashmir. The Pakistanis in Kashmir have taken full advantage of this and have even come out in the open for the first time. If Hindu communalists could organise a movement in Jammu, why should not Muslim communalists function in Kashmir? The position now is that if there was a plebiscite, a great majority of Muslims in Kashmir would go against us. In fact there has been some petty violence also.

6. So, this movement of the Praja Parishad, which aims at a closer integration of Kashmir State with India, has had the opposite effect. It is true that so far as Jammu Province is concerned, it has demonstrated that a majority of Hindus there want closer integration. Nobody ever doubted that and, whatever happens, Jammu cannot leave India. There need be no apprehension about that. The whole difficulty has been about the Valley of Kashmir and we are on the point of losing it because of the Praja Parishad movement. Psychologically we have lost it and it would be difficult to get back to the older position.

7. You will appreciate how it has distressed me to see the hard work of several years washed away by this movement. In the ultimate analysis, we gain Kashmir if we gain the goodwill of the people there. We cannot keep it at the point of the bayonet if it is clear that the people do not want us. For the first time public cries are raised in Kashmir that the Indian Army should get out. If I feel strongly on this subject, you will understand me. Nothing more harmful to our cause in the State could have been done even by our enemies. It is for me almost a personal tragedy.

8. It is true that if the Kashmir Government had implemented the rest of the provisions of our agreement with them, this would have helped considerably. But they were not given much of a chance. They started implementing it with the change in the Headship of the State.⁴ They would have followed with other provisions. But the first change itself was immediately followed by this agitation in Jammu and later outside. A new situation was thus created with which we have been struggling all this time and it became progressively more difficult to take any step in Kashmir of the kind we desired. It is easy to criticise Shaikh Abdullah and I think that he has acted unwisely in many matters during the past few months. But the point is that we have continuously lost ground there and have fought what might be called a rearguard action in regard to the main problem of the

4. Karan Singh was inducted as Sadr-i-Riyasat on 17 November 1952 and the Praja Parishad started its satyagraha, protesting against the constitutional changes brought about by the Kashmir Constituent Assembly on 23 November 1952.

Kashmir State. All this because of this continuing Praja Parishad agitation, which had a cumulative effect on the people of the Kashmir Valley and which helped Pakistan greatly in its general propaganda. If you read the papers of Western Pakistan, you will see how they have made much out of the Praja Parishad agitation. This agitation was not difficult to deal with from the law and order point of view, although it was a continuing nuisance. But it was no easy matter to get a grip of the psychological changes that it was producing. During the past few months, I have had no greater trouble or burden than this feeling of our losing grip in Kashmir.

9. However, as I have said above, I am perfectly prepared to issue a statement, which might help in putting an end to this agitation.

10. I have this evening received your telegram No. 12 of 29th.⁵ In this you inform me of a public meeting held on the 28th to express condolences at Syama Prasad Mookerjee's death and suggest that a high-power committee, consisting of Jayakar, Kunzru and a Judge of the Supreme Court and the Director of Health Services, should enquire into these matters,

11. I can understand that people are emotionally wound up because of Syama Prasad's sudden death. But we cannot be governed surely by emotional outbursts. In a previous letter, I suggested that you might yourself go to Srinagar and make such enquiries from doctors and others as you like. For us to appoint a Commission of Enquiry, as suggested, would not only be a step which is very unusual for the Central Government to take (because the State Government moves in such matters) but it would have a very injurious effect on the Kashmir people. They are very touchy at present and such obvious interference by the Central Government would lead to harmful consequences.

12. I do not myself see what this Commission would enquire into. The facts are not very intricate or difficult to discover. Possibly they might come to the conclusion that there was some little negligence or delay on the doctors' part, or that he had not quite realised the gravity of the case. The whole thing happened with great speed. About a dozen or so hours before his death, he was having interviews and he had, I believe, dictated telegrams to his relatives telling them not to worry. Of course that does not excuse any subsequent happening or carelessness.

13. I really do not see how we can appoint a Committee you have suggested, among whom are two persons who are severely critical of everything that the Kashmir Government has done. Even the appointment of such a Committee would create all kinds of difficulties.

Yours affectionately,
Jawahar

5. See the following letter.

21. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
June 29, 1953

My dear Bidhan,

After writing a letter to you in which I dealt with your telegram,² I have seen your letter of the 28th June.

As I have indicated in my other letter, in such matters if an enquiry is held, it is the State Government that functions and not the Central Government. In regard to Kashmir State, which is in a peculiar position and not like other States, this applies all the more. It would be extraordinary and quite abnormal for the Central Government to take any step directly.

As for the Kashmir Government, I cannot say what they will do in this matter and we are facing such very difficult problems with them, on which we differ, that I would hesitate to make any proposal to them. In any event, the kind of Commission that you have suggested, will never be accepted by them.³ That would indirectly raise several other issues which are under discussion between us. Kunzru's and Jayakar's names are in this case not at all suitable. They have been almost bitter opponents of the Kashmir Government.

I still think that it would be a good thing if you went there yourself and carried out such enquiries as you like informally and fully. To that I do not think the Kashmir Government can possibly have any objection.

Yours affectionately,
Jawahar

1. JN Collection.
2. See the preceding item.
3. Roy suggested that as the public opinion in Calcutta was greatly exercised a committee might be appointed comprising M.R. Jayakar or H.N. Kunzru, a judge of the Supreme Court and the Director-General of Health Services, "to appease the demand of the public."

22. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
June 30, 1953

My dear Bidhan,

I sent you two letters last night. Since then I have seen a number of papers which have come from Kashmir relating to Syama Prasad Mookerjee's

1. JN Collection.

detention there and his subsequent illness and death, I believe some of these are going to be issued to the Press by the Kashmir Government.

Some matters are perfectly clear. Syama Prasad was kept there in the loveliest surroundings and with every comfort that was possible under detention. I have seen many letters written by him and his colleagues in detention. In every one of them they give high praise to the conditions under which they were kept — a fine private villa with all modern sanitary equipment; a small but lovely garden with fruit trees and flowers, etc. Syama Prasad became eloquent in his letters to the beauty of the view of the flowers he had in his garden. He had newspapers, books, etc., such as he wanted. Latterly, he expressed a wish for longer walks than could be taken in his little garden. Thereupon, he was allowed to go into the Nishat Bagh nearby, which is one of the loveliest of the Moghal Gardens. The food supplied to them was suitable and praised by them except that Syama Prasad once said that fish was not always supplied, though when it came it was very good. Oddly enough it is not particularly easy to get fish in Kashmir. Trout is available sometimes with special permission and all that.

One of the colleagues of Syama Prasad in detention wrote in a letter that they got everything they wanted it was as if they were in Alladin's land.

I mention all this, although it has no connection with his final illness or death, to indicate how anxious the Kashmir Government was to treat him well and how Syama Prasad and his colleagues themselves recognised this fact.

The Director-General of Medical Services visited him from time to time and examined him. He is Sir Ram Nath Chopra and he recorded notes on his health. It is unfortunate that Chopra was on tour during the last two or three days of Syama Prasad's illness. It is evident that no one there suspected till the very last moment that his illness was serious. This may be due to lack of capacity in the doctors in charge. You are best able to judge this. Till after 7 p.m. the day before his death, that is about nine hours before his death no one, least of all Syama Prasad, took a serious view of the situation. It was about that time that Trivedi, his lawyer, came to get some papers and cheques signed. It was about then or a little earlier that he sent telegrams to his relatives in Calcutta telling them that there was no cause for anxiety. There is no doubt that he sent these telegrams. I have seen photostat copies of the original messages. At 9 p.m. he felt uncomfortable. Even then apparently there was nothing to cause grave anxiety. It was about 11 or a little before that his condition began deteriorating. Doctors were constantly in attendance. The question arises why information was not immediately sent by the doctors that night. There was delay and I have no explanation of that except that they did not realise the seriousness of the situation.

As far as the Kashmir Government people are concerned, they had no notion at all the previous evening that Syama Prasad's condition was grave.

They went to bed and it was only early in the morning, after Syama Prasad's death, that they learnt about it and were naturally much upset. There is a hiatus about giving information during the last four or five hours, though I suppose nothing could have been done at that late stage and in the middle of the night.

The fact of the matter is that the Kashmir Government as I indicated in another letter to you, is in a state of disruption with acute quarrels going on between the members who suspect each other. Nobody trusts another. This has nothing to do with Syama Prasad but is entirely an internal affair. But the result of it is that the normal governmental machinery just does not function. It is quite possible that the doctors tried to get in touch with some Government department or other and failed to get the right person. I know that even Shaikh Abdullah did not know of the death till after 7 a.m. the next morning.² In fact the people who went to inform him were kept waiting for some time outside because he thought it was something in connection with the internal wrangles. It is difficult for me to go about saying in public what the inner state of the Kashmir Government is and this has brought about almost a breakdown of their administrative machinery.

Even the Yuvaraj was not informed till after the body was sent away from Srinagar. This was just a case of nobody being responsible and everybody losing his head.

After the news of the death was known to Abdullah and the other members of Government, they did everything in their power to show respect and to give every facility. They arranged the plane and the whole Government went to the aerodrome with wreaths, etc. At the aerodrome, those who had been in detention with Syama Prasad and were released then together with Prem Nath Dogra expressed their appreciation of all that the Kashmir Government had done in this matter. Of course, they were terribly shaken up by Syama Prasad's death. But they did not accuse the Kashmir Government of any lapses in this matter.

I understand that Syama Prasad's brother, Justice Mookerjee,³ got a telephone message at five in the morning and he thought this had come from Shaikh Abdullah. That is not correct, I do not know who sent that message, but Shaikh Abdullah certainly did not telephone himself.

2. Recounting later the incident, Abdullah had said, "Dr Mookerjee was a friend of mine and I had great regards for him. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad held the portfolio of Home Affairs and Shyam Lal Saraf the portfolio of Health and Jails.... I could establish contact with Dr Mookerjee only through them. I did not even get authentic reports about his health from these people, and I received the news of his death quite unexpectedly one morning." Y.D. Gundevia, *The Testament of Shaikh Abdullah*, (Dehra Dun, 1974), pp.42-43.
3. Rama Prasad Mookerjee.

Apart from personal factors, you will appreciate that politically the Kashmir Government has suffered by all this train of events. To accuse them of deliberate connivance at anything is patently wrong.

I am enclosing a personal letter for Syama Prasad Mookerjee's mother.⁴ I shall be grateful if you will have it delivered to her,

Yours affectionately,
Jawahar

4. See the next item.

23. To Jogmaya Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
June 30, 1953

My dear Mrs Mookerjee,

It was with deep grief that I learnt a few days ago, as I was leaving Geneva for Cairo, that your son, Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee, had died. The news came as a shock to me for, though we may have differed in politics, I respected him and had affection for him. To you, his mother, the shock must have been very great and I can say little to lessen your sorrow.

I sent a telegram from Cairo to Dr Bidhan Chandra Roy asking him to convey my deepest sympathy and condolences to you. It is a matter of particular sorrow to me that Syama Babu's death should have occurred as it did under detention. When I went to Kashmir about five weeks ago, I enquired particularly as to where he was kept and about his health. I was told that he was being kept, not in any prison but in a private villa on the side of the famous Dal Lake in Srinagar. I found that the Kashmir Government was anxious to give him such comfort and amenities as were possible and that he was keeping well. I was happy to learn this at the time. Indeed, I hoped that the healthy climate of Kashmir might lead to an improvement in Syama Babu's health.

But it was not to be so and the shock and sorrow are, therefore, all the greater. I suppose it was beyond human power to do anything and we have to bow to circumstances beyond control.

To you, revered lady, I offer my respectful homage and expression of sorrow. If I can be of any service to you, you will please not hesitate to inform me.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. S.P. Mookerjee Papers, NMML.

II. EXTERNAL ISSUES

1. The Kashmir Issue¹

I do not know why there is such a fuss about the discussion of the Kashmir issue. We are always prepared to discuss every issue. In fact in my last letter to the Pakistan Prime Minister, I told him that I was prepared to discuss every issue with him, though I did not particularly mention Kashmir.²

2. It is clear, however, that nothing substantial can come out of a discussion of the Kashmir issue on official level. The only possibility is noting down various lines of approach without commitment. As a matter of fact, even I cannot fully discuss the Kashmir issue with Khwaja Nazimuddin, because a third and very important party is the Kashmir Government.

3. However, we can certainly inform the Pakistan Government that our officials who will participate in the conference are prepared to discuss every issue including the Kashmir issue. But it should be further pointed out that it is obvious that the discussion of the Kashmir issue on official level can hardly yield any substantial result.

4. As for my meeting Khwaja Nazimuddin, it is exceedingly difficult for me to find time during this month or the next which is heavily booked up. Apart from this, I should like to wait for the result of the officials' conference before I consider fixing any definite meeting.

5. I propose to write to Khwaja Nazimuddin tonight.

I have written to him.³

1. Note to the Cabinet Secretary, 6 April 1953. JN Collection.

2. In his letter of 15 March 1953 to Nazimuddin, Nehru had expressed his "earnest desire" and readiness "to consider all these questions in all friendliness." See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, pp. 498-500.

3. See *post* pp. 313-315.

2. To K.M. Panikkar¹

New Delhi

April 14, 1953

My dear Panikkar,

I have just received your letter of the 11th April in which you refer to the

1. File No. 52/200/NGO-52, MEA.

conversation which your Counsellor, Nair had with Major Saleh Salem.² This was about General Neguib playing the part of an arbitrator in the Kashmir dispute.

You have raised a difficult question. The Kashmir problem is, as you know, frightfully complicated, not only from the international point of view but also from the national. Normally speaking, we would refuse to accept any person's intervention or arbitration. That is the position we have taken up all along and I do not quite see how we can depart from it even in the case of General Neguib.

There is some talk of my meeting Nazimuddin. I rather doubt that I shall meet him before I go to London. I shall, of course, meet him there. Meanwhile, an official conference is taking place soon.³ At this conference they want to discuss Kashmir also though officials cannot obviously come to any decision.

Meanwhile, Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee and company are carrying on their misconceived agitation in regard to Jammu, Shaikh Abdullah and his colleagues are not showing much wisdom in dealing with the situation, that is they are confused and cannot make up their minds just when quick action is necessary. Anyhow, a number of developments are going to take place in regard to Kashmir. I could not, of course, think of any one's intervention without fully consulting not only my colleagues here but also Kashmir Government. My own inclination is that it will not help at all. I have told Nazimuddin that we had better decide that our problems will only be settled directly between us and not by outsiders.⁴

I suggest to you, therefore, that you might not encourage this talk of intervention. You need not reject it utterly. You might say that we propose to deal with it directly as between the Prime Ministers. Later, we might consider other methods, if necessary.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Panikkar had conveyed that following a reported suggestion by the US statesman Ralph Bunche to Neguib, that he should intervene in the dispute over Kashmir, Salem had told Nair that Neguib was prepared to bring about a settlement. Panikkar suggested that it might not be wise to give the impression that India did not, in principle, welcome mediation by a friendly Arab country. He suggested that "if Pakistan is agreeable," India should "welcome General Neguib's direct interest in the matter."
3. The official level conference between India and Pakistan took place in mid-May 1953.
4. See *post* pp. 313-315.

3. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
April 27, 1953

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

... Meanwhile, as you know, a new situation has developed in Pakistan after the coup d' etat, which put an end to Nazimuddin's career as Prime Minister. The new Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali, has been making repeated gestures of goodwill to India and to me.² So far as that goes, it is good. But I am by no means sure what all this means. One thing is clear that Pakistan is now very much under the influence of the United States.³

There is no chance of my going to Karachi during May, that is, before I go to London. But there is an odd possibility of Mohammad Ali coming to Delhi. If he wants to come, obviously I cannot say no to him. In any event I shall meet him in London. I leave for London on the 28th May morning and I am due back in Delhi on the 26th June.

I am giving you this information, so that you may have some idea of my programme.

I am writing to you, however, about a matter, which has been distressing me for some time. This is the very slow progress made by your committees etc., in regard to giving formal shape to the relationship of Kashmir with India, in terms of the agreement arrived at last year.⁴ Normally, I would have thought that, in a matter of this kind, there would have been some speed in implementation. It is now about nine months or so since that agreement was arrived at. I know of course the difficulties you have had to face. Nevertheless nine months is a long time and there appears to be no sign yet of how matters stand or what is likely to be done. I have no idea whatever of what your committees are doing. Occasionally something appears in the press, which is not likely to be accurate, though there might be some element of truth in it.

I have referred to normality. But, as we all know, there has been no normality at all in recent months. You have had to face the agitation in

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Soon after assuming office, Mohammad Ali, told a press conference on 18 April 1953 that, "If Mr Nehru is earnest and honest about settling Indo-Pakistan issues, I shall be prepared to go more than half way to meet him." On 27 April he told a PTI correspondent that he looked upon Nehru as "an elder brother" and was optimistic about an early solution of disputes including a plan for "joint defence of India and Pakistan."

3. The new Prime Minister and Pakistan's former Ambassador to the USA, was described by some US officials as a "progressive with a western outlook."

4. Nehru placed the Agreement before the House of the People on 24 July 1952 and Abdullah placed it before the Kashmir Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1952.

Jammu and we have had to face for some months now daily trouble in Delhi especially and partly elsewhere. This continues. It has no large significance from the law and order point of view and, I am glad to say, the people generally are rather fed up with it. But the fact remains that this continuing trouble is a strain on all of us. We should like to see the end of it. It would no doubt have ended long ago if we could have said definitely that the Jammu and Kashmir Government had finally implemented the agreement arrived at last year. The only thing that keeps going this trouble and agitation is the charge that even the Agreement has not been implemented. We have no reply to that or rather the reply we have given grows more and more stale as time goes on. Even in a relatively small matter of a strike or something like that, we function with speed and approach it not only from the law and order point of view but from the other points of view and we come to decisions and act up to them. Only recently we had the possibility of a big strike in our shipyards at Visakhapatnam. Within 24 hours we dealt with this situation and broke the back of the strike by coming to some kind of an agreement.⁵

I give you this very minor instance as it has some relevance. Here is a major occurrence which has affected our public life for months past and caused us no end of trouble, and yet we have no constructive approach to it. Soon I shall be going away to England and I shall not return till almost the end of June. Is everything to remain hanging in mid-air till then and all this wretched and reprehensible activity to continue?

I do not myself understand why this particular limited matter of Kashmir's association with India should not be speedily decided. In fact, I have all along been under the impression that it has been decided by our Agreement and that only some proper shape has to be given to it. That should have been a matter of a few days. Obviously we have to adhere to that Agreement. Any deviation from it would give rise to a great deal of criticism and trouble. Indeed, after all that I have said in Parliament here, I could not put forward any variation of that Agreement.⁶

5. On 22 April, 3,600 workers of the Hindustan Shipyard Limited struck work protesting against summary discharge of 813 workers by the management. The Madras Government promptly appointed an adjudicator and brought both the parties to the negotiating table. On 11 May, the parties agreed to refer the case to Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan of Supreme Court and to accept his verdict as final and binding.
6. On 27 April 1953, it was reported in *The Hindu* that Shaikh Abdullah was planning to bring about a federal polity in Kashmir consisting of five autonomous units of Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, Poonch and Gilgit. So long as the Pakistan-held areas remained undecided, only Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh were to be brought within the new constitutional structure. The name of the State was to be changed into "Autonomous Federated Unit of the Republic of India." The Basic Principles Committee was accordingly instructed to work out details on these lines.

If that is so, then this matter at least should be tackled with speed and settled. I do not mind how long the rest of your Constitution takes.⁷ If it is said that this is a part of the entire Constitution and must, therefore wait for it, that argument could have equally applied to the change made in the headship of the State.⁸ If that can be isolated, so can other matters we had agreed upon.

My own view about the Constitution has all along been that it is always better to have a brief and flexible Constitution. We have made a mistake, I think, in having too long and complicated a Constitution of India and we are regretting it. If I had another chance. I would not repeat this error, because it comes in the way all the time.

The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir State will necessarily have to fit into the Constitution of India, if Jammu and Kashmir State is a constituent unit of India and is part of the territory of India. But for the moment I am not concerned with the whole Constitution but only with that part which defines the relationship to India. I fear that the longer we delay this, the more difficult the situation becomes.

I have referred previously to the possibility of my seeing the new Prime Minister of Pakistan. I shall certainly see him in London, if not earlier, and afterwards we are also likely to meet to discuss our various problems.⁹ Among these problems, Kashmir is bound to come up. I have not the ghost of a notion what I am going to say to him about this because, apart from larger issues, I do not even know for certain what the present position is vis-a-vis India.

As the time is approaching when I shall leave India for some weeks, I felt that I should write to you about these matters, so that you might give thought to them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. The Kashmir Consenbly which began constitution-making in October 1951, completed its task in November 1956.
8. On 12 June 1952, the Kashmir Consenbly had adopted the recommendations of the Basic Principles Committee, that "the office of the head of the State should be based upon the elective principle and not upon the principle of heredity." A Bill to this effect was passed on 12 November 1952. Following a formal proposal of his name on 14 November by Shaikh Abdullah, Karan Singh was sworn in as the first elected Head of the State on 17 November.
9. The two Prime Ministers met in London on 5 and 6 June and spent two and a half hours together, having a broad and general discussion on Kashmir, minorities and evacuee properties.

4. Kashmir—a Bilateral Problem¹

...Question: The Arab as well as the East appreciates your efforts for the cause of world peace and would like to grasp this opportunity to ask you what efforts India is making for the cause of peace in the East. What is her stand as regards the Kashmir question which calls for a settlement that satisfies her people's wish for a free plebiscite? What is India's attitude towards Israel? Is she prepared to withdraw her recognition of Israel until Palestine goes back to the Arabs?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I should have thought that at least part of these questions was partly covered by my general remarks at the beginning, the general approach, I mean.

Kashmir has been referred to. You should know that it was India who, right at the beginning, without anybody suggesting it, had laid down that the future of Kashmir would be decided by the people of Kashmir. That was a unilateral declaration on India's part right at the beginning. Neither the United Nations nor anyone else, suggested it then. We stand by that. I think naturally when a question has troubled us for a considerable time, you can presume that it is an intricate and difficult question. Otherwise, why should it trouble us all this time, the parties concerned. Now obviously I cannot go and I do not want to go into the intricacies of it, except to say that we want that it should be settled with a view to satisfying the people of Kashmir and that it should be settled in a friendly, peaceful way between the parties concerned which are certainly India and Pakistan, but which even more certainly are the people of Kashmir. Kashmir is not a bit of baggage to be thrown from Pakistan to India and from India to Pakistan. There are a number of people living there who really are chiefly interested in their fate.

Two things I should like to say about this. My own impression has been that this question might have been solved or might have been nearer to its solution some time ago, but for the fact of the intrusion of outsiders into this business, who have taken an unholy interest in it and come in the way of a solution, although they talk so much about it. I think that a direct approach by the parties concerned, i.e., India and Pakistan, and Kashmir, of course, is the best way of solving it, rather than others coming in.

One thing also I should like to say generally about India and Pakistan,

1. Press conference, Cairo, 25 June 1953. *Jawaharlal Nehru, Press Conferences, 1953*. Information Service of India, New Delhi, 1954. pp. 18-36. Extracts. For other parts of the conference. see pp. 79-83, 361, 416-418, 470-472 and 526.

not only about Kashmir but other issues. Please remember that the people of India and Pakistan, even though they may live in two separate independent countries now, are not only very near to each other in geography but have innumerable common affinities and, in fact, they are hardly distinguishable from each other. If we meet, Indians and Pakistanis, anywhere in the wide world or in India or Pakistan, and if for the moment we set aside some political problems over which we differ, we meet not as strangers or people from two countries, but as people who have known each other all our lives. We speak the same language, we have the same ideas. We have innumerable not only friendships, but relationships like marriage and this and that on either side. In fact, from one point of view, apart from being, of course, citizens of different countries, we are a common people in many ways.

Now, there the difficulty arises. We are so near to each other that a quarrel assumes the aspect of a brothers' quarrel, which is sometimes, unfortunately, rather bitter; but nevertheless it is a brothers' quarrel, it is not a strangers' quarrel. And if once the approach becomes a friendly approach, then one goes very far. I am happy to say that at present, more so than in the past, the general outlook is a much more friendly one between India and Pakistan. So far as we are concerned, whatever our differences might have been or might be, we have always avoided bringing these differences to the outside world. It is our concern—it is between us that we should settle it...

5. Search for a Solution¹

... Question: What is your idea about a statement reported to have been made by Mr. Mohammad Ali in Karachi that the Kashmir problem would be solved within a year?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I will be happy if the Kashmir question is solved in one year, and I shall be happier still if it could be solved within six months.

Q: Would you like to go to Karachi?

1. Press conference, Bombay, 27 June 1953. From *The Statesman*, *The Times of India*, *The Hindustan Times*, and *The Bombay Chronicle*, 28 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 351 and 402-403.

JN: I hope to visit Karachi but I have not fixed any date.

Q: Can you state what the trend of your talks with Mohammad Ali was?

JN: You cannot ask me about the trend. My talks with the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mr Mohammad Ali, in London, were very friendly. Both of us naturally desired that we should go ahead and find some agreement on the various issues before us. The talks in London were preliminary and would definitely be continued...

6. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
June 30, 1953

My dear Krishna,

Your letter without date has just reached me.²

I have been here three days now and long to pick up old threads. You refer to the Kashmir situation. I shall welcome any suggestions you may have to send. But our major difficulty now, as I told you, is progressive disintegration of the State. Even the Government and the Cabinet are going to pieces. The National Conference is equally divided and the position is a bad one. Naturally this does not strengthen our hands in dealing with Pakistan.

The death of Syama Prasad Mookerjee has added to the difficulty. He was being treated very well in Kashmir and had a lovely villa to live in by the side of the Dal Lake. The Kashmir Government did everything to add to his comfort and amenities. But at the last moment, when he fell seriously ill rather suddenly, there was no full realisation of the gravity of his illness. Everything was rather sudden and the result was that his people got the news of his illness and death at the same time. This has naturally upset everybody and all kinds of accusations are being made.³

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.

2. Menon had informed that in response to Nehru's letter of 21 June 1953 from Berne, he had prepared a note on Kashmir, which might be of some relevance.

3. There was widespread speculation regarding Mookerjee's death. While a section of the press described it as death in "mysterious circumstances", the Praja Parishad Secretary, D.D. Verma, stated in a press release of 25 June that they "refused to believe that death occurred in natural circumstances."

Pearson⁴ replied to me yesterday about convening a meeting of the General Assembly. He says that he would like to wait till President Eisenhower's emissary has reported about his negotiations with Rhee. Otherwise he is willing and anxious to convene a session. I suppose a session will be convened in the course of the next two or three weeks. You will have to go to it. It was as well that I asked Pearson and that this fact became generally known. That has had a good effect.

Winston Churchill's illness appears to be more serious than has been made out. That will make a difference. I should like to know from you what future shape of things is likely to be.

Love

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

4. Lester B. Pearson was Foreign Minister of Canada and President of the UN General Assembly.

TRIBAL PEOPLE AND WELFARE

1. To Jairamdas Doulatram¹

Camp: Aijawl
April 3, 1953

My dear Jairamdas,

I am sorry you could not come here as I have had a most interesting tour and have gathered much information and formed many opinions. I cannot write to you about all these now, because that would take too long a time. I have had fairly long talks with Medhi² and the many officers who have been here with me. Among these officers is T.N. Kaul, Joint Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry, in charge of the North-East Frontier Agency work. I have asked him to go to Shillong to discuss these frontier problems with you and generally look into papers there, so that he might be in more intimate touch with them. He has already had some talks with Subramanian.³

At present, I am writing to you only about a few selected matters. One of these is the incident that happened at Kohima when the Prime Minister of Burma and I went there⁴ and the Naga District situation generally.

I have given a good deal of thought to this Naga District situation. The incident, when a large number of Nagas left our meeting at Kohima was significant and I have been thinking as to what we should do about it. We cannot just ignore it. At the same time, I do not wish to make too great a public fuss about it.

I suggest that you might do two things about it: (1) that you should send for two or three of the Naga leaders who were present at the Kohima village meeting, at which U Nu and I were welcomed on behalf of the Naga residents of the village, presented spears and other emblems in token of friendship and made to drink Tzu in sign of friendship, etc. Affirmations of friendship were made by them, to which I suitably replied. Two hours later, these Naga leaders and others walked out of the meeting where they had gathered. They went out just before U Nu and I arrived at the meeting, or rather as we were arriving. I think that there might have been better management of this on the part of the D.C.⁵ However, that is a small matter and the D.C. was new to the place.

1. JN Collection.

2. Bisnuram Medhi, Chief Minister of Assam.

3. R.V. Subramanian, IAS, Secretary, Tribal Areas and Development Department, Government of Assam.

4. Protesting against the Deputy Commissioner's order that no memorandum or welcome address could be presented to the Prime Minister, the Nagas walked out of a public meeting which was to be addressed by both the Prime Ministers U Nu and Nehru at Kohima on 30 March 1953.

5. S.N. Barkataki.

I want you to send for these Naga leaders and tell them yourself that we take a grave view of the discourtesy offered by them to a most distinguished guest of ours, namely the Prime Minister of Burma. Quite apart from political or other questions, it was wholly unpardonable for such a grave affront to be offered to the leader of another nation who was our distinguished guest.⁶ (I should not like you to lay any stress on the affront offered to me also on this occasion). Tell them further that we had always thought that, with all their failings, the Nagas were a brave people whose word could be relied upon. By the way they have behaved, however, they have shown that no faith or reliance can be placed on their word or assurance. They invited U Nu and me to their village and gave us gifts in token of friendship and made assurances of peace and goodwill. Only two hours afterwards, they forgot or deliberately broke those assurances and pledges and insulted our honoured guest. No decent people and no one who cares for his word could have acted in this way. It was bad enough to show this discourtesy, but to do so soon after giving their pledge of friendship was a double insult and was hypocrisy and fraud. We want to make it clear to them what we think of this action of theirs as well as of those who sided with them. We do not wish to punish them for this, because we feel that they are misled by others, but we intend taking a more serious view of any misbehaviour in the future.

Tell them also that by this action, the so-called Naga National Council⁷ has put itself outside the pale so far as we are concerned. In future, we shall not recognise it in any way, nor deal with it in any way. We shall accept no letter, representation or communication from it. Individuals, even though they might be members of that Council, may send communications to us and we shall deal with them as we think proper, but if any communication is sent on behalf of the Naga National Council, this will not be accepted and will be ignored.

Further tell them that if the Naga National Council or any individual will offend against the law, immediate action will be taken.

That is the general line I should like you to adopt with them. I do not want you to give anything in writing, but it is better for you to have a note prepared for yourself. You can read out this note to them without giving it to them. It would be desirable not to enter into any argument with them. As you are summoning them, you may, if you like, pay them their bare expenses of travel.

6. The Governor called and reprimanded the Naga leaders for their behaviour. They submitted a written apology thus: "By our insulting behaviour we had given pain to the mind of the Burmese Prime Minister and we find no language to express our regrets."
7. Born out of the Naga Hills District Tribal Council, the Naga National Council was formed in 1946, under the presidentship of Mayang Nokcha. Later it became the sole body expressing the Naga aspiration for autonomy within India.

I should like you also to summon, separately of course, two or three prominent missionaries working in the Naga Hills District. Tell them that you and the Government are gravely dissatisfied at the way certain Nagas and, more especially, those associated with the so-called Naga National Council, have been behaving. Their behaviour at the time of the visit of the Prime Minister of Burma was insulting in the extreme and no Government can tolerate such behaviour which is on the verge of treason. You have warned them. For the present, however, your Government has not thought it necessary to take any further action, because you have felt that they are misguided and misled. But if in future such instances of behaviour occur, your Government will take action. As for the Naga National Council, your Government have decided not to recognise it in any way or to deal with it in any way and no communication from it will be considered in future. Individuals may send communications, but if these are sent on behalf of the Naga National Council, they will not be considered.

You should further tell them that the missionaries in these areas have a special responsibility. They have a considerable influence with the people and that influence can be exercised in a healthy way or in an unhealthy way. It is well known that British officials in these areas before India became independent, encouraged separatist and anti-national tendencies among the Nagas.⁸ Some missionaries may have done so also. Missionaries are given every freedom for legitimate activity and our Government gives freedom to every religion to function, but if any missionary indulges in any political activity, or any anti-national activity, then he is going beyond his legitimate domain and Government cannot approve of any such person continuing in India.

You might mention that it has come to your knowledge that a circular letter was sent to various chapels or churches in the Naga District asking the pastors to observe April 5th as Naga Independence Day in their churches or chapels. You do not know who was responsible for this letter and it may be, as has been stated by one missionary to the Chief Minister, that they were not aware of it. Nevertheless, this indicates the kind of atmosphere that prevails among the churches and chapels in the Naga Hills District and for this a certain measure of responsibility must attach to the missionaries. If any missionaries functioned in India, they must not only observe the laws of the land, but should also not abuse the hospitality of Government. They must not encourage in any way, actively or passively, anti-national sentiments. If such sentiments existed in the churches, a measure of responsibility for this must

8. For instance Robert Reid, a former Governor of Assam, had espoused the cause of a separate Naga homeland and C.R. Pawsey, the last British Commissioner of the Naga Hills, had been instrumental in the formation of the Naga Hills District Tribal Council, a political body.

necessarily attach to them. The insult offered to a head of a neighbouring country and an honoured guest of the Government of India at Kohima indicates to what extent some misguided people among the Nagas are prepared to go. Government has treated them leniently in the past and is even now not desirous of punishing them for their behaviour, but this lenient attitude cannot be continued if it appears to Government that any person is actively fomenting disloyalty and hatred of Government of India.

I have indicated the general lines of your talk to the missionaries. Here again, I would suggest your having something written to read from, but not to give it to them.

I am not in the least concerned with what might be called the law and order situation in the Naga Hills District, but I am greatly concerned at this unhealthy atmosphere that prevails there and I do not propose to tolerate any insult from the Nagas or from any one else. Therefore, these facts should be made clear both to the Naga leaders and to the missionaries.

More and more I have come to think that a very special and trained officer is needed for work in these tribal areas. The normal administrative officer though otherwise good, may prove totally inadequate here. This is a larger question to which we will have to give a great deal of thought. I was not particularly impressed by the new Deputy Commissioner at Kohima. I do not wish to judge him from a brief acquaintance, but I did have the feeling that he could have exercised more tact in dealing with the situation. I heard another thing which is not much to his credit. This relates to his drinking overmuch.

Here in the Lushai Hills and in the Naga Hills District, I am told that impressment of labour still continues.⁹ I was surprised to learn this. I am sure this is utterly wrong and I rather doubt if it is not unconstitutional. In any event, it must be put a stop to. I have no doubt that it will have to be ended. The question is, whether we should do so on our own initiative or be compelled to do so after a public agitation. The District Council of the Lushai Hills has already objected to it. Therefore, I am firmly of opinion that it should be ended as rapidly as possible. This may mean a little more expenditure in money, but that cannot be helped. It might mean either giving higher wages to voluntary labour or keep a bigger permanent labour corps or partly both. As a matter of fact, I think that we could reduce expenditure by changing our present scales of the numbers of porters allowed in tour etc. These scales have come down to us from British times when both human beings and labour were

9. The practice of impressing local labour, often against their wishes, to carry goods, build communication links and to work as couriers in the difficult terrains of the North-East, started during the British Raj, was still continuing. They were paid a pittance as wages. This was one of the major grievances of the tribal people.

cheap and nobody cared how many people were engaged. We have to look at things differently now. I see no reason why the number should not be considerably reduced in the case of our officers, etc., on tour.

Medhi mentioned to me that there might be an emergency. That is true, but if a real emergency arises, it will have to be met by very special steps, quickly undertaken, and the impressment of labour will be only one small step at that time.

If we give proper wages, the District Council should be asked to help us to get the porters. This question of labour affects not only our civil officers, but perhaps even more so the Assam Rifles. I have spoken to the Commandant here and I should request you to speak to the Inspector-General of the Assam Rifles.¹⁰ I have no doubt whatever in my mind that if we do not stop this impressment of labour ourselves, we shall be compelled to do so by public agitation. If this matter is mentioned in Parliament, we will be totally unable to justify ourselves.

About air droppings, I have made the position clear to Medhi. We are prepared to do our best, but there is a limit beyond which we cannot go at present. On no account can we take risks with our aircraft and crews.¹¹ If the place for air dropping is dangerous, as our Air Vice-Marshal¹² has told us in regard to two places, then it has to be stopped there. An alternative place can be found nearby. The one suggestion made is that the base from which the supplies are sent might be nearer to the air dropping places than Mohanbari. The nearer it is, the more can be carried by the aircraft.

There was a proposal to send a Finance Officer from the Central Government to examine the finances of District Councils. Apparently, nothing has been done about this. Medhi tells me that he would like this to be done even now, although the Rs 10 lakhs has been granted.¹³ I agree and I shall try to have one sent.

It seems to me of the utmost importance that whatever we have to do in these tribal areas should be done quickly. The people here do not understand legal or constitutional difficulties and the delays that take place in our taking any action. We have to deal with very special problems in these tribal areas and our routine procedures are too slow for them. I have mentioned this to

10. Brigadier Bhagwat Singh.

11. In October 1952 an IAF aircraft while on a supply mission to the Tibetan and NEFA border out-posts, crashed, killing all its crew members.

12. Air Vice-Marshal S. Mukherjee, Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

13. The Assam Government had been asking for financial aid from the Central Government to support development work of the autonomous District Councils. The Finance Ministry observed that it was the responsibility of the State Government. Due to Nehru's intervention a sum of Rs 10 lakhs was granted in January 1953.

Medhi and I intend speaking to the Home Ministry about it too. I am afraid the fault often lies with us in Delhi .

There is one rather small matter which may occasionally create difficulties. It is essential that there should be perfect cooperation between the Assam Rifles and the local authorities wherever they may serve. I am told that there was an unfortunate incident here at Aizawl between the I.G. of the Assam Rifles and the Deputy Commissioner who was here then and who is now at Kohima. As far as I can make out, the Deputy Commissioner was at fault, but of course I have not gone into the matter carefully.

When I was at Manipur, the Chief Commissioner said that some orders had been issued by the I.G., Assam Rifles, for the non-use of the wireless except for law and order purposes. This rule is an odd one generally, but in a place like Manipur or the Lushai Hills or like places, this order may well lead to grave difficulties. Communications in these places are very bad and there must be perfect cooperation between the Assam Rifles and the other authorities. To limit the use of the wireless in such places would not be good. The matter should be left to the discretion of the men on the spot, in the case of Manipur, the Chief Commissioner, who is the responsible head of the administration there. I should like you to mention this to the I.G., Assam Rifles.

There are also many minor matters about loan of a landrover and of Guards of Honour on special occasions. In these petty matters, there must be cooperation and it is wrong for one party to try to bypass the other. Unless they cooperate and accommodate each other, there will be needless irritation and difficulty.

About missionaries generally, I would lay down the rule that no new centre should be opened, more especially of the Evangelical variety. Where there is some constructive scheme like a hospital, etc., you might examine it on the merits, but purely for proselytization, no new centre should be opened and no new branch of an existing centre should be opened. This rule should apply also to new foreign missionaries coming to these areas. No such newcomers from foreign missionaries should be encouraged.

The question of the existing missions is a little more difficult. Of course if anyone misbehaves, he must depart, but it is better not to be too hasty in dealing with the existing persons. We should try to get full particulars about the antecedents of these missionaries. I say this because I am told that in some cases they are ex-British officers.

I should like to hurry up basic education in these areas. I wish Aryanayakam¹⁴ could be made to come soon for this purpose.

I am told that some members of the Imperial War Graves Commission want to visit these areas without the usual permit. If there are only a few of

14. E.W. Aryanayakam. Educationist and Gandhian, active in the Gandhi Seva Sangha and the Bhoodan movement.

these persons, we might allow them to come without previously taking a permit, but, in any event, they should send intimation of their coming and they should not wander about the whole places. As for other foreigners, i.e., relatives of those who may be brought there, they should certainly require permit.

I am giving a copy of this letter to Medhi, with whom I have discussed these matters. I shall also give a copy to Dr Katju.

I hope you are well now.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Achievement through Self-Help¹

I am a child of the mountains. Whenever I visit the hills on the frontiers of India I feel exhilarated. On this occasion, however, I am more happy because you have invited me to open this great road built by the people. This is much more than a road of means of communication to southern Lushai Hills where there is no communication. It is a monument of human labour and goodwill and human enthusiasm, and the monument is the result of cooperative effort by a large number of people.

The construction of the road is noble and significant, because it is done in a cooperative way, willing and voluntary work being given by the people. This road is a great road, road of all roads and a great example of achievement through self-help.² No nation can progress without self-help on the part of the people and cooperation between the Government and the people.

In India we are building many great projects such as dams, factories and roads and are thus laying the foundation of the great nation. No Government however great can undertake this by itself. Therefore, the Government has

1. Speech at the inaugural ceremony of Aizawl-Lungleh Road, Lushai Hills, 3 April 1953. From the *National Herald*, 4 April 1953.
2. A 128-mile long road connecting Aizawl with Lungleh, sub-divisional headquarters in the north of the Lushai district, was constructed with the voluntary labour of nearly 5,000 Lushai men, women and children, who inhabited 470 villages in that area. Villagers also contributed Rs.80,000 towards the construction of the road. The project was undertaken on 26 January 1950 for providing communication to South Lushai Hills.

appealed to the people all over the country to undertake and share in this task. It is joyful because we can work for ourselves and for the people all over the country.

I have talked about the construction of this road in different parts of the country so that it may become a great symbol of self-help—a work which can be done under compulsion but it should come from the people themselves.

The Assam Rifles have played a great part in building the road. It is right for them to do. People in our army and in services are meant to serve the country and the people.

3. Missionaries in Tribal Areas¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: The novel problems presented by the tribal people in a sense are a challenge to us as to how to treat them so as to help them develop without any imposition from outside or without cutting them from their own distinctiveness.

Outsiders are responsible for misleading the Naga people.

Question: Who are these outsiders?

JN: I do not know exactly as to who these outsiders are, but everyone knows that people of those hill tribes are not allowed to come in contact with the people of the plains. They are kept cut off from the political development in India.

There is a very marked similarity amongst all the people inhabiting in the border hills from the Lushai to all over the Himalayas right upto the northernmost region. In spite of difference in language and costumes they are similar in many respects.

If the tribals are given the opportunities they will become good teachers, engineers and good doctors, statesmen, etc. some of the tribals like Nagas and Lushai have made themselves good soldiers and some of them are serving in the Assam Battalions.

I do not like the prevailing feeling in many parts of India that the tribals

1. Press conference, Aizawl, Lushai Hills, 3 April 1953. From the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, *The Statesman*, *The Hindu* and the *National Herald* of 5 April 1953.

are backward and primitive. Most of the tribals are advanced in many ways and are delightful.

A Foreign Correspondent: Whom did you exactly mean by outsiders in reference to your speech at Kohima?²

JN: Sometime back on receiving a memorandum from certain Nagas I felt that the memorandum could not possibly be written by them.³ Not to speak of the language, the deep historical allusions contained in it were also very odd. I believe that somebody who was not a Naga must have written the memorandum. All these hill areas during the entire period of British rule were completely cut off from the rest of India. Nobody was allowed to go or come from there. As a result the people were cut off from the developments taking place in India politically, apart from other ways. Of India they had only distant echoes reaching them. During the days the only people they came in contact with were the outsiders — the British officials and some missionaries.

Q: Does the Government of India blame the missionaries for this demand?

JN: The Government had no particular view on this subject. I think that in the past, when these areas were isolated, there were only the missionaries as outsiders here. There is no doubt that missionaries have done excellent work in some hill areas⁴ but they can hardly be expected to espouse Indian culture properly because their outlook is different. During the British regime, when these areas were isolated and cut off from the rest of India, there were only missionaries and British officials present in the hills. The missionaries not only thought alike but also functioned alike and that not on a missionary plane but on a political plane. What happened since then I cannot say because conditions have become different now.⁵

I have no doubt in my mind that the idea of independence now being demanded by a section of the Nagas was planted in them a year or two before India became independent.⁶

2. For Nehru's speech at Kohima on 30 March 1953, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.21, pp. 165-166.
3. A memorandum was presented to Nehru at Mao on 24 October 1952. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, pp. 150-151.
4. For instance the missionaries, active in the Naga Hills since 1870, were responsible for the spread of education, health care and employment among the Nagas.
5. Soon after independence nine missionaries out of eleven were asked to leave the country because of their alleged political activities.
6. The Naga National Council had started a campaign for an independent homeland for the Nagas in July 1947.

When talk of Indian independence became a live issue, the British officials in these areas, who disapproved Indian independence, thought that they might perhaps keep out these hill tracts. Some of the officials even spoke about this quite openly.⁷

They were disappointed as things did not happen as they expected. During the period these areas remained isolated, the tribal people were made to feel a certain contempt and hatred for the Indians whom they did not know or did not come in contact with. We would have to deal with the after-effects of all these.

Q: Shall the foreign missionaries be replaced by the Indian Christians to do missionary work as was the case in South India?

JN: The Government do not look upon the question from the religious point of view, but look upon it from the national point of view. In India the scope is open for any religion to flourish. But the Government do not, therefore, appreciate what they consider anti-national sentiments to be spread in these areas. If, therefore, the foreign missionaries did any kind of social work such as opening schools and hospitals, that was one thing. They could not however present their national viewpoint. If the missionaries did purely evangelical work they would not be said to be anti-national. The foreign missionaries, even without any particular desire to do anything, could, however, present their national viewpoint. It is, therefore, better that the Indians take up the work as in fact it was being done in South India. In fact, in South India a large section of the Christian population and Indians, who were indigenous to the place, do it.

I visited the Naga tribal areas in Burma. The Nagas there were in almost all stages of development... 1500 Nagas in various stages of development met me and presented me an address.⁸ There were mass dances by them in which

7. Robert Reid, a former Governor of Assam, proposed that the Naga Hills should become a crown colony, controlled by Whitehall to ensure a 'square deal' to the Nagas. Reginald Coupland also suggested a plan for changing the Naga Hills into a condominium, preceded by a treaty between Burma, India and Britain. But there were also officials like Andrew Clow, the last British Governor of Assam, who actively tried to convince the Nagas that their interest lay in integration with India.
8. In their address the Nagas affirmed that they "would not take a 'no' for an answer ... to their demand for independence", and hoped "you will bring yourself to a full appreciation of the matter and undertake to implement forthwith the promises made to us by Mahatma Gandhi at Delhi in 1947 and by C. Rajagopalachari, at Shillong, in 1949." The address presented to the Premier of Burma expressed the hope that some day the Burmese flag would fly in this country not as a symbol of conquest but of friendship and equality.

U Nu took part. The administration is being extended to unadministered tribal areas in Burma.

After independence more contact is being established with the people of hill areas of Assam. A team of agricultural experts would shortly be visiting the Lushai Hills to advise the people on the latest system of cultivation.

When I read a memorandum presented to me previously, I felt that a Naga could not possibly have written. The language and the deep historical allusions showed that somebody else and not a Naga had written it.

According to the Burma Government, a number of foreign missionaries are involved in the Karen movement because the Karens are Christians. The Burma Government has gone a long way to meet the legitimate demands of the Karens. There are two Karens as ministers in the central cabinet of Burma⁹ and the Karens are also granted autonomy within the Burma state.¹⁰

The parts proposed as the Karen state area are still in the insurgent hands and the autonomy cannot fully function. That is not the fault of the Burma Government.

9. Ba Maung Chien and Sao Wunna.

10. In October 1951, the Burmese Parliament passed a Constitutional Amendment Act for setting up an autonomous Karen State as a constituent part of Burma. Formally the autonomous Karen State was inaugurated on 1 June 1954.

4. The Lushai Experiment in Development¹

The Lushai Hills Autonomous Council should have a certain kind of dynamism—an impatience and strong impulse to push ahead of time.

The Lushai Hills area² is a part of the vast country India, politically and otherwise. India has undergone during the past few years great changes and it is also going to undergo big changes in the coming years.

Obviously, when a huge country like India involving one-fifth of the population of the world, undergoes changes, the curiosity of the whole world is naturally focussed on it as to how far they succeed and how far not. It is therefore the task of the administrators to face the responsibility both on the national as well as on the international plane. This vast responsibility should be shared by the people of Lushai Hills as anybody else.

1. Speech at a meeting of the members of the Lushai Hills Autonomous District Council, Aizawl, 4 April 1953. From the *National Herald* and the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 5 April 1953.

2. The Lushai Hills are part of the Union Territory of Mizoram with Aizawl as the capital.

As Prime Minister of India I carry a responsibility for my job. But other citizens have as much responsibility in working for the progress of the country as I have. I will therefore expect that the members of the Council shall take up the adventure of building up the people of the hills in right earnest and thereby have a right type of developments.

I would like you to look at things from the larger perspective. If you have that, I think you will be able to see your particular problems from a proper perspective.... Most people are prone to think of the problems from a relatively narrow sphere. But I would like to tell you that unless one sees them in proper perspective the real good cannot come. Always try to do big things in a big way and act in a big way and you will become bigger. You have an adventure that is worthy and great and I think if you develop the proper approach towards it and the proper perspective to work with, success cannot be far off.

We want the individuals to grow in wisdom as much as we desire it of the nation. For the progress and development of a country or any part thereof we have to go into planning. But you must also bear in mind that the human beings needed in the planning are not all alike. It is rather impracticable to expect this. It is essential that you try to grow a good deal of wisdom and also help it to grow among your individuals.

The District Council has got a very fine opportunity to serve the people and help them to grow. The Council has also given you a magnificent opportunity to undertake the worthwhile task, a great adventure in which not only this Council but also all the people are engaged,

Many of your problems are common ones. It is obvious that the first and foremost of them is the development of communications like essential road-links and if possible an airstrip in the area. Then you have to open schools, dispensaries, provide water supply in the area which are other important problems. But over and above these there is the problem of more and more production because after all your progress would primarily depend upon the wealth you would produce.

I caution you that while undertaking these development works you must not fall in the errors which have crept into the systems in many other parts of India where schools and colleges are turning out boys and girls who cannot be fitted into work for society. The unemployed in these parts are not suitably trained to do the kind of work they can.

I have no doubt that in your particular case a similar error can be avoided partly because the conditions here are different and partly because I am glad to see that people here do not look upon human behaviour in the way, as they do in other parts of India.

You should study your problems carefully and undertake an investigation to find out what kind of productive activity can be introduced in the area with a view to raise the standard of life of the masses.

You should think on productive lines. You have both natural resources and human factors and you will be able to raise the standard of living of your people. You should produce things for local consumption.

I assure the Council that all possible assistance will be given to them, but they should not depend on the outside help. I hope that the Council will give opportunity to their people to grow.

I am glad to find that the people here appreciate dignity of labour and with the combination of natural resources and human labour, a great deal can be done. In the past these areas were neglected and now they deserve encouragement and help. But all your plans must be based on the capacity of your resources.

5. Impressment of Labour¹

I enclose copy of a letter I am sending to the Governor of Assam.² In this reference is made to a number of matters. Some of these are of particular interest to our Ministry.

2. I would like to draw your attention to the question of stopping impressment of labour. The Assam Rifles is concerned with this matter and I think that we should write to them formally on this subject.

3. I should also like to discuss with the Finance Ministry the question of sending an officer to the Autonomous Hill Districts in Assam, which have been newly constituted, to look into their finances and to make such recommendations to them and to us as might be considered necessary.

4. The question of missionaries in these frontier areas has to be specially considered.³

5. I have asked T.N. Kaul to spend two days at Manipur on his way back from Shillong.

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary, R.K. Nehru, 4 April 1953. File No.112/53-F I. MEA.

2. See *ante*, pp. 221-227.

3. Missionaries have been active in this region since 1870s, when Rev. E.W. Clark opened the first American Baptist Mission at Sibsagar. They were solely responsible for spreading education, providing medical aid and employment to the Nagas till 1947. In the post-independence era, the Naga demand for a separate State and their refusal to participate in the democratic process which was at work in the rest of the country made the Government suspect the hands of some missionaries behind such a stance.

6. To Amrit Kaur¹

New Delhi
April 8, 1953

My dear Amrit,

I enclose a letter I have received from Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant² about a matter which you referred to me.

We have come across a number of instances where foreign missionaries have been found to be carrying on some kind of intelligence work on behalf of a foreign country. It is for this reason, and not because they are Christians or missionaries, that some enquiries were made, more especially in border regions. Indeed, I have been surprised to find that some missionaries are ex-British officers. In the case of some American missionaries also, we have had reason to suspect their political activities.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 2 (238)/48-PMS.
2. Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh.

7. Jhum Cultivation¹

Some months ago I drew the attention of your Ministry to the *jhum* (shifting) cultivation in the Assam Hills.² It was suggested that an agricultural expert should be sent there to advise on this subject and how to change this present system of cultivation. Apparently, nothing has been done thus far....³

I should like you to take early steps to send a suitable person to advise on this subject.

1. Note to the Minister of Food and Agriculture, 21 April 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. For Nehru's note of 27 October 1952, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.20, pp.160-172.
3. Following up his discussions with Nehru at Aizawl, Bisnuram Medhi requested Nehru and the Central Government to send an agricultural expert to advise on, (i) how to replace the *jhum* or shifting cultivation which was "doing great damage in the Lushai Hills" and the people were keen in having "this system replaced by something more scientific and less wasteful... taking into account the conditions... prevalent in those areas," and (ii) extension of fruit cultivation and preservation of fruit to prevent it from rotting before export from the Lushai Hills District.

8. North-East Frontier Areas¹

During the last six months I have twice visited the tribal areas in the North-East Frontier Agency and seen for myself the conditions that exist there.² I have discussed the matter with the Governor of Assam, the Chief Minister and various officials in the North-East Frontier Agency, in the Autonomous District Councils, of Assam, in Manipur and in Tripura. As Minister for External Affairs, I have had more direct dealings, though through the Governor of Assam, with the North-East Frontier Agency.

2. Apart from my deep personal interest in these areas and the people who live there, I have been impressed by the political importance of all this frontier tract and the necessity for dealing with it effectively and with some speed. Delay might well add to the complexities of the problem. The situation is, on the whole, fluid and, with care, it might be made to take the right shape. But it is equally easy for it to take the wrong shape, if we delay or if we take a wrong step.

3. The first thing to be realised is that these areas have to be considered as something different from the rest of India. They must not be thought of in the same terms even as the tribal areas in central or west or other parts of India. They are *sui generis* and any attempt on our part to apply all our normal rules and regulations to them will be unfortunate. To some extent, our Constitution itself recognises this and I am glad to say that there is more and more realisation of this among those people who have to deal with them.

4. I have received a note from Shri T.N. Kaul, Joint Secretary, External Affairs Ministry, who recently spent some days in these frontier areas and who is in charge of the North-East Frontier Agency in our Ministry.³ Having spent some years in our Diplomatic Service in the Soviet Union and China, he could bring to bear a somewhat wider experience on these problems. The note refers briefly to some of the aspects of these problems. On the whole, I am in general agreement with his approach and I think that this note might well form the basis for a fuller consideration by us of these problems. That consideration will have to be given by the Assam Government, the Governor

1. Note, 24 April 1953. S. Dutt Papers, NMML.

2. Nehru visited these areas in October 1952 and again in March-April 1953.

3. T.N. Kaul in his note of 21 April 1953 had highlighted the common problems of the area, such as lack of communications, absence of educational facilities and general economic backwardness. He felt that there was a need for an administrative reorganisation of the area. Kaul suggested that given the socio-cultural and political differences of the tribal communities with the Indian mainstream, a concerted effort by the Government of India was necessary to develop these areas and instil national consciousness among the tribal folk.

of Assam and by the Chief Commissioners of Manipur and Tripura (Tripura perhaps is not so closely connected with this matter). But ultimately the matter has to be considered by the Central Government and our Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Tribes⁴ must necessarily be brought into the picture. In the Central Government, the Ministries more especially concerned are External Affairs, Home, States, Finance, Education, Health and Transport. To some extent, other Ministries also are concerned, more especially Defence. In effect the whole Central Government is interested in this problem and I think that the matter should be placed, at some stage or other, before the Cabinet.

5. Before that is done, however, it would be desirable to work out the approach in some detail in consultation with those most concerned.

6. The Planning Commission has discussed development plans for these areas with the State Governments concerned and some schemes have been approved. But I rather doubt if the Planning Commission gave much thought to the wider aspects of the problems of the North-East Frontier. Whatever our schemes may be, they depend, even more in the frontier than elsewhere, on the human material and on the official element. In Manipur, practically nothing has been done so far about development, because there are no competent officers. We can and should send two or three competent men to Manipur.

7. But the real question is of building up a cadre, specially selected and specially trained. Also of giving some measure of training to the local people locally for subordinate types of work. It is essential that we should make them feel that the responsibility is going to be cast more and more upon them and that they are partners in the work that we undertake.

8. I think that Mr Verrier Elwin⁵ could be of great help to us because of his wide knowledge and experience and his human sympathy for these tribal folk. Whether he is available or not, I do not know. Nor is it quite clear to me in what capacity we could use him. But I have little doubt that he can be of great help to us.

9. For the present, I am having Shri T.N. Kaul's preliminary note on the problems of the tribal areas, together with this note, circulated among members of the Cabinet, the Governor of Assam, the Chief Minister of Assam, the Chief Commissioners of Manipur and Tripura and the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Shri T.N. Kaul proposes to send a detailed note on the problems of each area later.

10. After some little time we might have a small conference of some of the Ministers especially concerned to discuss generally the broad outlines of our approach.

4. L.M. Shrikant.

5. An eminent British anthropologist who worked among tribals in Central and North-East India, took up Indian citizenship and was later appointed Adviser, Tribal Affairs, NEFA, 1954.

9. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
May 6, 1953

My dear Medhi,

I have been repeatedly asked, whenever I go to Assam, to arrange to send an expert in agriculture to advise regarding an alternative for *jhum* cultivation. Accordingly, I have been pressing the Ministry of Agriculture to send such an expert.

I am now told that a proposal was made to send an FAO expert on *jhum* cultivation, but that your Government was not anxious to have him. Also that the Inspector-General of Forests visited Assam in 1951 and made some suggestions. If you are really anxious that this matter should be taken in hand, something should be done speedily and our proposal is that a team should go there, consisting of a senior forest officer, an agricultural expert and the FAO expert.

As for horticulture, it has been found that air-lifting of fruit is difficult and very expensive. I understand that the Food Ministry are sending you two experts to help to evolve plans for setting up moderate sized units for grading and juice extraction.

The question of reduction of freight rates has also been taken up.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

10. To Jairamdas Doulatram¹

New Delhi
May 8, 1953

My dear Jairamdas,

Your letter of April 30th about the missionaries.

There is no harm in your giving a statement of your talk to missionaries or to the Naga leaders, as the case may be. My point was that you should not

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Secretary-General, N.R. Pillai.

give them a formal document, but you can always give a kind of unsigned aide-memoire of a conversation. Therefore, if the missionaries want this, you can give them a gist of your talk with them on the first occasion.

I have heard that some of the missionaries have pointed out that you want them to indulge in political activities on behalf of Government. That, of course, is not true. We do not want them to indulge in any political activities. What we object to is their exercising their influence against governmental policies. In the Naga Hills the missionaries' position is very special and we cannot tolerate any foreign missionaries utilising that position to the disadvantage of Government policies. The instance you gave about a circular letter issued to the churches in the Naga district was relevant.² It is inconceivable to me that local pastors or the like can issue such a letter unless the senior foreign missionaries create an atmosphere favourable to this type of activity.

Dr Katju's recent statement in Parliament³ about missionaries has created some consternation among missionaries in India, as well as, to some extent, abroad. Today I received a telegram from Ottawa making inquiries about this.⁴ I enclose a copy of my reply to our High Commissioner there.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Earlier during Nehru's visit, it was reported that some Naga leaders had issued a circular letter to various churches asking them to observe 5 April 1953 as the Naga independence day.
3. Replying to a question in the House of the People on 21 April 1953, K.N. Katju had stated that foreign missionaries in the country engaged in social welfare, medical and educational fields were welcome, but if they indulged in proselytization, inter-communal strife, and anti-national activities they would not be welcome. He stated that Government had received complaints from Sarguja, Chattisgarh, Bilaspur and Raigarh districts that monetary temptations were given to the villagers to accept Christianity and further that their temples were being turned into churches.
4. R.R. Saxena, the Indian High Commissioner to Canada had reported that Katju's statement had stirred considerable public opinion abroad. Most of the religious organizations were worried that their long-standing missionary activities in India would be curtailed. He sought an immediate clarification from the Foreign Secretary whether there was any change in Government's policy of "strict religious neutrality" since such an impression was afloat in Canada.

11. Cable to R.R. Saxena¹

Your telegram of May 7th about Dr Katju's statement regarding missionaries?² There is no departure from our policy of strict religious neutrality. But we have had to deal with cases of missionaries encouraging separatist and anti-national tendencies.³ In some cases in our border areas, we have suspected even intelligence work done under the guise of Mission activities. We welcome foreign missionaries for specific social welfare activities. But those who come here for purely proselytizing purposes usually run down our religious and cultural traditions resulting sometimes in bitterness and even conflict. During past few years a very large number of missionaries have come from abroad to India and this has created difficulties for us in many places. Unless we check this inflow of foreigners, we may have to face still further difficulties in future. This has nothing to do with religion as such. In any event, followers of all religions in India have complete freedom.

1. New Delhi, 8 May 1953. File No.5(103) P.V.II/53, MEA.
2. In his telegram to R.K. Nehru, Saxena had observed that Katju's statement in Parliament disturbed religious bodies who feared that the activities carried on by their missionaries for many years be stopped or curtailed, while others read in the statement, a departure from India's policy of strict religious neutrality.
3. Saxena asked if the intention was not to restrict entry of missionaries or to interfere with their welfare activities provided they did not promote inter-communal strife or separatist tendencies.

12. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

Camp: Srinagar
May 23, 1953

My dear Medhi,

Thank you for your long letter of May 14th.² I have read this with great

1. JN Collection.
2. Bisnuram Medhi wrote that some observations and inferences in T.N. Kaul's note appeared to be based on "inadequate appreciation of the local conditions and the facts of geography and history." He concluded that the only logical development of the area would be "the progressive assimilation of these areas in the State of Assam, after they are properly developed."

interest. This letter deals with so many matters affecting the tribal areas that I cannot discuss them here at this stage. These questions of the tribal areas all over India, and more especially in the North-East, have attracted me greatly and I am intensely interested both from the national and international points of view. It must always be remembered that the North-East Frontier has now become one of our principal frontiers and we can never forget the international aspect of it.

It is my intention to have these questions of the North-East Frontier and the tribal areas discussed in our Cabinet fully, without coming to any decisions. A general discussion will clear the air and then I shall write to you more fully on this subject. Obviously the views of the Assam Government will have the greatest importance for us on these matters.

For one thing, I am quite clear that all this area is *sui generis* and has to be considered from various special points of views.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. To Jairamdas Doulatram¹

New Delhi
26th May, 1953

My dear Jairamdas,

We had a discussion in Cabinet today about the North-East Frontier Agency. We did not come to any final decision, but we did record our views in regard to many matters and have asked the Ministries concerned to put up more detailed proposals in regard to them in consultation with you. You will hear from External Affairs about it.

Among other things, we feel that it will be desirable to appoint a Commissioner for the area who would function under you and with your advice. He would have executive authority and can coordinate activities.

We were clearly of opinion that the NEF Agency should be treated in a rather special way having regard to its special problems. We shall investigate the building up of a specially trained cadre.

Although this Agency is your particular concern, I think that the Assam Government should be kept in touch with the schemes we are making and

1. JN Collection.

their advice taken. Some of these schemes, although not directly affecting the Assam Government or the autonomous areas, may indirectly affect them. Anyhow, they can profit by them.

As I have said above, nothing has been finally decided. But we have set the wheels in motion so that by the time I come back from Europe, these matters will be ripe for decision.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Medhi.

As you know, I am on the point of going away to Europe.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

14. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
June 30, 1953

My dear Medhi,

Thank you for your letter of the 25th June. As some of the matters in it relate to other Ministries, I am sending extracts from your letter to them.

I am interested to learn from your letter about the new attitude of the Naga leaders, which is a little more friendly. You say that they have suggested an amnesty for all leaders wanted on criminal charges. I do not know what these criminal charges are. But if they are not serious, it may be worthwhile considering giving them amnesty or, at any rate, giving an amnesty to all except very serious cases. This of course can only be done when they surrender themselves. It is for you to judge the proper moment. It may well be that such an action will strengthen your position in the Naga areas.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

CONGRESS PARTY AFFAIRS

I. PARTY DISCIPLINE

1. To Harekrushna Mahtab¹

New Delhi
11th May, 1953

My dear Mahtab,

I was not present in the House of the people today when Balkrishna Sharma² spoke on the Vindhya Pradesh Bill.³ When I went there subsequently, I was informed by Dr Katju and others that Balkrishna Sharma had not only opposed the Bill but had done so in a highly objectionable manner.

Normally, of course, Government Bills should not be opposed by Members of the Party unless that freedom has been accorded to them in special matters. In this particular Bill a whip had been issued that Members should support the Bill. The Bill had also been considered at a Party meeting some days ago when Balkrishna Sharma had raised some objections to it, which had been answered.

Balkrishna's speech, therefore, appears to be the clearest defiance of the Party whip and party discipline. He did not even choose to inform the leader or any of the Whips as to his intention to speak in this way. It was open to him to raise the matter before the Executive Committee or the Party or at least the Leader. He did nothing of the kind and suddenly got up and opposed this Bill, condemning it tooth and nail as the death of democracy.

This is a serious matter. I spoke to Malliah⁴ and I think Barooah⁵ about it and told them that notice should issue immediately to Balkrishna Sharma to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him because of his patent breach of discipline.

1. JN Collection.
2. A Congressman and member of, UPPCC, AICC and House of the People and a Hindi poet.
3. In his letter to Balkrishna Sharma of 12 May 1953, H.K. Mahtab asked him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him because of his defiance of the rules and conventions of the Congress Party, in condemning the Vindhya Pradesh Bill outright in a manner highly detrimental to Party discipline inspite of a whip specially issued for the purpose. Mahtab also asked Sharma to explain his conduct personally to the Executive Committee on 13 May.
4. U.S. Malliah, General Secretary, AICC.
5. D.K. Barooah (1904-1996); participated in the freedom movement and was imprisoned in 1930, 1941 and 1942; Secretary, Assam PCC, 1938-45; editor, *Dainik Assamiya* and *Netun Assamiya*, 1947-50; Member, Constituent Assembly, 1949-51, House of the People, 1952-57 and 1977-79, and Assam Legislative Assembly, 1957-72; Minister of Education and Cooperation, Government of Assam, 1962-66; Governor of Bihar, 1971 to 4 February 1973; Union Minister of Petroleum and Chemicals, 1973-74; Member, Council of States, July 1973-77; President, Indian National Congress 1974-77 and trustee, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1976 to 1996.

I had not seen the speech then but had only reports of it. I have now read the speech and there can be no doubt that this speech is a patent and serious breach of the discipline of the Party. Will you please, therefore, have notice issued to Balkrishna Sharma to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him because of defiance not only of the rules and conventions of the Party but of a whip specially issued for the purpose for he opposed the Bill in the House of the People and further did so in language which was unbecoming.

This matter should be expedited.

There is a meeting of the Party on the 13th at 5.30 p.m. I suggest that a meeting of the Executive Committee be held earlier, say at 5 p.m. to consider this matter and that Balkrishna Sharma should be invited to it.⁶

I am sending you the report of the speech of Balkrishna Sharma.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. In his reply to Mahtab the same day, Sharma wrote: "I honestly consider the Bill to be a shameless Bill. It is a step towards putting an end ultimately to Democracy in Asia. The Bill was not even "thoroughly discussed" in the Party. I will vote against Bill. I will tender resignation from Parliament afterwards."

2. To Syed Ahmed¹

New Delhi
May 17, 1953

My dear Syed Ahmed,

The following message appears in a PTI despatch from Delhi dated May 15:

Speakers at a public meeting, including Mr Hiren Mookerjee, Communist MP, and Mr Syed Ahmed, Congress MP, today protested against the forthcoming visit to India of Mr John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State.² The meeting, held under the auspices of the Communist Party, adopted a resolution expressing its profound indignation at Mr Dulles visit etc.

1. JN Collection.

2. Syed Ahmed was reported to have said that Dulles was an unwelcome guest in India and at a time when the world was going through a critical phase there was no need for US 'gangster politics' in India.

I am greatly surprised to read this. First of all, it is surprising for a Congress MP to appear on a common platform of this kind and at a meeting organised by the Communist Party. Secondly, it is very odd for a Congress MP to protest publicly against the visit of a very high official of the US Government, who is coming here as the Government of India's guest.

It seems to me completely wrong for even the Communist Party to oppose such a visit. A visit does not signify agreement. If this opposition is correct, then there can be no meeting at all between representatives of different countries and even the talk about a Big Power conference is foolish. But Communists can do what they like. Why should a Congress MP indulge in this manifestly foolish behaviour, more especially when the person concerned is our guest in India?

I should like to know what the facts are and what induced you to act in this manner as you are reported to have done.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To Syed Ahmed¹

New Delhi
May 21, 1953

My dear Syed Ahmed,

Your letter of the 20th.² I am rather surprised to read it, I would not say that in no circumstances should Congressmen join on a common platform with Communists. There may be such circumstances, though they will have to be very carefully considered. But to go to a communist-sponsored meeting on a political subject, does not mean a common platform. It is something much more.

1. File No. G-11/1953, AICC Papers, NMML. Copy was sent to General Secretary, AICC.
2. Syed Ahmed admitted of having addressed such a meeting organised by the Communists at Delhi assuming that on some matters, sharing of common platform with the Communists was not objectionable. After receiving Nehru's letter he had realised his mistake.

As for the Friends of New Kashmir Committee,³ I know nothing about it and, though it may be doing some good work, I am not prepared to take responsibility for all its activities.

But what has amazed me is that you should consider a protest meeting for Dulles' visit a suitable occasion for a common platform. I cannot conceive of any understanding person objecting to the visit of a Minister or the like of one State to meet a Minister of another State to discuss matters. In fact even the Communists have been shouting for what they call big power talks. If they object to Dulles coming here to talk to me, they also object necessarily to any talks in which Dulles comes in or the US. The whole conception is fantastic to me and only a communist mind could have conceived of this illogicality. It is totally immaterial what policy Dulles pursues. Either we break relations with America and have nothing to do with it or we discuss matters with them either in India or elsewhere.

Apart from this, it was well-known that Dulles was the guest of the Government of India, as indeed all high officers of Foreign States are. I entertain him to dinner and otherwise we show all courtesy to him as we do to others. For Congressmen to join an anti-Dulles crusade is not only to exhibit political ignorance and active discourtesy to the person coming but is to protest against their own Government.

I am sure you did not realise all this, but the matter is serious.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Ahmed had cited that for some time both Congressmen and Communists had been working together on forums such as the Friends of New Kashmir Committee. This Committee was started by Mridula Sarabhai on 10 December 1952 at Delhi to counter the communalist propaganda against the Kashmir Government and Abdullah, enlisting support of all non-communal political forces. The founding members of the Committee were Subhadra Joshi, Shah Nawaz Khan, Amar Nath Chawla, Vishwa Bandhu Gupta, Sikandar Bakht, Shiv Charan Gupta, A.P. Dube, B.P.L. Bedi, M. Farooqi, Brij Mohan Toofan, H.K.L. Bhagat, O.P. Bahel, Shakil Ahmed and Anees Kidwai. The Committee had set up branches at Pathankot, Amritsar and Jalandhar.

II. BIHAR

1. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
May 5, 1953

My dear Sri Babu,

I returned to Delhi yesterday from Maharashtra. The news of Prajapati Mishra's death² grieved me. The poor man had been ill for a very long time and suffered from a number of diseases. Perhaps it was difficult for him to recover. Nevertheless, the death of an old colleague is always sad.

I have had a brief talk with Khandubhai Desai. He has told me about the enquiry work done by Badri Babu³ and others. This is over now and I hope to have Badri Babu's report soon.⁴ Khandubhai has come back greatly impressed by the real strength of the Congress position in Bihar and of the fine lot of workers you have there. The only weakness is when those workers work against each other. Otherwise, he assures me, that Bihar would be one of the leading Provinces in India from the Congress point of view. I am very happy to learn this. Indeed, I knew it. It is up to us now to pull ourselves together and go ahead. In this matter, naturally, you will have to play the leading part.

Khandubhai suggests that I should go to Bihar for a couple of days. I shall gladly do so, but I fear I cannot go there this month. That will have to wait for my return from Europe. But I should certainly like to go there for two or three days, later.

About a month or so ago, Jayaprakash Narayan came to see me. In the course of his talk with me, he mentioned that Kripalaniji was likely to stand for election from Purnea. He suggested that Congress might not oppose him. I did not give him any reply at that time. But the matter has remained in my mind. Yesterday, Maulana Azad told me that Sucheta Kripalani had been to him and made the same proposal. So have some others.

In this matter I would normally hesitate to come in the way of the discretion of the Pradesh Congress Committee. I have no idea of what your

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Balvantray Mehta.
2. Member, Bihar Legislative Assembly and President, Bihar PCC, died on 4 May 1953.
3. Badri Nath Verma (1889-1972); educationist; organised Bihar Provincial Seva Samiti, 1918; chief organiser, Bihar Vidyapith (National University), 1921; became its Registrar, 1930; President, Patna DCC, 1930-31; Editor, *Desh* (Hindi weekly) and Joint Editor *Searchlight*, 1930-42; Education Minister, Bihar, 1946-56.
4. See the next item.

PCC thinks about it. But taking a larger view, it seems to me that it would be a good thing for us not to oppose Kripalaniji. This will create a good impression about our broadness of outlook and will really strengthen us. Maulana Azad feels the same way. Therefore, yesterday we told Balvantray Mehta to send this recommendation of ours to you and the Pradesh Congress Committee.

This is apparently a double seat, one of them being meant for a Scheduled Caste candidate. It is clear that we should run our own Harijan candidate in any event. There is no question of our withdrawing our Harijan candidate in favour of any one else. The proper thing would be for the Praja Socialist Party to withdraw their Harijan candidate and thus have probably an uncontested election for the two.

I have been wanting to put you formally in the Congress Working Committee. I thought that the appropriate time for this would be after Badri Babu and Khandubhai Desai had finished their work. I hope, therefore, to take this step after the next Working Committee meeting when I hope to meet you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Report on Bihar PCC¹

I have read Shri Khandubhai Desai's report on Bihar.² I am returning it to you. It should be circulated among Members of the Working Committee when they come here.³

I presume the report of Shri Badri Nath Varma will also be received. This should also be circulated.

Will you please convey to Shri Khandubhai Desai, Shri Badri Prasad

1. Note to Shriman Narayan Agarwal, General Secretary, AICC, 11 May 1953. File No.P-4(A)/1953-54. AICC Papers, NMML.
2. Enquiring into the alleged enrolment of bogus members on the eve of election of Congress delegates in November 1952, Desai discovered that out of a total of 24 lakh members about 10 lakh were bogus and thus almost 50% of the elections could be declared void. The responsibility lay at the doors of the two factions in the Bihar Congress led by Sri Krishna Sinha and Anugraha Narayan Sinha.
3. The Congress Working Committee considered Desai's report on 16 and 17 May 1953.

Varma and all others appointed to help in this enquiry, whether by the Bihar PCC or the AICC, our thanks for their labours?

At the end of Shri Khandubhai's report, there is a reference to certain trusts and he has suggested that an inventory should be prepared for all these properties.⁴ You might write to the Bihar PCC suggesting that this might be done and reported to us.

4. During the enquiry Desai found out that assets in the form of buildings, land or cash, held by individual Congressmen or trusts, were not properly audited and often used for purposes other than that of the organisation.

3. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
May 12, 1953

My dear Sri Babu,

The death of Prajapati Mishra raises the question of a new election for the Pradesh Congress Committee. I think this offers an opportunity for so arranging matters for the future as to have harmonious working in the Congress. Khandubhai Desai's report, which you have seen probably or will see soon, makes it clear that the Congress in Bihar is fortunate in having more village level workers than in any part of India. From that point of view it is our strongest province. Unfortunately, these workers themselves have become ineffective because of mutual conflicts. Khandubhai says that there is a very strong desire all round to put an end to these conflicts and pull together. If this is done, Bihar will go ahead fast in every direction.

You are the undoubted leader of Bihar and I am quite sure that if you exercise your influence in this direction, it will yield fruit. If the new President of the Bihar PCC is one commanding general confidence and is approved of by you, this would be a very good step which can be followed up later.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To Anugraha Narayan Sinha¹

New Delhi
May 22, 1953

My dear Anugraha Babu,

For a long time past I have been inviting you and Sri Babu to the Working Committee. I would have liked to have a full Member of the Working Committee from Bihar, but, because of Congress election enquiries I thought I ought to wait till these were over. Now that these are over, I have decided to invite Sri Babu to become a full Member of the Working Committee. There are at present two vacancies; one will be filled by Sri Babu and the other by Dev Kanta Barooah, who is our MP from Assam and who has done very good work.

I hope, however, that you will continue to attend the meetings of the Working Committee as our invited guest. We have to consider big problems in the future, both political and economic, and we want the assistance of all our senior men.

Owing to Prajapati Mishra's death, there is a vacancy in the Presidentship of the Bihar PCC. This will no doubt be filled in the ordinary course. I hope that, in filling it, someone who commands the widest confidence among Congressmen will be chosen. Meanwhile, the Bihar PCC has got to face fresh Congress elections on account of the decision of the Working Committee after the enquiry. It should have some head to organise this and be responsible. I think it will be a good thing if Badri Babu, who conducted the enquiry could be made the temporary President of the PCC. I know that this is rather against the rules we have ourselves laid down of Ministers being office-bearers of the PCC. But we have made exceptions temporarily and I think that, in the circumstances of Bihar and the elections, it will be eminently suitable to make an exception in this case and invite Badri Babu to be the temporary President.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No.P-4, 1953-54, AICC Papers, NMML.

III. PUNJAB

1. To Satyapal¹

New Delhi
April 15, 1953

My dear Satyapal,²

For some time past I have been receiving information to the effect that some Congress Members of the Punjab Assembly are forming a faction against the present Government.³ This was bad enough. But I was astonished to learn that this faction had held a meeting at your house on the 8th April 1953 where certain decisions were taken.

As you well know, faction has been the bane of the Congress, as of other parties, in the Punjab, both undivided and divided. If we have to learn one lesson, it is this: that we cannot afford faction. Apart from this general rule, for a Speaker to be a party to it, is completely wrong.

You will remember that when we had a talk last year, I referred to the necessity of avoidance of faction. It is a matter of distress for me that this kind of thing is beginning again in the Punjab. I would sooner wind up the Congress organisation than permit this to grow.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Bhimsen Sachar Papers, NMML. A similar letter was sent to Shri Ram Sharma.
2. Speaker, Punjab Legislative Assembly.
3. Bhimsen Sachar, the Punjab Chief Minister, had forwarded an intelligence report that twenty-five Congress legislators led by Shri Ram Sharma, Kidar Nath Saigal, Bibi Shanno Devi and Maulvi Abdul Ghani, had met at the Speaker's residence on 8 April 1953, for the purpose of bringing about a change in the existing ministerial set up.

2. To Bhimsen Sachar¹

New Delhi
April 21, 1953

My dear Sachar,

You will remember my writing to Dr Satyapal and Shri Ram Sharma. This was on the basis of what you told me and the secret report that you showed

1. Bhimsen Sachar Papers, NMML.

me. Now I have received replies from both of them² denying absolutely and categorically the contents of that secret report and their having been any kind of a meeting mentioned there. I must accept this denial. As for the general issue, I have no doubt that what I wrote to them will produce a marked impression.

This raises another issue and that is that of the veracity of the secret reports you get from your Intelligence. The other day I received such a report in which reference was made to some secret meetings of the Peace Committee at which Dr M. Atal was supposed to have spoken. On the face of it, this report seemed to me false and I could not possibly conceive of Atal having said what he was alleged to have said.

I think that you should check up these matters with your Intelligence people. If their reports are so absolutely wrong, then something has got to be done about it.

I gather that you are coming to Delhi.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. On 16 April Satyapal wrote that every word of that report was false and categorically denied having attended any meeting to topple the present Ministry.

IV. RELATIONS WITH SOCIALISTS

1. To J.B. Kripalani¹

New Delhi
May 6, 1953

My dear Jivat,

I received your letter of the 6th May this afternoon.² I saw the statement you refer to in this morning's papers. I had not seen it previously. I do not think

1. File No.P.E.C.-3/1953, AICC Papers, NMML. Copies of this letter were sent to Balvantray Mehta and Abul Kalam Azad along with a copy of Kripalani's letter.
2. Kripalani was upset by a press statement of Balvantray Mehta, announcing withdrawal of candidature of the Congress nominee from the Bhagalpur-cum-Purnea Parliamentary by-elections so as to let Kripalani get elected uncontested. Further, the statement mentioned the margin by which the Congress nominee had defeated his Socialist opponent in the last elections and that the Congress Parliamentary Board had taken this decision at the behest of a senior Socialist leader.

that Balvantray Mehta had the slightest wish, to embarrass you in any way. The statement might have been perhaps worded differently. He had to think of dealing with the Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee to whom our advice and recommendation had been sent.

When Jayaprakash came to see me some weeks ago, he did mention this matter to me and suggested that it would be desirable for the Congress not to contest this seat. The matter came up before us two days ago, on my return from my Maharashtra tour. Maulana mentioned that Sucheta had seen him about this and written to him also. Both Maulana and I as well as Balvantray Mehta agreed that we should welcome your presence in Parliament and that the Congress should not put up any candidate to oppose you. We decided to give this advice to the Bihar PCC. The General Secretary, Balvantray Mehta, was requested to take the necessary steps. Thereupon he wrote to the Bihar PCC and issued the statement to which you refer.

I agree with you entirely that every matter should be handled with tact and grace.³ Sometimes it is more important how a thing is done than what is done. Perhaps you are taking an unnecessarily hard view of Balvantray Mehta's statement. Although Jayaprakash had spoken to me about the matter, I did not want his name to be dragged in or indeed any name and I had mentioned this matter to Balvantray.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. "A graceless act is worse than a wrong act, because it is ugly," wrote Kripalani, urging Nehru to tell Mehta to handle such delicate matters more gracefully,

2. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

New Delhi
May 10, 1953

My dear Jayaprakash,

Thank you for your letter of the 6th May.²

I am sorry for the misunderstanding and mess made about Kripalani's

1. Jayaprakash Narayan Papers, NMML.
2. Jayaprakash Narayan wrote that he was happy to read in the papers that the Congress had decided not to contest Kripalani's seat. But the graciousness of the gesture was wholly destroyed by Balvantray Mehta's statement that a PSP leader had requested that Kripalani be allowed to win uncontested.

candidature. I did not see Balvantray's statement before it was issued. I am sure he did not mean any ill, but he was trying to convince the Bihar people. However there it is.

I do not know if you saw a statement issued by some official of the Praja Socialist Party from Patna. This was, if I may say so, very offensive.

Now a new difficulty has arisen, in spite of all that has happened, Congress is not running a candidate against Kripalani. But this is a double seat, one of them being meant for Harijans. Harijans are contesting the other seat, one Congress and one Praja Socialist. The result is that there is a contest anyhow.

You refer to the Vindhya Pradesh MLA matter.⁴ You have no doubt judged of this from certain rather superficial facts. We have gone very deeply into this matter and consulted the best authorities we could. There is no question of our by-passing the Election Commission or the President.⁵ It is rather accepting their decision that we have proceeded. There are exact parallels to this in British practice which we normally follow. I know that, *prima facie*, this looks odd, but people forget that Vindhya Pradesh, as a Part C State, is governed by somewhat different laws than the other States.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

4. Jayaprakash had written that if an ordinance or Act of Parliament sets aside the decision of the Election Commission, disqualifying 12 MLAs of the Vindhya Pradesh Assembly for holding "office of profit", then both the rule of law and the Election Commission "would be brought into derision". He suggested that it was better to go through the by-elections than take recourse to "what would be described as a subterfuge to protect partisan interests."
5. In April 1952, the Vindhya Pradesh Government had constituted District Advisory Councils in which local MLAs and officials were members. The MLAs were allowed travelling and daily allowances for attending meetings of the Council. On 30 October 1952, the President of India received a representation from an MLA that membership of DAC constituted an office of profit, hence those MLAs who were members should be disqualified. The President referred the matter to the Election Commission on 14 January 1953. On 2 March, the Commission held 12 MLAs to be disqualified. The President was bound by the Commission's advice under section 17 of Government of India Part C States Act, 1951. At this juncture the Parliament intervened and a Bill amending this particular section of the Act, was adopted on 13 May 1953.

V. GENERAL

1. To Khubchand Sodhia¹

New Delhi
May 10, 1953

Dear Khubchandji,²

I have your letter of the 9th May. In this you advise me to leave the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and devote myself to the coordination of the work of other Ministries. In this matter you will permit me to judge my responsibilities. If you will point out to me exactly what you think is wrong and which can be remedied, I might look into the matter.

Your other point about the amendments of Congress MPs, has been considered repeatedly and a procedure laid down. You can discuss this with Shri Mahtab³ or Shri Satya Narayan Sinha. You might also discuss your point No. 3 with them.

If you will compare the problems of MPs here with MPs in other countries, you will find that some difficulties arise and that in fact we have tried to meet them, perhaps, somewhat more effectively here. There are difficulties of course, as it is not possible for hundreds of persons to participate in the day-to-day activities of Parliament.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Harekrushna Mahtab.
2. Congress MP from Sagar, Madhya Pradesh.
3. Secretary, Congress Parliamentary Party.

2. To Shriman Narayan¹

New Delhi
May 23, 1953

My dear Shriman,

I have rather rapidly read through your pamphlet on the *Constructive Programme*.² There are some parts which I would have preferred to have

1. Shriman Narayan: *Letters from Gandhi Nehru Vinoba*, pp. 37-38.
2. In a letter of 13 May, Shriman Narayan had requested Nehru to write a foreword to *Constructive Programme for Congress* which was to be published by the AICC as a guide for the Congress workers.

been worded somewhat differently. But I cannot go into these matters now.

The part dealing with *Goseva*, however, does seem to me to require redrafting, more especially because of the agitation for banning cow-slaughter which certain communal organisations have been carrying on. What you have written might be utilised to support this agitation. As a matter of fact, we have discouraged this agitation and only recently the Bombay State Assembly rejected a Bill brought by the Opposition on this subject. The whole question cannot be approached in a negative way. I think that the finest achievement in this respect is that of the Bombay Government who have put up the Aaray Colony.

I do not know how far it is true that we do not care to patronise the products of the cow. People do not patronise them because they cannot afford them. There are vast numbers of people who would like to have cow's milk if they could afford it. For my part, I am entirely opposed to a complete ban of cow-slaughter, it is quite another thing to ban or prohibit the slaughter of milch cattle. It may also be possible for some States to go further, but any all-India measure of this kind, in a country so varied as India and with such entirely different customs, will immediately lead to trouble. Also, I repeat that the negative approach cannot be undertaken by itself and unless positive steps are taken at the same time.

I would have liked the prohibition chapter also to be somewhat differently worded. It is right to say that the loss of revenue should not be an argument. A social evil has to be prevented. The question is what is the best method of preventing it. It is obviously not a good method when it fails in its purpose by encouraging too much illicit distillation. We should approach the problem with the intention of giving effect to prohibition. But we should consider effective ways and means of doing so. Much experience has been gathered during the last few years and we can profit by it. I believe the Planning Commission intends appointing a Committee for this purpose.³ But again, I do not think prohibition is at all feasible in the tribal areas of the North-East.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The Planning Commission subsequently appointed a Committee with Shriman Narayan Agarwal as its Chairman.

3. The Congress and the Nation¹

I agreed to meet all of you because I am going abroad in two or three days. I shall be away for about a month. I do not have anything of special importance to share with you. Yet I wanted to have a farewell in meeting of this kind. I had gone to Kashmir for a couple of days. I had no particular work there. I had gone to get some work done in peace, some paper work which I had taken with me because I do not find the time here. We are so bogged down in our problems. Delhi has lots of problems. Every problem must be looked at in a broader perspective. You read about the whole world in the papers. India is being drawn more and more into international issues. Our responsibilities are growing. It is a good thing that India's stature in the world is growing. But the burden of responsibilities also becomes increasingly heavier. These responsibilities also create many problems.

There are many critics of our foreign policy, whether rightly or wrongly. Most people are in favour of our foreign policy but there are many critics too. But the fact of the matter is that it has succeeded so well that sometimes it is a little frightening because success brings responsibilities in its wake. Why has it succeeded? Partly because there are some things which are absolutely right. But even being right does not always lead to success unless other factors contribute. That is, it could not have succeeded until the world had begun to realize that India is a growing power, that its influence is growing, that India is growing strong within and outside too. We have no military might and obviously we are not very rich either. So where does our strength lie? The world realizes that the views that we express are based on our own intrinsic beliefs, that it is our honest opinion and not dictated by outside pressures. Therefore there is growing respect for us. People consult India's representatives at the UN and other organizations about our views. India occupies a very high position in the world community.

Secondly, the world has seen that in spite of innumerable difficulties we are gradually laying the foundations of a new India. The time in Asia is not very favourable. I do not wish to make invidious comparisons. But you can see that India is forging ahead. I agree that we must move faster. But other countries, far from going ahead, are sliding back. You have seen what has happened in Pakistan in the last two or three years, what difficulties it is facing, economic and political. They have yet to draft a constitution though

1. Speech at a gathering of the workers of the Congress Party in the Prime Minister's House, New Delhi, 25 May 1953. From *Sahi Rasta* (published by Friends of New Kashmir Committee), Mahakoshal PCC Papers, NMML, Original in Hindi.

five or six years have gone by, nor is there any likelihood of their getting one in the near future. By contrast, the world is impressed at the way we are going ahead.

We have our Five Year Plan. You are free to criticize it. I have no objection. We have drawn up the Plan after much careful deliberation and it is open to changes. It is not a rigid document but merely a basis for our thinking and working. You do not see anything like this anywhere else. Therefore India is growing in stature and with that come responsibilities. The two warring factions in Korea look to us to aid them in reaching a settlement. You may remember that a few months ago we had put up a resolution about the Korean issue in the UN. It was accepted by everyone except China and the Soviet Union. So it could not be implemented. Three months later, they are coming back to the same thing. The new resolution is very close to our previous resolution. So these things also make an impact.

We must realize this and look at India's problems in the perspective of the outside world. Three days from today I shall be in Egypt. I am not stopping there. The plane halts for an hour there. General Nasser will meet me on the plane at one o'clock at night. He has sent a message. I shall be very happy to meet him and shall talk to him for as long as I can. I may stop in Egypt for a couple of days on my way back. The problem of Egypt has also become extremely complex and there is apprehension that war may break out. Strange upheavals are taking place in other parts of Africa as well, which affect us too. The Blacks of Africa who are facing tremendous difficulties look to India for sympathy and help.

So at a time when our responsibilities are growing we too must grow in stature. Otherwise we shall be submerged. Small minds cannot achieve big things. When the intellect grows, a nation grows. A nation grows in stature by engaging in big tasks. India's stature is not dependent on its huge population. Our population was large even earlier but we were under British rule.

When I observe the antics of some people in the country, let alone the right or wrong of it, I am amazed at their petty-mindedness. On the one hand we are being forced to play a major role in world affairs, though that is not our desire. It has been my wish that India should not get bogged down in the major issues of the world before we have had a chance to put our own house in order. Once the country is on an even keel then we could take on other burdens. Therefore I had no desire to get involved in these matters. But then it is not a question of my wishes alone. When a large country like ours becomes free, responsibilities automatically come to it. There is no escape from them. But what amazes me is that there are narrow-minded people in our country who raise such petty issues that have no bearing on the country's progress and development, neither political nor economic. They are merely out to create obstruction.

For the last few months we have been facing a Jan Sangh movement in Delhi. I have referred to it in many public meetings and also in Parliament. I cannot imagine a more narrow-minded attitude. It can mean only one of two things. Either the people who are behind the movement do not understand anything or they follow rules which have nothing to do with any logic. After all anyone can understand that such things have a pernicious effect. Even from their own point of view, it will have an adverse impact. But it is strange that people should indulge in acts which harm the country. However, one good thing is that the people of Delhi opposed it tooth and nail. Everyone knows that the persons heading the movement are getting people from outside Delhi to participate in it by paying them. This is wholly detrimental and at the same time artificial. This is a poison which can vitiate India's body politic. It is a sign of a narrow mind which has gone wrong. We must combat it.

As a Government we have no interest in telling people what to do. We have so much else to do. But when something like this happens, it is but natural that we should face the challenge. The public can put a stop to it very speedily. I want all of you to understand this and face the challenge and do it calmly, not in an excited way. You must spread the word in your neighbourhood as to how pointless this entire movement is. Here is one example of how the communal mind works. I am convinced that if unfortunately their psychology works and they succeed in getting power into their hands, they will most certainly ruin India. You can gather from the news from abroad that all this is earning India a bad name, all because of the Jan Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha. People abroad cannot understand what these people are doing. There are parties of different hues in other countries with their own bearings. In England, for instance, you have the Labour Party and the Conservative Party. Similarly there are different parties in other countries too. But there are no communal parties anywhere as we do in India except in Pakistan of course where they are even more fanatical. But people abroad cannot understand this. It is a sign of a nation's backwardness because only a backward mind can think of such things.

India is a very large country. Our size is our strength as well as weakness. It is a weakness because in a vast country like ours, there are good people as well as bad. Even the slightest wavering on our part can give the wrong signal. Therefore we have to remain vigilant and combat this. There is a special responsibility as far as the citizens of Delhi are concerned because apart from being a big city Delhi is India's Capital. The eyes of the world are upon Delhi. News filters out. Therefore the people of Delhi must be specially vigilant. Everyone can participate in this task but it is obvious that the real responsibility rests with the Congress. I have no objection if others want to help the Congress.

As I said earlier, there is an old debate about why the Congress should continue to function. You must understand that there is a need for the Congress. Leave aside the fact that the Congress committees do not function efficiently everywhere. We will go into all that separately. But the basic question is: why should the Congress continue?

About 70 years ago, the Congress took up the task of winning freedom for India and finally succeeded. The Congress occupies a place of honour in the history of India and it will have a place in the history of the world too. So you must understand what is at stake because I find that people get involved in petty matters forgetting the bigger issues. The country needs the Congress inspite of its shortcomings, then it is a different matter that we have to cleanse the Congress. But it would be absurd to think that the Congress can be dispensed with. There is no other party which can take the place of the Congress. It is only the Congress which can keep the country together at this critical juncture when we have just won freedom and lead it on the path of progress. I agree that the speed with which the Congress is moving is not fast enough. We must increase our pace.

The most important item on our agenda is to control the fissiparous tendencies which threaten to break up the nation. The foundation must be strong. Otherwise we shall see a repetition of what is happening in Pakistan and elsewhere, wrangling and rowdyism. I do not wish to say anything against other parties—each one has some good or bad points. I shall of course say one thing; the communal parties have a fundamentally wrong approach to issues, an approach which will divide the nation. The Congress has many responsibilities still to fulfil. I do not know what may happen fifteen or twenty years hence. That remains to be seen. At the moment I feel it is essential that the Congress should try to check the divisive forces—communalism, regionalism, casteism, etc. There are so many of them.

I want all of you to consider what has been happening in Delhi. You must make them understand that it cannot possibly do any good. Communalism is fundamentally wrong and will retard India's progress; if it succeeds India will fail. We must remain vigilant and guard against such tendencies. We have to pay a price for our freedom, our Constitution. We have an excellent Constitution but it also creates many problems. Matters are delayed, people go to the High Court, the Supreme Court. In fact we have so much freedom that itself can be used for wrong-doing. We cannot prevent that. It is a question of weighing the pros and cons. When one comes across all these obstacles, one wishes that one could somehow move faster. But we have to look beyond today. We are laying the foundations of a strong edifice. We must not take any steps which will be beneficial in the short run but do harm in the long run.

Please do not be under the illusion that the Government will not combat

communalism with full force. It is true that we may not want to do many things until we are strong, especially in dealing with the loopholes provided by the Constitution or the law. We can change the law if that becomes necessary. That is a different matter. But it would be wrong on your part not to obey the law implicitly. You may sometimes get the impression that the Government is not being as strict as the British Government used to be. There was neither a Constitution nor freedom under the British Government. So they could ride roughshod over us.

I mentioned at the beginning how India's stature in the world is growing. While this is so, on the other hand, you see the strange spectacles that are being enacted in Delhi and elsewhere. What is the comparison between a nation proudly on the march and a motley crowd of petty and narrow-minded people who try to drag the country down. We must face this squarely and with quiet determination. Most people get confused.

I just made a mention of the Congress. I do not have much to do with the working of the Delhi Congress though of course as the President of the Party, I do receive reports, some good and some bad. Action is taken as we see fit. But as I said, the problem is twofold. One, the Congress is necessary for the country and so we have to make it strong. The Congress is not a mere party. It has its own principles which must be maintained. As a Party, its members must adhere to discipline. They must learn to work together. Those who lack this ability cause more harm than good. I do not know if those of you who work in Delhi understand this. I do hear some complaints. There have been elections in Delhi and the Congress has lost. There is nothing to be terribly worried about losing or winning an election. It is merely a barometer of the public mind, its attitude to and opinion of the Congress. It may change tomorrow, but our Party is not concerned merely about the here and now. It has to establish contact with the people and serve them. The Congress workers must cooperate in the task. The next few years will be pretty crucial for India and the world. Therefore I do not want that we should get bogged down in problems like forming the new state of Andhra. Well, the people want it and they are welcome to it. But I want that our energy should be directed towards making India strong. We should make the Plan work. Later we can be free to engage ourselves in other matters.

As I said, there are different methods of working. You must understand that your responsibilities are increasing. Parliament meets, people come and go, and something or the other is happening all the time. That is a good thing but it can also create problems because the wrong type of people also float around. Now this is all that I wish to say at present. I shall speak to you later if something comes up.

Mr Dulles was here on a visit recently. He is the Secretary of State in the United States. There were demonstrations against him, slogan-shouting

"Gó Back, Dulles". I fail to understand what it was all about and I cannot imagine anything more stupid. But one thing seems quite clear and that is that the people who indulged in these antics have not understood that India is now a free country. We remember the "Simon Go Back" incident twenty years ago when Sir John Simon came to India. We had a foreign government which had sent him here as the head of a commission to decide our future. We refused to accept that and said we would decide our own future. But what is the meaning of shouting slogans against an individual from an independent country who had come to meet us and discuss things? Are we not to talk to anyone from other countries? We especially need to talk to people from countries with which we have differences.

It is being said by a section of people, and the Congress has also accepted it, that the big powers should confer together about international problems. But how can we meet anyone if people shout slogans. India is a free republic and people come as our guests. To insult them is the height of stupidity. Members of the Peace Committee took part in such activities. But what is more regrettable is that even Congressmen have participated in it. Such people should leave the Congress. Just think, are you going to frighten a big power by such antics? And would you like it if I were to visit another country and was greeted with "Go Back Nehru" slogans? All this can only result in everybody getting isolated. Nobody can then meet anyone else. Such methods cannot work now. We must use our intelligence, not indulge in hooliganism. Congressmen must not fritter away their energies in such futile activities but stand tall.

4. To Balvantray Mehta¹

New Delhi
26th May, 1953

My dear Balvantray,
The Delhi election² is worrying me a little. I should like a vigilant eye to be kept on it. I understand that Radha Raman³ has been appointed to take charge.

1. JN Collection.
2. Delhi State elections took place in August 1953.
3. Radha Raman (1904-1982); took part in the Khilafat, non-cooperation, individual satyagraha and Quit India movements and went to jail five times; General Secretary, Delhi PCC, 1938-39, and its President for two terms, 1948-51; Member, AICC, 1950-52; Member of Parliament, 1952-62; Chief Executive Councillor of Delhi, 1972-77; leader of several all-India organizations, and editor of some English and Hindi journals.

That is good, but not quite enough. I should have liked Barooah to take personal interest in this matter. I believe he intends doing this. I hope you will see to it that he does it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To Savitri Nigam¹

New Delhi
May 27, 1953

My dear Savitri,²

Thank you for your letter of the 27th May.

I have greatly appreciated the work of your Committee and I hope it will continue. I shall certainly convey your message to Indira.

Although normally I do not like this kind of constructive work to be mixed up with election work, to a large extent the coming election in Delhi is going to be run on a communal question. Therefore it becomes rather important and is in fact part of our mass contact programme. Your Committee may, therefore, give help in the election, provided it does not give up its other work.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. (1919-1985); social worker; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1952-62, Lok Sabha, 1962-67, Executive Committee of Congress Party in Parliament, 1958-60; National Advisory Council for Family Planning, 1954-62; Central Advisory Council for the Education of Handicapped, 1955-61; AICC Secretary, Congress Committee in Parliament, 1961-62; Founder and Patron President, All India Federation for Deaf and Dumb. Founder and Secretary, Occupational Therapy Institute till 1971; author of *Grahastanjali*, *Annapoorna* and a large number of articles on family planning.

PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS

1. To G.V. Mavalankar¹

New Delhi
April 11, 1953

My dear Mr Speaker,

The Minister of Parliamentary Affairs² has sent me a copy of his letter to you dated 25th March and your reply to this letter. This relates to the Secretariats of the two Houses of Parliament as well as to the question of having common administrative services insofar as possible. In your letter you have stated that you do not think the suggestions made by Shri Satya Narayan Sinha are advisable.

I shall be grateful if you could indicate what other course of action we should take to clarify the present rather unsatisfactory situation, in conformity with the Constitution. The present arrangement is a continuation of the period when there was only one House. Now that there are two Houses, according to the Constitution, that arrangement is inadequate and unsuitable. If some kind of a common arrangement cannot be made, then a clear demarcation, both physical and in regard to functions, would become necessary. This will be difficult in regard to some matters, like the Parliament Library, which inevitably must be common.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 32(419)/53-PMS.

2. Constitutional Position of the Two Houses¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: I crave your leave, Sir, and the indulgence of the House, to refer to certain incidents which took place in this House² as well as the

1. Statement in Parliament, 6 May 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People) Official Report*, Vol. IV., Part II, 22 April-11 May 1953. Cols. 5881-5885. Nehru made a similar statement in the Council of States on the same day.
2. Questions relating to powers, privileges and rights of the Houses of Parliament were raised in the House of the People on 1 May 1953, when the Law Minister walked out of the House, saying that he was required by a resolution of the Council of States not to be present in the House during the discussion.

other House³ in the course of the last week, and which somewhat disturbed the normal serenity of the work of Parliament. Unfortunately I was not here then,⁴ but since my return, I have endeavoured to acquaint myself fully with what happened in both the Houses of Parliament.

Under our Constitution, Parliament consists of our two Houses, each functioning in the allotted sphere laid down in that Constitution. We derive authority from that Constitution. Sometimes we refer back to the practice and conventions prevailing in the Houses of Parliament of the United Kingdom and even refer erroneously to an Upper House and a Lower House. I do not think that is correct. Nor is it helpful always to refer back to the procedure of the British Parliament which has grown up in the course of several hundred years and as a result of conflicts originally with the authority of the King and later between the Commons and the Lords. We have no such history behind us, though in making our Constitution we have profited by the experience of others. Our guide must, therefore, be our own Constitution which has clearly specified the functions of the House of the People and the Council of States. To call either of these Houses an Upper House or a Lower House is not correct. Each House has full authority to regulate its own procedure within the limits of the Constitution. Neither House, by itself, constitutes Parliament. It is the two Houses together that are the Parliament of India.

The successful working of our Constitution, as of any democratic structure, demands the closest cooperation between the two Houses. They are in fact parts of the same structure and any lack of that spirit of cooperation and accommodation would lead to difficulties and come in the way of the proper functioning of our Constitution. It is, therefore, peculiarly to be regretted that any sense of conflict should arise between the two Houses. For those who are interested in the success of the great experiment in nation-building that we have embarked upon, it is a paramount duty to bring about this close cooperation and respect for each other. There can be no constitutional differences between the two Houses, because the final authority is the Constitution itself. That Constitution treats the two Houses equally, except in certain financial matters which are to be the sole purview of the House of the People. In regard to what these are, the Speaker is the final authority.

3. Replying to the debate on the Indian Income Tax (Amendment) Bill, Biswas had stated on 29 April that "the Bill has been treated, may be by the Secretariat of the other House as a Money Bill and placed before the Speaker as such" and "the Speaker...as soon as it is placed before him... has gone to give his certificate." The House of the People took exception to this remark and the Deputy Speaker considered it "a reflection upon the integrity of the Speaker" and directed Biswas to be present in the House on 1 May, during discussion on his statement.
4. Nehru was on tour in the drought-affected areas of Maharashtra from 28 April to 3 May 1953.

This position is perfectly clear and cannot be and has not been challenged at any stage. Unfortunately, some words were used by my colleague, the Law Minister, in speaking in the Council of States on April 29th which led to a misunderstanding. That misunderstanding could have been easily removed by a direct reference to him. This was not done and the matter was raised in the House.⁵ Further misunderstanding then arose as between the two Houses and questions of privilege were raised and it was stated that the dignity of this House had been affected.⁶

All of us are jealous of maintaining the dignity and authority of this House and of the Speaker who represents this House. Indeed, all of us are anxious to maintain the dignity and authority of both Houses which constitute Parliament. My colleague, the Law Minister, is as anxious as any of us to maintain that dignity and authority and it has been a matter of the greatest regret to him that any words of his should have led people to believe otherwise and further led to certain occurrences in both Houses which disturbed for a while the cooperative and friendly atmosphere which must of necessity prevail in both Houses of Parliament. Owing to some of these occurrences, he was placed in an embarrassing position, where to carry out the directions of one House might appear as if he had ignored the directions of the other. In this dilemma he might have produced an impression of not having shown the usual consideration which is the duty of every Member. But that was far from his intention and he regrets it and trusts that the House will accept his apology for any mistake which he might have inadvertently committed.

So far as the facts are concerned, they are clear, although unfortunately my colleague, the Law Minister, was not aware of all of them at the time the first reference was made to this matter in the Council of States. It is clear and beyond possibility of dispute that the Speaker's authority is final in declaring that a Bill is a Money Bill. When the Speaker gives his certificate to this effect, this cannot be challenged. The Speaker has no obligation to consult any one in coming to a decision or in giving his certificate. But he has himself decided to ask for the opinion of the Law Ministry in every case that has arisen since the commencement of the Constitution in 1950, before he records his decision. In the present cases namely the Indian Income-Tax

5. On 30 April Thakurdas Bhargava (Congress) observed that the Minister should have been more careful while expressing an opinion about the Speaker. He termed Biswas' remarks as "thoroughly unjustifiable". The House agreed with this view and requested the Chair to ensure the Minister's presence on 1 May 1953.
6. On 1 May, the Chairman, Council of States, stated that he was satisfied that the Minister had not "cast any slur on the Speaker" and hoped that the House of the People would give "sufficient consideration to the views expressed" in the other House. Yet, the Council of States passed a unanimous resolution, moved by C.G.K. Reddy, directing Biswas not to be present "in any capacity" in the House of the People during discussion on the proposed motion.

(Amendment) Bill, when the Bill was first received, the Law Ministry advised that it was a Money Bill. It was subsequently referred to the Select Committee and thereafter considered by the House of the People on the 23rd April 1953. The Speaker raised the question himself as to whether the Bill as amended by the Select Committee was a Money Bill and directed that the Law Ministry be approached and asked again to re-examine the position as also to give the grounds on which they think that the Bill was a Money Bill. The Ministry of Law replied on the 24th April 1953 saying that the Bill as amended by the Select Committee was a Money Bill and gave reasons for their advice. Thereupon the Speaker came to the decision on the 25th April 1953 that the Bill as passed by the House of the People was a Money Bill and later signed the certificate embodying this decision.

It will be observed that every care was taken by the Speaker to seek the advice of the Law Ministry at various stages, although there was no obligation on him to do so. Unfortunately, the Law Minister himself though undoubtedly responsible for the advice of his Ministry, was not himself aware of these references at that time. As soon as the Law Minister became aware of this on April 30th he brought these facts to the notice of the Chairman of the Council of States.

These are the facts. An error, which is regretted, led to a good deal of misapprehension and some feeling in both Houses. The dignity of either House of Parliament is precious to everyone of us. Not only is each House anxious to maintain its own dignity but I am sure, that it is equally anxious to maintain the dignity of the other House, which is equally a part of Parliament. The dignity of each House is represented by the Speaker and the Chairman and every Member of Parliament, in whichever House he may be, must respect that dignity and authority.

I earnestly trust that these unfortunate incidents will be treated as closed now and that any feeling of resentment that might have arisen will pass away and the two Houses will function in friendship and cooperation, maintaining the high dignity of Parliament and furthering the public good.

3. To M.C. Setalvad¹

New Delhi
May 8, 1953

My dear Setalvad,²

As you know, the two Houses of Parliament have had some friction over

1. File No. 32 (10)/56-57-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.

2. Attorney-General of India.

various rather small matters. Indeed, there was a big row when I was not here. However, that is over.

There is another question which has been troubling us for some time. We have now two Committees, the Public Accounts Committee and the Estimates Committee under the Constitution. Last year it was suggested on behalf of the Council of States that they should be associated with these two Committees. We considered this in Cabinet. Two viewpoints were urged; one was that these Committees dealing with financial matters were completely in the purview of the House of the People and the Council of States should not be brought into the picture. The other viewpoint was that there should be no difficulty in doing this. After considerable discussion and consideration of the Constitution, etc., it was decided by our Cabinet that we should associate the Council of States with the Public Accounts Committee but not with the Estimates Committee, the proportion of association being 2:1, that is according to the numerical strength of the two Houses. It was felt that the Estimates Committee dealt with certain matters which did not come within the purview of the Council of States. The Public Accounts Committee was rather a committee for scrutinising what had been done and there was no harm in the Council of States being associated with it.

As a matter of fact, there is nothing to prevent the Council of States from having a Public Accounts Committee of its own. This would be a nuisance because that would mean duplicating all our work and our officers being summoned with their files repeatedly by the two committees. There would be some kind of a rivalry between the two Committees. Therefore, it was thought better to associate seven persons from the Council of States to the fifteen from the House of the People in the Public Accounts Committee. The idea was also, of course, to encourage a spirit of cooperation between the two Houses. As it is, the Council of States suffers from a sense of frustration which is not good.

The Cabinet having come to this conclusion (which was, of course, subject to the Speaker's approval) we discussed the matter with the Speaker. He was not enthusiastic about the association of the Council of States with the Public Accounts Committee, but he told us ultimately that he was not against it and that because we had so decided in Cabinet and with a view to promote harmony between the two Houses he would be agreeable to the association of seven men of the Council of States to the Public Accounts Committee.

Meanwhile some Members of the House of the People, including the present members of the Public Accounts Committee, have raised what they consider constitutional objections to the association of the Council of States in this Committee.³ The Speaker still adheres to the opinion he arrived at,

3. The motion was unanimously rejected by the Public Accounts Committee and the Rules Committee.

that he has no objection to this association provided that the other rules governing the Committee remain the same, that is the Chairman is appointed by the Speaker. We agree, of course, to all this. I have no doubt myself that from the point of view of harmonious working this is desirable. I should like to have your opinion, if you think there is anything against the provisions of the Constitution in our associating some members of the Council of States in the Public Accounts Committee.⁴ Your opinion will help us to come to a final decision. I shall be grateful if you could let me have your opinion as soon as possible because we have to make a Motion in the House on Monday.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. In his reply of 9 May 1953, Setalvad observed that *prima facie* it appeared that there was nothing in the provisions of the Constitution which prevented the association of members of the Council of States in the Public Accounts Committee.

4. Procedural Delays in Law Ministry¹

The recent incidents in Parliament, resulting in a conflict between the House of the People and the Council of States, have brought out the faultiness of the procedure frequently followed in some of our Ministries.² It was quite extraordinary that a matter of such high importance as the certification of a bill as a Money Bill should be dealt with by the Secretary of the Law Ministry without any reference to the Law Minister.³ Even if this had been completely clear the Law Minister should have been inevitably consulted. This particular matter was certainly not free from doubt and I believe that the Joint Secretary of the Law Ministry pointed this out. Nevertheless no reference was made to the Law Minister. This put him in a highly embarrassing position and created undesirable scenes in the House.

1. Note to Cabinet Secretary, 9 May 1953. File No. 32 (10)/56-57-PMS. Copies of the note were sent to the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Law.
2. This refers to the procedure followed by most Ministries while dealing with the day-to-day procedural matters, without any reference to the Minister concerned.
3. That was how, the Law Minister, while making a statement in the Council of States, had no knowledge of the fact that his Ministry had been consulted by the Speaker as to whether the Income Tax (Amendment) Bill could be called a money bill before certifying it as such.

I should like you to point this out to the Law Ministry and to inform them that they should not follow any such procedure in future about important matters. This general principle should be pointed out to the other Ministries also.

I receive complaints from various States about the legislation passed by their State Assemblies. This legislation is sent here either for general administrative approval or because the Governor refers some matter in them to the President. They are, in the ordinary course, referred to the Law Ministry. In addition they are referred either to the Home Ministry or to States. Such Bills remain here for months and months and a serious situation is created in the State concerned. Their legislation is held up, their budget is affected, and there is public dissatisfaction at their not carrying out the pledges they have given.

This delay is thus very harmful and cannot be justified. There appears to be no reason why Bills passed by a State Assembly should be dealt with here *de novo*. They should be considered of course to find out if there is anything in them which is patently objectionable. In any event, this procedure should be a matter of days, not of months.

Even now, there are a number of Bills from the Bombay State hung up in the Law Ministry here.⁴ I do not know how many other Bills are pending there. I think it will be desirable for you to find out from the Ministries of Law, Home and States how many such Bills from the States are with them at present and how long they are likely to remain there.

4. See also *ante*, p. 109.

5. An Essential Bill¹

May I say a few words, Sir?² The honourable Member has referred to what I

1. Debate in Parliament on Vindhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Prevention of Disqualification) Bill, 9 May 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People), Official Report*, Vol. IV, Part II, 22 April to 11 May 1953, Cols. 6283-4.
2. Nehru intervened in the debate, when H.N. Mukherjee said that the Government had earlier given an "implied assurance" that no major Bill with major significance would be brought forward and now by bringing it up at the fag end of the session they were trying to rush it through.

said on a previous occasion.³ I do not know what relevance that has, because this particular Bill was included in the essential ones.⁴ So, the non-essential ones which were added on do not make any difference. The honourable Member may have certain views about this Bill which may be at variance with ours. We know that this is a necessary Bill, an urgent Bill and an important Bill, about which the law is hundred per cent clear.⁵ The honourable Member must study the law carefully, because it has to be approached from a legal point of view as much as it is approached from any other point of view. We think that the law is completely clear. We have gone into that with the greatest care, and I really do not see why, simply because some honourable Members have some misgivings about it, a large number of other honourable Members who have no misgivings should not proceed with this Bill.⁶

3. H.N. Mukherjee had said that, in the meeting of the Business Advisory Committee of the House, the Government had made a statement that some non-essential Bills were included in the agenda to safeguard against the Parliament having nothing to do, in case the essential Bills were completed before time.
4. The Speaker clarified that in the Business Advisory Committee meeting of 15 April 1953, the Committee had recommended 15 Bills in their order of priority to be discussed during the session, in which the Vindhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Prevention of Disqualification) Bill was the seventh. Further the Committee noted that "as sufficient time would not be available to put through all the Bills — i.e., all the seven Bills — not fifteen Bills—if the session were to conclude on the 8th of May 1953, as scheduled, the session might be extended by about a week and should not in any case go beyond 15th of May 1953."
5. The procedure followed in this regard was that the Government placed all the Bills before the Business Advisory Committee and emphasised the ones it wants to be passed during the session by marking them 'essential'. The Committee, with the consent of the leaders of various groups, then allotted time to each Bill to be put up to the House for approval.
6. On 26 April 1952, the Vindhya Pradesh Government, by an order, constituted District Advisory Councils, comprising Officials and local MLAs. The Councils met once a month and attending members were paid travel and daily allowances. On 30 October 1952, the President of India received a representation from a Vindhya Pradesh MLA that membership of District Council constituted an "office of profit" and participating members be disqualified. On 14 January the President referred it to the Election Commission, who held 12 MLAs, who were resident of District headquarters and had charged daily allowances, as disqualified. The Bill sought to prevent this disqualification. On 13 May 1953, the House passed the Bill.

6. To S. Radhakrishnan¹

New Delhi
May 12, 1953

My dear Radhakrishnan,

Thank you for your letter of May 11, with its enclosures.²

I do not think this matter is going to be raised in the House of the People again.

You will have noticed that I have put forward a motion in the House of the People today for the association of seven members of the Council of States to the Public Accounts Committee. Objection was taken to it by some members of Opposition and there would be further discussion tomorrow afternoon at 4 p.m.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 32(424)/53-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Radhakrishnan wrote that the debates on privileges in the two Houses of Parliament should be treated as closed and if the Opposition in the House of the People insisted and the Government would yield, it would become awkward. A note by R.V. Krishna Ayyar, Secretary of the Madras Legislature, on the debates was also enclosed.

7. Membership of Public Accounts Committee¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: I beg to move:

That this House recommends to the Council of States that they do agree to nominate seven members from the Council of States to associate with the Public Accounts Committee of this House for the year 1953-54 and to communicate to this House the names of the members so nominated by the Council.

Lanka Sundaram: May I know from you, Sir, whether it is a fact that the Public Accounts Committee and the Rules Committee have unanimously recorded their opinion that this association should not be permitted, and the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee wrote a letter to the Chairman of the other House that it would not be possible.

JN: May I answer it, Sir? It is a fact and that was considered in all its legal

1. Debate in Parliament, 12 May 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report. Vol. V Part II, 12 to 15 May 1953, Cols. 6402-7.

aspects by the highest legal authorities and the Speaker was also consulted. The Public Accounts Committee members were completely in the wrong....²

As a matter of fact, naturally in a matter in which the House desires to discuss further, we should try to find time for that. There is no question of coming in the way of a full discussion of any matter. But the House knows that we are hard pressed for time in the next few days and it is not quite clear to me where to find that time even an hour or two.³ If the House is willing to sit in the afternoon, certainly we are prepared to deal with it this afternoon or any afternoon. But, obviously there would be no particular point in this motion unless it is accepted and dealt with fairly soon. May I mention, listening to the honourable Member Mr Chatterjee, I felt that he was lacking in his usual clarity of thought. He referred to taxation without representation, Money Bills etc. I really did not understand who was taxing whom in this: whether the Public Accounts Committee tax the people or whether it considers Money Bills. All this reference was completely beside the point. He was speaking more like the man in the moon: it had no relevance at all.⁴

The honourable lady opposite also said that something is being done without precedent. If I may submit with all respect this House and our Constitution are also without precedent. The two Houses started functioning after the general elections a year ago. About eight months ago this matter was considered and after taking legal advice in the matter, we (that is the Government), came to the conclusion which is embodied in this motion. It was nearly eight or nine months ago that this matter was first considered. For a variety of reasons—we were pressed for time as well—we did not bring it forward. Naturally we could not and we did not wish to take any step without the concurrence of the Speaker. The matter was first referred to the Speaker and first discussed with him. The Speaker ultimately approved of this approach of ours and, if I may say so, suggested that we might proceed in this way. We consulted not only the Ministry, but other eminent lawyers.

But the main point for the House to consider is this. This Public Accounts Committee has nothing to do with, what I might call, the financial powers of this House, which, of course, are supreme in that matter. There is another Committee, the Estimates Committee. A distinction is made by us as between the Public Accounts Committee and the Estimates Committee. The Estimates Committee has something to do, perhaps, with those powers.

2. See *ante*, p. 273.

3. Sucheta Kripalani thought that it was "a marked departure from the usual parliamentary practice" and hence it would have been better if all the parties had been consulted beforehand.

4. N.C. Chatterjee, opposing the motion, had stated that the House of the People had the "sole authority" regarding Money Bills, since it was directly responsible to the electorate.

The Public Accounts Committee is a scrutinising Committee. It scrutinises accounts, points out the failings and errors and mistakes made and that kind of thing, which anybody can really do. There can be no doubt that it is open to the other House to appoint a Public Accounts Committee of its own to do exactly the same thing, that is to scrutinise and say what it likes and what it does not like. It would be most unfortunate, I think, if there were two Committees functioning like this for two Houses trying to rival, or out-rival each other, and summoning large number of officers of Government, to explain this or that to them. As it is, a good deal of time of officers of Government is naturally spent on this and rightly so. But to duplicate all that would be unfortunate from various points of view. So that one does not come in the way of members of the other House considering these matters. Only, perhaps, it leaves them to consider them separately and in a way, perhaps, which would tend to make the two Committees try to outdo each other. It would not be a healthy rivalry.

The only thing they can do in this is, as I said, to criticise, or scrutinise things. Our own impression has been that not only is it perfectly justified, but, it is—if I may say so—desirable and wholly in the spirit of the Constitution. There is no question of the other House encroaching on any special privileges of this House in any way. The Chairman of the Committee is appointed by the Speaker. My honourable friend Mr Chatterjee pointed out that perhaps members of this House may not be present, and some other Members might be. Even if that remote contingency arises—and remember that there will be fifteen Members of this House on the Committee, while the other House will have only seven—all that would happen is that some point would be noted, that is all. The final report of the Committee comes out after long proceedings and the report is submitted to the House. So no vague or dangerous development can take place, even if Members are not present there, except some noting. I do submit that this is a simple proposition and important issues which are referred to do not really arise in this. When they arise certainly they should be considered fully. This is a simple matter, which is conducive to efficiency of working and prevention of waste and duplication of work, which would help, if I may say so with all respect, in certain promotion of an atmosphere of cooperative working between Members of the two Houses. And I submit that this proposition might well be accepted by this House. If, however, the House wants a little discussion on it we have no objection.

Deputy Speaker: This subject need not take a long time, but if it is the desire of the House that it should be discussed, I have no objection.

JN: May I suggest for the consideration of the House that instead of the question hour tomorrow, we may discuss this tomorrow morning?

8. Membership of Public Accounts Committee¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: May I intervene?² I cast no aspersions on the Members of the Public Accounts Committee. As a matter of fact it was odd for me to say so. I did not know at all what the Public Accounts Committee had said or written about this matter till rather accidentally and casually about four days ago, it came to my notice. Nobody sent it to me. Neither did the Public Accounts Committee machinery come to my notice. The Public Accounts Committee deals with certain matters of great importance, but I may submit the Public Accounts Committee is not a high authority on constitutional practice. In regard to that matter I felt the Committee was wrong....³

I am in your hands, Sir. As a matter of fact it was fixed at six and many people have made engagements after six. But it is for the House to decide....

Lanka Sundaram: May I make a submission, Sir?

JN: I have listened naturally with the greatest respect and attention to what has been said on this motion and I hope I have profited by it. But that profit, I do not think, is related much to this motion, but to the general aspects of the Constitution.

I have felt that much that has been said, though perfectly true, has little relevance. Great stress is laid on the powers of this House, as if somebody was challenging them or perhaps making an attack on them. There is no doubt about what the powers of this House are in regard to money and financial matters. It is on that basis that we proceed. There the matter ends. Let us talk no more about it.

The second point is, whether this innovation—if you like, that my motion suggests—interferes with those powers in any way. If it interferes with those powers, then it is a wrong motion. I accept that position. If it is likely to interfere with those powers, then we should be wary and see it should not do so. I accept that position. Why then this lengthy argument? Insofar as the Public Accounts Committee is concerned, it is a creature of the rules, not of the Constitution. Rules, of course, can be changed, if we so will. The rules lay down among other things that the Chairman of the Committee shall be

1. Debate in Parliament, 13 May 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People), Official Report*, Vol. V, Part II 12 to 15 May 1953, Cols. 6556-6600. Extracts.
2. Nehru intervened when Lanka Sundaram said that the Prime Minister's calling the decision of the Public Accounts Committee as "wrong", was "unfortunate", especially coming from the Leader of the House.
3. Deputy Speaker asked Nehru if the proceedings of the House could continue till 6.30 p.m.

appointed by the Speaker. That is number one. The Chairman, of course, has a casting vote. The Speaker may, from time to time, issue such directions to the Chairman of the Committee as he may consider necessary, for regulating the procedure and the organisation of its work. On any doubts arising on any point of procedure or otherwise, the Chairman may, if he thinks fit, refer the point to the Speaker whose decision shall be final. Therefore, the Speaker plays a very important part in this. Nobody is seeking to diminish the authority of the Speaker given in these rules. If that is so, then I really do not understand where the difficulty arises, except something at the back of some members' minds that this is some kind of a thin end of the wedge,⁴ and we do not quite know where this will lead us.

Well, it is a little difficult to deal with vague suspicions, suspicions also which flow not from anything in our Constitution but from some distant background knowledge of English history. Obviously, our Constitution is different. It may be similar in regard to certain Money Bills and others but obviously, as an honourable Member said, our Council of States is something entirely different. It is envisaged as something different from the House of Lords. Whether in the dim future we have a second chamber or not, we are not considering. But the whole conception of the second chamber here was not an ineffective second chamber, not an unrepresentative second chamber, but a representative one, representing the country in a different way—representing it by election, not by nomination or by birth, representing it by election—partly indirectly and partly directly. The Council of States is partly there by direct election and partly by indirect election by those who have been elected to the State Assemblies.

S.S. More: Nominated.

JN: There are a few nominees. For instance, the President has nominated some Members of the Council of States who, if I may say so, are among the most distinguished, taking everybody in Parliament altogether—it is true, distinguished in arts, sciences etc,—and our Constitution in its wisdom gave that. They do not represent political parties or anything, but they represent really the high water-mark of literature or art or culture or whatever it may be. That is a small matter. In effect, the Council of States is supposed to represent the States, as the name says so, through the State Assemblies or otherwise through local bodies or Universities or whatever it may be. Now, it may be improved upon or not. That is immaterial. But it is a definite and

4. N.C. Chatterjee had said that the powers and functions of the PAC was the responsibility of the House of the People which could not be shared with the other House. The Government's insistence on the motion at the cost of setting up "dangerous" precedents could just be "the thin end of the wedge."

important wing of our Constitution, as it has been envisaged.

It is perfectly true that in regard to financial matters its powers are strictly limited. Or rather those powers vest in the House of the People. There the matter is and it is not open to argument here or there. Nobody can say—I say so naturally—nobody here will say that by any special virtue as individuals or otherwise. Members of that House are inferior, or superior, or not as good or as bad as Members of this House. Some may be good in our opinion and some may be bad; that is immaterial. But, what I mean is this: they do not represent a particular class or group; they come from the same classes and groups of political opinion as Members of this House. There is no difference of that type and it is desirable obviously that Parliament consisting of these two Houses should function in a smooth way, in a cooperative way and that each should have as much opportunity to cooperate with the other as possible. It was for this reason that we decided to have Joint Select Committees for particular Bills, wherever possible. Many of the arguments raised today may well be raised in regard to those Joint Select Committees. Not all; I say many of them can be raised. They would not apply as those arguments, do not apply in this case either. We have Joint Select Committees because it is convenient, because it is desirable for us to have them. Bills, except Money Bills etc. go up to the other House, they are considered there and in order to avoid some cumbersome procedure, which may have to be gone through again and again, we have Joint Select Committees. We at least get theorised more wisdom also.

S.S. More: Can we have a Joint Select Committee on a Money Bill?

JN: Apparently the honourable Member has not followed me. I said that. Therefore, there is no essential divergence in this matter, that is in a joint consideration of things. If you exclude the financial aspect and the Money Bills, where is the difficulty? So far as the Public Accounts Committee is concerned it mainly deals with scrutiny of expenditure. It is quite clear that it does not deal with any other aspect which is the particular purview of this House. The Estimates Committee might. Therefore, so far as the Estimates Committee is concerned, we have kept it apart. This proposal is not made in regard to the Estimates Committee.

There is just a possibility that in regard to—some honourable Member said—censure or something like that⁵—an attempt to censure or cast blame

5. N.C. Chatterjee had said that, supposing the Public Accounts Committee found a minister guilty of misappropriating public funds, could the Committee censure the minister or the Government? Since it was the privilege of the House of the People, it would be against the spirit of the Constitution to associate members of the Council of States in such committees and it might create “unhealthy” and “dangerous” precedents.

on a Minister or a department of Government, I am not clear at the present moment—it may perhaps be considered a peculiar privilege of the Members of this House only. Censure of a Minister in that way and in many other ways is the privilege of this House. But, surely to point out an irregularity in accounting or in expenditure is not the peculiar privilege of anybody. Any person in the public street can do so. Of course, what effect it will have is another matter. It really does not matter whether some of the Members of the Public Accounts Committee differ. Ultimately that point has to be decided by this House. Nobody is going to limit the powers of this House in that respect. But even so, going a little further, that is a question that can be regulated even by rules. There is no peculiar difficulty; the rules have been framed by us. They can be framed to provide for that too, to provide for any contingency. There is really no difficulty insofar as I can see, except this great fear in our minds that something might happen. I really do not see why something might happen and how it should happen because in the whole texture of our Constitution, the power of this House in the ultimate analysis is greater—whether it is when you meet together in joint session or in other ways, your numbers are always greater. Therefore, I do not fear it. Let us presume that some attempt at an invasion of the prerogatives of this House takes place; well, it should be considered as such. But, why for fear of that not do something which appears reasonable and desirable to do? Surely, that is not a reasonable way of approach to this problem.

The honourable Member opposite talked about compromise.⁶ Is it we are compromising with somebody in order to pour oil over troubled waters? He said that. I want to make it perfectly clear that this motion is not put forward as a kind of sop to anybody or as compromise. It is put forward because it was considered desirable and workable and, as I hinted at it yesterday, the matter came up before us roundabout a year ago, we discussed in various ways and were generally of the opinion that this should be done. But we did not wish to hurry; there has been the least hurry in this matter. The honourable Member said that we are trying to rush this. I have no desire to rush this at all. But in my mind there is no sense of hurry because we had dilly-dallied with this problem for nearly a year, and as was natural, the person whose approval and general advice was quite essential in this matter was the Speaker. His advice was taken and the matter was referred to him and discussed with him. That took some time. As the House well knows, the Speaker was unwell for a long time and I did not wish to do anything at all till he was back at his place. All that led to those delays. Anyhow, there was no question of rushing

6. K.S. Raghavachari pointed out that while the Public Accounts Committee and the Rules Committee had unanimously rejected the proposal, the Prime Minister had again brought it up because he was "actuated by very good motives of compromise."

through and there was no question of compromising something or in order to soothe the ruffled feelings of somebody else.

Then again, something has been said about associate Members.⁷ Who are these associate Members? The motion is a very simple one, inviting the Council of States to associate seven of its Members with this Public Accounts Committee. It is not for us to say how the Council of States will choose them. It is patent that they will choose them. It is patent that they will choose them by election; they cannot choose them in any other way. We know that it is for them to decide. Naturally, they will choose election by proportional representation and all that. If they come to the Committee, as the major function of the Committee is scrutinising, there is no question of two grades of Members. They have the same grade and status. If any question arises—at the moment it is not in my mind—if any question arises which is the peculiar purview of this House, then that matter shall not be dealt with by them. If necessary, rules may be framed. There is nothing to prevent us doing that, to make things clear. Normally, that does not arise; it is a rare thing. But, there is no reason why we should be afraid—if I may use the popular word—of being bamboozled by somebody and forget our own rights and privileges. So I submit there is nothing that we need be frightened about. This is not any question of compromise in a bad sense of the word, doing something that we consider not good in order to gain, may be something else.

It is true it is my desire and I think it should be the desire of the House to cultivate to the fullest extent possible cooperation and friendly relations with the other House, because in the nature of things and in the nature of the Constitution that we have, if we have not got cooperative relations, each can hamper and delay public work. There is no doubt about it. Each has the capacity for good certainly, but also for delay and for just irritating and annoying, by delaying tactics, the other House. The conception of the Constitution is that Parliament is an integrate whole. I regret, as my honourable friend on this side regretted, describing a Member of the other House as an outsider. In a narrow sense you may use that but the conception behind it is not a happy one and we are all joined together in Parliament, shouldering the burden of Parliament, and looked up to by the people of India. If we do not cooperate with each other, what kind of lesson do we teach to the people of India? What will our States do? The whole structure of federal Government here requires the cooperation of not only both the Houses, but of the Central Government and the Governments of the States, between the State Councils

7. Lanka Sundaram had asked whether the associate members of the Public Accounts Committee, were subject to the Speaker's discipline? S.S. More, on the other hand, pointed out that the motion was not clear whether the associate members in the Committee would have voting rights or were only to participate and make suggestions.

and the States, Legislative Assemblies. The background is one of cooperation everywhere; it is one of cooperative effort. Otherwise the constitutional machine of India creaks; it does not go fast and may be here and there it breaks down. There is some provision in the Constitution by which the President can take over the administration of a State, in case of failure of the normal constitutional machinery. But nevertheless those are unusual provisions and unusual procedures. The real thing is the cooperative effort among these and it is important that we at the top in these two Houses of Parliament set the pace. If we do not do it, obviously others will not do it. That is an important consideration. This is not an attempt at soothing, or presenting a sop, or a compromise. I do submit that the motion that I have made does not in the slightest degree infringe on the powers or the authority of this House, but is a desirable thing from the point of view of cooperative effort of the two houses, from the point of view of showing an example to the others, other countries and other Parliaments, as to how this complicated structure of our Constitution can be made to work smoothly and effectively and with goodwill.

One thing has struck me, I am free to confess. Although I have said it was not my intention to rush through this motion, some honourable Members seem to have felt so. One honourable Member said something which surprised me very much. He seemed to think that this motion had some secret motive behind it to get more Members of the Congress Party from the other House on the Public Accounts Committee.⁸ That surprised me very much because the Members of the Houses will be represented on the Committee in the proportion that there are parties there. It is not going to be by nomination by one party; or by election of only one Party's Members. That question does not arise. It depends on what type of Members there are and the groups there are.

K.S. Raghavachari: It will not be so subsequently; it will be so only at the first election.

JN: It is rather a remarkable thing; the conception of democracy that some people sometimes lay stress on. It is said sometimes in this House sometimes outside the House, sometimes in foreign countries, that in India they have got a one-party system. Why? Because one party happens to have a considerable majority. It is a very extraordinary idea of describing this as a one-party system. Because in a vast General Election one party gets a majority here

8. Raghavachari had said that Rule 196 laid down the quorum of the Committee at 4 members and "for aught I know in the space of a few years the Upper House would be packed with Congress members", and so would be the Committee.

and in all the States, it is a one-party system. Their idea perhaps is that we should have a ten-party system as some countries may have. That may be considered a better democracy.


Honourable Members on the other side say that we are using our majority for this purpose and that.⁹ Of course, we are. What is the majority for?—not to bow down to the minority. And the majority, in spite of what honourable Members on the other side may say, represents the majority of the people of India. There the matter ends. That is democracy.

But I do submit that this is not a party matter, of course, and I do not wish it to be treated as a party matter. I entirely agree with honourable Members opposite who said that this should not be treated as a party matter. I did not bring it forward as a party matter; nor did I have the least desire to rush it or push it through the House, or give an impression to this House or anyone outside this House that a matter which some Members thought raised various constitutional points and difficulties was rushed through without having been given adequate thought or adequate consideration. Well, I have no doubt about this matter in my mind and I regret to say that the arguments advanced by honourable Members opposite have not convinced me to the contrary. Because, as I said just now, whatever possible difficulties you might have can always be got over by variation of the rules, if necessary. Even so, I am prepared—if that is the wish of the House and if the House permits me—to postpone further consideration of this matter to the next session, so that all honourable Members on the other side, as well as others, may have the fullest time to give it their thought and consideration and then we can decide.

9. Most of the Opposition members, except the Communists, stressed the fact that the way in which this motion had been brought up at the end of the session, despite opposition from all quarters, reflected the Government's desire to rush it through using its majority in the House.



INSIDE THE AHMEDNAGAR BARRACKS WHERE HE WAS IMPRISONED
DURING QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT, 1 MAY 1953



ADDRESSING A PUBLIC MEETING, AHMEDNAGAR, 1 MAY 1953

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

I. 'ACTING' PRIME MINISTER

1. Cable to N.R. Pillai¹

Your letter of 4th June. I have seen the statements in the Press about Resident Prime Minister and Officiating Prime Minister.² These descriptions are not correct, as I continue to function as Prime Minister even though I leave India. In fact I have come to London as Prime Minister to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. Therefore there can be no question of a vacancy arising or of anyone functioning or acting as Prime Minister in my absence. Otherwise there would be two Prime Ministers functioning at the same time.

Before my departure from India, I made specific arrangements for work to be carried on in various Ministries and in Cabinet.³ As next senior member of Government, Maulana Azad was to be referred to, whenever any special matter arose.

This is for your information in order to remove any misconception about the present positions. You need not take any particular action on it.

You should, however, show this telegram to Maulana Azad and Dr Katju for their information.

1. London, 6 June 1953. JN Collection.
2. On 29 May a PTI release stated that "there is to be no acting or resident PM" during Nehru's absence and that it was "officially stated" that since constitutionally there was no such provision, "no officiating arrangements could be made."
3. Before leaving for tour, Nehru had issued a directive on 20 May, making arrangements for work to be carried on in various ministries. He named Azad, the senior most Cabinet member and the Deputy leader of the Party, to perform the routine duties of the PM.

2. A Petty Controversy¹

...Jawaharlal Nehru: Just one small matter I wish to clarify before we end, because we have correspondents from India. I have been rather surprised to see some press cuttings from India, which have come to me—statements and

1. Press conference, London, 10 June 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Also from *India News*, 13 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 174-175, 327-329, 400-402, 408-411, 451-452 and 489-491.

notes and newspapers about some petty controversy in Delhi as to acting Prime Minister and the like.² The whole thing is ridiculous. I do not understand it. I saw the other day that PTI correspondent from here sent a message, in which he dragged in my Secretary, Mathai's name.³ It was most unfortunate. Poor Mathai has been put in a false position very much by his name being dragged in. He had some casual conversation. He has not made any statement. He has no business to make a statement and he did not make a statement. In fact I heard that when I got a telegram from India. I have not seen it here. It is completely ridiculous. When I came away from Delhi naturally I made arrangements. Every Ministry, of course, has full authority to function in the normal way during my absence. I made arrangements for the formal functioning of the Foreign Affairs Ministry also of which I am head. That is where signatures, etc. are needed. Any important matters are referred to me, in fact many important matters are being dealt with here as it is. And it had been arranged before I left India that, if any urgent matters requiring decisions cropped up, they should be referred to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who is the senior Member of the Cabinet as well as of the Foreign Affairs Committee. I do not like the petty controversies which have broken out in New Delhi as to the acting of PM and so forth. Others, as the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet, may deal with them as and when they arise and any matters, which require any immediate decision which could not be referred to me should be naturally referred to the senior member of the Cabinet, that is Maulana Azad. I made that clear. He is also the senior member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as the senior member on the Cabinet. So I made arrangements about that, that he would function in that matter. Arguments as to whether he is Acting Prime Minister or not, or Resident Prime Minister, are completely beside the point. He is functioning as such. I continue to function as Prime Minister even though I may be in London, otherwise I would not be in the Prime Ministers' Conference. That is obvious. So I want to make this clear. There is nothing in this argument. I do not know why, and I hope our friend, PTI representative, will also make this clear and not drag poor Mathai's name into it.

2. Countering the PTI release of 29 May, the Cabinet Secretariat issued a press note on 31 May stating that "so far as PM Secretariat is concerned Maulana Azad will officiate for the PM... and also preside over all meetings of the Cabinet that may be held during the PM's absence."
3. A PTI release from London of 8 June, stated that M.O. Mathai had the previous day said that descriptions such as officiating PM and resident PM were completely incorrect. "The press note issued by the Cabinet Secretariat, evidently during the absence of Mr Sukthankar on tour, is not wholly correct."

3. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

London

June 11, 1953

My dear Maulana,

I received your letter of the 3rd June three or four days ago. I have been so terribly busy from early morning till very late at night that I have not found it possible to answer it.

I am sorry that a needless controversy has arisen over a petty matter. It is particularly regrettable that it should appear before the public that two of our Ministries are at variance with each other. I think it would have been better not to take any notice of the *National Standard* statement, although this was not correct. Frequent statements appear in the press which are not correct and to which I do not think it worthwhile to reply or correct. To create an impression that there is conflict within Government is always undesirable. The method usually adopted by us when an incorrect statement is made, is not to issue a statement but informally and privately to tell some important press people what the facts are.

As I have telegraphed to you, Mathai did not issue any statement at all. But because there has been too much talk about this matter among Indian journalists here and he was asked some questions, he replied to them privately. There was no question of publishing any statement. I referred to this matter at a press conference of Indian journalists here.

I have received your message about your going to Kashmir. I am afraid Shaikh Abdullah will give us a good deal of trouble. He is acting very irresponsibly. I hope your visit will check him.

You can well imagine that I can hardly have talk with Mohammad Ali with this background of Kashmir. Our talks have been rather general. But I have promised to meet him in India—either in Delhi or Karachi.

My talks with the Ceylon Prime Minister have thus far been inconclusive.

News about Nepal is very disturbing. I agree with the decisions of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

II. DEFENCE PERSONNEL

1. To Mahavir Tyagi¹

New Delhi
May 10, 1953

My dear Mahavir,

We had an inconclusive discussion about the pensions matter yesterday in the Defence Committee of the Cabinet.² We shall now have to meet ourselves, that is the Ministers concerned, to consider this matter further. It is important that we come to final decisions and not delay this much. I do not quite know your programme and when you will be here.

I have been giving a good deal of thought to this. I am not much concerned with an individual item here or there. That can be adjusted. But in regard to the larger approach affecting sepoy and NCOs, which is the major issue before us, I feel that our decision will have rather far-reaching consequences on the morale of the Defence Services. You will no doubt appreciate the importance of this morale and a sense of satisfaction among them that justice has been done to them.

We apply certain rule of thumb and compare these Defence Services to the civil services. That is right. But there are obviously many other approaches and considerations also. A soldier's life is a much more concentrated one and, by and large, he has to work harder and under more difficult circumstances than a civilian. He is of course fed better and looked after better. Nevertheless, his fifteen years' service represents to him a somewhat longer period compared with civilian standards. We spend a good deal of money in the way of food, equipment and the rest and then we push him out, whether he wishes to stay or not, and have no further responsibility for him. We try to help him a little, but that does not go far and he is stranded. I can well understand his feeling of discontent when he reaches that stage. The so-called pensions we offer can by no means be considered as big or even adequate.³ I am not referring to the higher officers for the moment but to the NCOs and other ranks. It pains me to see these fine youngmen thrown out with no employment offered to them and not much prospect of future work except for a few who might have some land. Even there, our land legislation has come in the way.

1. Mahavir Tyagi Papers, NMML.

2. On 25 May the Ministry of Defence approved of a formula under which JCOs and other lower ranks of the three armed forces were to receive enhanced pension on retirement, taking into account the length of service and the rise in cost of living.

3. Till then pension to the lower ranks of the armed forces were given on an ad hoc basis. A sepoy was paid Rs 9 a month, at a flat rate irrespective of years of service put in.

Our money values have fallen and 15 or 20 or 25 rupees do not mean much today as they might have done previously.⁴ Only today I was looking at a number of *Blitz*, where this question has been raised. I have no doubt that if we decide something which our Defence Services consider wholly inadequate, there will be grave dissatisfaction and this will be played upon by all kinds of anti-social forces. Our officers, junior or senior, can hardly be expected to go about explaining to the sepoys and NCOs that they have been treated fairly because these officers themselves will not have that sensation. The result may well be that we might have to face a situation which is not a happy one and have perhaps to reconsider any decision that we may now take. That obviously will be very bad. After having taken some years to come to a decision, then to reconsider it within a few months or a year will not redound to our credit as a Government and will put new ideas in the minds of the Services.

We have, therefore, to look ahead and not consider this matter from a narrow viewpoint or some comparison with somebody else. That comparison also does not hold good completely because conditions are different. It so happens that our Defence forces are one of the principal bulwarks of the structure of Government today. We have trouble sometimes with the men employed in the Defence industries. If that feeling of dissatisfaction spreads to the other ranks, etc., then the outlook will not be good.

After all, no one can say that what is claimed on behalf of these people is exorbitant. It is true that totalling it up it comes to a considerable figure. But each individual does not get much. Even the total itself between the two approaches is not very considerable, taking into consideration the large numbers of people involved.

Having given much thought to this matter, I feel that we should generally accept the approach of the Chiefs of Staff. Having done so, we might examine the details and vary them where we consider necessary.

That is my present inclination. However, I should like to discuss this matter with you more fully as soon as possible. I suggest that you, the two Deputy Ministers and I might meet together for this purpose. Our minds should be clear first. The next step would be for us to meet the other members of the Cabinet in the Defence Committee.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Under the new formula a sepoy was to receive Rs 15-17 per month, a naik, Rs 17-19, havildar, Rs 35-46 and subedar, Rs 50-60, and for each additional year of service after 15 years the rate was higher.

2. To Mahavir Tyagi¹

New Delhi
May 10, 1953

My dear Mahavir,

I have written to you separately about the question of pensions.

My attention has been drawn to another matter. Some three years ago or so, Cariappa,² I think, called upon the Army to contribute from their rations for the relief of famine conditions in the country. This was done, I believe, and even the ordinary soldier contributed. There was a voluntary cut which has continued. I gather there is some discontent about this now and it has been suggested that the cut be restored. I do not know anything about this. I should like you to look into this matter.

All this business of a cut in their rations and their future pensions has to be seen together.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Mahavir Tyagi Papers, NMML.
2. K.M. Cariappa.

3. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
May 15, 1953

My dear Deshmukh,

You will remember our considering in the Defence Committee of the Cabinet the proposals for pensions for the Defence Services. We listened to the various viewpoints and did not come to a decision. Since then, I have gone more deeply into this matter and discussed it with the persons concerned. I came to the conclusion that, broadly speaking, the proposals of the Chiefs of Staff should form the basis of our consideration. That is to say, we should accept the general principles behind those proposals and then consider the details. I

1. JN Collection.

am referring chiefly to the proposals relating to the sepoy and the NCOs.² These were the major matters of contention and dispute.

Soon after the Defence Committee, I wrote to Mahavir Tyagi on this subject. As this letter indicates how my mind was working, I enclose a copy of it. Since then I have spoken to Mahavir and he is in agreement with me. I have discussed it with a number of other people, even outside Defence, and they have also been, on the whole, of the same opinion.

I do not know what you think about this, because we have not had a separate talk. But I should like you to consider what I have written. More and more I feel that this is a matter which might lead to grave consequences if not tackled properly. We seem to be having some trouble with our Ordnance Depots. That might pass. We have the question of our Ordnance industries before us and there is this question of pensions. In some way or other, we are affecting the entire defence establishment. Of course we should not do anything which is definitely wrong. But we have to carry people with us also and not create a sense of grave dissatisfaction.

I hope you will give this matter your consideration and then we can meet and discuss it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. On 26 May 1953, the Government of India accepted the major recommendations of the Kalyanwala Committee, which included: increase in the scale of its contribution to the provident fund of employees serving in defence establishments; declaring a certain portion of ad hoc employment permanent; reinstatement of workers, who had been downgraded due to rationalisation policy; gratuity for non-industrial personnel who retired without being confirmed; and finally the formula under which the Officers, JCOs, NCOs, sepoy and other ranks of the three armed forces would receive enhanced pension on retirement taking into account the years of service put in.

4. Retrenchment in Ordnance Depots¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: It is a fact that certain notices have been issued to some

1. Debate in Parliament, 15 May 1953, *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report, Vol.V, Part II, 12 to 15 May 1953, Cols. 6687-6689. Extracts.

personnel in these Ordnance Depots.² The matter has been considered from a very long time past. Conferences have also taken place in Works Committees and with managers and others. Because of this patent difficulty there has really been this surplus for some years past. And we have tried in every way to avoid retrenchment. But it became quite impossible to keep on people who have absolutely no work to do. In fact they clutter up other work. So we were compelled to give notice to a number of people in the Ordnance Depots.³ It is our desire and our practice to enlarge our work in the Ordnance Factories so that they might supply civil needs also and we might avoid any retrenchment. But this particular matter deals with Depots, not with Factories. That might also be kept in mind. So notices have been issued. Even so the matter is being investigated as to how far any person can be kept and not retrenched. And even if they are retrenched, even then an attempt will continuously be made to take them back whenever an opportunity occurs. That is the position. I do not know that there is any abnormality about it.⁴

H.N. Mukerjee: 'So far as we are concerned we have been informed that 1,362 notices were served, they were to expire on 15th May, that is today, and alternative employment has been provided only to 150. Is the Prime Minister in a position to state if the position is likely to improve—whether more will have alternative employment and that sort of thing?

JN: All I can say is that we make our utmost effort, and I believe that effort succeeds; in what time I cannot say...⁵

I do not know about what the honourable Member says in the last three or four days—I cannot say. It may be just to clear up loose strings.

2. The Deputy Speaker stated that he had received notice of an adjournment motion from M.S. Gurupadaswamy which stated that "the recent strike ballot taken by eighteen thousand employees of Ordnance Depots in Kanpur, Jabalpur, Pulgaon, Panagar and Chheoki against the policy of retrenchment announced by the Government, has produced a grave situation which will lead to far-reaching consequences."
3. Till the end of April 1953, out of a total of two lakh employees in the Ordnance Depots, 1362 had been declared surplus and 261 of them had already been retrenched.
4. To protest against the Government decision on retrenchment, a convention of Ordnance employees of 18 factories and depots met at Kanpur on 23 and 24 May 1953. At this convention, the three unions of Ordnance employees, namely, the All-India Defence Services Civilian Employees Federation, All-India Ordnance Employees Federation and Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh Ordnance Employees Federation, merged together and formed the All India Defence Employees Federation, with Maitreyee Bose as their General Secretary.
5. Gurupadaswamy wanted to know whether for the last three or four days over-time work was allowed in the Delhi depot and, if so, what the reason was for that over-time work.

5. To V.V. Giri¹

New Delhi
May 19, 1953

My dear Giri,

I have just received your letter of the 18th May about the Kalyanwala Committee's report.²

At your request I postponed consideration of this Committee's report in the Cabinet although I was exceedingly anxious that this should be expedited. The matter has been pending for too long. I realise that the subject dealt with in this report is of interest to Labour. But primarily the Defence Committee had to deal with it and to prepare their summary. In this summary it was patently not feasible to put in all the arguments for and against various recommendations. The summary would have become a minor report if this was done. The actual recommendations of various persons are given in appendices attached. For the arguments, any person interested can go to the report itself.

Normally speaking, a summary should be brief and I had impressed this upon the Cabinet Secretariat repeatedly.

This whole story of the Kalyanwala Committee's report fills me with astonishment. Unfortunately, Kalyanwala died. The two remaining members of the Committee, both officials of the Government of India,³ then proceeded to write two separate reports as if they represented hostile and diametrically opposed viewpoints and interests. The result is that the report is not of too much use and instead of lightening our burden has added to it. I am surprised at the way Government officials function in such committees. They forget that Government is an integrated organism and not hostile elements pulling in different directions. I do not mean that every one should agree about everything, but there is a way of dealing with these matters which helps and there is a way which hinders. Also no subject can be considered in isolation. Every recommendation has a far-reaching effect which has to be considered in its totality. There are so many things that we want to do, but which we cannot do. Nothing is more painful to me than the scale of salaries paid to our Local Board teachers. Yet, we cannot go ahead as fast as we can

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to Minister of Defence Organization and Cabinet Secretary.
2. In 1950, the Government of India had appointed a Committee of Inquiry under the Chairmanship of F.N. Kalyanwala to look into the service conditions of civilian employees in ordnance factories and other Defence establishments.
3. B.B. Ghosh and K.N. Subramanian.

in that matter. Generally speaking, and apart from any particular point, Subramanian's report has struck me as unbalanced or rather the approach is unbalanced.⁴

Here we have now practically two reports and then the views of the Defence Ministry and finally the views of the Finance Ministry which do not accept even the Defence Committee's recommendations. A discussion on this in Cabinet on the basis of all these differences can lead to no result whatever. Hence, the Defence Ministry has tried to convince the Finance Ministry and to get some common approach.

I really do not see why the Defence Ministry should prepare another summary. Indeed, I am almost inclined to deal with the recommendations, purely and simply, of all the parties concerned without any summaries and to come to decisions on them.

I feel strongly that this matter should be decided before I go away. It is because of that that I have given some time to it already and the postponement of its consideration has rather upset my programme. I think we should take it up before I go to Kashmir in its present form and discuss a few of the major points on which there is a difference of opinion. It is this that matters and not the many others that flow from it. There is not much point in our taking this up a few hours before my departure.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Subramanian's report was finally rejected and the Government, on 26 May 1953 gave partial effect to the Kalyanwala Committee report.

6. To Mahavir Tyagi¹

New Delhi
June 30, 1953

My dear Mahavir,

One of these days I want to go over to the Defence Ministry just to get in touch with developments. I am rather anxious about the news I received abroad about discontent owing to retrenchment.²

1. Mahavir Tyagi Papers, NMML.
2. Tyagi replied on 1 July 1953 that there had been no retrenchment in the Defence Forces, and it seemed the news pertained to a strike in the Central Ordnance Depot at Dehu Road, Pune, which was called off on 13 June.

Some time ago I wrote a note about a proposal made by General Cariappa to the effect that the Central Government might interest itself directly in the fate of ex-Servicemen all over India. Normally the State Governments deal with this matter. They should continue to deal with it but some Central supervision and direction appears to be desirable and would certainly be welcomed by the ex-Servicemen. This really means a fairly senior officer, possibly a retired officer, being put in charge of Department for Ex-Servicemen. He can deal with State Governments and find out what was being done. He could help to coordinate these activities and keep us informed. It is desirable to help as far as possible these men.

Some of these men have been discharged after many years in the Army, but before they had earned a pension. It is not particularly easy for them to find new employment at 35 or 40 years of age.

Cariappa has also mentioned to me the case of Emergency Commissioned Officers. Apparently the question of some gratuity to them has been pending. Many of these men have also been for many years in the Army and they had to leave when the possibility of other employment is remote.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

III. APPOINTMENTS AND SERVICE RULES

1. To B.V. Keskar¹

New Delhi
April 24, 1953

My dear Balkrishna,

I wonder if you know Paramanand Desai. He is Mahadev Desai's younger brother. He did well here and then at Sardar Patel's instance and my suggestion also, he went, I think, to America for a two-year course of training in diplomacy etc. When he came back, he was over-age for the Foreign Service and there were various other difficulties. However, ultimately we managed to put him in the Historical Division temporarily. After a year was over, we referred this matter to the Public Service Commission who expressed their resentment at anyone having been appointed without their previous consent.

1. File No. 4(73)/50-PMS.

Subsequently his case was put up to them in the normal course and they did not approve.

So here we are. I have not been in touch with his work and so cannot say much. But he has had good training in many ways and I am rather unhappy at our inability to use him. I do not know if there is any possibility of your utilising his services. Perhaps you might see him.

I enclose a note.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Engagement of Foreign Experts¹

I agree with this note. I might mention that an American expert who had come here under some plan or other had a talk with me some weeks or months ago. He said that he was a little surprised at the way we invited and accepted so-called experts from abroad when we had persons of at least equal standing and experience, and often more than that, available in India. He said that some of these foreign experts who had come here had often little experience even of their own country and certainly none of India. Unfortunately some kind of halo attaches to a foreign expert.

2. Procedure suggested in the note appears to me correct, provided it is strictly applied.

3. I do not see why we should accept experts from abroad simply because they happen to be paid for by some foreign agency. They have to justify themselves in other ways too.

1. Note to Cabinet Secretary, 9 May 1953. File No. 17(8)/47-PMS.

3. Service Rules and Specialists at AIIMS¹

In some form or other this matter has come before me previously. I have discussed it not only with the Health Minister but with a full deputation of the Expert Committee appointed to advise Government on the establishment of the All India Medical Institute of which Shri A.L.Mudaliar is the Chairman. That Expert Committee consists of some of the most distinguished medical men in India, and normally I would have no hesitation at all to accept their opinion as men of distinction in that particular field. In the present case, they were also the very committee of Experts appointed to advise us in regard to this Medical Institute. Their opinion, therefore, according to my thinking, must have the greatest value attached to it. I discussed this matter at some length with them to find out the reasons for their holding this opinion. They convinced me that these reasons were adequate. The test in all such matters should surely be what is good for the new Institute from the national point of view. Service rules are good in their own way, but they cannot override national advantage if this is clearly established. It has been clearly laid down by Cabinet that, in the case of experts and scientists, the normal age of retirement need not hold. In no country that I am aware of does such an age of retirement hold good for experts, technicians, scientists and the like. Indeed, some of these persons do their best work at relatively advanced ages. We have, during the past few years, lost the services of some very good men in this way and they have been employed in other countries. Considering the size of the country and the many demands made upon us, we are short of first rate men and women and we can ill-afford to lose the services of any one of them because of the application of some rigid rule relating to the services. Top-ranking men are generally fairly well known. They are not hidden away somewhere to be discovered after a close search. So far as the medical men are concerned, our Health Ministry and even more so the Expert Committee of distinguished men from all over India know all the outstanding medical men in India and many abroad.

2. The sole question, therefore, is whether Dr K.C.K.E. Raja² is to be considered suitable and fully competent to carry on his work as Member-Secretary of the Expert Committee. As to that, obviously the most suitable persons to judge are the distinguished Members of that Committee. Their

1. Note, 16 May 1953. JN Collection.

2. Director-General of Health Services, Government of India, 1948-52, and Officer on Special Duty, Ministry of Health, for the development of All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, 1952-56.

opinion is clear and is in his favour, apart from that, it seems to me rather an odd procedure to remove the Member-Secretary of an Expert Committee during the last stages of the work of that Committee. Even if (and this is by no means clear) some fully competent person could be found for this work, he could not possibly have the same experience of this particular work and will take a little time to pick up the strings and get used to it. That would mean delay in an important undertaking and delay is both costly and otherwise undesirable.

3. I note that the UPSC hold strong views on the subject. It is always with reluctance that I find myself in disagreement with them and I try to avoid this to the utmost of my ability. But, in this case, I am absolutely clear that I cannot support their views and that we must accept the joint recommendation of the Health Ministry and the Expert Committee. I think that Dr K.C.K.E. Raja should complete his work as Member-Secretary of this Expert Committee and full opportunity should be given to him for this.

4. It is stated in the note of the Secretary, appointments committee, that this case is likely to be included in the Commission's Annual Report. I think that such an inclusion should be welcomed. That will enable Parliament to consider the question of the employment of scientists, experts and technicians in relation to the present rules. That question is of great importance in view of the different outlook of our Government from that of the old. The old rules were good rules from the point of view of the outlook of the State then. That outlook was a confined one and a feature of it related to rules relating to Services. Indeed, the previous State was dominantly a Service State. The new State aims at developing into a Welfare State. The outlook is completely different and service rules should play a subordinate part.

5. Dr Appleby's Report,³ presented early this year, laid stress on the necessity of our changing our outlook in regard to the services. Dr Appleby brought the fresh and unbiased mind of a trained observer to bear upon our administration and his advice is valuable.

6. I think that, in any event, we should consider this larger question in all its aspects at an early date in Cabinet and later in Parliament.


7. Meanwhile, I agree with the proposal made by the Health Minister.

8. Copy of this note should be sent to the Health Minister and to the Minister for Home Affairs.

3. Appleby pointed out a number of defects in the administrative system, such as there was too much of diffusion of responsibility in the administrative hierarchy; and the system of seniority had "too much feudalistic heritage" and "too little human relations orientations."



WITH JOHN FOSTER DULLES, US SECRETARY OF STATE, AND HAROLD STASSEN,
DIRECTOR, MUTUAL SECURITY AGENCY, NEW DELHI, 20 MAY 1953



TELEVISION PRESS CONFERENCE, BBC, LONDON, 12 JUNE 1953

4. To Lal Bahadur Shastri¹

New Delhi
May 25, 1953

My dear Lal Bahadur,²

T.T. Krishnamachari has drawn my attention to the case of a young man who passed first in the Indian Railway Service Engineers examination last year but who was not taken in because of a police report against him³. I agree with T.T. that we should not act on police reports in this way and attach importance to a young man's indiscretions. We shall just drive them away into wrong channels⁴. I think you should engage him. I have written to Katju about this.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Union Minister for Railways and Transport.
3. Krishnamachari had written that the said young man, L. Natarajan, was prevented from joining the Service because the police report had dubbed him a Communist since he had Communist sympathies during his student days.
- 4.. Krishnamachari had wondered whether "we are recruiting young men for the Communist Party which is what we will be doing if we give such young men no chance of retracing their steps." He further asked: "who is ruling over this country, the police or Jawaharlal Nehru?"

5. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
May 27, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

Thank you for your letter of the 25th May about Natarajan. I know nothing about him and can have no personal opinion, but the quotation you have given from the report of the DIB does not appear to me quite adequate except in so far that it put us on enquiry. The fact that a person was connected with the

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to T.T. Krishnamachari and Lal Bahadur Shastri.

Students Federation of the Communist Party is an important consideration from this point of view. But we should go further into the matters. As you say in your letter, there are many brilliant young men who are attracted to the communist doctrine. Indeed, this is so all over the world. It is these brilliant young men whom we should like to have with us, if possible. There are never many such persons about and it always hurts me to see a good young man going astray. I do not want to do anything to push him in that direction.

You will notice that in Krishnamachari's letter, there is a reference to T.R. Venkatarama Sastry² who is a moderate and a liberal and a person greatly respected in Madras. If Venkatarama Sastry knows the young man and speaks well of him, that is an important consideration in his favour.

In such cases, I should like to enquire from other sources also and in particular, I should like to meet him and have a talk with him. I suggest that you might find out from T.R. Venkatarama Sastry what he knows of him and later send for the man, have a look at him and talk to him and then decide.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Former Advocate-General of Madras and President, Indian National Liberal Federation.

6. To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai¹

New Delhi
June 29, 1953

My dear Rafi,²

I have seen today a note for the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet with enclosed papers regarding the appointment of the Raja of Bhadri³ as Cattle Utilization Adviser under your Ministry. These papers indicate a difference of opinion between your Ministry and the Union Public Service Commission in regard to the proposed appointment.

I do not agree with all the arguments advanced by the Public Service Commission, but there is certainly some force in them. Normally speaking, a

1. JN Collection.

2. Union Minister of Food and Agriculture.

3. Bajrang Bahadur Singh.

person appointed to a post of this kind should have high technical qualifications apart from other necessary qualifications. It may well be that the Raja of Bhadri will make good in this post because of his general experience and the energy he might put into his work. But it cannot be said that he has the necessary technical qualifications.

Also the mere fact that he happens to be a friend of ours and is personally known to us goes rather against him in this particular matter.

On the whole I am inclined to think that in a case like this it would not be right for us to override the recommendation of the Union Public Service Commission. Where real technical and expert knowledge is required and we have had a person of high qualifications in view, I have not hesitated to recommend an appointment, even though the Public Service Commission was not agreeable to it. They looked at it more from the service point of view while I was more concerned with the success of the work. But in the present case all that can be put forward for the Raja of Bhadri is his general knowledge and experience and his social status in life. These are undoubtedly useful qualifications in their own way, but they are rather vague and can hardly take the place of technical knowledge. Such matters do require a wide knowledge of what has been done to cattle in other countries.

The extraordinary fact is that cattle are infinitely better in other countries even though there is no special sentiment there in regard to cattle. We have the sentiment in India and at the same time both ignorance and carelessness.

Therefore I feel that, in the circumstances, we ought not to go against the wishes of the Union Public Service Commission in this matter and we should try to get some person with technical and expert knowledge, preferably of the cattle problem in other countries. I do not think that a revenue official will be at all suitable. It may be that the normal veterinary official will also not be particularly suitable, though there may be exceptions.

Could you not have the Raja of Bhadri as an Honorary Adviser to you, in addition to the paid technical man that you might appoint? That would be a suitable place for him. In fact, it would give him a somewhat higher status though there will be no payment. You would thus have the technical man separately and an Honorary Adviser.

I am sending you the papers relating to this matter that were forwarded to me.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

IV. GENERAL

1. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi

April 5, 1953

My dear Mr President,

I have received your letter of the 5th April sending me copy of Master Tara Singh's letter of the 4th April.²

Master Tara Singh's letter ends with an ultimatum.³ I hardly think it deserves a reply. But perhaps it would be better for your Secretary to send a brief acknowledgment and say that the letter has been referred to the Home Ministry.

In regard to the particular matter referred to in the letter, that is, privileges for some depressed class Sikhs, this was, as you well know, discussed and decided after full consultation with the then Sikh representatives, including Giani Kartar Singh, who was in close association with Master Tara Singh. However, so far as we are concerned, we would probably have no special objection to our considering this matter, provided the Punjab Government was willing to do so. I understand that the Punjab Government has been considering this.

Apart from the merits of this question, I should not like our Government to take action as a result of an ultimatum from Master Tara Singh.

I am sending your letter to the Home Minister.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 56/53, President's Secretariat.
2. Tara Singh had urged the President to get amended the Schedule in the Indian Constitution, which provides special protection and special rights to the depressed classes, so as to extend those privileges to the Sikhs of the same classes. He felt that in a "professedly secular" Government there should be no discrimination on grounds of religion.
3. Tara Singh had asked for a reply by 13 April, when he had to give some "decisive advice" to the Sikhs who were in a restive mood and it was necessary to give them some proof of the Government's "fair and non-discriminatory" attitude. Otherwise, he threatened to "adopt some measure which may be interpreted as an ultimatum."
4. In his reply of 10 April 1953, K.N. Katju observed that though it was generally believed that when a person was converted to Sikhism, he became equal with other Sikhs, a Harijan "by merely becoming a Sikh, does not get rid of his backwardness or his ignorance." He, therefore, had no objection to the reconsideration of the matter by the Government of India.

2. Madam Sun Yat-sen's Proposed Visit¹

I am surprised at the suggestion that a lady of the position of Madam Sun Yat-sen should be prevented from coming to India, whatever the purpose of her visit might be. This is quite impossible. If she comes, she ought not only to be allowed to come, but all normal courtesies given to a person of her high position must be accorded to her. Normally, she would have been treated as a guest of Government. If she comes privately or in response to a private invitation, we need not treat her as such, but we shall have to consider what courtesies we should give her. As a matter of fact, I doubt very much if she will come to India, though there is always a possibility of her passing through India and breaking journey here for a brief while.

2. Madam Sun Yat-sen has been personally invited by me repeatedly to come to India. She has separately been invited by Rajkumari Amrit Kaur. It would be the height of discourtesy for us to put obstructions in the way of her visit to India, for whatever purpose, and even to object to her spending a few days here in transit. If any news reaches us that she is likely to come, our Ambassador in Peking should be asked to verify this news and to find out directly from the Chinese Government whether this is true and other particulars about her visit. The Ambassador should state that she will always be welcome in India.

3. To a somewhat lesser extent, the same principle should apply to women of note who may come to India or pass through India. I am afraid the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Intelligence Bureau are taking much too narrow a view of these matters and of international affairs. We cannot run our foreign affairs on this basis. Whatever general principle we might adopt, we cannot apply indiscriminately to every person, whatever his or her position or status. Therefore, each case must be considered separately.

4. In particular, difficulties being placed in the way of transit visas seem to be objectionable. Our trying to prevent Commonwealth citizens, merely on the ground of their intending to attend a conference in India, also appears to me objectionable. A particular individual to whom we have special objection may be dealt with differently.

5. Apart from the general approach to this question, it would be particularly undesirable for us to take any obstructive action of this kind at this juncture when international affairs have taken a particular turn and India is playing some important part in them. It is wrong for us to appear before the world as if we have lined up with some kind of an anti-Communist front.

1. Note, 6 May 1953. File No. 5(52)-P.V.I.T/53-MEA. Copies of this note were sent to Secretary-General and Ministry of Home Affairs.

6. As regards permitting Indian women attending the proposed conference at Copenhagen, there is no reason why we should apply any general ban. Quite a number of people, of whom we disapprove politically or otherwise, travel abroad. It makes little difference whether a few more go or do not go. It does make a difference to our general reputation if we act in a narrow way, which has become the distinguishing feature of American policy. Generally speaking, the United Kingdom does not act in this way nor do most countries in Europe. As a matter of fact, a woman Member of Parliament asked me if she could go to Copenhagen and I told her that she could do so if she was keen on it. Later she decided herself not to go. Some other women Members of Parliament asked me about this and I advised them not to go, because of their special position.

7. Applications should therefore be considered on individual merit or demerit. The case mentioned of Shrimati Mohini Devi Srivastava² may, for the reasons given, be treated as not suitable for the grant of a passport.

8. Our general policy to discourage large numbers of people going abroad at the expense of an outside authority, may hold, but individual cases should be considered individually.

9. A very large number of persons are going to the US from India on some scholarship or leadership programme or in some other way at the expense of a foreign authority. I do not approve of this very much either.

2. A Communist worker from Bhopal.

3. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
May 12, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

I am sending you some papers about one Ravi Mohan Bakaya.² If you will read the note by Mathai, this will give the facts. These are clear enough. The only question is whether a person who is a known Communist should be allowed a passport, especially when he has been undoubtedly suffering from TB, in view of all kinds of developments and the fact that many Communists go abroad.

1. JN Collection.

2. Bakaya was one of the pioneers of the movement for friendship between India and the Soviet Union; Secretary, Preparatory Committee of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society and later of the National Council of the Society; taught Russian language at IIT, Bombay and in Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi from where he retired as Professor in 1989.

I do not see the particular point in refusing a passport to a man merely on the ground of his being a Communist. We do not stop contacts that way. There are plenty of contacts. A minor consideration is the change in Soviet policy and the international position.

On the whole I would be inclined to let him have the passport. But I should like you to judge this matter.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Mathai had forwarded the papers regarding issue of support to R.M. Bakaya, to travel to USSR for medical reasons, along with a note by B.N. Mullick, Director, Intelligence Bureau. Mullick contended that Bakaya was a known Communist and the Bureau had "good reasons to believe" that he wished to go to Moscow on a "mission given to him by the Central Committee (CPI)". Mathai maintained that since nothing serious had been pointed out by Mullick against Bakaya, his case might be reviewed.

4. Income Tax on Privy Purses¹

So far as equity is concerned, I see no reason why the Nizam should be exempted from income-tax on this annual payment of Rs 50 lakhs.² As a matter of fact, from the point of view of equity, I do not think any of the Princes should be exempted from income-tax on their Privy Purses. Our difficulty is that we are bound down by our own assurances and constitutional provisions. Whether those constitutional provisions apply to this particular payment to the income-tax or not is partly a matter of public policy, much more so a matter of legal interpretation.

2. I think that some time or other, and I hope this time will not be delayed too much, a new approach should be made in regard to all these Privy Purses and heavy payments to Princes. But that is a separate matter.

3. Meanwhile, as the Finance Minister desires that this matter should be referred to the Cabinet, this will have to be done. But the Cabinet can hardly judge of the legal issues without full advice. Therefore the opinion of the Law Ministry as well as of the Attorney-General should be taken and then the matter should be placed before the Cabinet.

1. Note for Minister for States, 22 May 1953. JN Collection.
2. Ramakrishna Rao had, on 13 February 1953, sought Nehru's guidance on: (i) the payment of Rs 50 lakhs to the Nizam as compensation for the *Sarf-e-Khas*, Nizam's own jagirs; (ii) the reduction of the commutation amounts payable to the jagirdars; and (iii) the abolition of cash grants called *mansabs*, *yumias*, etc.

5. To Brahm Perkash¹

New Delhi
27th May, 1953

My dear Brahm Perkash,²

I am told that the RSS are using some public parks in Delhi for their drill and training of boys, etc. Indeed, I understand that these boys take possession of a park for the time being and push out others. This is very extraordinary. I thought that such drill etc. were all forbidden. In any event, it should not be allowed in present circumstances.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Chief Minister of Delhi.

6. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
May 27, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

...I am totally dissatisfied with these explanations and excuses. Personally I do not want Gulab Chand Jain to go to the law courts.³ I seldom am prepared to advise anybody to go to the law courts unless he is compelled to. But what troubles me is the way the Delhi Administration and the Police have resisted all attempts to treat this matter in a normal way and to give some consolation to a citizen who was treated badly for no reason at all. I would have been satisfied if even an apology was given plus a severe admonition to the Sub-Inspector. Instead of this, the Sub-Inspector is defended and all kinds of allegations are made against Gulab Chand Jain.

I have had enough of this matter. But I have registered a black mark against the Delhi Police and Administration in my mind.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Gulab Chand Jain, a well known citizen of Delhi, was "for no rhyme or reason...handcuffed and locked up by a Sub-Inspector in Delhi." Nehru considered it "a monstrous affair" and desired the local Administration to punish the guilty official.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

I. BILATERAL RELATIONS

(i) Pakistan

1. To Khwaja Nazimuddin¹

New Delhi

April 6, 1953

My dear Khwaja Sahib,

Thank you for your letter of March 28th.² I received it last night on my return from a tour of our frontier with Burma. I hasten to reply to it.

I have already told you that I am prepared to discuss any subject of dispute or common concern between India and Pakistan. I am convinced that the right approach to any problem, between two nations is for them to deal with each other directly and not through intermediaries. After all we know each other and understand each other much better than any foreigner can do. If others intervene, then the direct link is lost and there is a tendency for either party to function as advocates of a cause. That is hardly becoming for self-respecting and independent nations.

It is true that some of our problems have become very complicated and what might have been easy at an earlier stage is more difficult today. This is so not only because of the complexity of the problems, but also because of the emotions roused in regard to them. Passions and emotions do not yield to logic or calm reason. Nevertheless, the only approach is that of logic and calm reason and that approach can only be made directly. The overriding fact is, and every sensible person must necessarily recognise it, that it is in the highest interest of India and Pakistan to cooperate in the largest measure possible. That cooperation can only take effective shape when the problems that beset us are put away and solved, or, at any rate, we go some long way towards their solution.

We must realise that the solution may not be easy or quickly arrived at because of the past background. But if we are determined to find a solution, I have no doubt that we shall find it, even though that may not be at the first attempt.

You refer to the Canal Waters dispute and to the good offices of the World Bank in this connection.³ I would have preferred this, as other matters

1. JN Collection.

2. The Pakistan Premier had referred to the Canal Waters dispute, a review of Prime Ministers' agreement of 1950 and matters relating to trade and commerce between the two countries, and had proposed an early meeting with Nehru to discuss these issues.

3. Referring to the Canal Waters dispute, Nazimuddin wrote that the immediate problem was to devise measures, which would ensure the maintenance of existing uses, as agreed to by both the parties, based on the World Bank's proposal of 13 March 1952.

in issue, to be decided by us directly. But since the World Bank has been good enough to interest itself and give us help, I welcome it and I hope that this will lead to an understanding. We have agreed that existing uses will be continued so long as we are continuing these discussions with the World Bank, which, we hope will result in a satisfactory solution. We shall abide by that agreement and assurance. You refer to some kind of procedure for verification.⁴ We have in fact appointed a special Commissioner on behalf of the Government of India to see to it that full effect is given to our assurance.⁵ If, at any time, you have the slightest doubt in this matter, I invite you to refer it to me, as I am taking personal interest in this question. I am sure, however, that there will be no occasion for your doing so.

While we welcome the good offices of the World Bank in this connection and will cooperate with them to the fullest extent to find a solution, I would not welcome any Inspectors or others of the World Bank to interfere with this matter.⁶ That is unbecoming for an independent nation. Indeed, we will have no objection to explaining anything to you or to your representatives at any time so that you can satisfy yourself.

You refer to the Kashmir dispute.⁷ It is true that this dispute has embittered relations between India and Pakistan and the sooner it is resolved, the better it will be. I am perfectly prepared to discuss this with you. Indeed, I am convinced that a real solution can only come by mutual agreement and not by any attempt at imposition by any outside party. You will appreciate, however, that, both under our Constitution and for other obvious reasons, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir State has a very large say in this matter and we have to consult it in regard to any step that might be taken. However, I am perfectly prepared to discuss this subject with you.

During my absence from Delhi, I find that some telegrams have been exchanged between your Government and mine regarding a conference at official level between our respective representatives.⁸ I welcome this

4. Nazimuddin had written that the Bank was trying to establish a procedure for the verification of water discharge data so as to obviate any fear of reduction of supplies. He was convinced that if a satisfactory procedure was devised, it would lead to the solution of the problem.
5. G.R. Garg, a retired Chief Engineer from Punjab, was appointed Special Commissioner for Canal Waters in March 1953 and the Punjab (India) Government was instructed that his orders were to be "scrupulously carried out."
6. In the latter half of March 1953, when the World Bank's proposals were discussed at the highest level, Nehru had opposed the idea of any foreign observers on the canals. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, pp. 508-510.
7. Nazimuddin had written that Kashmir remained the most contentious issue between the two countries and had suggested that the two Prime Ministers should meet at an early date for that purpose.
8. The secretary level conference took place on 14 and 15 July in Karachi.

conference, and I hope they will discuss many matters that are unresolved still. I am told that it has been suggested on your Government's behalf that the officials should discuss the Kashmir issue also. I have no objection to their discussing this or, any other issue, but it is obvious that much progress cannot be made at an official level in regard to the Kashmir issue.

You have been good enough to invite me to visit Karachi to meet you there. I would gladly avail myself of any opportunity to meet you and to discuss matters with you. But I find it exceedingly difficult at present to fix up any such meeting outside Delhi. Our Parliament is meeting from day to day and this casts a heavy burden upon me. In addition to this the new developments in the international situation concern us, in many ways, rather intimately, and I have to give constant thought to them with a view, sometimes, to action being taken. From now on till the time I leave for London I am almost completely booked up with important engagements and I do not quite see how to do away with them. Secretary Dulles of the USA is coming here⁹ as he is going to Pakistan. Mr Adlai Stevenson is also coming here. I have promised some visits to our scarcity-stricken areas in the south and the working out of our Five Year Plan and Community Projects scheme is of vital importance and I am deeply committed to them.

You will appreciate my difficulties. Nevertheless, I am eager to meet you. There is no point in my going to Karachi for an odd day. I must find at least three or four days and for the present I do not see my way to them. I shall, however, consider this matter further and see what can be done. In any event, it would be better to have the conference of officials as early as possible and then decide as to what further step we might take.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. John Foster Dulles visited India from 20 to 22 May 1953.

2. Cable to Khwaja Nazimuddin¹

I am surprised to read in Pakistani newspapers that I have objected to

1. New Delhi, 13 April 1953. JN Collection. The cable was sent through the High Commissioner, Karachi.

discussion of Kashmir and Canal Waters questions with you.² As you know I have repeatedly made clear that I am prepared to discuss every issue with you and that further our officials also can discuss every issue. I do not understand therefore why these completely false statements are appearing in the Pakistani press and why the Pakistan Government does not contradict them as being wholly untrue.

I must express my regret also at the continuing attacks on India by responsible Pakistani Governors and Ministers.³ This is hardly a suitable preparation for friendly talks. So far as we are concerned, we are always prepared to consider any matter affecting India and Pakistan in a friendly and cooperative spirit. You should yourself make it perfectly clear to press and public in Pakistan what our attitude is in this matter and that we have never refused discussion on any subject.⁴

2. On 12 April 1953, *Dawn* reported that Nehru had "refused to discuss" the Kashmir issue and the Canal Waters dispute with Nazimuddin.
3. Responsible Pakistani politicians like Abdur Rab Nishtar and F.K.Noan had been indulging in India-baiting and talking of an impending war to sort out various problems between India and Pakistan.
4. In his reply of 15 April, Nazimuddin expressed regret for the behaviour of *Dawn* in giving publicity to a false statement.

3. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
April 19, 1953

My dear Dickie,

...You must have been surprised to read of the extraordinary developments in Pakistan.² The whole thing is rather Gilbertian. On Jinnah's death, Nazimuddin becomes Governor-General. On Liaquat Ali's death, Nazimuddin appoints himself as Prime Minister, which was rather odd constitutionally speaking, and makes Ghulam Mohammed the Governor-General. And now, Ghulam Mohammed dismisses Nazimuddin with little ceremony and almost at a few hours' notice. Nazimuddin goes on protesting that he will not resign and that he still continues as Prime Minister *de jure*.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Nazimuddin and his cabinet had been dismissed by Ghulam Mohammed, the Governor-General, who invited Mohammad Ali Bogra to form the new Government.

The fact of the matter is that hardly any constitution functions in Pakistan and it is all palace politics and palace intrigues—without a palace. Some time back, Zafrullah Khan said that Pakistan was a part of the Middle-East.³ Geographically, that was far from correct, but it has proved to be correct in another sense, i.e., the politics of Pakistan are similar to the politics of the Middle-Eastern countries... A number of unscrupulous persons control the destiny of this unfortunate country (that is, Pakistan) and I do not quite know where they will take it....

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. In a statement of 24 July 1952, speaking about the unstable political conditions in the Middle Eastern countries, Zafrullah had said: "...In the first instance, law and order in all the Middle East territories in which Pakistan is also included, will be impartially, firmly and if necessary even ruthlessly maintained."

4. Mohammad Ali's Assumption of Office¹

I am grateful to you for your message of greeting on the assumption by you of the high office of Prime Minister.² My Government and I believe that relations between India and Pakistan should be friendly and cooperative and that we should solve our problems in that spirit. To that end, we shall continue to address ourselves.

1. Message to Mohammad Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan, 21 April 1953. From the *National Herald*, 22 April 1953.
2. The Pakistan Prime Minister had said: "Upon assuming the office of Prime Minister, I send to you and to your cabinet colleagues my greetings and compliments. I would like to take the opportunity to assure you that it would be my Government's earnest endeavour to promote friendly relations between our two countries."

5. To Mohan Sinha Mehta¹

New Delhi
April 22, 1953

My dear Mohan Sinhaji,

I have been reading your recent letters with interest. I have just read your letter of the 21st April.²

It is quite clear that the US Government have heartily welcomed the change at Karachi.

The day before this coup d'etat took place in Karachi, or rather the night before, Paul Hoffman³ came to dinner with me and had a long talk lasting nearly three hours. He had come to India for a very brief visit rather secretly.⁴ I had been informed of it some days earlier as he wanted to see me specially and I had fixed the dinner engagement. He brought me a letter from President Eisenhower conveying his greetings and commending Hoffman to me as a person in whom the President had the fullest trust.

Hoffman is a liberal Republican and has a high place in the US. He was one of the persons who induced Eisenhower to stand for the Presidentship and refused to stand himself, although he was pressed to do so. He spoke to me about Eisenhower's passion for peace and all that. He tried to make out that there were only two persons in the world who were big enough to stop the drift to war and to lay the foundations of peace in the world—the two persons being Eisenhower and I. He discussed the recent Soviet moves, etc., and, though not without suspicion, said that we ought to welcome them and take advantage of them.

After a long talk about other matters, he came round to India and Pakistan

1. JN Collection.
2. In his letters of 18 and 21 April, Mehta sent a detailed report about the sudden political change in Pakistan and his impressions about the new ministry. He had hinted that this was brought about by active influence and support of the United States Administration.
3. Paul Gray Hoffman (1891-1974); Republican politician; Chairman, Federal Reserve Bank, 1942-49; Administrator, ECA (Marshall Plan), 1948-50; President and Director, Ford Foundation, 1951-53; Chairman, Studybaker Corporation, 1953-56; member of US delegation to the UN, 1956-57; Managing Director, UN Special Fund, 1959-65; Administrator, UNDP, 1966-72; author of, *Seven Roads to Safety* (1939), *Peace Can be Won* (1951), *100 Countries: One and a half billion people* (1960), and *World Without Want* (1962).
4. In a secret memorandum to Eisenhower on 24 March 1953, Dulles wrote that "The Kashmir situation is becoming increasingly acute and war between India and Pakistan is not a remote possibility... Would you think that Paul Hoffman might go on a private mission to explore confidentially the attitude of the two parties to some partition of Kashmir? It would seem that such a project might be acceptable and it is the only solution which now seems to have practicable possibilities." The US President accepted the suggestion.

and, more particularly, the Kashmir issue. He made it clear that he did not know much about it, but he was distressed that American opinion generally should be against India on this subject. American opinion was often ill-informed and seized hold of some simple aspect of a case. Here they went by the fact that Pakistan was prepared for arbitration while we were not. This came in the way of the abundant help that he would like the US to give both India and Pakistan to develop them.

He referred to the speech that Eisenhower was to deliver that very evening and emphasized that this was going to be a very important utterance.⁵ He said that Eisenhower was very pleased to learn that I was going to meet Nazimuddin. He almost hinted that this was one of the reasons that had induced Eisenhower to send him to India to see me. He would of course go to Pakistan also, but the main purpose of his coming here was to see me. He reverted to the Kashmir issue and made some rather silly suggestions. I told him that so far as we were concerned, we were always anxious to settle this and other matters and that I would continue trying my best to do so. Some time or other, I would certainly meet Nazimuddin. But I pointed out that the real difficulty in the past had been the interference, however good the intentions might have been, of the UK and USA in this matter. Left to ourselves, we would have probably made much better progress. We talked at length, but I need not say much more here about it.

The very next morning, Hoffman went to Karachi and spent just a day there. That day happened to be the day of the coup d'etat, when everybody in Karachi must have been not only busy but excited. Nevertheless, Hoffman managed to meet quite a number of people there. From there he went to Calcutta direct and returned here today. He came to see me this evening and told me that the change in Karachi appeared to be all for the good and a much more energetic lot of people were now in charge. Further that it was clear that this was a popular change. I said that the popularity of the change probably was rather a negative thing, i.e., dislike and disgust of the previous administration and a feeling that any change would be for the good. However, I said that I was in no position to judge. All I could say was that most of the people at the top in Pakistan could hardly be considered popular figures from the point of view of the people. Politics in Pakistan appeared to be palace

5. On 16 April 1953, in a statement in response to the Soviet peace gestures, Eisenhower called for peace and disarmament and proposed that a reconstruction fund be set up out of the savings from the armament programme to be used for the development of the under-developed areas of the world. Referring to the Soviet desire for peace he said that their "sincerity of peaceful purpose" should be "attested by deeds" such as peace in Asia, disarmament, and signing of an Austrian Peace treaty, and the release of World War II prisoners.

politics, minus a palace, or clan or family politics, which often dominate the scene in a politically backward country.

Hoffman told me of the vital necessity of the US helping Pakistan. For India, US help was desirable and necessary, but for Pakistan this was absolutely vital to keep it going.⁶

Hoffman is of course what the Americans call, a super salesman.

It would be interesting to find out whom Hoffman met during his brief stay in Karachi. He certainly met Ghulam Mohammed and Mohammad Ali,⁷ the Prime Minister as well as Mohammed Ali, the Finance Minister.

I am writing this brief account to you just to keep you informed.

As far as I can see, there is no chance whatever of my meeting the Pakistan Prime Minister before I go to England. Indeed, it would not be proper for me to do so suddenly after the coup d'etat, and besides, it is extraordinarily difficult for me to find the time. I shall be out of Delhi for a week or so touring the Maharashtra scarcity areas, returning on the 5th May. After that I am likely to pay one or two brief visits. On the 28th May, I leave for England.

As you perhaps know, we are having military exercises in East Punjab. They will begin tomorrow and last for about ten days. On the very morning of the day when Nazimuddin was dismissed, our Army Headquarters sent a telegram to the Pak Army people informing them of these exercises. There was some talk here later on in the diplomatic colony that we were having troop movements because of the changes in Pakistan. That was silly. It was fortunate that we informed the Pak Army of our exercises some time before the change at Karachi. I am going to Ludhiana for a day to see these exercises.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. For strengthening Mohammad Ali's position, Hoffman wrote to Dulles on 28 April: "One action must be taken by the USA in order to insure the support of his own countrymen and that is the effecting of some arrangement whereby shipment of sufficient wheat can be made in order to prevent famine."

7. (1909-1963); member of Muslim League in Bengal, 1937-47; Pakistan's ambassador to various countries, 1948-53, and Prime Minister of Pakistan, 1953-55.

6. Improving Relations with Pakistan¹

...5. The future of the Hindu minority in East Bengal² is dependent upon the larger issue of Indo-Pakistan relations. There is a possibility now, more than at any time in the recent past, of these relations improving. I think this is largely due to the shock that people in Pakistan have received from the realisation that conditions in Pakistan, both political—and economic, have deteriorated greatly. In fact fear of some kind of disaster began to grip the people. The reasons for this deterioration were largely of course internal, though sometimes India was blamed. On the whole, however, people in Pakistan realise that these reasons were internal. They also compared regretfully the stable politics of India and her improving economic condition as well as the advance made by us in many directions. Gradually a feeling spread that Pakistan's leadership was gravely at fault and comparisons were made with India's leadership to the disadvantage of Pakistan. A vague regret spread among many people at the fact of partition and its consequences. This must not be taken to mean that anyone really thought of reversing the Partition. History cannot be reversed in this way. But all this did mean a reversal of the old habit of mind of blaming India for everything and a toning down of the ill-feeling against India. Probably, at no time during the last five or six years, has the public of Pakistan been more friendly, or to put it better in a negative way, less unfriendly to India than now. There is a genuine desire both in the public and among the leadership for some way to be found to settle the issues between India and Pakistan, which have created so much trouble and ill will. Whether they can be settled soon or not, it is difficult to say. But the atmosphere is certainly more favourable for their settlement....

1. Note, 26 April 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. This note was based upon a detailed report by Mohan Sinha Mehta submitted after a tour of East Pakistan. While spelling out the major disabilities of the Hindu minorities in East Pakistan, Mehta concluded that the allegation that there was a deliberate policy on the part of the East Pakistan Government to squeeze out Hindus was unfounded. He felt that the Hindu political leaders painted an "unduly and unfairly dark picture of the situation" and that their "distrust and condemnation" of the Pakistan Government was only "partially justified."

7. To Gulzarilal Nanda¹

New Delhi
April 26, 1953

My dear Gulzarilal,

On my return to Delhi this evening, I have received your letter of April 25 about the Bhakra Canals etc.

When we agreed to the standstill clause contained in Black's letter of 13th March 1952,² we made it perfectly clear that this was for a relatively short period. I forget what the actual words were, but I think that there was some reference to these talks with the Bank being concluded within a short period of time. Anyhow, this fact was made quite clear to Black in my correspondence with him as well as orally.

We cannot agree to a continuation of this standstill agreement beyond the date when, in the normal course, we can use the Bhakra canals, that is, beyond April 1954.³ That is the final date. In effect we should get rid of this restriction before that.

If our talks lead to an agreement in September next,⁴ this question does not arise. If they do not lead to an agreement, it must be made perfectly clear then that we are not bound by this standstill clause in view of the Bhakra canal system being ready for use next year. We shall, however, always try to accommodate Pakistan to the best of our ability, but it is essential that they should realise that our demands for the water will be much greater from April 1954 onwards.

Therefore our representatives must have the clearest instructions in this matter. It would be desirable, I think, that Black should be told informally if necessary about this position even before the September meetings. Our representative in the Bank, B.K. Nehru, should be informed of this, so that

1. JN Collection.

2. Eugene Black, President of the World Bank, had proposed that the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint technical survey of the Indus basin, and had stated that the World Bank would be happy to extend the assistance, financial or technical, necessary for such a survey. He further suggested that so long as cooperative work continued with the participation of the Bank, "neither side will take any action to diminish (water) supplies available to the other side for existing uses."

3. Since no agreement could be arrived at on the World Bank plan of 5 February 1954, India opened the Bhakra canal system on 8 July 1954.

4. After a six-week inspection tour of the irrigation works and sites in the Indus basin during December 1952 and January 1953, the Indian and Pakistani engineers reassembled in Washington on 1 September 1953 to draw up a plan on the basis of the statistical and technical data.

Black may not say that we are springing a surprise upon him at a late stage. This gives Pakistan also more time to make such arrangements as may be considered necessary for alternative supplies for their use.

It is likely that we shall have talks with Pakistan on a number of issues in the near future. I am likely to meet the Prime Minister of Pakistan. But probably this meeting will not take place before I go to London. I shall certainly speak about this matter to him. When I go to London, a short brief on this subject should be given to me or preferably to N.R. Pillai who will be accompanying me. I do not want a multitude of papers because obviously I am not going to discuss anything in detail with the Pakistan Prime Minister. Probably early next month there will be a meeting of officials, Indian and Pakistan, in Delhi to discuss various matters. I do not quite know what the agenda is and who will come for that meeting. The canal water issue will not be on the agenda. But it might be desirable, subject to other developments, for N.R. Pillai to have a talk with the Pakistani officials about this aspect of the canal waters issue.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. To Mohan Sinha Mehta¹

New Delhi,
May 7, 1953

My dear Mohan Sinhaji,

...I enclose now my reply to Mohammad Ali, which please have delivered to him.² Also a copy for your information. You will notice that it is a brief letter. I do not quite understand this business of officials discussing agenda. However, they can proceed as they like and the sooner they come, the better. To me, it is perfectly clear that the official level conference should be held previously. When I meet Mohammad Ali, I shall hardly have any officials about with me. I propose to talk to him and then do something else. I just cannot carry on leisurely conversations indefinitely and refer matters to officials in between.

However, this question of my meeting Mohammad Ali will have to wait.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. See the following item.

When I see him in London, I shall make it perfectly clear to him how I think we should proceed in this matter. Meanwhile this ought to be made clear to the officials who come here.

You ask me about my programme after the Coronation. I have fixed no particular programme because I avoid fixing long distance programmes. One thing, however, is certain and that is that I will be overwhelmed with urgent and important work on my return after an absence of more than three weeks. Apart from the difficult internal problems I have continually to deal with, the international situation is a dynamic one and I have to give a good deal of my time to it. You will appreciate, and I hope Mohammad Ali might also appreciate to some extent, that India functions on a higher level than Pakistan in a variety of ways and we have to deal with a multitude of other problems also.

I expect to return to India about the 26th of June....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. To Mohammad Ali¹

New Delhi
7 May 1953

My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of April 25.² I was on tour when it reached Delhi and hence some delay in my answering it. I find that you are now touring in East Bengal.

As I indicated to your predecessor, Khwaja Nazimuddin, I would be happy to discuss any of the matters in issue between our respective countries. It appears to be clear now that no such meeting is feasible before you and I go to London. We shall of course meet in London and I hope that we may have an opportunity there for at least a brief talk. But that is hardly a suitable place for any long discussions. We shall, therefore, have to meet later again.

But it would be desirable for a meeting at official level to take place as early as possible. You refer to officials meeting and working out an agenda and the procedure to be followed in dealing with it. I do not quite know why

1. JN Collection.

2. Mohammad Ali had suggested that, since not much progress could be made at the official level discussions, he and Nehru could discuss some of the outstanding issues, such as Kashmir, "straightaway."

it should be necessary to take so much trouble over an agenda. No formal agenda is necessary in our meeting, and, even if it is necessary, it can be written without much trouble. I was hoping that our officials could meet as early as possible not merely to discuss preliminaries but to consider many matters. I still hope that this would be possible. Indeed it seems to me that such an official meeting is a desirable preliminary to our meeting.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. To Mohan Sinha Mehta¹

New Delhi
May 25, 1953

My dear Mohan Sinhaji,

...I am sending you a telegram about the suggestion of Mohammad Ali that you should also go to London.² I do not think this will be the right thing to do. I shall certainly see Mohammad Ali more than once. But it does not help much for us to stay in the same hotel.³ My programme is terribly crowded and so no doubt will be his. It really is not possible to discuss anything in detail or at length there. All we can do is to refer to various matters and create some kind of a friendly and cooperative approach, which is important.⁴ If you go there, these meetings assume a more formal importance and it is presumed that all kinds of details are being discussed. As a matter of fact,

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Mohammad Ali had suggested to Mehta that he should also accompany Nehru to London and while the Prime Ministers were engaged otherwise, he could carry on discussions with his Pakistani counterpart. Mehta had requested Nehru to reply telegraphically if he approved of the idea.
3. In his letter of 24 May 1953, Mehta had informed that at the time of meeting, Mohammad Ali mentioned that he would be staying in the same hotel in which Nehru generally stayed—Claridges—and added: "It does not matter how busy Panditji would be, I shall meet him at any time of night or day when he is free, late in the evening, when we are having coffee or at any time when I can get even a few minutes with him. I would like to be with Pandit Nehru as much and as often as we can manage."
4. Mohammad Ali had told Mehta that his desire for a "close and friendly relations with India" had the backing of the people of Pakistan as a whole.

neither you nor I can discuss effectively such problems as Canal Waters, Evacuee Property, East and West Bengal, except in the broadest way.⁵

As for Kashmir, that is very tough and any new approach will require reference to the Kashmir Government.⁶ It is best, therefore, for you not to go there.

As for Ghazanfar Ali, we all know him well enough⁷. I do not propose to object to his name.⁸ I suppose he will try to carry out instructions given to him. He is pliable enough, but nobody can respect him for his integrity.⁹ If Mohammad Ali asks me, I shall be frank with him without being offensive to Ghazanfar Ali.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Mehta gave Mohammad Ali examples where urgent matters had been held up, such as (a) the agreements reached at the previous Passport Conference at the end of January which had not been ratified, (b) there were serious problems connected with border trade between East Bengal and the adjoining Indian States which caused widespread hardship to the people of that area.
6. Given the unique status of Jammu and Kashmir State, due to Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, and its question being sub judice at the UN, it was necessary to refer relevant questions to the Kashmir Government as a party to any decision affecting their interest.
7. Mohammad Ali had indicated that he had selected Ghazanfar Ali as the Pakistan High Commissioner at New Delhi and that he had not yet informed his cabinet colleagues about it and proposed to do so after obtaining Nehru's reactions.
8. Ali was apprehensive that since Ghazanfar Ali was a member of the Interim Government of 1946 and the relations between the two parties were "not inspired by trust and understanding" then, Nehru might raise some objections to his appointment.
9. Mehta had reassured Ali that so long as Ali had complete trust in Ghazanfar's absolute "integrity" and "loyalty" to his policy, Nehru would not consider political differences of past as any disqualification.

11. To A.P. Jain¹

New Delhi
May 27, 1953

My dear Ajit,

There is much trouble about arrears of rent of houses given to refugees. Many of them probably find it difficult to pay, but I feel sure that some at least can

1. File No. 29(225)/-50-A-PMS.

easily pay. Indeed, I am told that some of them are Government servants, while others have actually let out a room or so and get rent for that. Surely, these people should pay.

But how far does this question of rent come into your scheme of compensation?² If you are including the houses themselves in the scheme, I suppose the rent is also included. That is to say, these arrears of rent may be considered as an asset to be given away. You have built houses, but provided neither light nor water, and proper drainage is also often lacking. I think you should have given them light and water at least, and, for the sake of health, drainage.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. The Central Cabinet Sub-Committee, consisting of Maulana Azad, K.N. Katju, C.D. Deshmukh, A.P. Jain and Swaran Singh met in April 1953 to consider a scheme for paying compensation to displaced persons from West Pakistan. The Rehabilitation Minister claimed that if the Central Government were to pay Rs 15 crores in addition to writing off Rs 82 crores spent so far on housing and loans, the displaced persons would be deemed to have been resettled and rehabilitated.

12. The Issue of Joint Defence¹

Question: Can you tell us how the talks are going on with the Ceylon and Pakistan Prime Ministers?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I cannot say very much. We have had some talks. So far as the Pakistan talks are concerned, they can only be in the nature of preliminary talks here, and even before we came here it was decided that we should have a preliminary survey and then have more detailed talks after our return. I met the Prime Minister once or twice, that is, apart from meeting in conferences, and I am likely to meet him again. So far as the Ceylon talks are concerned, they are also, well, in the initial stages yet.

1. Press conference, London, 10 June 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Also from *India News*, 13 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 174-175, 289-290, 400-402, 408-411, 451-452 and 489-491.

Q: With regard to Pakistan, the Pakistan Prime Minister told us that you had put cold water on the suggestion of common defence.²

JN: I? No, that is not quite correct. What I have said was that it is obviously natural for countries like India and Pakistan to develop common policies. Defence was completely dependent on foreign policy. It is the foreign policy that governs defence, it cannot stand by itself. We are interested in Pakistan's defence, of course, as Pakistan would be interested in India's defence. Secondly, I have said that I am not interested in any defence pacts which are in the nature of military alliances. Policy is one thing, because I do not like to have military alliances, which can normally only be thought of as against somebody else. If you leave out the factor that it is not against anybody, I am prepared to have everything in common. It is not a question with Pakistan but within any country, we are not having any military alliance. We have, if you like, pacts of peace, pacts of what is it, no-war, non-aggression, that type of thing, but a military pact involves us in commitments which we are not prepared to undertake, not that we are afraid of a commitment, but because it goes somewhat against our basic policies of developing friendly relations with other countries. We think the best defence, and the best pact is friendly relations with other countries.

Of course, every country has to provide for contingencies. If you carry my argument to the extreme, you might say, why not abolish the army and the defence services in India. Well, we cannot do that. We want to keep them up to the mark, as efficient and confident as possible, but we look upon them completely, first of all, as defence. We do not think of them as going out of the country—leave out the Korea business, which is separate. We have no expeditionary forces as we used to have in the old days; and secondly, we do not wish to tie ourselves up with any other country. Now take another country like Burma with which our relations are extremely friendly and cordial and with which, say, in the realm of foreign policy, we are also having a great deal in common, but we do not talk about defence pacts.

Q: I understand that you have made a suggestion to Pakistan for the abolition of the visa system.

JN: You mean in India. These matters are being considered. The position in West Pakistan and India is different from East Pakistan and India. Until

2. At an interview with the PTI correspondent at Karachi on 27 April 1953, Mohammad Ali had said that he looked upon Nehru as "an elder brother" and that after creating a "favourable atmosphere" they could very well sit down and discuss the possibilities of "joint defence of India and Pakistan."

recently, before the passport system was introduced, there was no difficulty in travelling between East and West Bengal. Now there is a passport system. Well, I suppose that some kind of easy passport or permit system inevitably has to come in between two independent countries as things are but the next step to an easy travel would be to do away with visas....

13. Cable to A.P. Jain¹

Your telegram. No. 2857 of 14th June.²

I appreciate the force of your argument for disposing of old dilapidated and deteriorating evacuee properties by auction and credit sale proceeds to account of evacuees.³ Nevertheless it is desirable not to proceed with this auction. It will not yield any substantial results and will certainly create difficulties in our talks with Pakistan on evacuee property and other issues. More especially in view of protest from Pakistan Minister for Rehabilitation it is desirable to postpone this matter for the present.

I have briefly consulted Pakistan Prime Minister who also advises postponement.⁴

You will remember that we have agreed with Government of Pakistan to have a Steering Committee of officials on both sides which will keep in touch with all matters affecting the two Governments. This matter also should have been considered by them in consonance with our agreement before any action was taken.

I suggest therefore that you should postpone auctions and invite Shuaib Qureshi to send someone to consider this matter and see these old properties for himself. Also refer matter to Steering Committee.

1. Berne, 16 June 1953. JN Collection.
2. Jain had sought Nehru's instructions regarding the Rehabilitation Ministry's decision to auction dilapidated evacuee properties in Bombay and Delhi, to which Shuaib Qureshi, the Rehabilitation Minister of Pakistan, had vehemently objected.
3. Jain argued that the Custodian had the right to transfer, in any manner whatsoever, any evacuee property if he considered it necessary for the management and preservation of that property. On the other hand, Qureshi pointed out that "extinguishment" of evacuees' rights without obtaining their consent was a serious breach of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement of January 1949.
4. Nehru met Mohammad Ali separately thrice during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference at London.

14. Cable to B.F.H.B. Tyabji¹

Your telegram 2859 June 15th.² I have had long talks with Pakistan Prime Minister. We agreed to begin with that our talks could only be of a preliminary and exploratory character. More detailed conversations to be followed in India or Pakistan.

We discussed briefly Canal Waters issue, Evacuee Property and East-West Bengal matters. On all these matters his attitude appeared to be cooperative and desirous of settlement. But he was not fully acquainted with details and did not therefore like to be precise and definite. Further consideration therefore was postponed.

So far as Canal Waters issue was concerned we decided to wait for International Bank Conference on this issue and in any event to settle matter between ourselves. In regard to Evacuee Property he was agreeable to a joint high-powered judicial commission, as previously stated by us, to consider this problem. In regard to East and West Bengal he was in favour of further facilities in regard to movement etc. being given and if necessary, abolition of visas.

We discussed Kashmir. Most of the talking was done by me and I pointed out various lines of approach. We did not pursue matter further. Mohammad Ali said that he is very anxious for a settlement but he wanted me to appreciate his position in Pakistan, which was not very strong and had its limitations. He left it to me to make more definite proposals at later stage. Maulana Azad had written to him suggesting our meeting in Delhi. He was perfectly agreeable to this and said that it would help him greatly if previously I paid a brief visit to Karachi even though this was only for one day. I said that I was agreeable to this subject to convenience of date which could not be fixed at this stage. Later he would come to Delhi for a longer period. Please inform Members of Foreign Affairs Committee.

I was naturally handicapped in discussing Kashmir because of present internal conditions there.³

1. Berne, 16 June 1953. JN Collection.
2. Tyabji had informed that the Indo-Pak Secretary level meeting was at a standstill as Pakistan was marking time and Mohammad Ali's statements from London had made it difficult to surmise what kind of talks were actually taking place between him and Nehru.
3. The Praja Parishad movement, internal dissensions in the Kashmir Cabinet and above all, an increasingly intransigent position taken by Shaikh Abdullah regarding implementation of Delhi Agreement had added greatly to Nehru's anxiety.

I. BILATERAL RELATIONS

(ii) Myanmar

1. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

U Nu appreciates friendly efforts of US and emphasises that Burma Government have made and will continue to make utmost efforts to secure goodwill and friendship of US² but circumstances have compelled his Government to take step regarding Burmese KMT issue³ which has been approved by popular opinion in Burma powerfully and is being exploited by communist insurgents in Burma.⁴ Burma Government have kept KMT and ECA issues separate.⁵ Conciliatory statements have also been made.

U Nu informed me in detail of numerous steps taken to meet demands of minorities.⁶ This has been recognised to be position and nothing more is possible.

1. New Delhi, 1 April 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Relations between Myanmar and the US became strained when the KMT forces, often in collaboration with Karen rebels, forcibly occupied large areas of eastern and western Myanmar by December 1952. The correspondent of *The Times* reported from Rangoon that public opinion held the US "responsible for the presence of those forces and for failure to persuade the Chinese Nationalists in Formosa to remove them." On 17 March 1953, Myanmar informed the US of its decision to terminate from 30 June the Technical Cooperation Agreement signed in February 1952 under US Mutual Security Act for American economic aid.
3. On 25 March 1953, Myanmar requested the UN to place on agenda of the General Assembly, a complaint against the Chinese Nationalist Government for committing aggression on Myanmar territory.
4. Rapid expansion of KMT troops in eastern Myanmar took place in early 1952. It was reported that in January 1952 contact had been established between Karen rebels and KMT in Mawchi area. By middle of 1952, it was estimated that 1,000 KMT troops were fighting side by side with Karens. By December 1952, the KMT forces moved westward and took forcible possession of Mong Hsu and Mong Pan area in western Myanmar.
5. In the note of 17 March to the US Government, the Myanmar Government wished to put on record "its appreciation and gratitude for the material and services received under ECA agreement" and clarified that termination of that agreement was "not intended in any way to cast reflection on the activities of the existing programmes or on the activities of the Technical Cooperation Agreement personnel in Burma."
6. In October 1951, the Myanmar Parliament passed a constitution amendment act for setting up of a Karen State which was to have three districts of lower Salween area east of Moulmein, while two more adjacent districts were to be incorporated after being cleared of guerrillas. A special boundary commission was appointed by the Government and the State came into existence on 1 June 1954.

U Nu has had correspondence on these issues with Hoffman and Justice Douglas⁷ urging them to support Burma Government's position.

He says full implications of proposals made for Tripartite Commission⁸ etc., not clear and clarification necessary for Burma Government to express their views. It is possible that serious international complications may arise and People's Government of China might take serious view of US arrangements.

7. William Orville Douglas; Associate Justice, Supreme Court of United States of America. 1939-75.
8. A tripartite commission consisting of Myanmar, Thailand, USA and Nationalist China was proposed to be set up to deal with the evacuation of KMT troops from Myanmar.

2. To K. K. Chettur¹

New Delhi
6th April, 1953

My dear Chettur,²

Your letter of the 4th April. I have already sent you a telegram on the subject containing a message for U Nu.

I have no doubt whatever that the Burmese Government should not postpone discussion of this issue.³ If the US Government want a postponement, they should ask for it and then the Burmese Government can agree.

The US Government are naturally anxious not to have this discussion because they will come but very badly from it.⁴ The Burmese case is a very strong one and the US Government have not played fair at all during the past two years.

We need take no further step and should watch developments. I am likely to meet Secretary Dulles in the course of the next few days in Delhi and probably he will discuss the matter with me.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. India's Ambassador in Myanmar from 1952-54.
3. On 6 April 1953, Nehru was informed that the US Ambassador in Myanmar had proposed to the Myanmar Government a postponement of the discussion on KMT troops in the UN till the next session of the General Assembly, while in the meantime the tripartite commission could consider ways of withdrawal of KMT troops.
4. It had been repeatedly alleged that the KMT troops had been receiving aid and support from the USA in their fight against Communist China. The USA continued to provide military and economic aid to the Formosa Government, which were mostly diverted to KMT operations in Myanmar, Korea, Indonesia and Malaya.

3. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

Burmese Prime Minister has informed me that American Ambassador approached his Government with proposal that discussion of KMT issue should be postponed till next session of General Assembly and that meanwhile Committee consisting of Siam, Nationalist China, USA and Burma should consider ways and means for implementing withdrawal of KMT troops.

Burma Government's reply has been that USA should take initiative in asking General Assembly for postponement of discussion to enable attempt being made for withdrawal of KMT troops within one month. USA further declaring that she is opposed to presence of KMT troops in Burma. Burma Government would then agree to postponement declaring however that they are determined to drive the aggressors out of their country. In view of US undertaking they would welcome peaceful settlement of this dispute.

Burma Government does not wish to associate itself with Committee proposed by US.

I have informed U Nu of our full support in any action taken by him in UN on this issue.

1. New Delhi, 6 April 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.

4. To U Nu¹

New Delhi
April 21, 1953

My dear Maung Nu,

I have just received your letter of the 18th April informing me of the latest developments in regard to the KMT forces in Burma.²

The matter is now being discussed in the Political Committee of the UN and probably some decision will be arrived at within the next two or three days.³ My writing to you now, therefore, is only of academic interest.

I think that the message that the US Ambassador gave you was certainly

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to Secretary General and Foreign Secretary.
2. The complaint by Myanmar about the presence of Kuomintang troops in her territory was introduced in the General Assembly on 18 April.
3. The UN Political Committee passed the amended Myanmar resolution on 22 April 1953 and the General Assembly passed it on 23 April by 59 votes to nil with Nationalist China abstaining.

not properly worded and the attitude of the US Government is not proper. What particular step you should take is a matter which you alone can decide. You will no doubt be in constant touch with your representative in the UN⁴ We have also been receiving reports from our representative, Krishna Menon, who has been instructed by us to give full support to the Burmese complaint.⁵

It has been pointed out to us that there are certain legal or constitutional difficulties in accepting your Resolution exactly as it is. For instance, the description of the Nationalist Government as the "Formosa Government"⁶ presents a difficulty to the UN, although it is a fact. These are minor matters and might perhaps be got over by slight changes in phraseology. But I feel that, in substance, it would be desirable for Burma not to weaken her attitude. If necessary, a cessation of operations for a while might be agreed to, provided there is something substantial to be gained thereby.

Today's news in the papers stated that the KMT forces were giving trouble in other and more southern parts of Burma.⁷ Thus, from that point of view, the situation is worsening and instead of toning down their activities, the KMT forces are becoming more aggressive. On the other hand, the report I heard on the radio today of the British delegate's speech in the UN appeared to be on the whole favourable.⁸

You can be rest assured that whatever decision you take in this matter will have our full support.

With kind regards,

Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. U Kyin.
5. On 22 April 1953, Krishna Menon informed Nehru that the Political Committee passed the draft resolution by Myanmar with amendments proposed by Mexico. The Mexican draft was promoted by India "behind the scenes" to prevent a milder resolution and to rally support for Myanmar's case, with its express consent.
6. The draft resolution of Myanmar urged the General Assembly to recommend to the Security Council to "condemn the KMT Government of Formosa" for committing acts of encroachment against the territorial integrity of the Union of Myanmar. The Myanmar representative said that his Government recognised the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate Government of China and thus would use Kuomintang to designate the authorities of Formosa for the sake of clarity and not in any derogatory sense.
7. In April 1953, the major KMT concentration was reported to be in Mong Hsat area.
8. British delegate, Gladwyn Jebb, said that there was no doubt that the Myanmar's frontiers had been violated by Chinese Nationalist troops, whose activities were of an essentially aggressive character, and suggested that the Chinese troops must leave Myanmar or submit to internment. Jebb added that Britain was ready to do all in her power to achieve a settlement. Owing to Formosa's limited control over these forces, he doubted whether the formal charge of aggression brought up by the Myanmar Government could be substantiated.

5. Cable to K.K. Chettur¹

Burmese Ambassador² has conveyed to us today message from U Nu regarding developments in UN Political Committee on resolution about KMT forces.³ Please inform Prime Minister that we are asking our delegation in New York to act in concert with Burmese delegation.

Also inform him that UK High Commission approached us today asking us to support their resolution and to advise Burmese delegation at UN also to support it. We are informing UK that we are unable to do this.

1. New Delhi, 22 April 1953. JN Collection.
2. U Kyin, Ambassador of Myanmar in India and also a member of the Myanmar delegation which presented Myanmar's case against KMT at the UN.
3. On 20 April 1953, it was reported that a compromise resolution was in the making, which, while condemning "foreign aggression" in Myanmar, would not specifically condemn the Formosa regime. A Good Offices Commission under the UN was to be set up to bring about an agreement for disarming and interning the KMT troops.

6. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

We have been approached by UK High Commission here asking us to support their alternate resolution regarding KMT troops in Burma.² They tell us that Burmese Delegation would not support this and would abstain.

2. I do not like UK resolution and in any event we cannot support it if Burmese object to it nor should we press Burmese to support it.

3. I have received message from Burmese Prime Minister in which he says that in spite of majority sympathy in Political Committee Chinese and

1. New Delhi, 23 April 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. The resolution, passed by the General Assembly on 23 April 1953, condemned the presence of foreign forces in Myanmar and their hostile activities against that country; declared that those forces "must be disarmed and either agree to internment or leave Burma forthwith"; called upon member states to respect territorial integrity of Myanmar; urged that negotiations pursued by certain States in this regard be continued; urged all States to render all help to Myanmar and refrain from any assistance to these troops, and asked Myanmar to report to the eighth session of the Assembly regarding progress achieved.

American influence was too great.³ U Nu is opposed to any conciliator or mediator or good offices commission on behalf of United Nations being put in charge of this matter. I entirely agree with him.

4. U Nu informs me that you have privately suggested after sounding USA and UK a resolution which may get requisite two-thirds majority. This is as follows:

- (1) General Assembly having considered complaint concerning presence and acts of war and depredation of foreign troops who have violated frontiers and territorial integrity of Burma,
- (2) Views with great concern this gross violation of territory and sovereignty of a member State,
- (3) Notes that these troops have declined to submit to being disarmed and interned and are continuing acts of war and depredation,
- (4) Deplores this act,
- (5) Calls upon these foreign troops to submit immediately to being disarmed and either to accept internment or to leave Burma forthwith,
- (6) Affirms that assistance given to these troops which enables them to maintain or continue their hostile acts is contrary to Charter,
- (7) Calls upon all States to respect territorial integrity and political independence of Burma and to be guided by frames of Charter in their relations with Burma.

5. Burmese Government have instructed their Delegation that they will have to adhere to their original resolution. But they add that Delegation may discreetly suggest to Indian Delegation to get a resolution on the lines proposed by you moved by some friendly powers to obtain two-thirds majority. They want Burmese Delegation to make clear from the beginning that though adoption of such a resolution is inoffensive, Burmese Government are unable, in view of their original resolution, to support this resolution, but will abstain.

6. You will consider all these factors and then decide what course to adopt, which must, in any event, have approval of Burmese Delegation. It would only be worthwhile suggesting any other resolution if there is fair chance of obtaining two-thirds majority.

7. Anyhow, we should not support resolution, UK or other, which is objected to by Burmese Government.

3. The representatives of Australia, Canada, Egypt, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden and Britain, among others, while agreeing that Myanmar's complaint was well-founded, felt that they could not unreservedly support its draft resolution. Yemen, while declaring support for the resolution, said that it would agree to any amendment that it considered "reasonable and conciliatory". Indonesia, though making an incisive rebuttal of Nationalist China's defence of its own role, did not openly endorse Myanmar's resolution.

7. Trade with Myanmar¹

I am sending you my reply to U Nu about the recent visit of our Delegation to Burma.² You will have noticed from U Nu's letter to me as well as from our Ambassador's letter to me that U Nu has been greatly disappointed at the turn events took. There is no doubt that he tried his utmost to help us. But he was taken by surprise first at the fact that we did not want the quantity of rice we had demanded previously and secondly by the prices we quoted for our goods. U Nu had gone all out to prepare his Government for a deal with India and this new development embarrassed him not a little.

It appears to me that our Delegation produced an impression in Burma that we were trying to overreach them. Even the prices we quoted were old prices of 1952 when actually they have gone down.³

It is patent that we cannot ask the Burmese Government to sell us rice at a price which is much less than what they can get in the international market. It is not enough for us to say that their procurement price is low. The price that counts for them is the one they can get and they have been getting a very high price indeed from Japan, the UK and other countries. They have no lack of buyers. Nevertheless, U Nu went out of his way to help us and had much argument with his colleagues in his Government over this issue. His disappointment, therefore, was all the greater.

Any successful deal between us and the Burmese Government must naturally be one which does not involve obvious loss to us or to the Burmese Government. Whether this is possible or not in the circumstances, I do not know. But our approach should be completely frank and care should be taken that we do not produce an impression of too much cleverness and over-reaching.

We must be clear about the quantity of rice we want and then we must put forward the prices of the goods we can supply. These prices should be strictly competitive and, if possible, lower. It does not matter really in a barter deal what the actual price of the rice or the other goods is, provided the two balance each other.

1. Note to Secretary General, MEA, 11 May 1953. JN Collection.
2. The Indian delegation headed by Rafi Ahmed Kidwai and D.P. Karmarkar went to Myanmar on 19 April 1953.
3. Earlier in August 1952, Mahavir Tyagi had informed Nehru that India had paid £ 38 per ton of rice to Myanmar in 1948 and £ 62 per ton in 1952 by which the Myanmar Government had made a profit of Rs. 40 crores. Nehru had suggested that India should in future dealings "fix a price and not go beyond it."

Please note what our Ambassador says about the Defence articles being discussed rather publicly much to the embarrassment of the Burmese Government.

Politically speaking as well as for some other reasons, it is highly desirable for us to go as far as we can to have a successful deal with Burma. Our relations with Burma are friendly and these are of great importance to us in the context of today. They add to our international strength and affect our relations with some other countries. It is fortunate that we have U Nu on the other side with all his friendliness for India. We should take advantage of this to increase our contacts and better our relations.

Even from the economic point of view, a settled market for our goods in Burma is of importance. That is a natural nearby market. In the long run it is profitable to us to build this market up, even though initially we do not make much profit out of it. We help neighbouring countries like Nepal and Afghanistan. Exactly for the same reasons we should endeavour to help Burma, not in the same way of course. The return we will get from Burma in many ways will be more valuable.

I am writing so that our approach to the Burmese Delegation that is coming should be governed by these factors.

I would repeat that the military supply element should be kept separate.⁴ We should get the correct prices, as low as possible, from the Defence Ministry. Here again, Burma is the natural market for our Defence goods and we should develop it, even though we make no profit to begin with. It is quite wrong to put all kinds of overhead charges.

In regard to steel, whatever reduction we can give, is heavily counterbalanced by the heavy duty. I do not know how we can deal with this matter.

I sent copies of U Nu's letter to the Food Minister, Finance Minister, Commerce & Industry Minister and Mr Karmarkar.⁵ I am not sure if it was sent to Defence Ministry. I should like my reply to U Nu (not the letter dealing with the international situation) sent to all these, together with this note. I think that the Food Ministry should be separately informed. As Mr Kidwai is away and my letters to him do not go to the Ministry. You will please inform the Defence Ministry of the position also.

4. U Nu was interested in a barter deal with India in which rice could be exchanged for military goods.

5. D.P. Karmarkar (1902-1991); Congressman from Karnataka; member of, Central Legislative Assembly, 1945-47, Provisional Parliament, 1951-52, House of the People, 1952-62; Union Minister of State for Commerce, Trade, and Health from 1950-62; member, Rajya Sabha, 1962-68.

8. To U Nu¹

New Delhi
May 11, 1953

My dear Maung Nu,

Thank you for your letter of the 1st May.² I have read it with some regret, chiefly because I find that there has been a good deal of misunderstanding on both sides. I have appreciated very greatly the personal interest you have taken in this matter of a barter deal and the efforts you have made to help us. I looked upon this transaction not merely as a business deal to the advantage of both countries, but something much more.

Fortunately, our countries have drawn closer to each other in many ways; we follow common policies in international affairs and, what is even more important, there is a sense of comradeship between us. I noticed with pleasure that this was your approach to this problem and I was grateful to you for it. That was and is my own approach. I am sorry, therefore, that any misunderstanding should have arisen. I hope that, in our future talks, which will take place when your mission comes here soon,³ there will be a frank approach and a full desire on both sides to meet, as far as possible, the wishes of the other.

It is true that we have been rather fortunate in our rice production during the recent season. We have produced and procured much more rice than we had anticipated. The extreme pressure on us, therefore, in this respect became much less. Indeed we could even carry on, with some difficulty, no doubt, without any imports in the near future. But nevertheless we were anxious not to take any risks and to build up a stock for emergencies. Hence our desire to get a substantial quantity of rice from Burma. But the extent of that quantity became a little less important as the rice harvest progressed.

I quite appreciate that you cannot take a step in introducing a marked differentiation in price without getting into trouble with some of your customer

1. JN Collection.

2. U Nu mentioned that during his earlier meeting with R.K. Nehru and R.A. Kidwai, he was given to understand that India was interested in an increased quota of rice, which he procured with some difficulty. But he was disappointed to note that India only wanted one and a half lakh tons and that too at a price which was considerably below what Myanmar was offered in the international market. This resulted in considerable loss of face for his Government in the international market.

3. A trade delegation, led by U Tin, Minister of Finance and Revenue, and U Thakin Thakin, Minister for Commerce, Government of Myanmar, arrived in New Delhi on 29 June for further talks.

countries.⁴ I also realise that the income from rice is one of your major items of revenue for Burma. We would not like you to suffer because of any deal with us. We are anxious that Burma should prosper and it would be a bad thing if any impression arose either in India or Burma that one country was trying to take undue advantage of the other.

I do not know the details of what took place at the time of our delegation's visit to Burma. Kidwai, our Food Minister, very soon after his return, was somewhat unwell and has gone away to recover. I have had brief talks with our other Minister Karmarkar. You can rest assured, however, that we shall continue to approach this problem in as friendly a way as possible and I hope that during our future discussions we shall be able to arrive at an arrangement satisfactory to both our countries. In any event, nothing should be done which might create any embarrassment for you or which produces an impression that either side is trying to overreach the other. We should approach this question on both sides in a frank and friendly manner.⁵

Kidwai told me not only of the generous hospitality which you and your Government offered our Delegation, but also of the personal kindness and friendliness which they had from you. I am very grateful for this.

I shall be leaving for the United Kingdom on the 28th of this month and I shall be away for about three and a half weeks.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. U Nu further wrote: "...increasing quota did not present to us so serious a difficulty as introducing differentiation in prices between our customer countries, and that the consequences of the latter would be that the other buyers, among whom there had been many who had made their bids on the basis that we would only supply the quota they had demanded and that price did not matter would seriously resent it, causing loss of our reputation in the international markets ..."
5. On 3 July 1953, a letter of exchange was signed between India and Myanmar modifying the five year Trade Agreement of September 1951. The letter of exchange widened the range of Indian exports to Myanmar.

I. BILATERAL RELATIONS

(iii) Nepal

1. To the King of Nepal¹

New Delhi
April 27, 1953

My dear friend,

You were good enough to write to me some time ago and inform me of Your Majesty's intention to form a Cabinet, consisting of people from various parties.² On receipt of your letter I wrote as well as telegraphed to you indicating that Your Majesty's wishes appeared to me to be right in the circumstances and that the change proposed would probably improve the situations.³

That change, however, was not brought about owing, presumably, to some new difficulties that had arisen. It seems to me, if I may say so, that the present state of affairs in the Government in Nepal is not very satisfactory and that Your Majesty does not get the help that you should have.⁴ The Advisers' regime has apparently outlived its utility. What exactly should take its place, it is for Your Majesty to determine.

Nepal, and especially Kathmandu, is a place where all kinds of rumours spread from day to day. There is no proper public press or other avenues of giving expression to public opinion and views. Because of this, perhaps, rumours spread. Some of these rumours are quite fantastic.

It would, therefore, be desirable for the Government to function effectively and in the public interest so that the people may realise this. The continuance of a fluid state of affairs leads to unfortunate consequences.

I am told that B.P. Koirala is becoming more and more irresponsible and

1. JN Collection.

2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.21, pp.528-529.

3. After the M.P. Koirala Ministry fell on 10 August 1952, King Tribhuvan took complete control of administration under the Special Emergency Act of 9 September 1952, and appointed six Counsellors to assist him. The Counsellor regime lasted from 14 August 1952 to 15 June 1953.

4. In an undated note, B.K. Gokhale, India's Ambassador in Nepal, had informed Nehru that due to the lack of cohesion in the Counsellor regime the political situation in Nepal had become fluid and consequently three major groups represented by the Communists, B.P. Koirala and M.P. Koirala were trying to pull Nepali politics in different directions, rendering an impression of general chaos and failure of administration.

is, perhaps, being encouraged by foreign sources.⁵ If that is so, I should like to have such data as might be available because, and I am sure Your Majesty will agree with me, we cannot allow this type of foreign interference.

Our Ambassador in Kathmandu is keeping in touch with me and reporting on events. He will always be available for any service or advice that Your Majesty might require.

I understand that General Mahabir Shamsher⁶ has gone to England with the Second Prince. General Mahabir has certain abilities, but, unfortunately, in his private life he functions in a way which is very unsatisfactory and which has produced a bad impression in the public mind. His association with the Government has thus been a weakening factor.⁷

I need not assure Your Majesty that I take the deepest interest in affairs in Nepal and am always at your service to help or advise where I can. I am going away tomorrow on a week's tour in the west of India. I shall return about the 5th of May. On the 28th May I leave for England for the Prime Ministers' Conference and the Coronation. From there I shall go to Switzerland for a conference and return to India about the 25th of June. I shall thus be away for a good part of June.

In view of developments in Nepal, it may be necessary for Your Majesty to take some steps during this period. If so, I hope you will not delay it. I shall, of course, gladly give such advice as may be necessary if any matter is referred to me. I am anxious to help Your Majesty as much as possible in the difficult task you have undertaken.

Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Gokhale had reported that "B.P. Koirala hopes to establish a Fascist State with the help of his British and American contacts. His group is prepared to make common cause with Gurkha Parishad and hopes to achieve its objective by armed resurrection."
6. Counsellor for Home, Planning and Development.
7. Gokhale had informed that Mahabir Shamsher was the only person who was prepared to help M.P. Koirala, but he wished to make more money by establishing his control over the Government, and that he had already induced the King to invest large amounts of money in his own ventures and that despite his lack of integrity, he could help M.P. Koirala in forming a new Ministry.

2. The Situation in Nepal¹

Since my return from tour, I am trying to deal with my correspondence which had accumulated. I have just seen a letter from Shri Gokhale, our Ambassador in Nepal. I believe there is another letter from him which I shall probably come across a little later. I have also had a talk with Shri Gokhale as well as with Major General Yadunath Singh who is going to Nepal.

2. The situation in Nepal is highly unsatisfactory and whatever we have to do, we should do with speed.² There is the question of our sending a few officers there. This has been long pending and I think we should take action. S.K. Anand, the Police Officer, should be called back immediately.

3. I am sending you Shri Gokhale's letter. You will of course discuss these matters with him more fully. With this is attached a note by Shri Govind Narain.³ Please note that Govind Narain is anxious that his note should not go down in the file.

4. I am also enclosing a letter from Shri Suryaprasad Upadhyay.⁴

5. Our Ambassador has been telling us repeatedly that B.P. Koirala is planning armed insurrection and that in fact he openly talks about it.⁵ Further that he is in close touch with the UK Embassy in Kathmandu and frequently visits it, more especially he maintains contact with Col. Proud of the UK. Embassy in Kathmandu.⁶ It is stated, and is widely believed, that Col. Proud distributes money to various groups and individuals in Nepal. Mr Curran,⁷ the Attache of the US Embassy in Delhi, is reported to have said to press

1. Note to Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, 6 May 1953. JN Collection.
2. In April 1953, the Counsellor regime was badly shaken by the discovery of an anti-government plot in the police force, believed to have been instigated by the revivalist political elements, seeking to organise political cells among the police with the objective of affecting a revolt. Eighty arrests were made in this connection.
3. (b. 1917); joined the ICS and served in various capacities in the UP, 1940-48; Home Secretary, 1948-51; Adviser-cum-Secretary to King of Nepal, 1951-54; Chief Secretary and Secretary, Information, 1958-61; Chairman, MMTC, 1963-66; Secretary, Ministry of Health, Government of India, 1967-68, and of Defence, 1968-70, of Home, 1971-73.
4. A member of M.P. Koirala Cabinet, who resigned in July 1952. A supporter of the B.P. Koirala faction of Nepali Congress.
5. A no-rent campaign was launched among the peasants of Taulihawa and Pokhara sub-districts of eastern Nepal by the Nepali Congress demanding agrarian reforms. The final date of annual payment of rent to the government was 15 May. Hence the Nepali Congress leaders exhorted the peasants to refuse payment and join the civil disobedience movement till their demands were met.
6. Lieut. Col. R.R. Proud was First Secretary of UK in Nepal, 1950-60.
7. Jean A Curran, Jr. Assistant Attache, US Embassy, New Delhi.

correspondents that Proud was instigating the Limbus and Rais in eastern Nepal to claim a separate province. This area in eastern Nepal has been in the past the main recruiting ground for the UK Army.

6. I think that we should take this matter up with the UK High Commission here and tell them about these reports which have reached us from a number of sources. The King himself has told me about these matters. The fact that the American Attache has repeated this even to pressmen is strong evidence. We must express our strong objection to these activities of the UK Embassy in Kathmandu and more particularly of Col. Proud who is reported to be encouraging elements in Nepal which are actively preparing for insurrection and which are hostile to India.

7. I have suggested to Gokhale that he should mention this matter to the UK Ambassador in Kathmandu also and also suggest to the King to do so.

8. The situation in Nepal has its comic opera element, but, of course, it may become serious at any moment. Gokhale thinks that an insurrection is less likely now, but we cannot be sure. We may have to consider putting some restrictions on the movement of people in Indian territory and the use being made of Indian territory as a base for insurrection. Patna and Calcutta are the two main bases where these people gather. For the present we should inform the Bihar and the West Bengal Governments about this and ask them to watch all developments,⁸ and more especially the activities of B.P. Koirala, Subarna Shamsher and their group.

8. On 27 May, Nehru wrote to Sri Krishna Sinha: "We will tolerate no conspiracies on Indian soil against the Government or people of Nepal. Your Intelligence and Police should be warned.... B.P. Koirala is the principal mischief-maker now. I think he has lost his head."

3. To B.K. Gokhale¹

New Delhi

May 27, 1953

My dear Gokhale,

News from Nepal has been progressively depressing. Your last telegram gave

1. JN Collection.

a picture which is about as bad as one can expect it to be.² I do not at all like the idea of our looking on passively while disaster approaches, and yet I see no clear way. That is to say, I do not see anyone in Nepal who can act rightly and strongly.

If even the Advisers have gone to pieces and are supporting B.P. Koirala, it is obvious that they must not continue.³ Anything else would be better. In any analysis of the situation in Nepal, B.P. Koirala comes out as the most disturbing and wrong element. On the other side there is Mahabir Shamsher, but at least for the moment he is away. Therefore, to support B.P. Koirala is to support the worst tendency.

Just at this critical stage the King goes off to Calcutta.⁴ There are all kinds of rumours that he really went there so that he could come here later and consult me. Of course that is impossible as I am anyhow leaving tomorrow morning.

I am rather worried about Nepal because it is quite possible that effective steps may have to be taken in the near future, and I want to be here when such a contingency arises. If there is any real trouble in Nepal against the King or the Government, we cannot just look on. If an appeal is made to us for help, we must respond, even though that might mean our sending some troops there.⁵ I hope this will not be necessary, but I am quite clear that in case of real need we should do it. Indeed, I am telling our Defence Ministry to keep wide awake.

You must, of course, be in full touch with General Yadunath. He is a good man. He is not supposed to interfere in internal matters, but should a real crisis arise, he and his soldiers cannot merely look on.

It seems to me absolutely necessary now that some kind of a Ministry must be formed as rapidly as possible before the situation completely goes to

2. On 25 May 1953, Gokhale observed that India's existing attitude of "benevolent neutrality" was correct, and hoped that it would be possible for M.P. Koirala "to form a fairly strong and stable Ministry" soon after the King's return from Calcutta. But until a Ministry was formed and the Secretariat started functioning, Gokhale reiterated, it was "no use bringing our police training team and other officials to Nepal."
3. Gokhale stated that B.P. Koirala was determined to prevent any ministry being formed by M.P. Koirala. He was making "common cause with Communists and Gurkha Parishad", and would even accept continuance of the existing Counsellors, who were also on his side. And that he was trying to intensify anti-Indian feelings so as to pressurize the King to accept him as Prime Minister.
4. The King had left for Calcutta on 25 May 1953 and was expected to return on 28 May.
5. Gokhale added that "intelligent people in Nepal" were "getting tired of their own leaders and would like India to take a more positive attitude", while "political leaders on the other hand" would be only too pleased "if we again interfere actively in Nepalese politics and give them fuel for anti-Indian agitation."

pieces.⁶ It seems also clear that the only person who can lead the Ministry is M.P. Koirala with all his faults. However, such a Ministry must, of necessity, be a composite Ministry, including various groups. It was such an attempt that M.P. Koirala made and ultimately failed. I understand that the reason for his failure was the attempt made on behalf of the Nepal Congress people (Subarna Shamsher and S.P. Upadhyaya) for parity with M.P. Koirala's group, apart from independence. M.P. Koirala refused this, and hence the break.⁷

I am not particularly interested in parities and the like, but some way out should be found and a Ministry formed without delay. The Ministry must be prepared to act effectively and strongly against troublemakers. In order to do this, of course, it must have the proper approach to the public. That means that Government must make a proper declaration about its policy and must act up to it.

All this, of course, must be based on isolating B.P. Koirala who is completely hopeless. I gather that Subarna Shamsher and S.P. Upadhyaya are prepared to do so.⁸ Of the two, Subarna Shamsher is a person who is relatively more reliable and helpful.

I do not know when the King will return to Kathmandu, but the sooner this thing is done, the better.

You will keep my Ministry informed here who will send messages to London. If any crisis occurs, you will immediately send word with your own recommendation.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Gokhale had mentioned that five days earlier the formation of a Ministry "seemed imminent with M.P. Koirala as Prime Minister", with a set of Ministers, but Tanka Prasad changed sides thrice during the week and finally went over to B.P. Koirala.
7. The break in the Nepali Congress began when the non-ministerial group in the party, led by B.P. Koirala, suspected that M.P. Koirala was running the Government on lines different from those of the Party. Accordingly the Working Committee asked the Cabinet to resign and only three loyalists, Ganeshman Singh, Subarna Shamsher and S.P. Upadhyaya, complied. On 25 July 1952, M.P. Koirala, Mahabir Shamsher and Naradmuni Thulung were expelled from the party. The M.P. Koirala group formed the National Democratic Party (Jana Congress) on 30 April 1953.
8. He informed that talks were "in progress between M.P. Koirala and S.P. Upadhyaya to sidetrack B.P. Koirala and other extremists or doubtful elements and form a Ministry" with three representatives of M.P. Koirala, three of Nepali Congress and one representative of the King.

4. Cable to R.K. Nehru¹

Your telegram 24586 June 8th about Nepal.² Please ask our Ambassador in Kathmandu to give following message formally to Nepal Government. *Begins.* The Government of India have noted with grave concern the steadily deteriorating condition in Nepal and the intensification of anti-Indian propaganda which is reported to be supported even by the Chief Counsellor.³ They are deeply interested in the progress and stability of Nepal and in the past they have given such help as they could to the Nepal Government at their request. They are surprised that in spite of their efforts to help the Nepal Government without interfering in any way with their internal affairs some leading personalities in Nepal should create ill will between the two countries and endanger the stability of the country. The Government of India expects the Nepal Government to take effective steps to prevent this deterioration which is of intimate concern to India and affects her own security. They cannot remain passive spectators of this progressive deterioration and of the deliberate attempts to carry on anti-Indian propaganda. *Ends.*

This message should be formally given to Chief Counsellor and the Ambassador should make it clear to him that we take a serious view of this situation and more especially the part he is playing in it.⁴

The Ambassador should communicate this message to the King together with following message on my behalf. *Begins.* I am distressed to learn of your continuing ill-health. I earnestly hope that rest and treatment will bring about an improvement.

Conditions in Nepal have been steadily deteriorating and require urgent action. I am specially concerned at the attitude of your Chief Counsellor who

1. London, 11 June 1953. JN Collection.

2. R.K. Nehru, the Foreign Secretary had informed that anti-Indian propaganda was being intensified by B.P. Koirala and his supporters and that situation in Biratnagar was fast deteriorating due to no-rent campaign, picketing of treasury and courts, strike by mill workers and a general collapse of civil administration.

3. R.K. Nehru had informed that efforts for a consensus cabinet by M.P. Koirala and the King had failed, as the major faction leaders such as S.P. Upadhyaya and Subarna Shamsher were afraid of B.P. Koirala, who was openly backed by the Chief Counsellor, Kaiser Shamsher Rana.

4. The two major political leaders in Nepal at this time were M.P. Koirala and B.P. Koirala. While the King desired a ministry by M.P. Koirala, the Chief Counsellor alongwith B.P. Koirala fanned unrest, amongst peasants in eastern Nepal, civil servants and workers in Biratnagar, and tried for a coalition ministry excluding M.P. Koirala and his supporters.

is said to be encouraging anti-Indian propaganda. I think that urgent steps must be taken to put an end to the present state of affairs. *Ends.*

The Ambassador should personally make clear to Subarna Shumsher and S.P. Upadhyaya that we are taking a serious view of situation and are not prepared to tolerate this continued deteriorating and anti-Indian propaganda.

5. Cable to R.K. Nehru¹

Your telegram 2780 dated 11 th June.²

I agree with steps suggested by Foreign Affairs Committee and other arrangements made.³

This morning I sent you a message to be conveyed to Nepal Government. Gokhale should meet all Counsellors as well as, if possible, Subarna Shumsher and explain to them quite clearly that we cannot tolerate recent developments and more particularly activities of Chief Counsellor and Subarna Shumsher, B.P. Koirala and Upadhyaya. Further that, if necessity arises, we shall certainly take action to support the King.

It is certainly desirable to have some kind of Ministry, though even then it might be stated that Ministry will be added to later to make it more representative.⁴ Subarna Shumsher and others of his kind should be made to realise that if they persist in their mischievous activities, they will get into

1. London, 11 June 1953. JN Collection.

2. R.K. Nehru mentioned that B.P. Koirala and S.P. Upadhyaya had gone to Taulihawa, where a no-rent campaign was going on, despite a prohibition order clamped on them from leaving Kathmandu by the Home Counsellor, Mahabir Shamsher Rana. In view of the King's failing health, there was no possibility of a composite ministry being formed but that "situation might be saved" if M.P. Koirala "took courage in both hands" and "formed a ministry consisting of his own supporters as soon as possible."

3. At a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee on 10 June 1953, it was decided to instruct B.K. Gokhale to advise the King to ask M.P. Koirala to form a Ministry soon and to inform M.P. Koirala and the King about Indian support for preservation of peace in Nepal and to suggest to the King not to leave Nepal before formation of a ministry. The Committee also instructed Gokhale that military aid for Nepal was ready and could be provided at 24 hours' notice, if asked for.

4. On 15 June 1953, a ministry headed by M.P. Koirala was formed. In a proclamation the King declared that the present set up was a temporary arrangement and that Party leaders and independents were to hold negotiations with the Premier, who would accord seats to them in the Cabinet.

trouble. If they imagine that they can get into power in this way, they are very much mistaken.

If there is any attempt on Indians, immediate steps should be taken by us not only to protect them but to control the situation.⁵

Crown Prince of Nepal is not here. Second son of the King is here.

5. Earlier in April 1951, a dispute between Indians and Nepalis at Birganj had led to widespread riots, demonstrations and loot, resulting in death of two persons. Anti-Indian sentiments were often roused by opposition parties and conservative political elements to gain an upperhand in the unstable political situation of Nepal.

I. BILATERAL RELATIONS

(iv) Sri Lanka

1. Sri Lanka Citizenship Question¹

.... The Prime Minister emphasised the necessity of appreciating the psychological, and very real fear, that a small country like Ceylon had, of Indian pressure and absorption. While every attempt should be made to secure the best terms possible for people of Indian origin in Ceylon, the rights of an independent country to safeguard its own national interests must also be recognized....²

1. Minutes of a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet, New Delhi, 7 May 1953. JN Collection. Extracts. Among those who attended the meeting besides Nehru were Abul Kalam Azad, K.N. Katju, N.R. Pillai, Y.N. Sukthankar, C.C. Desai, High Commissioner for India in Sri Lanka and B.F.H.B. Tyabji, Commonwealth Secretary.
2. C.C. Desai's proposals for the settlement of the citizenship issue, on which he had preliminary conversations with the Sri Lankan Government, were discussed and the broad outlines of the proposals were approved. Desai was requested to prepare a note on the negotiating points to be urged at the conversations expected to take place in London between the Prime Ministers of India and Sri Lanka.

2. Cable to B.F.H.B. Tyabji¹

Your telegram No. 2859 15th June.²

Ceylon. My talks with Ceylonese Prime Minister though completely friendly have not yet resulted in agreement. Matters therefore in suspended condition.³ Ceylonese Premier's proposal was about 400,000 to be registered as citizens, 250,000 to get permanent residence certificate⁴ and remaining 300,000 to be liable to be sent out at convenience of Ceylon Government, though this might be phased. We accepted 400,000 figure but pressed for permanent certificates for 300,000 and remaining persons to be given assurance of not being sent away for a period of 7 or 10 years. Alternatively we were prepared to agree to permanent certificate for 250,000 on assurance for life for remaining persons unless they themselves choose to go away to India.

Ceylonese Premier would not accept either alternative. We pointed out that uprooting of 300,000 or creating complete uncertainty for them for future would create grave situation both among all persons of Indian descent in Ceylon as well as in India. We could not accept them in this way and would not issue visas to them. Result would be deterioration and ill will in Ceylon and India. We pointed out many other grave consequences. Ceylonese Premier said he could not go further without consulting his Cabinet. There matter rests.

Other Ministers accompanying Ceylonese Premier appeared to be much more accommodating. But Premier would not change his position. At the same time Premier was anxious to have our goodwill and was very conscious of increasing importance of India's position in world affairs. Our conversations were friendly though frank and we parted with mutual expressions of goodwill.

C.C. Desai who was present took part in some of our talks and agreed fully with attitude taken up by us.

Please convey this message to Hicomind Colombo. Tell them that our line should continue to be friendly expressing hope that settlement will yet be arrived at.

1. Berne, 16 June 1953. JN Collection.
2. Tyabji had enquired, in view of the reported failure of talks between Nehru and Senanayake in London, what line of action was to be taken by the Foreign Office as well as the High Commissioner in Sri Lanka.
3. After the enactment of the Indian and Pakistani Citizenship Act, 1949, by the Sri Lankan Government, approximately 300,000 out of a total of 950,000 residents of Indian origin in Sri Lanka were to be thrown out of the country.
4. The holders of these certificates were to have no right to vote while enjoying all other privileges of citizenship.

3. Indians in Sri Lanka¹

Question: What was the nature of your talks with the Ceylonese Prime Minister, Mr. Senanayake, in London?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The talks with the Prime Minister of Ceylon were of a preliminary nature and took place in a friendly atmosphere. They had been carried on in a very cordial atmosphere although no agreement had been reached. But we may come to an agreement very soon. There would be consultations on various problems affecting both the countries.

I do not want to answer further questions relating to details of the talks.

Q: Have you seen a Colombo report that, according to C.C. Desai, the Indian Government had accepted the Ceylonese Government's proposal to naturalise 550,000 Indians in the island and to treat the rest as aliens, i.e., that India had accepted a proposal for the repatriation of 150,000 people of Indian origin from Ceylon?²

JN: India has not accepted any such proposal. She has accepted nothing. Do not depend on newspaper reports. I know more than newspaper reporters. My talks with the Ceylonese Prime Minister, Dudley Senanayake, were friendly. No agreement had been reached. We—the Ceylonese Prime Minister and myself—shall meet again and, in the meantime, both the Governments shall consider the points of agreement....

1. Press conference, Bombay, 27 June 1953. From *The Statesman*, *The Times of India*, *The Hindustan Times* and *The Bombay Chronicle*, 28 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 216-217 and 402-403.
2. Of the 300,000 persons to be thrown out, about 150,000 were Indian citizens with valid visas. The problem was over the accommodation of the residue 150,000. India demanded either raising of the number of Permanent Resident Certificate Holders to 300,000 and 7 to 10 years of guarantee for the rest, or a figure of 250,000 certificate holders, with lifetime guarantee for the rest unless they themselves went away.

I. BILATERAL RELATIONS (v) People's Republic of China

1. Shipment of Strategic Goods to China¹

I think that we should give an aide memoire to the UK High Commission here in answer to their aide memoire.² A copy of this aide memoire should be sent to our High Commissioner in London for his information.

2. I agree generally with Mr Mani's note. I think that our aide memoire should make our position quite clear in this matter. I give below the substance of this aide memoire:

We should say that we have given full consideration to the aide memoire presented to us by the High Commission for the UK in New Delhi dated 18th March, 1953. We should like to draw the attention of the UK Government to the policy we have been pursuing in regard to China with whom, in spite of various developments, we continue to have friendly relations. We have endeavoured, to the best of our ability, to help the cause of peace in Korea and the Far East generally, and we have felt that peace will not be established there if any measures such as a blockade of China are taken.

It will be remembered that India was not a party to the UN Resolution which recommended that every State should prevent the supply of strategic materials to China.³ We felt then, and we still feel, that such a step can have little value and can only affect injuriously any attempts at a peaceful solution of the problems of the Far East. In effect China's oversea imports are not great and to try to cut off these oversea imports will not appreciably weaken China's powers of resistance. The only effect will be for the

1. Note to Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, 6 April 1953. JN Collection.
2. Following a statement by Anthony Eden in the House of Commons on 17 and 18 March 1953, the British Government had sent aide memoires to India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, seeking a ban on refuelling of merchant ships carrying "strategic goods" to China. The British move followed the American announcement on 2 March 1953, outlining a programme aimed at tightening up controls on the shipment of "strategic goods" to Communist countries.
3. Of 18 May 1951.

Government of China to look towards the Soviet Government for further assistance.

The Government of India would also like to draw the attention of the UK Government to the Geneva Convention of 1923 under which we are bound to treat all ships equally in the matter of grant of facilities, except in relation to ships of war or in pursuance of international conventions to which we are parties. If we agree to the UK request, we will have to apply the same principle to, and enforce the same disability against, all ships carrying strategic materials to China. In this way we shall be indirectly compelled to enforce the UN Resolution with which we did not agree.

It is also by no means clear as to what materials are in fact to be considered strategic. The UN Resolution leaves to each State a great measure of discretion in determining what commodities fall in this category. It is possible that some States may take advantage of this provision in order to strangle the normal economic life of China. We cannot be parties to this.

Nor can the Government of India accept the proposal which entitles a foreign-owned oil company in India to refuse oil supplies to a ship on political grounds. This will be against public policy as well as the attitude we have taken up in the United Nations and elsewhere. Refusal of supplies can be agreed to only by positive action on our part. This would mean our issuing an order under our export control regulations to prevent the supply of oil. The Government of India are unable to take any such action.

The Government of India would like to point out that, apart from the merits of the UN Resolution referred to above and the steps that have thus far been taken in furtherance of it by some Governments, the present is the most inopportune moment for the Government of India, or indeed for any Government interested in peace, to initiate any new action against China. That will be interpreted as a deliberate obstruction in the way of a peaceful settlement. The Government of India earnestly hope that these new developments, which are so full of hope, will be borne in mind by all the Governments concerned, who are so desirous of bringing about a peaceful settlement of the problems of the Far East.

The Government of India, therefore, regret that they are unable to cooperate in the procedure described in the aide memoire which has been presented to them on behalf of the UK Government.

3. An aide memoire should, therefore, be drafted on the lines suggested above and presented to the UK High Commission here. Copies should be sent to the Ministries concerned. It is not necessary to consult these Ministries before sending the aide memoire.

4. It is desirable that this should be done at a very early date and specially before Mr Dulles comes here.

2. China's Membership of UN Social Commission¹

I really do not know why this matter is being brought up again and again by Asha Devi.² You can look into the Constitution governing these bodies. Some of these organs of the UN have included in their membership countries which are not in the UN. They have decided for themselves and I believe there is nothing to prevent them from so doing. I have not myself seen the Constitution of the Social Commission. This might be looked into. The simple rule to be followed by us at every possible opportunity when this question is raised, is that we must clearly and emphatically state that China should be represented by the People's Government of China. If, by any technical rule, voting is not to be taken, our representative must state our position anyway. Anyhow, you can look into the rules and regulations.

1. Note to Deputy Minister of External Affairs, 15 April 1953. File No. VI/52/75113/10003, MEA.
2. Asha Devi Aryanayakam, the Indian representative in the UN Social Commission, wanted to know which way India should vote on the question of People's Republic of China's representation to this body.

3. To N. Raghavan¹

New Delhi
April 19, 1953

My dear Raghavan,

I received your letter of the 17th March some time ago.² Since then much has happened and the general situation has undergone a very marked change. Among other things, the Chinese Government has again become friendly to you and to us.³ In fact, they veer round very much to what we have been

1. File Nos. F.12/62/NGO-52, Vols. I-VI and F. 12/64/NGO-52, MEA. Copies of this letter were sent to Secretary General and Foreign Secretary.
2. Raghavan had written about his continuing efforts for friendly relations with China and had surmised that though "violent attacks on Indian resolution have died down" and "they have ceased questioning" India's *bona fides*, the Chinese attitude "still continues to be cold."
3. A substantive change in the Chinese attitude towards India was indicated in Chou En-lai's statement of 30 March 1953, proposing repatriation of all willing prisoners and handing over the rest to a neutral state "to ensure a just solution of the question of their repatriation", which in essence, was akin to the Indian resolution on Korea.

saying previously about Korea. That is all to the good and we need not go about saying that we told you so.

In this rapidly developing situation, we have to be wide awake all the time, to maintain friendly relations with the Chinese Government and at the same time, to keep our dignity. Perhaps, the events of the past few months have on the whole, yielded good results, The Chinese Government must appreciate that, while we continue to be friendly, we hold to our opinions also and cannot be made to change them by pressure tactics. Anyhow, we must always remember our long range policy, which is of developing friendship with China, subject always to not giving in on any matter that we consider important or vital to our interest.

Some time ago, i.e, before these recent developments, we were approached by the UK Government to cooperate with them in refusing supplies to ships going to China. We made it clear to them that we would not do so and that we would maintain our complete freedom of trade and giving supplies to ships. As a matter of fact, before this matter could come to a head, the new development took place and it was not pursued. It may not rise again, but that very incident demonstrated to the UK Government and to the US that we would follow our own policy that we intend to do, and the fact that we receive financial help for our development from America will make no difference.

As we have told you, we are prepared to allow the 1,000 tons of Chinese rice which are already in India to be sent to Tibet, subject to transport arrangements.⁴ But, it must not be taken for granted that this is a normal procedure. This transport business gives us a lot of trouble. In regard to other goods also, we are prepared to consider what we can supply to Tibet within reason.

You say, quite rightly, that with the Chinese one has to have an infinite capacity for patience. Fortunately, unlike the U.S.A., we too have some capacity for patience and we have shown it. Your work will probably be somewhat easier now and you should take full advantage of that and try to have friendly informal talks whenever possible.

I might inform you that our rice position is much better now and we are not in terribly urgent need of it. But if we can get rice from China on reasonable terms, we will be prepared to take it for future use.

It is important for us to know, in so far as this is possible, what new developments might take place in China vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. One would imagine that the pressure and influence of the Soviet Union in China would grow somewhat less.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. On 12 April 1953, Raghavan had informed that Chou En-lai was anxious for friendly relations with India and had offered help in transport of various articles to Tibet *via* India.

4. Policy on Trade with China¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: (a)² A reference was made by the UK Government to the Government of India, but this was not subsequently pressed.

(b)³ There was no occasion for any answer to be sent to the UK Government on this subject, but India's policy in this matter is quite clear and has been stated previously. India was not a party to the UN Resolution of 18 May 1951 banning the supply of strategic material to China. The Government of India continue to adhere to the same policy and have not accepted any commitment restricting trade with any foreign country.

May I add that, after the answer was drafted, a formal reply on behalf of the Government of India has been sent to the UK Government.

Govinda Reddy: Do I understand that trade between India and China is going on as usual without being influenced by the UN resolution?

JN: There has not been in the last many years much trade between India and China, and such trade as has been between India and China has been in regard to specific items being purchased by us or sold by us. We want to continue that and to add to that but anyhow not much could be done. We have not been influenced by any other consideration.

C.G.K. Reddy: May I draw the attention to a newspaper report... about the conclusions of the McCarthy Enquiry Committee where they have also taken note of our ships under our flag carrying on trade with China?...

JN: I do not know to which report the honourable Member is referring. I have not seen it. I understand there is something about ships under our fleet. Whose report is it?

C.G.K. Reddy: It is the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Enquiry Committee presided over by that famous Senator, McCarthy. He has listed

1. Reply to questions in the Council of States, 6 May 1953, *Parliamentary Debates (Council of States)*, *Official Report*, Vol. III, Nos. 43-51. Cols. 4993-4994.
2. Govinda Reddy enquired whether the Government of the United Kingdom had consulted the Government of India about tightening restrictions on the sea-borne trade with Chinese ports.
3. He further asked about the opinion, tendered by India, if the UK Government had consulted her.

two or three ships under the Indian flag, as carrying on trade with China. I want if such investigation even indirectly into our affairs is considered desirable by the Government.

JN: I need hardly assure the House that we attach no importance to McCarthy⁴ or his Committee in what we might or might not do.

4. Joseph R. McCarthy (1908-1957), Republican Senator from Wisconsin, 1946-57; conducted a vicious campaign against many liberals allegedly having communist sympathies, 1950-54. He was censured by the US Senate in 1954.

5. Exports to Tibet¹

The answer you gave to the US Minister was correct. Commerce Minister, in his speech, said nothing new. He merely repeated what has been frequently said before, explaining India's policy. Our Government cannot accept any restriction of our trade or any discrimination against any country.² We have to judge each case from the point of view of our own national interest and policy.

As a matter of fact, hardly anything in the nature of strategic materials has been sent to China or Tibet. Most of these are required in the country and the export of some of them is banned.

So far as Tibet is concerned, very small quantities of ordinary goods go to Tibet from India. Latterly the quantity of these has gone down considerably. A very small quantity of iron and steel has always gone there through Kalimpong.³ We do not encourage the export of iron and steel because of our

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, R.K. Nehru, 9 May 1953. JN Collection. A copy was also sent to Secretary-General.
2. The Commerce Minister, T.T. Krishnamachari, stated in the Lok Sabha on 7 May 1953 that India's trade policy was multilateral and completely non-discriminatory. "Our membership of the Commonwealth does not mean that we follow the pattern of the British commercial policy", he mentioned, and added that restrictive regulations that might be enforced on ships registered in the UK would not apply to Indian ships even though they might be registered under the UK Merchant Shipping Act.
3. As regards trade relations with Kalimpong, Krishnamachari said that the Government of India did not want to put any check. There was complaint about detention of iron and steel goods, he said, but this was due to some action by the local authorities to which Government was not committed.

own requirements. But we do not wish to interfere with the normal trade across the Tibetan frontier.

6. China and the United Nations¹

... Question: Do you think that, with the Korean truce, the prospects of China being admitted to the United Nations are much greater? Do you think your talks will lead to good results?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I suppose so, of course.

Q: Are all the members of the Commonwealth in favour of recognition of China?

JN: I do not think there is very much difference of opinion among the members of the Commonwealth on that issue. There may be a difference of emphasis, but not a basic difference of opinion. The opposition, as you know, comes from other quarters. I think the best thing for us is to see the truce through and then gradually take up other problems. With a Korean truce, the prospects of China's admission must be much better. Because, it is patent to me of course, our policy has been one of recognition of China almost right from the beginning. When the United Kingdom and India recognized China within a week or ten days of each other, there were some difficulties about the British position. We were more fortunate in that matter. So our position is perfectly clear in that respect, and it does seem odd that the United Nations should function without a very big country constituted of a large number of human beings. That of course raised a rather important and interesting point about the United Nations itself. There have been some arguments about it from time to time. As the UN was conceived it was meant to include practically all countries, all independent countries, whatever their ideology or viewpoint might be. Because, once you see the UN as something else, it ceases to have its universal character and becomes rather an exclusive group, however big the group might be. We think that it should be the representative of all countries.

1. Press conference, London, 8 June 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Also from *India News*, 13 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 106-107, 130, 174, 189-190, 396-399, 407 and 448-450.

Q: Was there any general discussion?

JN: General discussion where?

Q: Was the question discussed at the Prime Ministers' Conference?

JN: I do not know, but the particular conference you are referring to, the particular conference dealing with the Korean troops, I suppose, will rather tend to confine itself to any problems to be faced which are difficult enough. But in any other conference than the Prime Ministers, no doubt, all these questions may very well come up....

7. Faith in New China¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: India has no intention of assuming any leadership in international affairs—not even in Asian affairs, for that matter—and in consonance with her tradition she was always prepared to make what little contribution she could, but always in a spirit of humility. India has always been anxious to keep away from any alignment with one or the other power blocs and this has led to the position that enabled, or permitted, her to speak on friendly terms to both sides, as and when necessary.²

Philipp Etter³: What are Russia's intentions? Was Russia likely to start a war? What was Chinese communism?

JN: Russia is a great geographical landmass, a country with a large population and a programme of reconstruction. I am convinced that Russia has realized

1. At an interview with Philipp Etter, President of the Swiss Federal Council, at Berne, 16 June 1953. File No. E-11/53/1951/55, MEA.
2. Etter observed that India's place in international affairs was very different, and he was glad that there was "so much in common in the matter of foreign policy between India and Switzerland" and that the latter was proud of being associated with India as a neutral power in Korea." He wanted Nehru's views on some of the important problems of the day.
3. (1891-1977); a conservative, Examining-Judge, Zug Canton, 1917; Deputy to Council of States, 1930; Member, Federal Council, 1934-59; President, Swiss Confederation, 1939, 1942, 1947 and 1953.

that war shall not be to her advantage. She wants time for peaceful reconstruction. She is making great economic advances and she is, I feel certain, unlikely to start a conflagration which shall be materially and economically ruinous to her no less than to others. A great part of Russia and Russian economy had been destroyed in the last War and it was futile to imagine that Russia would, of her own accord, do anything that would lead to nothing but economic and material disaster for herself, which would definitely be the case if she were involved in a war.

China is, like Russia, geographically a huge country, also with a very large population and, above all, with a long history and very strong traditions of its own. It is strange that in recent years the western world, and America in particular, has repeatedly been complaining that China is, more and more, falling under the influence of the Soviet Union, and yet every step taken by America is one that cannot but drive China more and more into Soviet arms.⁴ The Korean War, for instance, has made China all the more economically dependent on Russia. The East-West trade embargo likewise, is having exactly the same effect. It is strange, under the circumstances, that America should complain of what is happening in China.

I am convinced that China has a history, and China has traditions of its own, which cannot be wiped away easily, at any rate, and the Chinese are certain to stand out and assert themselves. It must always be remembered that even the very revolution in China had been undertaken by Mao Tse-tung against the specific advice of Stalin. The Communist revolution in China was of a different type. It was an agrarian movement, an agrarian communism. That alone substantially distinguished Chinese communism from Soviet communism. Subsequent world events have certainly compelled China to move nearer and nearer towards Soviet communism, but I have no doubt that Chinese tradition and Chinese history shall assert themselves, in time to come, given the opportunity to do so.⁵

4. Reporting his conversation with Nehru, Paul Hoffman wrote to Dulles on 28 April: "I gathered the impression that he felt that the Russian strategy for the past few years has been directed toward keeping China out of the UN on the theory that China would thus be left without friends and would become more and more dependent upon Moscow."
5. Etter thanked Nehru for giving him an "opportunity of a discussion on matters of such great importance."

8. Recognition to People's Republic of China¹

...In regard to China, we recognized the new Government of China, although several great Powers did not. I think that the nonrecognition of China, of the People's Government of China, by the United Nations and some great Powers has been one of the major sources of trouble and war in the last few years. Because recognition or nonrecognition does not, unless it is some unimportant matter, put an end to an obvious fact. Now, can anyone challenge the fact about China, that China is a fact, a very major fact? It may be, if you like, an undesirable fact in the minds of many. But it is a fact. To shut your eyes to it does not make it cease to be a fact. It is an obvious thing. In fact, it is not only a fact, but it is a great Power, developing into it. And it is highly unlikely that anything else that is going to happen is going to weaken it. Therefore, it becomes totally unrealistic not to recognize a fact, dealing with a fact otherwise than not recognizing it. Shutting your eyes to it does not help.

The question of Israel, of course, is different. But as I said, once we applied that policy to China and argued about it in the UN and with other countries it became completely illogical for us not to apply it to Israel in so far as recognition went. What our other relations may be is another matter....

1. Press conference, Cairo, 25 June 1953. *Jawaharlal Nehru Press Conferences*, 1953. Information Service of India, New Delhi, 1954, pp. 18-36. Extracts. For other parts of the conference see pp. 79-83, 215-216, 416-418, 470-472 and 526.

I. BILATERAL RELATIONS

(vi) USA

1. International Military Tribunal¹

I agree that we should send this note to Washington and Tokyo.² We should also send it to other powers who were members of the International Military Tribunal. We should inform the US and Japanese ambassadors here also that we take strong exception to the suggested interpretation.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, R.K. Nehru, 17 April 1953. File No. J/53/2071/14, MEA.
2. In his note of 17 April, R.K. Nehru wrote that M.A. Rauf, Ambassador to Japan, had reported that the US had so interpreted the San Francisco Treaty as to deprive India of her rights as a member of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and to give Pakistan that position. R.K. Nehru proposed to instruct Rauf to inform Japan that India was not prepared to accept such an interpretation and to ask Indian Ambassadors in Washington and Tokyo to hand over the note prepared by F.J. Berber, the Legal Consultant to Government of India, to the respective Governments.

2. To Dwight D. Eisenhower¹

New Delhi
April 23, 1953

My dear Mr President,

I am grateful to you for your letter of April 6, which Mr Paul Hoffman delivered to me. It was a great pleasure to meet Mr Hoffman² again for we know him well in India and have a high regard for him. Mr Hoffman gave me your personal message which, if I may say so, I greatly appreciated. We have had long talks about various matters and, I am glad to say, I find myself in considerable agreement with much that Mr Hoffman told me. His imaginative and constructive approach to world problems is deeply interesting, more especially when most of us are apt to get into ruts of thought and action.

Mr Hoffman will no doubt report to you the substance of our talks. I can assure you, Mr President, that I am exceedingly anxious to do everything in my power to help the cause of peace as between India and Pakistan and also in the larger context of the world.

1. JN Collection.
2. See *ante*, pp. 318-320.

Recent events, which are reducing tension in the world, have given all of us in India deep satisfaction. I am happy that you and your great country are taking a lead in these matters, and I earnestly trust that your endeavours will lead to the settlement of the problems that afflict the world.

With my warm regards,
I am, Mr President,

Sincerely yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. US Wheat Loan Fund¹

Please see the attached letter from Dr Bhatnagar.²

I do not know the exact position and perhaps it is correct to say that the fund from the American Wheat Loan belongs to the US Government.³ Nevertheless, I do not at all like any foreign Government directly disbursing funds in India. All they should do is to give the lump sum available to some ministry of the Government of India for a particular purpose. If it is for education, surely the Education Ministry should have it, and there is no reason why the American officers should go into the relative merits of our universities.

Also, I dislike more and more this business of exchange of persons between America and India. The fewer persons that go from India to America or that come from the US to India, the better. I would rather return the money to America than have this imposition and this interference.

1. Note to Secretary General, MEA, 6 May 1953. File No. S/53/7011/70-MEA.
2. S.S. Bhatnagar wrote on 6 May that at a meeting between Indian and American officials on 23 April, it was proposed that out of a million dollars as interest on the American wheat loan each year, about 60 per cent be spent on exchange of personnel and 40 per cent on equipment. Indian officials did not agree saying that this arrangement would not meet their plans for the rehabilitation of universities.
3. G.R. Kamat informed Humayun Kabir that it was not possible for India to administer these funds, since the administration and accountability of these funds were placed by the US Congress on its State Department under the India Food Emergency Act.

4. Publicity in the US¹

I think that our approach to American publicity,² though undoubtedly affected by American conditions and reactions, should nevertheless in the main depend upon the Indian approach. What I mean is that we should not water down that approach merely to fit in with American habits of thinking. We may adapt that approach somewhat but it should not be weakened in any way. We stand for something in India and in the world. It so happens that there is a wide difference between our objectives and those of America in international affairs. To talk vaguely about the democratic world or the free world on the one side and the communist world on the other, as has continuously been done in the United States, merely indicates a lack of ability to think or understand events or forces at work in the world. This habit of simplification comes in the way of understanding anything.

2. All our officers in America, in whatever way they might function, should clearly understand that it is their function to interpret Indian policy in Indian terms, adapting them somewhat to American conditions but taking care that they do not lose their content in the process of adaptation. If, in our desire to please Americans, we produce a wrong impression in their minds about our policy, the only result is they get a shock later on when they find what we are aiming at.

3. Because of this approach, I do not think that American publicity experts can be of much use to us. While they are undoubtedly capable of putting something across to America, which an Indian might not be able to do, what they put across will seldom be what we want to be put across. They will give a different twist to it. They may be consulted when necessity arises.

4. I am more and more of opinion that in order to impress the Americans, we need not try to ape them. Thus, it may be said that American journalists can not be approached without drink parties to be thrown. I would make it perfectly clear to the American journalists that we do not function in this way and, if they choose to keep away, they can do so. I think that we will attract more attention in this way than the other normal method that is so often suggested.

1. Note to Secretary General, N.R. Pillai, 10 May 1953. File No: 32(6) -XPA/53, MEA.
2. In his note of 27 April, Samar Sen who looked after publicity in US, mentioned that after discussions with B.K. Nehru, N.R. Pillai and R.K. Nehru, agreement had been reached on the appointment of an Information Officer with a small staff for the Indian Delegation in New York, opening of an Information Section at San Francisco, the appointment of a competent officer as PRO in Washington with slightly increased staff and permission to consult publicity advisers on specific issues. This was estimated to cost about Rs 6.20 lakhs per annum.

5. Most countries working in the United States, and I suppose most of our own officers, are rather overwhelmed by the American scene and the rush and hurry of public activities there. They begin to think that the only way to get a hearing is to join in this stampede. Perhaps this might produce some momentary results, but we are after longer results and long results are not obtained by these methods. We can never compete in terms of expenditure with many other countries. But even apart from a desire for economy, I dislike this attempt to buy people by throwing money about. India has produced an impression on the outside world not by shouting too much, and not even by normal publicity, but by following consistently and quietly a certain policy. People begin to realize that we have an opinion of our own, that we think and not merely shout and that we propose to adhere to that opinion. It may be difficult for Americans to understand that money does not make any difference to the opinions that we hold.

6. Recently, the US Government was greatly pained and shocked at the Burma Government informing them that they will take no further technical aid. It was quite beyond the comprehension of the average American that a poor country like Burma, standing in tremendous need of help, dare refuse it. The odd situation arose that it was the receiver who was a dominant party and not the giver.

7. I want America to realize (they have done so partly, I think, already) that, while we welcome all friendship and help, we attach more importance to following our policies than to receiving help, however much we might need it. Further that in the final analysis we attach more importance to certain matters than merely to military power or economic strength, though, of course, we are anxious to build up our economic position.

8. It is the duty of our representatives abroad always to express themselves in friendly manner towards America, but they must not overdo this in terms of praise and adulation. They must always speak with the dignity becoming the representatives of a great country, who are not swept away by the glamour or strength of America.

9. Keeping all these things in mind, I should like to strengthen our publicity organizations in the United States. It seems to me, however, that the set-up proposed for San Francisco might well be reduced somewhat. It is expensive. San Francisco is important no doubt, but would it not be better to start on a somewhat smaller scale?

10. The Indiadel set-up should be strengthened so also the staff in Washington and New York.

11. These details should be finally considered by SG and FS and then Finance Ministry should be approached.

Copies of this note might be sent to our offices in the US.

5. To Morarji Desai¹

New Delhi
May 13, 1953

My dear Morarji,

I have received a report from a reliable source about the activities and behaviour of E. Drumwright,² US Consul-General in Bombay. It appears that he is generally arrogant and openly runs down India's foreign policy as well as the Prime Minister. On the basis of having spent many years in China, he goes about saying that India today will go the way of the Kuomintang in China, unless a more positive attitude to communism is adopted. In his opinion America should adopt a stiffer policy towards India.

I am told that at a tea party given to Adlai Stevenson in Bombay, there was a group consisting of Drumwright, S.K. Patil, Masani and J.R.D. Tata sitting at a table. Drumwright declared that the PM's foreign policy was impracticable and would lead this country to the same fate which overtook the Kuomintang in China. He asked others why did they not do something about it. J.R.D. Tata was silent. Masani completely agreed with Drumwright. So did S.K. Patil, who is reported to have said "What can we do when he (Mr Nehru) does not listen to us".

Drumwright reported to Stevenson later that S.K. Patil is "Our man in this part of the country".

I am sending this information to you as you might be interested.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Everett F. Drumwright was US Consul-General in Bombay from November 1952 to October 1953.

6. Utilization of Wheat Loan Fund¹

I agree with Shri R.S. Mani's note dated 8th May 1953,² which has been approved of by the Planning Commission.

2. I think we should urge the US Government or their Embassy here that the need of our universities for new equipment is urgent and far more important than any other way of helping education here. So far as we are concerned, we should like to give first preference to this and as large a part of the money as possible to be diverted to this.

3. In no event should this fund get mixed up with the US "Leaders' Programme". That would be unfortunate from many points of view and it might even cast some discredit on this whole business of the Wheat Loan interest funds. The Leaders' Programme has included in its scope many persons who are considered highly undesirable from the Government's point of view.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 22 May 1953. JN Collection.

2. R.S. Mani, India's Commissioner in Hong Kong, had expressed his strong opposition to the proposal put up by the US embassy that, the Wheat Loan Fund could be utilized for financing the US "Leaders' Programme" under which senior US statesmen were to visit India to assess the efficient utilization of US aid. Though the US statute governing the Fund specified that it was to be utilized for exchange of "students, professors and other academics" between the two countries, the US wanted to extend this to "eminent Indians" from the field of "information and politics" contravening the provisions of their own statute. Mani felt that this was indicative of US motives, since "their legal conscience is sufficiently elastic to admit of impossible interpretations."

I. BILATERAL RELATIONS (vii) USSR

1. Cable to K.P.S. Menon¹

I have just returned from tour of Indo-Burma border where I was cut off from news. Meanwhile, important developments have taken place, to which you refer in your telegram 47 of April 2.² We agree with you that we should welcome this new attitude on the part of Soviet and China Governments and should try to help in furthering cause of peace. Our fear is that USA may prove somewhat difficult.

1. New Delhi, 5 April 1953. JN Collection.
2. Menon had reported that home and foreign policy in the USSR was undergoing fundamental changes. On the homefront there had been drastic cuts in prices, a proposal for revision of the penal code, liberal amnesty to prisoners, and a marked decline in the "Vigilance Campaign", which sought to root out enemies of the country from the Government. On the external front, the change could be seen from the sudden turn in Chinese attitude towards Korean prisoners impasse, assurance of release of civil internees in North Korea, feelers for the German unity talk, participation of a Soviet ship in the Coronation ceremony and granting visas to ten US journalists to visit USSR. This change, Menon thought, could pave the way for a five-power peace pact.

2. Joseph Stalin¹

Dr Kitchlew² came to see me last evening and gave me an account of his visit to the Soviet Union. He gave me a bundle of papers relating to the Vienna Peace Congress. I am sending you all these papers for record....

3. Dr Kitchlew was full of praise for what he saw in the Soviet Union, more especially in Tashkent.

4. He spoke to me of a long interview he had with Stalin about twelve days before his death. He said that Stalin had particularly asked him to convey

1. Note to Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, 21 April 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Saifuddin Kitchlew.

his greetings to me and had expressed his desire to have closer relations with India.

5. In the course of the conversation, Stalin suggested that it would be a good thing if there could be a meeting between him, Mao Tse-tung and me,

6. Dr Kitchlew is an enthusiast and is not a close observer. He was given special treatment in the Soviet Union as the winner of the Stalin Prize and naturally he reacted to this very favourably.

3. Foreign Policy of the New Soviet Regime¹

Nehru welcomed the proposal for a high-level conference with the Russians and agreed that it should be kept on an informal basis without previous conditions.² He also agreed that it was necessary first to hold the Bermuda meeting.³ This should be held as soon as possible in order to clear the way for the even more important Four-Power meeting with the Russians. One of the main objects of the Bermuda meeting would be to reach agreement on the method of approach to a Four-Power meeting, since Sir Winston Churchill believed it should be without previous conditions or commitments, which was undoubtedly right, while President Eisenhower at present appeared to think otherwise.⁴

1. Minutes of the first meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, London, 3 June 1953. JN Collection. The Conference was attended by the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Southern Rhodesia. Extracts.
2. Churchill was not impressed by the changes in Russia's external policy and suggested that the members of the Commonwealth should hold an informal talk with Soviet leaders to ascertain how important those changes were. He believed that for "building bridges and not barriers", it was necessary to persuade the US President for such a meeting without any pre-conditions.
3. Louis St Laurent observed that it was necessary to hold the Bermuda conference before any approach was made to the Soviet Government. Since it was necessary to persuade the US President that a meeting was worthwhile, "care should be taken to avoid the impression that the Bermuda meeting was an attempt to concert action against the Soviet Government."
4. According to Churchill, the present attitude of the US Government was that before a meeting was held, the Russians must at least give more positive evidence that they were prepared to move closer to the US point of view.

The recent change in Soviet policy certainly seemed to offer a better opportunity for achieving peace and preventing war. While efforts should be made to discover the motives behind this Russian policy, at the same time, whatever those motives might be, advantage should be taken of the situation now presented. It seemed clear that Russia did not want a war, at least in the foreseeable future, though she undoubtedly would like to achieve the results of war without having to resort to one. It was, however, an extreme oversimplification of a highly complicated situation to present the problem as one of communism versus anti-communism. There were large areas of the world, particularly in Asia, where the outlook of the people was governed by factors which lay outside that simple definition. There were considerable nationalist movements and a desire for collective political freedom leading, it was hoped, to an increased measure of individual freedom. In those countries it was very difficult to convince people that they should give up their nationalist aspirations or their desire for freedom, while attempts were made to protect them from a Communist menace, which was by no means apparent in their particular area. It was, moreover, very difficult to appear as a liberating force if the anti-Communist world continued to offer willing support to certain individuals who in fact had no representative power and whom history had now passed by — e.g., Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee. He thought there was too great a tendency to look upon the whole problem from the military point of view and to forget the psychological factors affecting large masses of people, especially in Asia.

...Nehru agreed that there could be no question of handing over Chiang Kai-shek to Communist China.⁵

...Nehru said that he agreed with Mr Holland's conception of a friendly approach to the United States and, indeed, he felt that our approach to all countries should be friendly.⁶ Sometimes differences of opinion made that difficult, but it was still the object which should be pursued. He agreed with Dr Malan, who had put forward the doctrine of non-interference with forms

5. Churchill felt that since Chiang Kai-shek had fought on their side against Japan, the United States attached great importance to maintaining his position, and felt an obligation to protect him.
6. Sydney Holland observed that the Commonwealth could avoid insisting upon points which they knew would be unacceptable to the United States like the admission of Communist China to the UN. Eisenhower had already assured that he saw no reason for any major differences of opinion between the United States and the Commonwealth and felt that the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers might demonstrate forcibly to the Soviet Union "the unalterable friendship which existed between the Commonwealth and the United States."

of government in other countries.⁷ But a great many of the troubles in the world had in fact arisen from political or economic interference by one country with another. He feared very much that, if the United States affirmed in advance that one of their objects was to disturb the existing form of government in the satellite countries or in China, no progress could be made in the settlement of disputes. The United States were most anxious to receive evidence of good faith from the Soviet Union and from Communist China; but Communist China and the Soviet Union were equally anxious to receive similar evidence from the United States. Russia had undergone two German invasions, and there was no doubt that the basis of much Russian policy was the fear of a third.

Nehru said that he had had recent talks with Mr Dulles, the United States Secretary of State, and he had gained the impression from him that he feared that the problems of peace would be even more difficult than those of the present state of cold war. Four years ago he had heard Mr Dulles say that war settled nothing and that the country which could make the greatest economic advance would win any competition for power and create public opinion in its favour. There was no doubt in his mind that war-like preparations were throwing a strain on the economy of the Soviet Union which was interfering with progress in raising the standard of living of the Russian people.

On the question of admitting Communist China to the United Nations, Nehru said that he recognized that it would be impossible at the moment and that it would have no meaning if it were suggested to the United States. Nevertheless, the refusal to admit Communist China into the United Nations had led to many evils, including the war in Korea, and a reversal of that refusal was an essential part of any settlement in the Far East.

7. Daniel Malan expressed that each country should be allowed to adopt the system of government to which it gave preference. They could assure the Russians that they had no wish to interfere with the system of government they had chosen and that they were not opposed to communism as such, but only to its aggressive form.

I. BILATERAL RELATIONS (viii) UK

1. Cable to B.G. Kher¹

Your telegram 2001 dated April 17th.²

I am sorry that anything that I said should have shocked and pained the Ministers of the UK Government.³ I am myself surprised at this reaction of theirs though I can understand their not agreeing with our viewpoint in some matters. Clutterbuck⁴ saw Raghavan Pillai on 14th April and incidentally referred to my speech, more particularly to my reference to Central African Federation with which he expressed his concern. He intended seeing Pillai again.

I spoke as Congress President for nearly two hours to a vast audience on the anniversary of Jallianwala Bagh and reviewed world situation referring to Korea and recent favourable developments, to prospects of peace and to serious situation in Africa as a whole. As I have often said before, I pointed out the grave possibility of racial conflicts developing all over Africa. I pointed out good work done and progress made by UK Government in Gold Coast and Nigeria and referred to Dr Malan's dangerously anti-racial policies in South Africa. In East Africa the situation had become serious and had been described by UK Minister as bordering on civil war. I condemned violence of Mau Mau or others and said that this could only bring ruin to them, but I pointed out also the way to meet it was not by suppression of whole people and thus

1. New Delhi, 18 April 1953. JN Collection.
2. Kher had reported that Swinton, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, told him that Nehru's Delhi speech of 13 April 1953, reported in *The Hindustan Times* of 14 April, had "aroused deepest resentment", and was "made on a highly emotional occasion and was bound to encourage greater violence on the part of the Mau Mau". He felt that Nehru's reference to persecution and denial of fundamental human rights in Kenya and Central Africa was "travesty of the policy of HMG and amounted to interference in matters of British policy." For Nehru's speech see *ante*, pp. 17-38.
3. For instance, Thomas Lloyd of Colonial Office, wrote to Commonwealth Relations Office, on 17 April 1953, that considerable feelings had been aroused "in responsible quarters here and throughout East Africa by such speeches" and complaints were being made that "such allusive and untrue statements are going unanswered by HMG".
4. Peter Alexander Clutterbuck (1897-1975); entered Civil Service, 1919 and served in various capacities; Deputy High Commissioner for UK in Union of South Africa, 1939-40; Assistant Secretary, Dominions Office, 1940; Assistant Under Secretary of State, 1942-46; High Commissioner for the UK, in Canada, 1946-52, in India, 1952-55; Ambassador to the Republic of Ireland, 1955-59; Permanent Under Secretary of State, Commonwealth Relations Office, 1959-61.

laying seeds of bitter racial conflict. I referred to the land hunger of the Africans and fact that foreign settlers had taken possession of vast areas. This was the cause of trouble. Foreign settlers' activities had often been checked by UK Government. If they had their own way, position would deteriorate even further. African opinion could not and should not be ignored and constitution and formation of Central African Federation meant handing over those territories to foreign settlers against expressed will of people.

I referred to racial policies and conflicts in Africa, more especially as proclaimed in South Africa, as denial of UN Charter and fundamental human rights as we conceive them. I should like you to point out to UK Government that in these racial matters, as exemplified in Africa, there is deep passion in India. We have come into direct conflict with this in South Africa and the UK Government, as they are entitled to do, have adopted passive and neutral role. But we feel very deeply over these matters and consider that they are seeds of great conflict in the future. I have no desire to interfere in matters of British domestic or other policy.⁵ But where such policy hurts our deepest convictions and our national self-respect, we can hardly be expected to remain silent. I have tried to check expressions of these sentiments by others in Parliament and have often succeeded. But if I remain wholly silent, others will say much more.

Hindustan Times report of long speech is brief and does not correctly represent what I said. I tried to look at picture in broad continental and historical perspective and expressed my deep sympathy for the African people as a whole and warned Indians that they must on no account expect any privileges in Africa at the cost of the people there. That has been our basic declared policy for many years and I have often referred to it because that is part of our world view and, in our opinion, the future peace of the world depends upon it. In Africa we have supported throughout the ideal of an inter-racial society, which is the only way of bringing peace and some progress to that tortured Continent. To see that ideal being shattered in South Africa, and conditions being created elsewhere to prevent its realisation, is painful for us, regardless of whose fault this may be.

UK Ministers will, of course, answer any questions put to them in Parliament⁶ as they think proper, just as I would have to deal with questions in my Parliament.

You referred to Beaverbrook Press which has carried on virulent

5. Swinton further stated that while he had endeavoured to maintain very cordial relations with India, how would it strike Kher if in the course of his speech he criticised Indian Government's policy in regard to, say, separation of Andhra State or on the question of untouchability.
6. Swinton had said that questions might be put in the British Parliament and he might not be able to say anything in defence of Nehru's speech.

propaganda against India.⁷ We have not protested although it has hurt us. In *Daily Express* article recently reference was made to British Officers in Pakistan clamouring for war against India.⁸ It has been our conviction, to which we drew attention two years ago and more, that certain British Officers in Pakistan have done continuous injury to our relations with Pakistan because of their intense hatred of India.

I have repeatedly in recent months defended our relationship with the Commonwealth and praised British policy in many matters. We have avoided, as far as we could, any reference to domestic affairs of other countries. But there are certain world issues on which we hold strong opinions and we cannot be false to our own past and our present convictions. Even so, we express our opinions moderately and with no ill will, and our whole approach has been to further goodwill and cooperation between India and the UK.

We are firmly committed to the ending of colonialism and the spread of freedom according to the principles of the UN Charter. In particular, we view racial discrimination with the deepest resentment. We realise that progress has to be slow but, where whole trend is reversed and vicious policies laid down as in South Africa, we have to protest and give expression to our deeply felt feelings.

7. Kher had explained to Swinton that the intent and purpose of Nehru's Delhi speech had been misunderstood, that there was nothing new in it which could countenance terrorism and violence, that India's position on Central African Federation was well known and, told him that the press in Great Britain, especially the two major publications of Beaverbrook, *Daily Express* and *Evening Standard*, "had been exceeding all limits of decency" in attacking Nehru, and "did not meet with anybody's approval."
8. In a two-part serialised article, Charles Foley, Foreign Editor of *Daily Express*, had quoted British Officers, serving in Pakistan as saying that "unless something is done to stop Mr Nehru's power drunk politics, there will be no holding us." They described Nehru as a "bully" and a "hypocrite" while depicting Pakistan as the "most loyal" member of the Commonwealth.

2. Cable to B.G. Kher¹

Your telegram No: 2012 dated 20th April.²

There is no question of my expressing any regret or even indirectly

1. New Delhi, 21 April 1953. File No. Folder-Africa (H.C. London), 1953, MEA.
2. Kher mentioned: "I would advise that we do not say anything which may be construed as an "apology" or expression of "regret".

apologising. I had used the word "regret" in my answer to you in a formal way. You can vary the phraseology.

Indeed I have not thought in terms of regret at all and the whole purport of my message is otherwise. I think that the UK Government, more especially their Colonial Office, is completely in the wrong and I want them to know that we feel so.³ I would have preferred your informing Swinton⁴ as early as possible.⁵ Delay means that we are put out by his message and are thinking of how to answer it. But I leave it to you to judge when to inform Swinton.

3. Kher further stated that probably Swinton's outburst was at the instance of the Colonial Office and the vociferous lobby voicing the opinion of the white settlers. He added that it was significant that Swinton was "careful to avoid association of Churchill's name with his protest" and that no newspaper, with the exception of the Beaverbrook Press, had commented one way or another on Nehru's speech. He concluded that if the Government as a whole had felt as strongly as Swinton "would have us believe, there would certainly have been adverse press comments."
4. Swinton, 1st Earl of, Philip Cunliffe-Lister (1884-1972); MP, Hindon Division of Middlesex, 1918-35; President, Board of Trade, 1922-23, 1924-29, and 1931; Secretary of State, for Colonies, 1931-35, for Air, 1935-38; Chairman, UK Commercial Corporation, 1940-42; Cabinet Minister resident in West Africa, 1942-44; Minister of Civil Aviation, 1944-45; Deputy Leader, the House of Lords, 1951-55; Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, December 1952-April 1955; Baron Masham, 1955, and author of *Sixty Years of Power: Some Memories of the Men who Wielded it*, 1966.
5. Kher met Swinton on 23 April 1953.

3. Cable to B.G. Kher¹

Your telegram No. 2050 dated 23rd April.²

In view of the attitude that Swinton has taken up, I think that we should make our position perfectly clear to him.³ I propose to do this to the High

1. New Delhi, 25 April 1953. File No. Folder-Africa (H.C. London), 1953. MEA.
2. Kher mentioned that Swinton, in his reply, had stated that Churchill "endorsed and agreed" with the view Swinton had expressed, that he had read Nehru's speech and "had nothing to retract", that while he had nothing to say regarding India's views on South Africa, references to Central African Federation in a public speech were resented, that "grievances should be ventilated by communications from Government to Government and not in a public speech" and that "attacks by Beaverbrook Press" could be ignored.
3. India had consistently supported the struggle of the people of Africa against colonialism and while condemning the violence in their struggle, had advised the Indian community settled there to join the cause of the people of Africa, to help them achieve their democratic rights against the racist and exploitative policies of the colonial powers.

Commissioner for the UK here. Please inform Swinton that I have received his message with great regret and surprise.⁴ Our government is not used to being addressed in this way by any government and I can only conclude that he has for the moment forgotten that he is addressing the independent Republic of India. We have endeavoured on all occasions to observe the proprieties of diplomatic intercourse and have often suppressed our strongly felt feelings. It has been our constant endeavour not to embarrass the UK Government and we have tried to cooperate with them to the largest possible extent subject to adhering to our own principles and policies. We shall continue to do so, but we are not prepared to change those principles and policies because of any pressure exercised on us by an outside authority.⁵

4. On 28 April 1953, Swinton reported to the Cabinet that a reply had been received from Nehru "which was conciliatory in tone."
5. On 20 April 1953, commenting on Nehru's speech, Winston Churchill, in a personal minute to Swinton, wrote: "I am in entire agreement with your spirited reply, which I hope will be conveyed to Nehru. I never expected anything better from a Congress-governed India. However, we have to make the best of what is left. It is about less than half of nothing. In fact it may well be that they only maintain a formal association with us because of the sterling balances."

4. A Matter of Protocol¹

I find that sometimes, in answer to questions or otherwise, the UK Government is referred to by us as "His Majesty's Government" or "HMG" for short. This is an old habit, which has no relevance today. That Government should be referred to always as the UK Government. The officers functioning in our Ministry should be informed of this.

1. Note to Secretary General, Finance Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary, 26 April 1953. File No. 2 (223)/48-PMS.

5. Air-Strip Facilities to UK¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not see how we can be expected to have exact details of the number of aircraft that go across that island.² This matter was first considered early in 1947 and we were asked then about certain navigational facilities in the Nicobar Islands—not as an air-strip, a normal air-strip which requires many other things. We gave those facilities, subject to certain conditions. Later, it was suggested that there should be a regular air-strip made, to be extended etc. and to that we did not agree. The present arrangement is a mutual one and, as the House will remember, we are getting similar facilities over a large number of RAF fields in Europe. We send monthly courier Dakota service and we get this mutual concession over a large number of air-strips, for practice and various other purposes. In fact we get much more, and naturally, because of that we have agreed to give certain navigational and refuelling facilities at the Nicobar air-strip on the express condition that we can stop them when we choose and we can take it over almost immediately if we so choose or at short notice. That is the present position.

Violet Alva: May I know if an IAF unit is stationed at Nicobar Island?

JN: I do not think this air-strip has anything to do with that colonial war or whatever it is.³ This is just something to facilitate flying by a large number of aircraft. I cannot say military aircraft were not given that facility. But it is a dangerous area for flying and to afford navigational facilities there seems to be right. The whole point before us was that we should keep control and take it over whenever we required it or if for any purpose we thought it undesirable for anyone to use those facilities. The conditions are that we can take it over at any time, including the improvements that have been added on to it....

1. Reply to the question in Parliament, 11 May 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (Council of States)*, *Official Report*, 1953, Vol. III. Cols. 5364-5366. Extracts.
2. B. Rath wanted to know whether the Royal Air Force had been permitted to have its air-stations in the Nicobar Island and if so, what the reasons were for granting such permission.
3. Rath had asked about the conditions imposed in 1947 when RAF was allowed to use that air-strip in the Nicobar Islands and whether it was not desirable to see that the RAF planes used for suppressing liberation movement in Malaya were not allowed the use of that air-strip.

I. BILATERAL RELATIONS (ix) African Countries

1. To Apa B. Pant¹

New Delhi
April 8, 1953

My dear Apa,

I received your letter of the 26th March on my return from my North-Eastern tour.² Ever since you wrote, the situation in Kenya has become far worse. I read today the letter you had written to Tyabji dated 1st April.

On reading your letter I have the feeling somehow that you have not quite understood what I was driving at. You refer to our sticking to our ideals. Of course, we must do so. But we must have some basic understanding of the situation and the forces that underlie it. As I have told you previously, I have long attached the greatest importance to Africa. It is important to us for a variety of reasons. In a sense, it is our neighbour, just across the sea and inevitably we shall have much to do with it in future. Politically speaking, it will be very harmful to us if great colonial domains grow up there in the name of self-governing federations or dominions which will be White dominions, governing a large African population. This shift of empire to Africa and the building up of these White dominions is dangerous from every point of view. That is why we have the strongest objection to the new federation that the British Government has decided upon.³ That is why we object even more strongly to the possibility of white settlers in East Africa getting full control.

But apart from this, it is manifest that unless African claims are met in adequate measure, there is bound to be conflict in Africa. That conflict can only be of the kind we see in Kenya, i.e., large scale and barbarous repression of the people on the part of the Government and the settlers and murder and killing and inhuman atrocities on the part of the Africans.⁴ What is happening

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to Secretary General and Cabinet Secretary.
2. Apa Pant had apprised Nehru of the volatile situation in Kenya due to the extreme measures taken by both the blacks and the whites. He felt that good relations with Africans could not be purchased at the cost of correct ideals and hence "sponsoring violence or defending, justifying violence in any form will not be of any help to the Africans."
3. On 23 March 1953, the British Parliament had approved a scheme to create a Central African Federation comprising Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi (Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland).
4. Unprecedented violence occurred in Kenya in 1952 during the Mau Mau uprising when white settlers and supporters of white rule were killed and maimed and in response the colonial authorities imposed stringent measures, promulgated emergency laws and unleashed a reign of terror.

in Kenya might well happen in many other parts of Africa. For anyone to think that the Africans can be completely crushed even by the killing of tens of thousands of them, is to misunderstand the position.

I am horrified when the Africans or the so-called Mau Mau kill and I would condemn them, but I can hardly blame them. They are backward in many ways and trodden under foot. They are being deprived of their lands and herded together in preserves.⁵ They are being treated like wild animals. All the schools they had built up almost with their blood have been closed.⁶ Their leaders are not allowed to go to them. What are these unhappy wretches to do? They are not grown up enough to function in a peaceful and organized way of resistance. I wish they were, but we have to take facts as they are. The only alternatives for them are absolute surrender or rebellion with such weapons as they have. Of course, their rebellion will be crushed by superior might. But it is equally certain that the white man will have to go from Africa sooner or later.

You talk about a multi-racial society.⁷ Of course, we all agree with it. But all this sounds fantastic nonsense when murder is afoot all over the place.

We have to deal with an intensely revolutionary situation, and we have to understand it with sympathy. While I condemn the misdeeds of the Mau Mau or other Africans, I think all the blame rests with the British colonial authorities and the settlers. I realize that the colonial authorities are checking the settlers to some extent, but that is not good enough and the responsibility must rest with the Government there for whatever happens.

I have just heard of the conviction of Jomo Kenyatta.⁸ I think that this is purely a political conviction with practically no evidence to support it. I have followed this trial and I have seen no adequate evidence of any kind. But

5. In order to counter the Mau Mau, the Kenyan Government established preserves for natives, where people from several villages were put together under police surveillance.
6. On 14 November 1952, Evelyn Baring, Governor of Kenya, declared that the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association (KISA) and the Kikuyu Karinga Education Association (KKEA) had been dissolved on the ground that they were "societies dangerous to the good Government of the colony." Consequently, 34 KISA schools along with the Teachers Training College at Githunguri were shut down that day, 150 schools were ordered to remain open till the end of the term, but 29 schools run by the African Christian Church remained unaffected.
7. Pant had written that his work would help the Africans in creating a well-balanced and well-integrated multi-racial society.
8. Jomo Kenyatta and six other top leaders of the Kenya African Union were arrested on 21 October 1952 and were tried for managing the Mau Mau, inciting disaffection against the Government of Kenya, reviving discontent among the inhabitants of the colony and for fomenting ill-will and hostility among different classes of the population. On 8 April 1953, Kenyatta was sentenced to maximum penalty of seven years of hard labour for managing Mau Mau and three years hard labour for being a member of Mau Mau, the sentences to run concurrently.

evidence or no evidence, Jomo Kenyatta is a popular leader having the confidence of the Africans and we must respect him as such, just as we must respect Peter Koinange⁹ and others. I have no doubt about his popularity which will now grow even more.

It is now some months since the British authorities and the settlers have been trying to deal with the situation in East Africa. Every step they have taken has worsened that situation and now Lyttelton¹⁰ talks of civil war.¹¹ Of course, it is civil war with all its horrible consequences. It will grow worse.

Therefore, we have to deal with this revolutionary situation and we cannot sit piously by and cast individual blame here and there. The whole situation has arisen from the misdeeds of the settlers and the Government there and a gross mishandling by them. They must shoulder the responsibility and I fear that the outcome for them will ultimately be very bad. This is the collapse of British colonial rule, even though it may last a few years longer. The British have lost the art of adapting themselves to circumstances. They have made a mess of things in Iran,¹² to some extent in Egypt¹³ and now this horror in East Africa.

It is true that they have done better in the Gold Coast¹⁴ and Nigeria¹⁵ and that Tanganyika¹⁶ etc., are not bad.

9. Peter Mbui Koinange, a prominent liberal leader of the Kenya African Union.
10. Chandos, Lord, Oliver Lyttelton (1893-1972); Conservative MP from Aldershot, 1940-54; Minister of State in the Middle East, of Production and Member of War Cabinet, 1941-45; Secretary of State for Colonies, 1951-54; Chairman, Associated Electrical Industries Ltd. and subsidiaries, 1954-63; Trustee of, National Gallery, 1958-65 and of Churchill College since 1958; author of *The Memoirs of Lord Chandos* (1962) and *From Peace to War: A Study in Contrast, 1857-1918* (1968).
11. On 31 March, replying to the debate on Kenya in the House of Commons, Lyttelton contradicted the former Labour Secretary, James Griffith's assertion that civil war was on in Kenya and observed that nothing could be more 'fantastic' than calling Mau Mau a nationalist movement.
12. Iran broke off diplomatic relations with Britain on 16 October 1952 following a refusal to pay off 49 million pounds by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
13. On 12 October 1952, Egypt unilaterally abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Treaty of 1899 regarding Sudan.
14. In June 1952, the UK Government approved a constitution for Ghana (Gold Coast), which eventually led to its independence in 1957.
15. A new constitution was adopted in Nigeria in June 1951 and elections to the regional legislatures took place between August 1951 and January 1952. Nigeria became independent in 1960.
16. It was reported that a constitution on the lines of the Central African Federation was being drafted by Oliver Lyttelton for Tanganyika which evoked favourable response from the people.

We have Malanism in South Africa, we have this new federation in West and Central Africa and we have what is happening in East Africa. It just does not matter what the Africans have done, however bad it is. The fact is that it is naked and brutal racial domination. We can never agree to this kind of thing. We may not express ourselves forcibly in open because we happen to represent Governments, but in private I want to make clear how I feel and how India feels about this all and how this may well mean racial war on a big scale not only in Africa but ultimately elsewhere.

My own impression throughout this business has been that the so-called leaders of the Indian community in East Africa have been too timid and have played for safety all the time. I do not know these people, but I dislike timidity and cowardice.

At present, there is no question of our teaching the Africans anything. You do not teach any one when his house is on fire.

After I met Murumbi, I saw Oginga Odinga.¹⁷ He was even more bitter than Murumbi was about conditions in Kenya. He praised you and your work, unlike Murumbi, but the language he used about the settlers and the Government there was far stronger than I had heard from Murumbi. Indeed, every decent African must think and feel that way. To talk of loyal Africans supporting the Government when that Government is killing and crushing their people, is to talk a language of a past age which I do not understand.

Nobody talks of India having its sphere of influence in Africa. Nobody hints even at an imperialist policy of India. But India has the strongest objection to hostile empires being built up in Africa under foreign rule.

You have a hard job before you and I sympathise with you. You will of course do your best in the circumstances. So far as we are concerned, we should not be anti-European or anti-anything, except anti-racial domination, or any domination and anti-racial discrimination.

Perhaps somewhat later it might be a good thing for you to come to India for consultation. I shall be leaving for London on the 28th of May. I am terribly busy till then. If, however, the situation deteriorates and you feel that it would be worthwhile your coming here for a consultation before I go to London, you can do so.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

17. Nehru met Joseph A.Z. Murumbi, Acting Secretary of Kenya African Union, on 19 March 1953 and Oginga Odinga, a leader of the Luo tribe and Kenya African Union, on 24 March 1953. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, pp. 548-552.

2. Indo-African Association¹

I understand from the newspapers that some Members of Parliament have formed an Indo-African Association² after hearing Mr Murumbi who has come here from East Africa. MPs have every right to form such an organization, should they so desire, though it would undoubtedly have been better if they had consulted me as Foreign Minister before a specific step of this kind was taken. But, in any event, those of us who are Ministers have to function with greater caution and circumspection where international affairs are involved. A Minister is not supposed to run down or interfere in any other way in the domestic politics of another country, unless some conflict arises with our own policy, and we have to deal with it as such. We would undoubtedly dislike and express resentment if a Minister of another country criticised or interfered in any way in our internal politics.

2. It is true that it is no easy matter nowadays to draw a hard and fast line, and the old ways of diplomacy and the former codes of Ministerial conduct do not hold good now as they used to. We see strange exhibitions in the United Nations and elsewhere. Nevertheless, the principle is still there and we try to adhere to it as far as we can. In some cases, such as that of Indians in South Africa,³ we are intimately involved, and we express ourselves freely. In other cases such as Morocco⁴ or Algeria,⁵ we express our general sympathy for the nationalist cause but refrain from going much further in public. In private diplomatic correspondence we can go a little further.

1. Note to K.D. Malaviya, 18 April 1953. K.D. Malaviya Papers, NMML.
2. An Indo-African Council was formed at Delhi, with H.N. Kunzru as the President and H.K. Mahtab and S.K. Patil as General Secretary and Treasurer respectively. The Central Executive of the Council comprised Jayaprakash Narayan, S.P. Mookerjee, Sucheta Kripalani, P.D. Tandon, N.G. Ranga, Frank Anthony, Chaman Lall, N.V. Gadgil and S.N. Agarwal.
3. Plans for a joint civil disobedience campaign in protest against the Union Government's policy of racial discrimination were announced on 6 April 1952 by the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress.
4. From April 1953 onwards, the Muslim Religious Brotherhood Party and the other conservative political groups headed by the Pasha of Marrakesh, opposed to the reformist activities of Sultan Sidi Mohammad ben Youssef, waged a violent propaganda campaign against him and on 21 May 1953 petitioned the French authorities to depose him.
5. Spurred by the example of the struggle of Morocco and Tunisia for independence, Algerian nationalists also demanded civil rights and an equitable electoral system for the Muslim population from the French.

3. Then there is the question of British colonial territories. There is the case of Malaya,⁶ of East Africa, etc. We disapprove, on various grounds of much that is happening in Malaya or in East Africa. But, generally speaking, we restrain ourselves in public. Because we do so, we are enabled to express ourselves more forcefully in confidential and informal approaches to the governments concerned.

4. I have put this general position before you so that Ministers might keep it in mind. It would thus not be proper for Ministers to join any organization like the new Indo-African Association, or whatever it is called. That Association is obviously meant to carry on propaganda of a particular type. Wherever our sympathies may be, and they are clear enough, Ministers cannot indulge in agitational activities in foreign affairs. That is a delicate matter and is apt to lead to embarrassing situations. As Foreign Minister and at the same time as Congress President, I have to walk on a tight rope and to balance myself on it. Other Ministers need not put themselves in this rather difficult and embarrassing position.

5. Ministers are often asked to send their good wishes to organizations or conferences abroad. Here, too, some care is necessary and it would be desirable if they could refer the matter to the Foreign Office who are likely to know the status and objectives of these conferences or organizations.

6. The Communist guerrillas, mainly recruited from the immigrant Chinese population of Malaya, were carrying out terrorist raids on plantations, settlements, and highway traffic since 1948.

3. To Apa B. Pant¹

New Delhi
April 20, 1953

My dear Apa,

I have your letter of the 6th April together with the various notes attached to it. I have read these notes with some care. They confirm the general opinion I had formed of the situation in Kenya particularly and in East Africa generally.

In your note you say that there is a danger of our missing to see the wood for the trees. I agree. I have a feeling, however, that that is just what is happening. Perhaps it is a little easier to see the wood from a distance than from right in the midst of it. You say a good deal about truth and non-

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to Secretary General and Cabinet Secretary.

violence and multi-racial society. There can be no doubt that the only policy we can pursue and the only advice we can give should be based on truth and non-violence. But the repetition of axiomatic truths does not mean understanding or appraising a problem. Nor does such good advice has much effect to a person or a people in agony and torture of spirit.

The idea of a multi-racial society² at the present juncture in East Africa has no meaning at all. It is like our talking about a world federation, which is the obvious ideal for any intelligent human being, when actually nations prepare for war all the time. Our advice cannot be divorced from the reality of the day. Otherwise, it has no effect and is not even understood and is often suspected.

The reality is that a number of Africans, whoever they might be, in utter despair have resorted to violence and cruel murder. This is one side of the picture. The other is the overwhelming violence and cruelty of the Government and the settlers.³ To talk to anybody of a multi-racial society at this stage is to speak a language which is not understood. A teacher can only get across his truths or his advice if he has the full confidence of the taught and if his advice is correlated to the situation and to the receptiveness of the others' minds.

What has apparently happened in East Africa is the obvious result of the policy pursued by the Government and settlers there. Some Africans have acted foolishly. They have misbehaved badly, just as, in the early days of our national movement, people threw bombs, which was the height of folly. But we have to understand the background.

Allowing for the primitiveness of African ways, this is the reaction of any subject people who are cruelly suppressed and denied all rights. Every national movement has behaved in this way, except that there might have been less cruelty. In Ireland we saw the fierce and violent struggle of this kind going on for generations.

Therefore, we have to understand this and not merely dislike it. If we

2. "Multi-racialism", a colonial policy authored by Andrew Cohen, meant to combine the unity and economic progress of the region along with a partnership between black Africans and white settlers. African political power was to gradually evolve until they became politically equal to Europeans. In other words, the setting up of federations would not coincide with granting of political equality to Africans.
3. On 10 June 1953, it was officially declared that since 20 October 1952 till 3 June 1953, a total of 848 Mau Mau terrorists had been killed, 404 wounded and several thousands rounded up. Subsequent accounts revealed that during June and July 500 Mau Mau were killed, taking the toll to 1300 since the proclamation of Emergency. On 22 July 1953, it was announced that 116,000 Africans had been taken into custody, of whom 44,000 had been tried under Emergency Regulations and 71,000 subsequently released.

merely dislike it without understanding, we lose our capacity to help or to advise. The essential thing is to gain the faith of the Africans. If this is lost, then we can do little good.

Unfortunately, the Indian community in East Africa, exceptions apart, does not possess the confidence of the Africans. More particularly, the acknowledged leaders of that community had behaved in a manner which has enraged the Africans. You say about some leading personalities in East Africa that they are great admirers of me. I wish them to translate that admiration into service of the Africans which I so much desire. Instead of this, when trouble came to the Africans, your Indian lawyers, except for a very few, kept studiously aloof. In a moment of crisis, they were wholly lacking. That applies I think to the Indian community as a whole, though there are very few exceptions. As a matter of fact, newspapers contain reports of leading Indians in East Africa disapproving of my policy and saying that I do not understand anything about the position there. Whether I understand it or not, that is for the present, the policy of the Government of India and it flows out of the policy we have pursued during the last 30 years. It is going to be continued whether some members of the Indian community in East Africa like it or not like it. I am not interested at present in petty reforms for the Africans, that is a matter for them to decide. I am interested in standing by people who are in great trouble and who have to face tremendous oppression by a powerful Government. I should condemn of course every species of violence and give no quarter to it. But I shall stand by the Africans nevertheless. That is the only way I can serve them and bring them round to what I consider the right path.

That is the general approach. Details follow from that and may be discussed. Broadly speaking, we are against all forms of colonialism and we are convinced that this must go. As a Government, we express ourselves in diplomatic language. As a Mission, you have to function diplomatically of course and not overstep the bounds which are laid down. But always we must open our minds and hearts to the Africans and make them feel that they can trust us and that we serve them. If we fail in this, then we have failed in our mission.

You refer to Jomo Kenyatta. I do not know him and he might have many undesirable qualities. But there is no doubt that he is the outstanding leader of the Africans in East Africa at present and is the dominating personality. We have to deal with him as such and we have to gain his faith also. That was Gandhiji's way. For us to run down in any way a person who has become the symbol of African hopes and aspirations is not only wrong but will injure the very cause we seek to support.

Many long distance proposals have been made. We can consider them. But at present there is a fire raging in the hearts of millions of people in

Africa. It may well spread. Long distance proposals do not deal with such an immediate and urgent situation.

Fortunately there is some faith among the Africans in India and our policy and that is the one remaining hope.

I have had a protest from the UK Government about what I said at a public meeting on the 13th April here. I have sent them a suitable reply, a copy of which has been or will be sent to you. I do not propose to change our policy because of the wrath of the UK Government. They are obviously in the wrong in this matter although they might be in the right in a number of petty matters connected with Africa. I shall see them in June in London at the Prime Ministers' Conference and I propose to express myself as frankly as possible.

I have suggested that you should come here in the third week of May after your tour is over.⁴ The exact date will be indicated to you by the Ministry.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. For Apa Pant's meeting with Nehru on 26 May, see *post*, p. 396.

4. Guidelines to Mission in Nairobi¹

I have gone through these two letters of Shri Apa Pant dated 16th April. In spite of their length, they throw little light on the situation. It is evident that Apa Pant is somewhat unnerved.

2. He should be told that if any allegation is made against our mission in Nairobi, either officially or by non-official Europeans, he must protest to the Government there immediately. On every such occasion he must protest. He must not take these things lying down and he must not be afraid of the consequences.

3. He should point out to the Government there how the foreign settlers are behaving, as for instance, when they go to an Indian shop and curse India. We do not want our representatives there to take these things lying down.

1. Note to Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, 20 April 1953. JN Collection.

5. To Obafemi Awolowo¹

New Delhi
May 8, 1953

Dear Mr Awolowo,²

Thank you for your letter of the 20th April. I have given careful thought to your proposal. We would gladly help your Government in any way possible to us.³

An independent country necessarily has a ministry dealing with external affairs. It is not difficult perhaps to form a ministry, but it does take time to train up people who can function as ambassadors, ministers, etc. That training is not only the training of the individual, which is necessary, but something much more than that. A Foreign Service and a Foreign Ministry develop backgrounds gradually and a stock of experience which is larger than that of any individual. It is like the General Staff of an army. An individual officer may be good but if there is no proper General Staff, there is no coordination.

In the world today we are confronted with a multitude of difficult problems. Some of them almost appear to be insoluble for the moment. Even great countries with a large experience of foreign affairs follow policies which are sometimes contradictory, or follow no consistent policy at all. As you know, the world has been divided up more or less in rival blocs. Some countries do not formally belong to these rival blocs but are nevertheless inclined one way or the other. A very few countries are trying to follow an individual policy. India has tried to do so and will continue to do so.

A Foreign Service does the routine work of a foreign mission or of headquarters, which is important and delicate. One can train a person for that. But all that training does not take the place of giving a person a political understanding of the great events that are taking place so that he can form a correct appraisal of that. That can come only from a natural aptitude plus training plus experience.

Even in regard to training, we have to be fairly thorough. In our Foreign Service we take in recruits after a stiff competitive examination. After that we are supposed to give them about eighteen months training abroad and later at headquarters. During this training period they have to learn foreign languages. After this period, they are appointed to some mission in a junior capacity. In effect that training continues. Gradually they gain experience.

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to Secretary-General and Foreign Secretary.
2. Leader of the Action Group in the House of Representatives, Nigeria.
3. The date on which self-government was to be introduced in Nigeria, a British colony had been the subject of dispute for some months and had led to the resignation of four members of the Council of Ministers.

You will thus see that this is a laborious process. I am not sure that these junior recruits have much chance, to begin with, of meeting top diplomats in foreign countries, though sometimes they might see them.

I am pointing out to you some of the essentials of training for a Foreign Service. Though this may take time a country has to begin somewhere, as we began six years ago. We had perhaps a measure of training even previously.

We shall gladly help you. But I should like to know from you what the position is in Nigeria at the present moment. From such information as we have there are some constitutional and other conflicts going on. You mention in your letter that British officials have come in the way of some of your schemes in regard to this matter. I suppose constitutionally the UK Government will come into the picture now as they are responsible for Nigeria's external relations. If the matter is referred to them, what would be their reaction? If they agree, there would be no difficulty. But if they do not agree, then obviously a number of difficulties will arise.

I have been following with deep interest and anxiety the course of events in various parts of Africa. I am deeply distressed at much that is happening there. I have given expression to this distress in my general views. As a result of this I have not pleased the UK Government at all. It is stated by the European settlers in Africa that we in India have some ulterior designs on the countries of Africa.⁴ As a matter of fact this is completely without foundation, and all that we wish is that countries of Africa should become free and should progress. If we can give any help to them within our capacity, we shall gladly do so. Our explicit advice to Indians in Africa is that they must not do anything which is against the interests of the Africans. They should consider themselves as guests there and help in every way in the progress and advancement of the Africans.

While, therefore, I would gladly help your Government, I should like to do so in a formally correct way so as not to introduce any complications in the matter.

You will remember that it was suggested that we might perhaps be able to

4. Some reports alleged that the Mau Mau campaign was under the control of one overall commander and that the "brains" behind the movement was an Indian. According to the *Sunday Despatch*, "for the first few months no terrorist attacks" had been "made against Indians" and a Chief said at Lari on 29 March 1953, "I believe the Hindus are behind this." Meanwhile, reports from Northern Rhodesia stated that a peaceful noncooperation, inspired by the Indian satyagraha campaigns, was being planned by the Africans to resist the Central African Federation scheme. A correspondent mentioned that all indications showed a desire to follow Mahatma Gandhi's methods and that delegates "at the last week's meeting of the African Congress at Fort Jameson" were described as wearing badges provided by Indian traders with a picture of Mahatma Gandhi with the words, "Gandhi, lover of peace", inscribed on it.

help in planning for development in Nigeria and further it was proposed that a small team of Nigerian officers might come here to keep in touch with our Planning Commission with this end in view. I have not heard about this again.

You are good enough to invite me to visit Nigeria when I go to Egypt. I would greatly like to visit Nigeria, but I fear I cannot do so on this particular occasion. It has been difficult enough for me to find two or three days for Egypt and I have to be back in India as early as possible. But I shall remember your invitation and shall look forward to the time when I can visit you.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Indians in Kenya¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: (a)² The Government of India are aware that a section of the local European community in Kenya have made various charges against Indians in Kenya.

(b)³ Some such report has appeared in some Kenya newspapers. Government are not aware of newspapers in London publishing such reports.

(c)⁴ As far as the Government of India are aware, the interests of the local Indian community have not been adversely affected by this campaign. Government are carefully watching the situation and will take such steps as may be considered necessary.

B.Rath: Is it a fact that the Nairobi correspondent of the London *Sunday Despatch* reported that an Indian was the brain behind the Mau Mau movement in Kenya?

1. Debate in Parliament, 11 May 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (Council of States)*, Official Report, Vol. III, Nos.45-51, 6 to 16 May 1953, Cols.5354-5357. Extracts.
2. B. Rath asked whether the existing troubles in Kenya were being exploited by the local European community for an attack on the Indian residents in Kenya.
3. He further asked whether the reports in the London press accused the Indians of being the brain behind the so-called Mau-Mau troubles.
4. He wanted to know the steps Government was taking to safeguard the interests of the Indians in Kenya.

JN: I regret I do not read the *Sunday Despatch*.

C.G.K. Reddy: May I know if, in view of the fact that complaints have been made that some Indians are acting against the native population there, the Government have thought it fit to advise our nationals in Kenya not to take up that attitude?

JN: I do not think there is any Indian who can be described as against the African population. There are some Indians no doubt who might have expressed themselves in regard to the present situation there in some equivocal manner, but so far as the Government's policy is concerned, it has been laid down very clearly on many occasions publicly and privately to the people there that the Indians there should not seek to aggrandise their interests there at the expense of the Africans but that they should always work for the interests of the people of the country.

B. Gupta: May I know if the Prime Minister is aware of a campaign in the Tory press against India and even the Prime Minister of India for his sympathies for the people of Kenya?

JN: Yes, some attacks have been made....⁵

JN: Yes, Sir. An enquiry was made about what I said during my speech here last month.

C.G.K. Reddy: The enquiry was made by whom?

JN: On behalf of the UK Government, in regard to Africa. As I said, an enquiry was made in regard to what I said, notably about the question of the Central African Federation.

C.G.K. Reddy: Am I to understand that the Colonial Office of Great Britain has the authority or has the propriety to enquire into the actions of India or of its Prime Minister?

JN: When it concerns them, surely they can enquire into it....⁶

5. B. Gupta again asked if it was a fact that the Colonial Office in the UK had taken exception to Nehru's Delhi speech where he referred to Kenya and expressed sympathies of the Indian people for the people of Kenya.

6. N.G. Ranga asked if any effort had been made by the Ministry of External Affairs to let the UK Government know that all over India people had celebrated the African Freedom Day.

JN: It has been pointed out very clearly that there is strong feeling in India on this subject.

B. Gupta: Is the Prime Minister aware that because of his expression of such sympathies, he is being attacked as preparing for war against Pakistan and a cartoon appeared in the *Daily Express*, which is a Government party paper?⁷

JN: *Daily Express* London, is a particular type of paper which has not only recently but for a considerable period of time expressed itself in a very objectionable way in regard to India. The attention of the UK Government was drawn to this fact and they said that the *Daily Express* was one of those irresponsible newspapers and they were not in any way responsible for what that paper wrote.

B. Gupta: May I know whether the Prime Minister has enquired if this provocative attack against him and India has been tipped by the British Colonial Office?

JN: I am saying they totally disowned the *Daily Express* when the matter was brought to their notice....

7. *Daily Express* was part of the Beaverbrook Press, which incessantly indulged in criticizing India and maligning Nehru.

7. To Godfrey Huggins¹

New Delhi
May 11, 1953

My dear Prime Minister,²

Thank you for your letter of the 16th April 1953 which reached me about a

1. File No. AII/53/1423/29-30, MEA. Copies of this letter were sent to Heads of Missions in Nairobi and London.
2. Godfrey Martin Huggins, FRCS, 1908; served in two hospitals in the UK before migrating to Southern Rhodesia in 1911; general practitioner and surgeon, 1911-21; served in the War, 1914-17; Member, Legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia, 1923-44, and Prime Minister since 1934.

week ago.³ I have also received the copies of the debates of your Legislative Assembly which you were good enough to send me. I am glad you have written to me frankly. I have read the debates and, more especially, your speeches.

It is true that I addressed a meeting held in Delhi on the 13th April. That is an anniversary for us and every year I address meetings on that day, which are usually on a very big scale. On this occasion, I spoke at considerable length (I think I spoke for about an hour and three-quarters) and gave some kind of a survey not only of our problems in India but of world problems. I spoke in my own language, Hindustani. The brief report that you quote naturally cannot do justice to what I said, both because it is very brief and because it is a translation.

In the course of my speech, I referred to the turmoil and serious situation developing in various parts of the African continent, and expressed my grave apprehension in regard to it. I considered it as a matter which might well affect world peace in the future. I first referred to South Africa and the extreme racial policies being followed by the Government of the Union there, which I considered not only highly objectionable but also opposed to all the conceptions and ideals underlying the Charter of the United Nations. I referred then to recent painful developments in Kenya where, as stated I think by the Colonial Secretary in London, a kind of civil war is going on. I made mention of the Gold Coast and Nigeria, where certain steps have been taken by the UK Government which I thought were in the right direction.

Finally I referred to the proposal for a Central African Federation, and I pointed out that this was being imposed on the African population there against their expressed wishes,⁴ and was likely to lead to the formation of a dominion

3. Huggins wrote that he was disturbed on reading the report of Nehru's speech of 13 April. He had the impression that Nehru might have been misled by the information he had been receiving about Southern Rhodesia, so he enclosed the official reports of the Parliament debates of 23 June 1952 when the motion of Federation in Central Africa was introduced.

4. The formation of Central African Federation was an attempt to overcome the balkanisation of Africa. The Federation, initiated during 1945-51 by the the British Labour Party, consisted of three territories—Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi). The whites of North under Roy Welensky and of South under Godfrey Huggins favoured the Federation plan. For Southerners, Federation was the means to secure revenue from the copper wealth of the North to meet the rising cost of its rapidly increasing white settlement. The Africans of Zambia and Malawi opposed Federation fearing further loss of community lands to the whites and perpetuation of colour bar in the copper belt. In 1948, to resist amalgamation, they set up a Federation of Welfare Societies which in 1951, was rechristened Northern Rhodesia African National Congress under Harry Nkumbula, to resist the Federation scheme.

which might follow the racial and other policies of the South African Union. I felt that, even if this was not the present intention, this development was natural if a small minority of the population, racially different, governed the great majority.

I then explained what our policy was insofar as Indians in any part of the country or elsewhere abroad, were concerned. We had consistently advised them that they must not claim any privilege which was against the interests of the Africans. They had every right to demand equality of treatment, but they had no business to profit at the expense of the indigenous inhabitants of the continent. They must make friends with them and try to help them in such ways as they could, otherwise they would have no place in Africa in the future.

That was the main line of my argument. There had been a good deal of discussion of these subjects in the Indian press for many months past. Indeed, the South African issue has deeply stirred Indian opinion for years past. It has become a test case for them, and one of our basic policies is the recognition of racial equality. I do not mean to say that all races or all individuals are equal or have the same capacity, but we do feel strongly that there should be a basic recognition of equality and that equal opportunities should be given to all. Indeed, we thought that that was one of the basic criticisms against Hitler's racial policy and the idea that a master race should dominate the world. The Charter of the United Nations had laid down in clear terms that principle of equality or of equal opportunity. I know that the Africans are backward and that they cannot suddenly get out of this backward condition. They will require time to do so and every kind help.

We have all along stood, therefore, for the development of a multi-racial society in Africa. I am glad to find that you have used these words yourself in your speech, but evidently this concept of a multi-racial society can be interpreted in many ways.⁵ The way we interpret it is that the Africans must have first place in their country with others also having an honoured place. In your own speech you have indicated that you cannot foresee any time when the Africans will have that position or authority in their own countries.

In your speech you have discussed the concept of democracy and set out your political philosophy, and have stated that you reject the idea of domination of one race by another. But I do not myself see how the proposal, for a federation can result in anything but the domination of one race by another. Obviously, the basis of any such proposal, or the building up of a multi-racial

5. Huggins further wrote that their problems were those of a truly multi-racial country and added: "It is quite wrong to apply the term 'Colonialism' to us. Each of the three countries in this part of Africa contain Europeans, Indians and Africans, and all these races are here to stay. To refer to the Europeans and Indians as 'settlers' is to ignore facts, because these people are no less permanent inhabitants of these territories than are the Africans, who themselves only came to this part of Africa comparatively recently."

society, must be confidence and cooperation between the various elements that go to build up that society. If any such proposal is imposed against the wishes of the great majority of the people, that can only lead to increasing hostility, suspicion and bitterness. That will not only come in the way of the building up of friendly inter-racial relations but will inevitably make the dominant minority dislike the majority and try to safeguard its own interests by all the means in its power. We see that happening in other parts of Africa where a measure of political consciousness has grown among the Africans. The result is thus conflict in Africa and unhappy reactions in many other parts of the world.

We in India have no desire to interfere in other countries' internal affairs. I have deliberately refrained from discussing internal conditions in other countries, but where world issues of importance are involved, and when deep passions are aroused even among our own people, I have sometimes discussed these matters as moderately as I could, to give a right direction to people's thinking and not allow it to express itself in extreme forms. The basic thing in regard to any proposal is that it should come from goodwill and consent. Any other approach is not only opposed to the spirit of the times but is likely to lead to unfortunate consequences.

No one can be opposed to the concept of a federation and it is perfectly true that small backward countries cannot easily develop.⁶ The modern trend is for larger groups or federations to function together. But the element of consent among the people concerned appears to me to be essential. As far as I know, there is almost complete unanimity among the Africans in their opposition to the Federation scheme. No inter-racial society can grow up with this background, more especially when the colour bar operates both in the social and economic fields and legislative and executive authority is concentrated in the hands of a relatively small group of different people. With the best will in the world, this cannot lead to the realization of the ideal of a cooperative multi-racial society.

Any full consideration of this subject leads one into many avenues of thought and a variety of other world problems are affected by it. Indeed, it becomes part of the complex and confusing picture of the world today. This picture has to be seen as a whole even in order to understand a part of it. Among the major events of recent times have been the changes in Asia and the continuing ferment all over this great continent. Many things are happening in Asia which are good, many are not good. It is not so much a question of

6. Huggins mentioned that they had in the Federation of these three territories, three races of permanent inhabitants and that those races must live together, and make the best of it. Apart from any other consideration, the real interests of the Africans demanded that the three countries be federated.

liking or disliking them, as of understanding a tremendous, dynamic and historic process that is going on. To some extent, this applies to the continent of Africa, though in a different measure, as conditions there are different. Nevertheless, there is dynamism in Africa also, and it requires the most careful and gentle handling. I deplore the violence that is being indulged in by certain African tribes in Kenya. I think that will injure them more than anything else. But I deplore also any idea of crushing the whole people by the coercive apparatus of the State.⁷ That will sow the seeds of infinite conflict in the future. The Africans are, I suppose, a somewhat immature people with the virtues and failings which accompany immaturity. But they are to some extent aware today and a measure of political consciousness is coming to them. In the context of the world now, this political consciousness can neither be ignored nor suppressed, quite apart from the merits of the question. The only way appears to me to be to make a friendly and cooperative approach and try to help them to train themselves to assume responsibilities.

Looking at this world picture, I am greatly concerned. More and more I feel that no major problem in the world is going to be solved by war or by coercion on a large scale. Owing to the development of worldwide communications, there are reactions in different places of everything that happens anywhere.

I think that the biggest hopeful event of recent times was the friendly settlement between India and the UK which led to the independence of India and Pakistan, as well as Burma and Ceylon. That was a wise and statesman-like gesture and it has resulted in something that is very remarkable. All the piled up bitterness of generations of conflict has been largely put an end to. One can say with confidence that the relationship of India with the UK is essentially one of friendship today because there is no element of compulsion about it and the settlement was brought about in a friendly and cooperative way. I wish other problems in the world could be dealt with in that way.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Nairobi on 24 April 1953, western and south-western forest reserves on 20 May and Tinderet forest reserves on 29 May were declared "special" areas i.e., anyone failing to halt when challenged could be shot at. On 29 May 1953, all territory occupied by the Kikuyu, Meru and Embu tribes was declared "closed", i.e., official permission was required to go out or come into these areas. From 30 April, bombs were used against Mau Mau. In an official announcement made on 9 July, it was stated that during the past ten weeks, 183 sorties had been flown against 85 different targets; 1096 bombs had been dropped and 96,000 rounds of ammunitions fired.

8. Mission in East Africa¹

I had a long talk with Shri Apa Pant today about conditions in Kenya, etc.

2. I think that Shri Apa Pant should continue as our Commissioner in East Africa. To remove him now will be undesirable from many points of view. At the same time, we should think of removing him early next year.² He has already been at Nairobi for a long time now.

3. Some time back I had suggested that the status of our Mission in East Africa should be raised. From every point of view this is desirable. Shri Apa Pant has done excellent work. But the real reason is that the importance of the Mission has become even greater than it used to be. I think that raising of its status now will also have a good psychological effect. You should take early steps in this matter. This is not just a financial matter; it has a much larger significance.

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, 26 May 1953. JN Collection.

2. Pant was appointed Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, in February 1954.

9. African Regeneration and Race Relations¹

....Question: Mr Prime Minister, how do you consider the problems in Africa? Do you have any reluctance in regard to Africa?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Yes, the same reluctance in the sense that however anxious I might be in regard to a problem, that particular approach is seldom helpful. I mean to say, that direct approach. You mention Africa. Now we, in India, are tremendously concerned about Africa. If I may say something in this context, many of you, gentlemen, have visited Africa and Asia and all other places and have intimate acquaintance with developments there. Nevertheless,

1. Press conference, London, 8 June 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Also from *India News*, 13 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 106-107, 130, 174, 189-190, 358-359, 407 and 448-450.

we are not talking of press of other countries but of others. I do not think there is an adequate awareness in Europe or America of what is happening in Asia and Africa. Of course, I am not talking about events of the past but rather of a certain upsurge in the people's minds there, millions of minds, an upsurge, which is really changing Asia more and Africa in every way, much more rapidly than people imagine. Unfortunately, most discussions do take place on a level of certain communist countries, certain non-communist countries—communism versus non-communism or something like that. I will talk about achievements in those terms. Now, I think that we have some value in it, but it is a very very partial picture of many problems, and most certainly the problem of Asia and Africa, because you have something different there which is neither communism nor anti-communism there. It is nationalism, a demand for economic changes and a surge; it is political consciousness, which has awakened. It is a mark of economic changes and a vague search for them, and a person or an idea is welcomed if it seems to them to be a liberating idea, if it seems to them to answer how they could consider the question of political, economic, and the rest. It is something no good we are doing to a country in Asia with standard of communism or anti-communism unless that fits into their problems. Therefore, they did not get excited about these things. That is, you must appear—anybody who goes there appears—as a liberating force from what they at present suffer from, whether it is political or economic distress, and unless there is this much of awareness of these dynamic changes in the mind of Asia, you will not understand it. You see the various events that have happened in the War. Since the War, they are ending colonial conditions in some countries in Asia—independence of some countries. All this has released forces, which had been more or less suppressed. Now these forces have to function. They may function for good or they may function for evil, but they have to function, nobody can ignore them. And the only right policy can be to recognize those forces and direct them, insofar as we can, in right channels, and merely not recognize them or recognize them—not to like them and therefore try to suppress them is no good or it will bring some other argument, communistic or anti-communistic, does not help at all. They are just not interested in that argument.

Now, Africa is different from Asia or, if I may say so with all respect, less developed, more immature politically and otherwise and, but certainly with a developing political consciousness and a sense of grievance, which is perfectly justified. Undoubtedly, they, the people of Africa, have suffered tremendously for hundreds of years. What they used to tolerate in the past, they are not prepared to tolerate now. That is the question in a nutshell. I am not sure. Any attempt to force them with conditions, or to maintain *status quo*, meets resistance in their minds, even there is not enough response

otherwise. They go round, they misbehave in their anger. What wrong they do, you should check it, punish it, if you can, but understand the background and try to deal with it in a political and economic way.²

Q: Can land question be solved by asking people to behave properly?

JN: I spoke about the land question. As in India, the land question is a primary question of Asia. The Chinese Revolution succeeded because they dealt with the agrarian question.³ Even in Japan the Americans were wise enough to tackle the land question, and with what success I do not know, but I think, they put through a fairly far-reaching reforming agrarian legislation there. Now every country in Asia is troubled with the land question. In another sense that applies to Africa too. Land question is the principal question of Africa and other questions, of course, like racial discrimination, these are important questions, but neither can be solved by telling the people just to behave and to carry on the way they were carrying on. What frightens me about Africa is the depth and extent of the bitterness all over Africa, and it would be a bad thing if that is not met in a constructive way.

Q: Are you taking any step in that direction? Are you engaged in trying to help solve the African problem?

JN: No, I can say that we have not been so engaged.

Q: Did you raise that question in the United Nations? What is the position of Indians in Africa?

JN: Well! United Nations! The position of Indians in Africa is a United Nations problem. We have raised that question in the United Nations and the United Nations has passed several resolutions about it and nothing has happened, and the South African Government has ignored both the resolutions and will

2. In contrast to Nehru's perception of the African problem, Oliver Lyttelton, Colonial Secretary, stated in the House of Commons on 7 November 1952, that the Mau Mau movement was not "a child of economic pressure" but "an unholy union of dark and ancient superstitions with the apparatus of modern gangsterism."
3. By the end of 1952, land reforms in China were said to be complete by confiscation of lands belonging to feudal lords, schools, monasteries etc. by a law passed on 30 June 1950. By the end of 1955, 60 per cent of the peasants were said to have been organized in agricultural cooperatives.

not even permit the Commission of the United Nations appointed to go there. So there it is. Now in regard to bringing these matters up before Commonwealth Conference, well, even persons, who disagreed in these matters, agreed not to bring them up there. I tell you why, because we do wish the Commonwealth Conference to be treated as a super state dealing with different Commonwealth countries. Of course, in a friendly way, one can consult on any matter, but we do not wish to develop in that way. That would be something, I think, not in keeping with the growth of this Commonwealth status as it is. Therefore, some subject may incidentally be referred to but we do not really discuss such matters.

About Africa and Indians there, I might tell you the policy we have pursued for many years. We have said, I am not talking about the Indians in South Africa because they are not Indian nationals at all, they are South African nationals. I am talking about Indian nationals in Africa. We have told them very definitely and precisely that we as a Government will not encourage them, help them, support them in anything that they might want which goes against the interest of the Africans. We made that perfectly clear to them. We shall support, of course, our citizens in their particular legitimate demands, but not those demands for gaining any privilege at the expense of the Africans. We have told them that they are there with the goodwill of the Africans and if the Africans want them to be pushed out then they will be pushed out, and if they will be pushed out, they need not have to remain there. But, of course, that may be an idealistic attitude, if you like, but it is also an opportunist's attitude, because that is the only way—constructive way—of really seeing that they can live there in peace and goodwill of others. We have to educate opinion. Otherwise, obviously, they may remain there for a few years but the businessmen's business will mostly suffer. They cannot carry on, apart from other difficulties. And because we have adopted that policy, we have affected the African nation. There was a conflict between their interests, between the interest, I mean, of Indians there, who are mostly petty merchants, traders and the like, and of some Africans, who did not like them. There has been much more goodwill towards Indians there than there was previously, and in all these troubles it is very seldom that you are there if you find Indians involved.

Q: What is the position of Indians in South Africa?

JN: In South Africa the question of Indians, that is though important for us, we have deliberately allowed to become a secondary issue to the larger question of racial discrimination there. And as you know the resistance movement there is far more African than Indian. They are of course Indian but the leadership is really African and we wanted it to be so.

10. Urge for Independence in Asia and Africa¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: Then there is the fact, which I have tried to stress, that Asia and, to some extent, Africa are in the process of revolution—using the word in the broadest sense. That is, they have been uprooted, the minds of men have been uprooted, from what they used to be. They used to tolerate many things; they do not tolerate them now. They want changes. There is a strong national urge for independence. There is the economic urge for better conditions. That is, all kinds of new forces have been liberated in these continents in the course of the last generation. Now, how are we to meet this challenge? First of all, we have to understand that they are those forces and they are dynamic. Secondly, we have to consider how to meet them. You cannot meet them on a military plane alone. Sometimes you may, slightly here and there. We have to meet them on some other plane.

Now, the average politician or statesman in America or Europe may have some intellectual appreciation of the changes in Asia or in Africa, but he has not got what I would call an emotional awareness of these things. It is some statistical thing that he has seen. He does not realize that what has happened has changed very greatly his whole conception of the world. The European or the American outlook in regard to Asia and Africa, which may be, apart from the premise, which may be correct to some extent, yet somehow misses the inwardness of things that are happening.

Now, we have one advantage in India that we are more aware of them, we have gone through the mill ourselves, we can understand others' feeling that way, and our approach can be more understanding and sympathetic. So, I have stressed everywhere, whether in this Conference, this aspect of it, of this approach, and undoubtedly they have appreciated that there is such a thing. To what extent they have imbibed that approach is a different matter. Again, suppose we had a formal conference, each person formally addressing it, and I took up that attitude or somebody else did, it may have some effect, but the very formality and rigidity of the Conference would inhibit people from imbibing that. That is the advantage of these Commonwealth conferences. The lack of formality helps in putting forward viewpoints, and the minds of the hearers are a little more receptive than they might otherwise be.

1. Press conference, London, 10 June 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Also from *India News*, 13 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 174-175, 289-290, 327-329, 408-411, 451-452 and 489-491.

Q: How do you assess the situation in Asia and Africa?

JN: Talking about Asia and Africa, on various occasions here, I have drawn attention to the state of affairs in Africa, which distresses me very deeply. All over Africa, if I may say so, North Africa, the Arab part, Morocco,² Tunis, South Africa, of course, because of the policy of racial discrimination, East Africa,³ Central Africa⁴; problems differ in each part, and the only part which I would say is more or less satisfactory is the Gold Coast,⁵ Tanganyika⁶ and others are relatively speaking in a slightly better position. But what I have laid stress on is not a particular problem of Africa but the whole background of Africa. Large numbers of people there are politically conscious. No continent and no people in the whole wide world have gone through such a frenzy of martyrdom as the people of Africa in the last several hundred years. It is a terrible history of Africa if one reads it and so all our sympathies have gone out to these people and one feels that they should be given every chance to develop.

2. There was a nationalist upsurge in Morocco and Tunisia against French colonialism. The demands for political reform in Tunisia, conceded partially by the French in December 1952, led to an intensification of the campaign.
3. It was reported in April 1953 that a scheme for an East African Federation comprising Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika on the lines of the Central African Federation was being prepared by Oliver Lyttelton, the British Colonial Secretary.
4. The Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federation Bill was presented to Parliament on 22 April 1953, and was enacted on 14 July 1953.
5. Elections were held in the Gold Coast (Ghana) in February 1951 under the new Gold Coast Constitution. On 10 March 1952, Kwame Nkrumah was designated its Prime Minister. The British Government statement of June 1952 on the proposed Gold Coast Constitution paved way for the transfer of power by the British and evoked positive response from all major sections of public opinion.
6. Oliver Lyttelton, announced in the House of Commons on 25 June 1952 that the Government had accepted the recommendation of the Twining Committee on Constitutional Development in Tanganyika and that the unofficial seats in the Legislative Council should be divided equally among the three main racial groups, Africans, Asians and Europeans—while retaining the official majority in the Council.

Perhaps, you know that we have got nearly a hundred Government of India scholars from Africa in India, and we would like to increase them. Their hunger for education is tremendous. They want to get going. Thousands and thousands of schools are being started in East Africa from the pennies of the people. Whether these schools are good or bad, it is immaterial, I do not know, they may have been bad, but it shows their hunger for education. And it is a terrible thing that this desire to make good, is frustrated. It is crushed, because then all that turns into terrible bitterness, and I fear that bitterness is spreading in other parts of Africa too, all parts. And if that becomes, well, strongly entrenched, it is a bad outlook for the future for millions and millions of people in Africa. It inevitably takes a racial aspect, as it must.

Of course, the principal economic problem of Africa is land. They have been deprived of their land. Then there is this racial discrimination problem, and unless this is met constructively you get the basis for future racial conflict on a big scale. That is why I am greatly worried about it.

11. South Africa and Apartheid¹

Question: Did you discuss the racial policy of South Africa at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The South African question was not at all discussed at the Commonwealth Conference. Questions like that were never discussed at such conferences and I refused to discuss it at the meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. That is a matter between India and South Africa. What do you think the Prime Ministers' Conference is? Is it a tribunal to which we can refer our difficulties with another member of the Commonwealth. I do not want Commonwealth Conference to be a tribunal to which we go and wait for something.

The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference did not pass any

1. Press conference, Bombay, 27 June 1953. From *The Statesman*, *The Times of India* and *The Bombay Chronicle*, 28 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 216-217 and 351.

resolutions. We had general discussions which were very useful and helpful and the result is an attempt to find a large measure of cooperation as far as possible. I found the Commonwealth Conference useful and helpful in this respect. The Commonwealth Conference did not discuss any specific issue connected with racial problems in South Africa. The greatest strength to a country comes from its own strength and not from conferences.

Q: Has India's position strengthened as result of the talks?

JN: How can the talk benefit India? It is all right taking such issues before the UN. The purpose of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences is different. I refused to discuss the South African question at a conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. We discussed matters of general common concern, and we did not discuss the racial policy in any particular manner. But, in the general discussion, the racial policy might have come up, but no particular reference was made to any member country. At the Premiers' Conference, we discussed complicated problems and tried to emphasise certain aspects which might have been overlooked. The Conference could not force any other country to adopt a policy, but in the ultimate analysis, general policies of various countries were discussed.

The Conference cannot force any other country to adopt a policy. No country can force another to adopt a certain policy. But in the ultimate analysis general policies of various countries may be affected—and are affected—by friendly conferences and by putting forward one another's points of view.

The greater the contact among the countries in friendly conferences, the more would be the mutual understanding among them.

The Commonwealth Conference is a forum for informal discussions of problems affecting the various countries and about which there may be differences. Each one will have his own approach. My approach will be from the point of view of the Asian angle. The result is that there will be greater understanding of the problem.

The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference is for information, friendly discussions of problems about different countries. Some of these problems in their different aspects are approached in a different manner, but at the same time the discussions give greater emphasis to the general point of agreement. Ultimately, there is greater understanding of the problems by the countries concerned. There is nothing like "white or black" when we approach and consider the question.

Thus, in the Commonwealth Conference I discerned a greater realization of the importance of the Asian views. This has become more and more obvious. They have begun to realize that the Asian point of view counts....

II. ANGLO-EGYPTIAN DISPUTE

1. The Middle East¹

Jawaharlal Nehru said that all were interested in seeing the dispute between the United Kingdom and Egypt² settled satisfactorily, in a way which involved neither side in national humiliation;³ its continued existence gave rein to nationalist feelings which might spread over other parts of Africa with no good results. If no settlement were arrived at, it would be little consolation to realize that one had been in the right and one's opponent in the wrong. He agreed that some speeches by Egyptian leaders had been offensive and irritating and scarcely conducive to a settlement.⁴ But however difficult these leaders might be to deal with, they were in power and the regime appeared popular; to attempt to deal with anyone else could only strengthen its position. He had seldom come across a more pleasant and friendly sort of person than General Neguib, who seemed to be the last person to make difficulties in negotiation.⁵ It seemed to him that the points in dispute were few. The United Kingdom proposals recognized Egyptian sovereignty and allowed for the phased

1. Minutes of the third meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, London, 5 June 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. The Anglo-Egyptian dispute, which erupted in 1951, regarding suzerainty over the Suez Canal had ended in a stalemate following unilateral abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 by Egypt and suspension of negotiations between the two on 6 May 1953.
3. Winston Churchill had observed: "... (we) were willing to resume discussions at any time. We wanted no control of Egypt, but we must see that the Canal and the base were protected. We would be only too glad to remove our troops, and to reduce our financial burden, but we were not going to accept any solution of the problem at the expense of British humiliation."
4. In a statement made in the House of Commons, Churchill had said that it was an Egyptian monarchy which in 1951, denounced the 1936 treaty and it was an Egyptian dictatorship which in November 1952, sought a conference. He said, "we have not accepted the repudiation of the treaty, but we have willingly agreed to the conference... We went into conference with the Egyptians on 27 April 1953" and "complied with the Egyptian desire" but "now Neguib gives the violent outpourings".
5. Churchill said that when the British left Abadan the Egyptians began to insist upon British withdrawal from Egypt, and when General Neguib gained power those demands increased. The British proposed that technical committees should examine in detail the various aspects of the problem, such as the maintenance of the base by technicians and the phased withdrawal of British troops, but the Egyptians insisted that the British should agree to withdraw from Egypt first before the issues could be discussed. The British could not accept this and the talks were broken off.

withdrawal of troops.⁶ It could not be gainsaid that some technical personnel would be required to service the installations and the only personnel competent to do this in the foreseeable future were those who were there at present;⁷ in this respect he understood that the sole point of argument was the manner by which the orders should be transmitted to them. If that were so, it seemed that the points of difference were so small that it would be extraordinary if they proved insoluble. For the United Kingdom to obtain her objectives in Egypt it was necessary for her to retain the friendship of the people;⁸ the base would be of no value if set in the midst of a hostile population. Furthermore, if a future war took the course outlined by Sir Winston Churchill, no question of an attack on the Suez Canal would arise in the early stages, and the whole nature of the war and of the defence of the area would require to be thought out afresh.⁹ In peace time there should be no difficulty in placing the Suez Canal under the control of some form of international company, established without impairment of the sovereignty of Egypt; in time of war some new agreement might be needed.¹⁰ Too much store, therefore, should not be placed on the defence of the base and the Canal.

He hoped that the present difficulties between the United Kingdom and Egypt would not have an adverse effect upon the recently concluded settlement

6. Churchill further expressed that the 7,000 British troops whom they wished to maintain in Egypt to take care of the base should be armed only for their own defence. They would not in any sense be an organized military force capable of offensive action. He further maintained that the phased withdrawal of British troops would reduce their financial burden.
7. Churchill said that earlier Britain had proposed that the army would retain not more than 5,000 personnel and the Royal Air Force not more than 2,000 to run installations in Egypt.
8. Alexander, the British Defence Minister, said that the object of maintaining a base in Egypt which had taken three and a half years to instal at a cost of \$300 millions and contained \$200 millions worth of equipment, was "to enable us to use it in war" and could not be maintained under the existing conditions without the goodwill of the Egyptian people.
9. Churchill said that the Suez Canal was not so important for the British strategy as it used to be for they "had lived without it for three years in the last war and the character of a future war would be such that atomic attacks against Russia would precede any Russian invasion of Africa across the Senai peninsula or any attempt at domination of the Near East."
10. Churchill observed that Britain had already obtained a large measure of US support for their proposals for a new agreement. "Provided these satisfied Egyptian feelings and continued to have United States' support", he felt that it was unlikely that the situation would again deteriorate to the point at which the Egyptians would repudiate an agreement.

on the Sudan, which had been a great step in a forward direction.¹¹

He did not know what the ultimate intentions of the United States were, but it appeared that they were not entirely in accord with the United Kingdom point of view. He would not like to see an agreement forced on Egypt by the superior powers of the United Kingdom and the United States Governments, regardless of the consequences.

He had himself no positive suggestions to make and, while the policy of wait and see might be justified on its merits, he feared it would not lead to results. Indeed, if no positive steps were taken, the situation might well grow worse.¹²

11. A draft statute proposing self-governing Dominion status for the Sudan was approved by the British Government on 22 October 1952. On 24 October 1952, a Sudanese communique clarified that the Governor-General would remain responsible for the new Dominion on behalf of both the British Government and Egypt. This settlement paved the way for the democratic process in the Sudan, leading to its independence in 1956.
12. Churchill replied that the principle of not abandoning their interests in Egypt had been agreed with the United States, and Britain only wished to discharge international functions with no affront to Egyptian sovereignty. But they "would not be ordered out of Egypt and, in the meantime, we would wait and see. Things might improve", he continued. Subsequently a communique for the meeting was issued to the press.

2. Egypt¹

...(d) Jawaharlal Nehru said that the objective of any reference to the Middle East must be to further the prospect of a satisfactory settlement with Egypt.² It was particularly important not to miss chances of bringing this settlement about, now that the international atmosphere had been much improved by the success of negotiations in Korea. He wondered, therefore, if it was wise to emphasise the military use of the Canal and of the base, and the use of the base in war. Would not that make it more difficult for the Egyptians to ask for a resumption of negotiations?...

1. Minutes of the fourth meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, London, 8 June 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Louis St Laurent suggested that in the final communique a reference should be made to "our wish that the outstanding issues in the Middle East should be settled in such a way as to respect the sovereignty of the countries of that area...."

3. Prospects of Settlement¹

....Question: What do you think are the hopes of settling the Anglo-Egyptian dispute?

Jawaharlal Nehru: It is difficult to say what turn events will take, but I should imagine that the United Kingdom Government and the Egyptian Government have agreed to so much and there is so little left to agree to, that it would be most unfortunate if that little gap is not bridged. Some statements have appeared in the press elsewhere about discussions in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. These statements are pure guesswork and have no basis in fact.

Q: Do you see the basis on which the needs of Egyptian national sovereignty and feeling can be satisfied and at the same time the needs of Commonwealth defence and defence at large can also be met?

JN: I hope you will appreciate it is difficult for me to discuss these matters in detail because I am so anxious to have a satisfactory solution, and it would not help very much by expressing opinions.

Q: Does India have any specific plan for a settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute?

JN: No, India has no such plan. I am very anxious to have a satisfactory settlement in Egypt, but it does not help to lay stress on differences, if we seek a settlement. Therefore, we have constantly refrained, as far as we could, from criticising any government, however much we might have disagreed with them, unless of course it became absolutely necessary. We felt that it is better to restrain oneself and thereby help than to express oneself too much. In regard to Egypt, I think it is quite clear the sovereignty of Egypt and its territories must be acknowledged and I believe that is the position of the United Kingdom Government. That is the major question. The rest is a matter of mutual arrangement...

1. Press conference, London, 8 June 1953. AIR Tapes, NMML. Also from *India News*, 13 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 106-107, 130, 174, 189-190, 358-359, 396-399 and 448-450.

4. Security of the Suez Canal¹

Question: Some British spokesmen and newspapers had stressed the fact that according to the official communique of the Prime Ministers' Conference, both India and Pakistan had agreed with the British point of view. The *Daily Telegraph*, for example, called the concurrence of these countries with the British attitude "a significant factor."

Jawaharlal Nehru: But I refer you to the communique not to somebody's interpretation.

Q: Have you got the communique? What is your idea about the reference to the Anglo-Egyptian dispute in the final communique of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in which the Prime Ministers were reported to have recognized the international importance of the Suez Canal and the effective maintenance of the military installations in the Canal zone? Does it commit India?

JN: I have got the communique certainly. The communique does not commit India to the endorsement of the rival positions on the question. All that is said is the effective maintenance of these installations.

All Commonwealth nations including India and Pakistan are agreed to the effective maintenance of the military installations which are of international importance. This is the point, the communique does not say anything more than that. It is the maintenance, which is of importance. How the maintenance should be done is a matter yet to be determined.

Q: Will you consider sending Indian troops to share in the maintenance of the installations?

JN: Of course not, there is no question of any Indian troops. At first it is more a technical matter than a matter of troops. Certainly it is the first time I have heard of the Indian troops being mentioned in this connection.²

1. Press conference, London, 10 June 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Also from *India News*, 13 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 174-175, 289-290, 327-329, 400-402, 451-452 and 489-491.
2. There was a proposal that the US, UK, France and Turkey should send in their troops for the maintenance of the canal zone. But this proposal was rejected by Egypt.

Q: There is a suggestion in *The Times* that, in view of the fact that you have seen the British Prime Minister, and you shall be seeing General Neguib, you may be able to advise usefully on a solution to the problem. Will you be able to advise General Neguib during your visit to Cairo on your return journey to India, after hearing the British and Egyptian viewpoints?

JN: How can I advise? I do not know what you mean by advice. It is for Britain and Egypt to settle the issue amicably, according to principles stated in the Communique. We always try to steer the middle course. First of all, we try not to interfere in other countries' matters. Secondly, we are much interested in friendly and peaceful settlement of disputes, especially in countries in Asia or in Africa, which are relatively nearer to India. If we can help, our services are available but not in any sense of pushing ourselves in or of interfering. Now, in regard to this matter of Egypt, the Communique says the sovereignty of the country is recognized, and all that flows from it. That is the major point. The rest is a matter of coming to some settlement about the use of the Suez Canal as an international highway and the maintenance of certain installations there, keeping always in mind the sovereignty of the Egyptian Government.

Q: Are such things matters of mutual arrangement between the Governments concerned?

JN: Surely, such things are always a matter of mutual arrangement between the Governments concerned. Two Governments may agree to something, mutual privileges or something, without losing their own authority or sovereignty. It is where it is an imposition against the wishes of a Government that sovereignty suffers—not by the mutual agreement....

Q: What do you think about the references to Egyptian problem in the Communique. Are you hopeful of a peaceful solution?

JN: Who proposed it?

Q: You proposed it....

JN: Well, you have raised two questions. Taking the second one first, I should like you to read carefully the Communique. It may be that representatives of the British Commonwealth had emphasized their role, but the second sentence of the Communique fairly lays down a desire for a peaceful settlement on the basis of the sovereignty of the countries concerned. That is the crucial approach to the question—settlement on the basis of sovereignty.

Now the first question: the first sentence says something about the maintenance of those installations,³ for obviously installations should be maintained; they cannot go to pieces or be allowed just to deteriorate at all. Maybe, part of them may be renewed, whatever it may be, later some may be left but they have to be maintained. That is so far as the Communique goes. Now, it may be that some countries of the Commonwealth may lay greater stress on some aspects.

But, so far as we are concerned, it is only what is written down here and do not expect a communique to enter into a detailed examination of different approaches beyond what is said. Obviously, approaches are different, emphasis is different, and all that.

..Q: Since we say that we are interested in the Middle East and the security of the Suez Canal is an important international problem, would it mean that we should be prepared to take our share in any arrangements that may be made for the defence of that region?

JN: No, this question has not arisen and we are not prepared to take any burdens outside India. As I said, it is under very special circumstances that we have for the moment accepted the proposal with regard to Korea, but obviously any defence of the Suez Canal must be the primary interest and responsibility of the countries concerned there or, if you like, of those with whom they have come into agreement for that purpose.

Q: Will the British technicians be representatives of the British Government and not be under the control of the Egyptian Government?

JN: No, these matters did not come up for discussion because they are being dealt with or will be dealt with, I hope, by the Governments concerned, the Egyptian Government and the British Government. Presumably, there will be British nationals, appointed by the British Government with an agreement with the Egyptian Government. All these things could be provided for in an agreement between the two countries...

Q: What do you think about the Middle East policy?

3. The Communique, released on 9 June, read: "The Prime Ministers recognized the international importance of the Suez Canal and the effective maintenance of the military installations in the Canal Zone. They agreed that it is in the common interest that the outstanding issues in the Middle East should be settled on the basis of ensuring the peace and security of the Middle East countries, consistent with the sovereignty of each, and promoting their social and economic development."

JN: You see, that is a matter in which it is not for India to put forward or impose its wishes, that is for Egypt to decide. That is for other countries. All we have said is that these technical installations, big installations, very expensive, but useful, should be maintained. They cannot be allowed just to go to pieces. Now, what I would like Egypt's policy to be, is, would be slightly impertinent for me to suggest. One thing I can tell you. I should like as many countries as possible to adopt a policy, well, as nearly consonant with India's policy as they can. In other words, I should like the larger area of the world to become a no-war area.

Q: Do you think that those installations would be conducive to a no-war area?

JN: But the installations are there. It is not a question of putting in new things. The thing is there. You cannot get rid of them unless you propose to sink them into the sea. And that even you cannot do with what is on its building and the rest. But I am told that a whole city has grown up there. Aerodrome, city, this, that, fixtures, I mean, apart from the other things....

Q: What is your opinion about the installations in the Suez Canal Zone?

JN: But I am telling you, that is the matter for the British Government and the Egyptian Government to deal with. I do not wish to barge in, I want to keep out of these troubles, except for the fact that I am very friendly, all of us in India are very friendly and sympathetic to the Egyptian Government and Egyptian people. We want them to go ahead as a sovereign people. We do not wish to say anything about these matters, these installations. If they come to a friendly agreement, well and good. Because it is a fact it is not a theory, it is a fact that something has to be done to it. Let them come to an agreement about it...

5. To Lord Mountbatten¹

Cairo

June 24, 1953

My dear Dickie,

I have just received your letter of the 20th June. Thank you for it. From Berne I sent you a hurried letter. It was so hurried that I am not quite sure if I signed it.

1. JN Collection.

I have spent two days here now and after another day I return to India. Day after tomorrow night, I shall be in Delhi. I came to Cairo within a very few days of the declaration of the Republic here.² This change-over was not surprising and one had expected it. Nevertheless, it came rather suddenly. I am told that the final decision was taken by the Council of Revolution, as the group of young officers in control are called, in the evening and within a few hours the announcement was made. From the constitutional point of view, this was an odd procedure. But then one must not think too much of constitutions when a revolution takes place and a Revolutionary Committee is in command.

Normally, I would have avoided coming here so soon after the change. In fact, there are all kinds of formalities to be observed when such a change takes place, such as recognition of the new Government etc.³ But I could hardly give up my visit at the last moment and in effect the same people have continued here under a slightly different name. So I came. Mohammad Ali, the PM of Pakistan, had come two days before me and our visits overlapped somewhat. I was the guest of the Government and I had naturally to go and sign the book of the President. In this unusual way, India recognized the new Republic of Egypt. Yesterday afternoon General Neguib had invited me and Mohammad Ali for a talk with some of his Ministers. After that, he took us to the balcony of the house and we found a vast number of persons standing in the square. A little later he was going to deliver some kind of a formal speech to them from another end of the square. There were, so far as I could make out, from 50,000 to 75,000 people in the square. I am told that the crowd he addressed later was half a million or more. Anyhow, Mohammad Ali and I were displayed from the balcony on either side of Neguib, and he held up our hands in his own, as if we were the two main props of the new Egyptian regime. It was rather embarrassing, but there was nothing to be done about it.

2. Egypt was proclaimed a republic on 18 June 1953, and all royal titles were abolished by the Council of the Revolution, which had ruled the country since King Farouk's abdication. Presidential powers were conferred on General Neguib, who also retained the post of Prime Minister and all the powers vested in him under the provisional Constitution of 10 February 1953.
3. In a broadcast on 19 June 1953, General Neguib declared that the policies of the new regime would be maintained throughout the three-year transitional period, but promised that "the people will have the final word as to the type of republican system they desire, i.e., a Parliamentary or Presidential form of democracy, and elect a President of their own choosing under the new Constitution."

The recent changes have formally put the Army Council in control.⁴ On principle, I do not like this much. And yet, on the whole, I have been rather impressed by this Council. It consists mostly of young and earnest officers. Neguib is a frank and likeable person. Some of the other men, notably Colonel Nasser and Saleh Salem, are probably the most important members of it. They create a favourable impression, but of course they are all very inexperienced. I have no doubt that at present at least this change is popular and the new Government has the backing of a large number of people in the country. What the future will bring, I do not know.

The change-over was so sudden that the officers and indeed the officer Members of the Cabinet and Council of the Revolution still have crowns on the lapels of their coats. Indeed the Crown appears in most places, though the King has gone for good.

I have just returned from a dinner, given in my honour, by the President, at the Abdine Palace, now called the Palais de la Republique. This was Farouk's home. I walked about a little and saw not only some of the Reception Rooms but the living quarters also. It was all very magnificent, sumptuous, ornate with plenty of gold and crystal. I found the place rather oppressive and creating a sense of unease in me. Someone once said, on visiting Versailles, after the French Revolution, that after seeing Versailles, he could well understand the French Revolution. That might well be said of the Abdine Palace, when compared to the utter poverty of the Egyptian peasantry.

The city of Cairo itself has a disturbing effect on me. There is something ersatz about it, and it does not ring true. I believe that round about Napoleon the Third's time, the then Khediv tried to model parts of Cairo on the lines of Paris, as Paris was then being shaped by Haussmann.⁵ At present Cairo is full of cabarets and nightclubs and apparently they all prosper. People are bent on having what they consider a good time. That reminds me of what a Frenchman once said: Life would be bearable but for its pleasures.

Anyhow, the life of Cairo goes on without being affected in any way by the Egyptian problem or the future of the Canal base or the relations of Egypt and England.

4. Important Cabinet changes were announced on 18 June 1953 whereby Lt. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser became Vice-Premier and Minister of the Interior, Wing-Commander Abdel Latif Boghdadi was given War and Marine, Major Abdel Hakim Amer, became Commander-in-Chief and Major Saleh Salem was given National Guidance.

5. Georges Haussmann (1809-1891); Prefect of Napoleon III, whose most spectacular project was the rebuilding of Paris following the turbulence of 1848-51.

And yet, this question is very much in people's minds and there is no doubt that people here feel strongly about it. How difficult it is to look at a problem from the other person's eye. Here are Egyptians burdened with a sense of wrong for the last eighty years or so, constantly reminding one of a list of promises made to them and broken. Winston Churchill looks at this problem from the point of view of an East-West conflict and the security of the Middle East.⁶ The Egyptians are naturally first of all concerned in having a sensation of freedom, which, they say, had been denied them in spite of promises. Repeatedly in the past, they were told that the British troops would withdraw. This was not done. In 1946 they were told that these troops would go away in three or four years' time. The last treaty mentioned the figure of British troops at 10,000.⁷ Now they are 80,000 sitting within a few hours run from Cairo. It is not difficult to think of the reactions of Egyptians to all this. Indeed, while they are prepared for some kind of mutual security arrangement, they also think that the maintenance of this big base in the Suez Canal might well endanger that security and make Egypt an immediate target.

However, I am not discussing this question of Egypt here. Nor indeed have I interfered in it much except to discuss general principles and a friendly approach to the problem.

You mention in your letter the programme of the Indian Squadron at the Mediterranean. I am very happy that they will be functioning under your orders in the Mediterranean. As for their programme, I presume what you have said was drawn up in India. The arrangement has certainly my blessing, as you put it. But I should not like, nor would you like, to vary any arrangements made in Delhi without informing them.

When I was in India, a proposal came that some of our ships might visit a port in Yugoslavia. It was turned down, as our programme had already been made and there appeared to be no particular necessity for visiting Yugoslavia. The other day, however, I heard from our Ambassador there⁸ that Marshal Tito⁹ had expressed a special desire to have our ships visit his port. Thereupon

6. Churchill had said that the Suez Canal zone was established at British expense. Britain did not wish to keep on indefinitely 80,000 men at a cost of over £ 50,000,000 a year, "discharging a duty which had largely fallen on them of safeguarding the interests of the free nations in the Middle East," and also of preserving the international waterway of the Suez Canal. Churchill observed that it was not an imperialist or colonial enterprise by the British but it was for the purposes in which every member of the NATO and also the countries of the East and Middle East were directly concerned.

7. Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936.

8. B.R. Sen was India's Ambassador to Italy and Yugoslavia, 1952-55.

9. Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980); the first communist Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, 1945-53, and President of the Republic from 1953 till his death.

I sent a telegram to India suggesting that we might fall in line with Marshal Tito's wishes in this matter, even though only one or two ships went there. We might leave out a port in Italy. Five ports in Italy had been included in our programme—Naples, Genoa, Syracuse, Taranto and, I think, one other—or possibly there were only four. I did not see any particular reason why they should go to all these Italian ports, more especially as the Italian Government showed no enthusiasm.

The answer from Delhi indicated that this could be done by two or three of our ships which could visit Split and another Yugoslav port. I have left this matter in the hands of our Ambassador, who is dealing with our Naval Headquarters directly. I have myself suggested that only Split need be included from Yugoslavia.

Your account of your take-off from Nice is alarming. Why should the port engine stop functioning immediately on your taking off. Surely there was some lack of care. However, all is well that ends well.

Syngman Rhee has indeed done everything to upset the armistice and he has almost succeeded. The only thing that can be said for him is that he made no secret of his designs or intentions. But what are we to say of the UN Command or the US Government, which acted so carelessly and now functions so supinely? The issue is a straight one. Who commands in South Korea? Are there two different commands—the UN and Syngman Rhee? Either the UN Command has full control over Syngman Rhee and South Koreans or it has not. If the former, then they should do something about it and, as you suggest, should smack him down. If they do not wish to do so, then they are equally incapable of signing the armistice with effect. The Chinese can hardly be expected to sign an armistice for two-fifths of the front and carry on a war on three-fifths. It is a bad lookout and the credit of the UN has been badly damaged. Indeed, one might say that the future of the UN is at stake, apart from the major question of war and peace in the Far East.

Talking about Egypt, an incident comes to my mind. In 1931 Gandhiji, as you will perhaps remember, went to attend the Round Table Conference in London. He travelled, I think, by the ordinary P&O Boat. When he was passing the Suez Canal, the British-controlled Government of Egypt got very alarmed, lest even his shadow might produce a revolution or create trouble in Egypt. They banned all visits to the ship and prevented people from getting down it at Suez or Port Said. Indeed they declared some kind of martial law for two days in the Canal region. Ultimately a small deputation from the Wafd Party was allowed to visit Gandhiji on board to convey their good wishes. But no one else was allowed to come or go and that state of martial law, or something like it, continued till Gandhiji was far in the Mediterranean.

I shall certainly try to see Cole¹⁰ when he comes to India next.

As parts of this letter might interest Edwina, I am sending her a copy separately.

I am sending you, as I have indicated previously, a parcel containing about 700 or so Egyptian cigarettes. These are for Edwina.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

10. Anthony Bartholomew Cole (1909-1967); joined Navy, 1927; appointed Commander, 1944; Captain, 1951; Command, HMS Campania, 1952; Naval Attache, Rome, 1953-55; Command HMS Albion, 1958-59; Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, 1959-62; Rear Admiral, 1960; Chief of Allied Staff, Mediterranean, 1962-65, and Vice-Admiral, 1963.

6. Settlement of the Egyptian Question¹

Question: What conclusions have you reached on the Anglo-Egyptian situation after talking to both parties here and in London and what will be the effect on the Middle East in particular and the world in general if this dispute is left without settlement?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The conclusion I have reached is that there should be a peaceful settlement as soon as possible, consonant with the full sovereignty of Egypt. As for the results of not reaching a settlement, normally they are bad results. To what extent they may be bad, I cannot say.

Q: What practical measures do you think should be taken to realize a grouping of as many countries as possible outside the scope of any possible war?

JN: As you know, our policy in India has been not to align ourselves with any Power-grouping but to try to maintain friendly relations with all Powers.

1. Press conference, Cairo, 25 June 1953. *Jawaharlal Nehru, Press Conferences*, 1953. Press Information Service of India, New Delhi, 1954. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 79-83, 215-216, 361, 470-472 and 526.

Naturally, with some those relations are more intimate than with others, but they are friendly with all Powers. That naturally flowed from our previous policies and from the fact that we think that we serve our own cause and the cause of the world best in that way. Now, some people have thought in the past of what they call a third bloc. I venture to say that that approach is not a right approach. I do not like the first bloc or the second bloc. Why should I like a third bloc. But, I have suggested that a right approach to it is a third area which does not align itself for war. Nobody can guarantee what the future will bring or what a country might or might not do with a very difficult set of circumstances. But, apart from that, I think that it would be a good thing for the countries concerned, and for the world at large, for this third area, which I call no-war area, to grow in extent. It will exercise a powerful force, a powerful influence, in favour of peace. And even in the sad event of a war breaking out, it may exercise a good deal of influence, even then, for peace to return.

Now how to do it? I do not think this kind of thing should be done by what I call formal alliances and treaties. Because as soon as you talk of formality in this, you get back to that bloc idea. So, it is really a question of informal friendly cooperation and understanding each other's viewpoints. We may do that in UN. We may do it outside. In a measure, such informal groupings, as you know, have been taking place to the advantage of all concerned.

Q: Do you believe that a settlement of the Egyptian question is dependent on the defence of the Middle East?

JN: I do not see why it should be inevitably dependent upon the defence of the Middle East. I believe it is dependent in some people's minds. Or, if you like, you may say it has been connected with it. Certainly it has been connected with it. But I would not like to say it is dependent on it.

Q: Do you find it is important to have a pact in the Middle East? If yes, on what basis, do you think, this pact must be made?

JN: Pact between whom?

Q: Middle East.

JN: That is for the countries concerned to decide. Personally, speaking for India, we join no pact anywhere.

Q: Do you believe in the possibility of an armed Soviet invasion of the

Middle East and if not, why does Britain give that reason as a pretext for continuing to keep its troops in the Suez Canal zone?

JN: I do not know if you are discussing possibilities in the event of a world war or outside the scope of a world war.

What happens in the event of a world war, I cannot say at all. It is, I believe, not an easy question even for the most eminent military men and experts to say what would happen, because apart from general questions of strategy, such new weapons have come into the field about which you and I do not know anything. In terms of peace, if you ask, I think it is exceedingly doubtful if, apart from a major war, any such attack is likely to take place, because if it does, that itself becomes a major war.

Q: Do you believe the Soviet peace offensive is sincere and can it actually lead to the removal of world tension?

JN: You might as well ask me a question: Are any Governments or any politicians ever sincere?

Even granting the sincerity of the individual politician, he gives expression to the resultant of many forces he has to deal with in his country and in the world. Very very few politicians can just say what they want to say And do just what they want to do, specially in a democratic set-up. Maybe, in another set-up they have a little more scope. So that the question of sincerity does not arise. The question that arises is whether these moves by the Soviet Union are helpful or not, whatever the background of the motive might be. I have no doubt at all that they are helpful and that they have even thus far relieved tension in the world. That is a test of them and we should take them for what they are without sitting down and judging about sincerity.

I might tell you, just this question has been asked of me not here but elsewhere too; exactly a similar question has been asked of me by the Chinese Government. "Do you think that the policy of the United States or the United Kingdom is sincere?" They have asked me. How are we to test its sincerity? As if I can answer these questions, so that when there is such a great deal of suspicion and fear on each side, always doubts arise about the other party's sincerity. A politician or a statesman accepts everything that happens and tries to take advantage of it. If it is a good thing, he accepts it as a good thing. But he does not immediately give up his precautions. He has his precautions in case something may happen to be bad. But he accepts the good and works up—tries to follow it up. Therefore it is for this reason that we welcome in India, as in many places elsewhere, a proposal made by the Prime Minister of England some time back for a four-Power conference. All these things help towards easing tension, people discussing problems face to face, not too much in a formal way....

7. To Syed Mahmud¹

New Delhi
June 29, 1953

My dear Mahmud,²

I received your letter of the 4th June from Karachi in London.

I did not speak about this matter to the UK Government, because I did not think that would yield any result. Winston Churchill was very angry with this old Abadan business and repeatedly said that if he had been in power, he would not have left the place, whatever the consequences.³ He was angry at the aggressive, and sometimes offensive, speeches made against England both in Iran and Egypt. Egypt was an immediate issue and we did discuss it. I think that our discussion did some little good.

The question of Iran as such did not arise and my bringing it up then would not have improved matters. Our general attitude is not to interfere in international affairs, but deal with them in a broad way. In that way I referred to the position in Asia and Africa.

My visit to Cairo was useful in some ways and I am glad I went there.

In England the illness of Anthony Eden⁴ has made it difficult to take up a number of questions which he would have dealt with. Now Churchill also is ill. I am glad your visit to Iraq and Iran did good and you enjoyed it. The position in the Middle-Eastern countries, notably, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, is a confused one. Of course, you would be welcomed if you went there, but I am sure it was not the right time for you to go there.

Yours affectionately,
Jawahar

1. Syed Mahmud Papers, NMML. Syed Mahmud led the Indian delegation to King Faisal's coronation. A.K. Chanda, Deputy Foreign Minister, had accompanied him.
2. Syed Mahmud (1889-1971); General Secretary, Central Khilafat Committee, 1921-36; General Secretary, AICC, 1923, 1929-36; Minister of Education and Development, Bihar, 1937-39; Member, Bihar Assembly, 1937-39 and 1946-52; Member, Congress Working Committee, 1940-45; Minister of Development and Transport, Bihar, 1946-52; Member, House of the People, Union Minister of External Affairs, December 1954-April 1957.
3. On 11 May 1953, Churchill stated in the House of Commons that the Wafd Government of Egypt had unilaterally repudiated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, within a week of the evacuation of Abadan. He felt that juridically Britain still retained the legal advantages "which go to a nation confronted by an act of bad faith."
4. On 12 April 1953, Eden underwent a gall bladder operation following an attack of jaundice. A second operation was performed on him on 28 April 1953.

III. KOREA

1. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

I have just returned from Indo-Burma border where I was cut off from news. Meanwhile, important developments have taken place, which are hopeful and require full examination.

On the whole, we agree with analysis and recommendations contained in Krishna Menon's telegram 109, dated 4th April.² Chou En-lai's proposal³ and Molotov's statement⁴ undoubtedly remove chief barrier to settlement of PsOW issue and are in line with our resolution. Some matters require further elucidation, but this can be done at a later stage. In view of these important developments and possibility of Burmese complaint being considered, it is desirable for both of you to remain in New York for the present for consultations as well as possible talks with representatives of other countries.

1. New Delhi, 5 April 1953. File Nos. F-12/62/NGO-52, Vols. 1-6, and F. 12/64/NGO-52, MEA. This cable was also addressed to V.K. Krishna Menon.
2. Krishna Menon mentioned that negotiations on the Korean issue was still fluid and that India's endeavour should be to prevent further deadlocks. He felt that India should exert pressure on both sides to keep the UN informed in case of any difference of opinion on principles, keeping in view the objective of an early cessation of hostilities.
3. On 30 March 1953, Chou En-lai urged the UN to intervene for an early resumption of negotiations on Korea and expressed his country's willingness for an early settlement on the question of exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. On 5 April, Nehru cabled to N. Raghavan: "You can inform Chinese Government that we welcome their new proposals and are giving them our earnest consideration. We hope that they will lead to a solution of the problems which have baffled us for so long and bring peace to Far East."
4. On 1 April, Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister described the Chinese offer as an adequate basis for negotiation and hoped that "this proposal will be correctly understood by the Government of USA."

2. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram No. 117 April 8.² Polish Resolution³ appears to me wholly out of date now.

2. Third part dealing with NATO cannot be supported by us, as it is condemnation of one group.⁴

3. Second part dealing with disarmament is out of place now in view of new Soviet attitude.⁵ We cannot support it as it is and I do not see why it may be necessary for us to move amendments to it. If moved, proper course for us is to point out that practically an agreement has almost been arrived on this issue elsewhere and this should not be pressed.

First part dealing with Korea does not fit in at all with recent developments and it appears inappropriate even to move it.⁶ I do not think it desirable for us to move any amendments. In any event no amendment should be moved unless there is assurance of the acceptance. Otherwise it creates further difficulties. The fact that we call for stopping the fighting does not lead to ceasefire unless there is general agreement, which appears exceedingly unlikely on the basis of this resolution. Proper course would be for matters to be left

1. New Delhi, 10 April 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Krishna Menon sought Nehru's advice regarding India's stand on the Polish Resolution, which was to come up before the UN First Committee on 9 April. He suggested that India could refrain from participating in the discussion given the pro-Soviet tone of the Resolution, though a distinct change was noticeable in the attitude of the Soviet Union and China because of the inclusion of the Korean clause.
3. The Polish Resolution, finally withdrawn at India's request, had called for: (i) an end to the war in Korea; (ii) a treaty between the five big powers banning the use of atomic weapons and reduction of one-third of their armed forces; and (iii) dissolution of the NATO pact.
4. India had been consistently following a policy of neutrality vis-a-vis the two power blocs and had refrained from supporting any resolution, which condemned one party directly.
5. Soon after Stalin's death, the new Premier Malenkov, by a declaration on 15 March assured all nations, including the USA, about Soviet Union's firm commitment to peace. Further statements upholding "peaceful coexistence" and welcoming American journalists to visit Moscow indicated a distinct relaxation of the cold war tensions.
6. Krishna Menon had suggested that an amendment to the Korean clauses could be made, requesting cessation of hostilities pending a ceasefire agreement. Further, he argued that discussion on the Korean clause was inappropriate at this juncture in view of the negotiations at Panmunjon, "the issue being *sub judice*."

to negotiations at Panmunjon. Even for this no formal motion need be made. You may say that, in view of developments at Panmunjon and elsewhere it is better to wait for results there. You may even suggest that as so much progress has been made in these negotiations, temporary ceasefire might be agreed to pending finalisation of these negotiations, thus putting a stop to needless loss of life. All this should be suggested only without making formal motion. Of course if there appears to be general agreement on any such motion, someone can put it forward. But without this previous agreement it seems to me unwise to do so.

3. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

US Embassy here delivered urgent message to us from their Government in which reference was made to conversations between you and members of US delegation to General Assembly.² US Government alarmed at prospect of India putting forward any resolution for immediate ceasefire except as part of armistice settling all relevant military questions, including disposition of prisoners of war.³ Some appreciation was expressed of new Chinese attitude and of progress being made at Panmunjon. It was hoped that this would lead to honourable armistice in near future. Any action by General Assembly at this stage might create difficulties at Panmunjon⁴ and thus actually jeopardize

1. New Delhi, 11 April 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Krishna Menon replied on 12 April, that his talks with the US delegation had been "informal" and "general". Further, he surmised that the urgent message delivered to Nehru was "inexplicable in relation to any conversation here and no doubt extended as pressure."
3. Krishna Menon mentioned that the US Government was "jittery about any mention of peace by anyone", and there appeared to be "much internal conflict about Korean policies", because till three days earlier they were not even "sanguine that wounded would be repatriated." He pointed out that no legitimate reason was given to the US to think that India was contemplating independent action to which they might be opposed, but their fear was not only about India but pressure from their own side, such as France.
4. Krishna Menon proposed that it did not appear desirable to give the US any assurances by way of commitments and mentioned that the US desired to "vote down" the Polish resolution without further debate, while Canadian motion to that effect was heavily defeated when France initiated the opposition. He asked Nehru to advise whether any assurances regarding India's line of action should be given to the US.

early armistice in Korea.⁵

In view of this strong objection by US Government to motion for immediate ceasefire, it would obviously be undesirable for such motion to be made on our behalf.

We have given no indication to US Government of our instructions to you but have only told them that we are generally aware of the position.

5. Krishna Menon wanted to know whether the sentence, "any action ... Korea", contained Nehru's personal view or that of the US Government and sought Nehru's direction as to whether any assurance should be given to the US conveying that India would conform to the line they proposed to take in that matter.

4. Cable to G.L. Mehta¹

I would like you to approach State Department informally and express our gratification at agreement arrived at for exchange of sick and wounded prisoners in Korea.² We hope that this will lead to further steps resulting in truce. We feel that proposals contained in Nam Il's letter to Harrison³ dated 9th April afford an adequate basis for negotiations at Panmunjon.⁴ These proposals are in effect a very near approach to Indian resolution on Korea and there can be little doubt that Chinese Government have approximated to that resolution greatly.⁵ It is true that further clarifications are necessary. These

1. New Delhi, 13 April 1953. JN Collection.
2. The agreement was signed on 11 April 1953.
3. William K. Harrison, Jr, Major General, US Army; Senior Delegate, UN Command Delegation at Panmunjon.
4. Following Chou En-lai's message of 30 March to Lester Pearson, President, UN General Assembly, seeking efforts from both sides "to break the Korean deadlock by making a neutral nation responsible for prisoners refusing repatriation", the Communists had further indicated on 9 April their willingness to repatriate all prisoners who wished to go home after a ceasefire.
5. General Nam Il, senior member in the delegation of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers Delegation, called for a resumption of armistice negotiations since consultation was the only way to settle the issue, and conveyed that the Communists were willing to repatriate immediately after truce, all prisoners, who wanted to go home, and turn the rest over to a neutral country for further negotiation and persuasion.

might be obtained at Panmunjon in course of talks. This would involve no commitment except to discuss matters.

2. It is not our desire to intervene and we would greatly prefer for matters to be dealt with and decided directly at Panmunjon. We are, however, communicating our views informally to US Government because of our earnest desire for the initial good step in regard to sick and wounded prisoners to be followed up by other steps leading to peaceful settlement. As this is also the desire of the US Government, we venture to hope that negotiations for this purpose will be resumed at Panmunjon.

3. Personal. Please do not commit yourself any further. We wish to avoid entanglements. For our part we are reluctant to be named as neutral power and we do not wish even to function as intermediaries between US and China. It is better for parties to talk to each other directly at Panmunjon.

4. I might mention for your personal information only that Chou En-lai has had friendly talk with Raghavan who is anxious that India should help in early resumption of negotiations at Panmunjon on basis of Nam Il letter.⁶ This must not be mentioned to others.

6. On 12 April 1953, Chou En-lai told N. Raghavan that "the Chinese Government would greatly appreciate any move by India resulting in early resumption of negotiations at Panmunjon", since the existing Chinese position came very near to the Indian position of "No repatriation by force."

5. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram 127, dated April 12. In my telegram 21705,² first paragraph represents view communicated by US to us. But I generally agree that, at present stage, it is better for negotiations to be carried on at Panmunjon and not through agency of UN, where neither Chinese nor North Koreans are represented.

2. We have given no assurance to US and we do not propose to make any commitments to them or to China.

3. Raghavan had long conference with Chou En-lai.³ This was friendly and, for first time after considerable period, Chou En-lai appeared anxious

1. New Delhi. 13 April 1953. File Nos.F-12/62/NGO-52, Vols.I-VI and F-12/64/NGO-52, MEA.

2. See *ante*, pp. 422-423.

3. On 12 April 1953.

for friendly relations and for some help in transport of various articles *via* India to Tibet.⁴

4. Regarding Korea, Raghavan told him that I had welcomed Chou En-lai's statement and hoped that it would lead to peace. This apparently pleased Chou En-lai and he expressed his gratitude.

5. Chou En-lai referred to Nam Il's letter to Harrison, dated 9th April, and wanted its transmission immediately to me. Further, he wanted my views and comments in regard to it.

6. I am replying that I welcome approach in Nam Il's letter and think that negotiations should be resumed at Panmunjon on that basis. But, further clarifications are obviously necessary. It is not clear what the function of neutral power would be. Would PsOW, who are not repatriated, be sent to neutral country? Would there be any timetable for various processes? There is also the question of final residue of PsOW who refused repatriation. But I would rather not raise this at this stage, as that would create difficulties.

7. I have enquired whether it is possible to have more than one neutral power in charge of PsOW.

8. For your information, I might add that I would be reluctant to entangle India as such neutral power.

9. I would not like India at this stage to become an intermediary between US and China. This position is always embarrassing and creates misunderstandings. If, however, US definitely ask us to help in obtaining clarifications to Nam Il's offer, we shall do so through Chinese Government, but suggestion must come from them and not from us. I think that it is far better for representatives of rival parties at Panmunjon to deal with this matter directly.

10. I suggest that you might informally talk to US and UK Representatives in UN and tell them that we think that Nam Il's offer affords substantial basis for negotiations and we hope, therefore, that these negotiations will be resumed at Panmunjon. Any clarifications necessary can be obtained there. Question of ceasefire should not be raised by you. I am asking our Ambassador in Washington to approach State Department informally in the same manner.

11. It is clear that Chinese Government would like India to help in bringing about early resumption of negotiations at Panmunjon. We are prepared to help, but we must move cautiously and not get entangled in any way by commitments. Also, it is better for us not to raise this matter in UN, which apparently neither side desires.

12. Please do not mention to anyone that I have received any message from Chou En-lai.

4. On 19 April Nehru wrote to Raghavan that India was prepared to send 1000 tons of Chinese rice to Tibet subject to transport arrangements.

6. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram No. 131 dated April 14.² Brazilian Resolution on Korea.³ Resolution though unhappily worded appears innocuous. Consider phrase "consistent with United Nations principles and objectives," as ill-advised and likely to create controversy. There is also possibility of controversy in regard to Nam Il's proposals. Our position is, as I have informed you already, that there should be resumption of talks at Panmunjon without any commitments. Undesirable to discuss details of proposals in United Nations. Clarifications may be sought at Panmunjon.

We cannot oppose Brazilian Resolution and I think we should support it unless debate takes controversial turn. If so perhaps we might abstain from voting on controversial part.

1. New Delhi, 15 April 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Krishna Menon sought Nehru's advice on the line to be taken by India in the discussions and voting on the Brazilian Resolution which had "wide support" among many Western, Latin American and even Afro-Asian countries.
3. The Brazilian Resolution appreciated the signing of agreement on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war in Korea and hoped that further negotiations at Panmunjon would result in "an early armistice in Korea consistent with the United Nations principles and objectives"; and requested the President of the General Assembly to reconvene a session after the signing of armistice agreement in Korea or when the majority of members felt any need for it.

7. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Your telegram 84 dated 14th April.² I would like to emphasize that our reply to Chou En-lai should be in general terms, that is approving of resumption of talks in Panmunjon without any commitment as to details. Also we have no desire to act as intermediaries at this stage at least.

1. New Delhi, 15 April 1953. JN Collection.
2. Raghavan had telegraphed that during his meeting with Chou En-lai, he got the impression that the Chinese were not thinking on the lines of transfer of prisoners to territory of neutral power, but only "releasing" and handing over to neutral power to be kept in territory declared neutral, where Chinese could have facilities for full access for persuasion.

Any clarification that we require is merely to understand what position is and not to convey this to US or other country.³ It is better for these matters to be dealt with directly between parties at Panmunjon.

Question of residue being left unrepatriated should not be raised as this will create difficulties.⁴

3. In his telegram of 13 April, Raghavan had suggested that if the Americans sought India's mediation for clarification on any point, he might approach Chou En-lai in that regard.
4. Raghavan also observed that in order to avoid future deadlock the Americans might seek clarification on whether the Chinese would agree to any residue being left unrepatriated even if after persuasion anyone still refused repatriation, and further what was to be done with such residue.

8. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your letter of April 12.² I suggest that when Assembly recesses or adjourns you might return to London on date convenient to you.³ There would be no point in your staying on in New York then. Apart from Brazilian Resolution on Korea only other important matter appears to be Burmese complaint.⁴ This will either be dealt with during next few days or postponed to next meeting.

1. New Delhi, 17 April 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Krishna Menon mentioned that there was internal conflict in the US Government and Dulles was championing the idea of a divided Korea. The US regarded the Chinese approach as part of tactics to build up strength. According to Menon, the US was fearful of everything and "allergic to peace suggestions", and yet desirous of negotiations, which was a marked change in her attitude in comparison to previous occasions.
3. Menon had sought Nehru's instructions regarding his stay in New York while the Korean peace negotiations were on, since he felt that he did not have "any latitude for initiative" in these matters and had to make repeated reference to Nehru for guidance.
4. The Government of Myanmar had lodged a complaint with the UN against the Government of Nationalist China for committing aggressions and violating its territorial integrity. See *ante*, pp. 331-335.

9. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Received Goburdhun's telegram 106 dated 7th May.²

Chou En-lai's new proposals³ are very close approach to our Korean Resolution in UN and, obviously, indicate desire of Chinese Government to reach agreement.⁴ We welcome them and earnestly hope that they will lead to settlement. We shall communicate our views to other powers concerned.

Although we are reluctant to be involved in looking after prisoners of war, if agreement arrived at requires our help, we shall not refuse.

Please communicate to Premier Chou En-lai our appreciation of his friendly message and inform him that we shall continue our efforts for peaceful settlement.⁵

For your personal information. Even though Chou En-lai has gone far towards settlement,⁶ I fear United States may still create difficulties chiefly

1. 7 May 1953. File Nos. F-12/62/NGO-52, Vols. I-VI, and F. 12/64/NGO-52-MEA. Similar telegrams were sent to London, Washington, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, Cairo and Rangoon.
2. R. Goburdhun, First Secretary in Beijing, had mentioned that in the Ambassador's absence he was called for an interview by Chou En-lai on 6 May. Chou wished Goburdhun to convey the new Chinese proposals, which were to be submitted at Panmunjon on 7 May, to Nehru, and solicited India's support for those proposals.
3. The new Chinese proposals, also known as the eight-point proposal, provided for a five neutral nation Commission to take charge of prisoners refusing repatriation; prisoners to be kept in Korea for a period of four months; neutral nations to provide equal number of armed forces; nations to whom the prisoners belonged, to be given opportunities to send representatives to persuade the prisoners; and finally those still refusing repatriation after four months should have their cases considered by a political conference.
4. The Commission was to consist of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden and India, in which India was to play the part of an "impartial arbiter". While asserting that that was the last limit to which they would concede, Chou En-lai stated that they wished to compromise without giving up their principles regarding prisoners of war.
5. Goburdhun had mentioned that, during their meeting more than once Chou En-lai had referred to the friendly relations between India and China based on mutual respect of sovereign rights and non-interference in each other's internal matters and, in the name of peace and friendship, sought India's help in achieving a peaceful settlement in Korea.
6. Goburdhun mentioned that Chou En-lai repeated twice that India was their first choice for a neutral nation and if they had not formally mentioned India so far, it was because of American opposition to the proposal of sending prisoners of war to a neutral country. He felt that the number of prisoners refusing repatriation was not as large as alleged by the US and saw no difficulty in sending them to India. He further felt confident that most of the prisoners of war after being given explanations would willingly return to their homes and after that the small residue could be dealt with by the Political Committee.

because of new developments in Laos which Eisenhower connects with Korean situation.⁷ Adlai Stevenson is in India and I shall be seeing him again soon. A little later, Dulles is coming here.⁸ He is very narrow-minded and difficult to talk to.

7. The Vietminh troops, with the help of Laotian guerrillas, entered Laos in mid-April 1953 and in the first week of May partially withdrew at the face of retaliatory attacks from Franco-Laotian troops, retaining control over large parts of northern Laos.
8. From 20 to 22 May 1953.

10. Cable to K.M. Panikkar¹

Korea. Chou En-lai has sent me long message containing his new proposals for settlement and appealing in name of peace and friendship for India's help in achieving peaceful settlement. These proposals are close approximation to India's resolution passed by UN and indicate China's anxiety for peace.² Chou En-lai has made it clear that this is his last word.³

We must support these proposals because they are so near our own. We are conveying our views to other Governments concerned. I fear that United States will be obstructive for various reasons, chiefly because of developments in Laos. But if sufficient pressure is exercised by other countries, as was done in UN, this might influence US attitude.

I think that it would be helpful if Egyptian Government expressed their views to powers concerned and supported these new Chinese proposals which practically adopt what we said previously.

1. New Delhi, 7 May 1953. JN Collection. Copies of this cable were sent to Indian envoys in Peking, London, Washington, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris and Rangoon.
2. The Commission as suggested by India was to consist of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and Sweden, whereas according to Chou En-lai the fifth neutral country should be India which would be something like an umpire or impartial arbiter by virtue of the position she occupied. The new proposals were to be identical to the first part of the original Indian Resolution and did not mean that the Chinese had abandoned their original proposal of 26 April providing for the unwilling prisoners of war to be sent to a neutral country.
3. Chou En-lai had asserted that they wished to compromise without giving up their principles regarding the prisoners of war.

11. China's New Proposals¹

I have sent a number of telegrams in regard to Chou En-lai's new proposals.

I think that it would be desirable for you to send for representatives of all these countries (not Burma or Egypt) and point out to them what a great advance Chou En-lai has made and how very near his proposals are to what the UN accepted by resolution. It is difficult to see how these proposals can be rejected offhand. It might be possible to improve them in details.

Point out that it is perfectly clear that the Chinese Government is anxious for a peaceful settlement and has changed its previous attitude considerably. We have been informed, and I think this is true, that if these proposals are rejected, there will be no chance of a peaceful settlement in Korea in the near future. In fact a break is likely to lead to an intensification of warfare and all manner of other unfortunate consequences. There is little doubt that most countries will think that China has gone a very long way in search of a settlement and responsibility for a break will hardly lie upon her.

In the US, Indo-China has been associated with Korea and the recent developments in Laos will probably create additional difficulties. I think that the situation in Laos is likely to be relieved and the tension lessened if a peaceful settlement is reached in Korea. But in any event it would be most unfortunate for those new proposals of the Chinese Government to be rejected. We hope, therefore, that it will be made the basis of a settlement and, where necessary, minor changes introduced into it.

1. Note to Secretary General, N.R. Pillai and Foreign Secretary, R.K. Nehru, New Delhi, 7 May 1953. JN Collection.

12. To B.G. Kher¹

New Delhi
May 8, 1953

My dear Kher,

Last night I sent you a telegram in regard to the new Chinese proposals for a Korean settlement.² I suggested that you might inform the Foreign Office of our views in regard to them.³ I imagine that the UK reaction will not be unfavourable to these proposals, but I am gravely doubtful of the USA reaction.⁴ The only thing to be done is for the UK and other countries to impress upon the USA their views so that the USA might find it difficult to reject these proposals.⁵

Anyhow, by the time this letter reaches you, other developments would have taken place.⁶

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 428-429.

3. In his cable of 7 May to Kher, Nehru had mentioned: "I think you should convey to Foreign Office that we feel strongly that new Chinese approach approximates very closely to UN resolution and can form basis of settlement."

4. Regarding US reaction Nehru wrote: "... I greatly fear that United States will be obstructive for various reasons, chiefly new developments in Laos."

5. While the White House said it would carefully study the eight-point proposal, three members of the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William Knowland, Alexander Smith and John Sparkman expressed their bitter disapproval of the Communist proposals. Accusing India of supporting the Communists in the UN on Korean issue, they said: "This is only another plan to put India in charge of the prisoners. The result would be proselytizing of prisoners from only one side—from Communist viewpoint."

6. On 9 May 1953, the Allies sought clarification on certain points of the eight-point proposal. On 12 May 1953, General William Harrison declared that the Chinese eight-point proposal was "unworkable and unacceptable" as it was. On 13 May 1953, the Allies submitted their counter proposals at Panmunjon.

13. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
May 9, 1953

My dear Krishna,

I have received in recent days four airgraphs from you.² The latest two, which have just come, are dated the 6th and 7th May.³ Thank you for sending me these appraisals of the situation and your accounts of talks with Selwyn Lloyd and Attlee.

Since you wrote, further developments have taken place and Chou En-lai has come out with another proposal, which is exceedingly like our own resolution in the UN. Indeed it might be said to be practically what our resolution originally was before some amendments were introduced into it. In any event, it is a very close approximation, and it is very clear that China is going all out for a settlement.

This new proposal of Chou En-lai was communicated to our representative who was sent for the purpose. As a matter of fact, Raghavan was not in Peking as he had gone to Shanghai. So, his No. 2, Goburdhan was sent for and Chou En-lai had a long talk with him which was very friendly and appreciative of India's help. He appealed, in the name of peace and friendship, for India's further help in reaching a peaceful settlement. He made it clear that this was the utmost he could do, and if even this failed there was no alternative but to carry on the war. But he was anxious to end it.

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Of 30 April and, 3, 6 and 7 May 1953. In his first two airgraphs, Menon had apprised Nehru of the thinking in the UN and US circles regarding armistice in Korea. The suspicion in the US seemed that the Soviet "peace offensive" was a ploy to disunite the Allies. Menon felt that the US was not ready for an armistice and was "nervous and ill prepared for the sequel, both at home and abroad", while at the UN the consensus was in favour of an end to the Korean war. According to Menon, left to himself, Dulles would make withdrawal of Ho Chi-minh's forces from Laos a condition for Korean settlement. Menon feared that the US would object to the transportation of POWs to distant countries, while the Chinese wanted such isolation, away from US vigilance, in order to persuade the reluctant POWs to return home.
3. In his airgraphs of 6 and 7 May Menon informed Nehru about his conversations with Selwyn Lloyd and Attlee on 5 May. While Lloyd was opposed to Secretary Dulles' proposals for a blockade, limited nuclear war and all help to Chiang Kai-shek, he agreed with the US about the impracticability of transporting large number of prisoners from Korea as demanded by China. Menon impressed upon Lloyd that under no circumstances the US should be allowed to deadlock the negotiations on Korea. Regarding his talks with Attlee, Menon reported that Attlee did not hide his concern about US foreign policy and on the whole agreed that a solution to Korean problem could only be found on the lines suggested by India in its resolution of December 1952.

On receipt of this message, which I acknowledged appropriately, I sent telegrams to our Missions in Washington, London, Moscow, Paris, Ottawa, Cairo and Rangoon, suggesting that our views might be conveyed to the Governments concerned. These views were to the effect that we thought these proposals very worthy of acceptance as a basis for settlement, though minor variations might no doubt be made. In fact, we pointed out that it was difficult to reject something which was so near the UN Resolution.

I have had replies from London, Paris, Cairo and Rangoon, generally appreciating our position and hoping that this will lead to a settlement. In Cairo, the Egyptian Government has approached the UK and USA Governments to this effect and is also moving the Arab League, The Burmese Government has approached the UK and USA Governments.

It is clear that the only stumbling block at present is the USA.⁴ After their initial reaction against the Chinese proposals, they are a little more cautious, partly no doubt because of pressure from other countries.

Adlai Stevenson is touring about India and will be in Delhi in two or three days time. Dulles is coming here on the 20th or thereabouts. He is difficult to talk to, because his outlook is frightfully bigoted and narrow. Adlai Stevenson is more amenable to reasonable talk.

The other day in Parliament here, it was stated on our behalf that we did not consider ourselves bound by any restrictions imposed on trade with China, including Tibet.⁵ As a matter of fact, there was very little trade for a variety of reasons. But we judge of this trade from the point of view of our own policy and interests. This statement has apparently not pleased the US much.

I suppose you have met Indira and are acquainted with the general programme drawn up for my stay in London.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

4. It was believed that the US would reject the new Chinese proposals, due to developments in Laos, where the Laotian guerrillas, supported by Communists, had inflicted a major defeat on the French army.
5. On 14 April 1953, Nehru had told the House of People that India was not a party to the UN Resolution of 18 May 1951 banning supply of strategic material to China and had not accepted any commitment restricting trade with any foreign country.

14. Cable to B.G. Kher¹

Your telegram 2235 of May 8th.² Our Resolution on Korea as passed by UN must not be considered as something final and unalterable. It was made repeatedly clear on our behalf in United Nations that Resolution was a basis for negotiations and was not an ultimatum.³ This view had considerable support in General Assembly. Lester Pearson, in forwarding Resolution to Chinese Government stated in his covering letter that, in the Assembly's view, the proposals formed "a just and reasonable basis for an agreement."

2. Therefore paragraphs 7 and 17 of our Resolution are both negotiable and capable of suitable modification if necessary. We have no objection at all to an agreement being reached on any basis. As a matter of fact, Chinese proposals accept substance of our Resolution and differences are only on minor points.

3. I have heard from our Ambassador in Paris that French Government is favourably inclined to Chinese proposals. Egyptian and Burmese Governments have intimated their approval to UK and USA representatives.

1. New Delhi, 9 May 1953. JN Collection.
2. Kher had sought Nehru's advice whether the provisions in paragraph 17 of India's Resolution should be regarded as negotiable and whether new Chinese proposals apparently modifying paragraph 7 of that resolution would be acceptable to India.
3. Kher further stated that at his meeting with Selwyn Lloyd, the latter had pointed out that Britain welcomed the new proposals, which provided a basis for settlement, and did not relish the entry of Polish and Czech troops into Korea as envisaged in the new Chinese proposals, "being armed forces of the Five Power Commission". Regarding residue of prisoners, Britain would prefer the proposals made in India's Resolution. These ideas, Lloyd expressed, were of Churchill, who was not supposed to be a "war-monger" as he appeared but a "peace-monger." He reiterated that Britain had strongly urged "upon USA acceptance of these proposals as basis for negotiations."

15. To U Nu¹

New Delhi
May 11, 1953

My dear Maung Nu,

You will no doubt be following with deep interest the new developments in

1. JN Collection.

the Far Eastern drama. Chou En-lai's recent proposals are, as you must have noticed, a near approach to the Indian Resolution passed by the UN. This makes it clear to me that the Chinese Government is really anxious for a settlement. After a period of some coolness between China and India, since the passing of the Indian resolution by the UN, China has again approached us in the friendliest of terms. Chou En-lai has had long talks with our representative in Peking and appealed to us for our help in the name of peace and friendship. He has suggested that both our countries should keep each other fully informed of our thinking and possible action so that we might try to cooperate to the greatest possible extent.

All this indicates a marked turn which, whatever the reason for it, must be welcomed.

So far as I have been able to find out, almost every country, except the US, have welcomed Chou En-lai's new proposals and is anxious that they should form the basis of a settlement, though minor changes might be considered and made. The US is in a dilemma. Frankly, I do not think that the US is very anxious for a settlement in Korea for a variety of reasons. Some of the statements made by responsible people in the US have been really extraordinary. Indeed, these statements are often mutually contradicted. There appears to be no constant foreign policy in the US. Even between President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, there does not appear to be community of thought. Only today I read a statement by the new Director of Public Relations in the State Department, which was really extraordinary in its ineptitude.

American thinking appears to proceed on the basis that, if China makes a proposal, there must be some trick in it. They imagine that this indicates the weakness of China and that probably there are grave internal troubles in China and that is why they are climbing down. This leads them to think that now is the time to exercise full pressure to get full results. That seems to me wishful thinking. China may have her troubles, but there is absolutely no reason to think that she is in grave difficulties. Chou En-lai has made it clear that if his new proposals are not accepted, he will revert to his previous ones and if neither are accepted, then the matter ends there because he is not going to concede anything further.

I think that we should take advantage of these proposals and make them the basis for a settlement in Korea, subject to minor variations of course. It is possible that if other countries exercise pressure on the US Government, that Government might become less rigid in its response. I know that the UK and even France are generally agreeable to Chou En-lai's new proposals.

The sudden withdrawal of the invading forces in Laos is rather intriguing. I do not know the explanation of it. It can hardly be just the rainy season, though that might be one factor. In any event, all these developments are to

be welcomed. Our information is that undoubtedly there is an indigenous freedom movement in Laos, under one of the Princes, who led an anti-French Resistance Movement as long ago as 1945. It is true, I think, that Ho Chi Minh and perhaps the Chinese Government have supplied arms etc.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

16. Cable to K.P.S. Menon¹

Korea. We have now examined full text of American counter-proposals.² Some of these proposals appear to diverge completely from principles of Indian Resolution adopted by UN. It is clear that these cannot prove acceptable. Chou En-lai has sent me another message expressing his distress and pointing out that it is impossible for him to accept some of the American proposals.

2. Canada has reacted strongly against American counter-proposals and Pearson has expressed himself in favour of Chinese eight-point proposals, which are generally in conformity with Indian Resolution. UK Government probably takes, more or less, same views.³

3. In these circumstances, it is clear that India cannot assume responsibility on basis of American counter-proposals. Only hope of settlement appears to be to lay stress on Chinese proposals as basis. We would like you to convey our views to Foreign Office and to express hope that further consideration will be given to second Chinese plan.

1. New Delhi, 14 May 1953. File Nos.P-12/62/NGO-52. Vols.1-VI and F-12/64/NGO-52. MEA. Also available in JN Collection. This cable was repeated to Indian Ambassadors in Paris, Cairo and Rangoon.
2. On 13 May 1953, the US delegation put forward certain counter-proposals to those of the Chinese eight-point proposals of 7 May. These were: The five-nation Repatriation Commission should take the custody of non-Koreans only and that all Koreans refusing repatriation should be freed as civilians after the signing of armistice; the Repatriation Commission should operate for 60 days instead of 4 months; India should be the Chairman of the Repatriation Commission and be the only nation allowed to bring armed forces and administrative personnel to Korea.
3. On 16 May 1953, Churchill stated that the Communist eight-point plan deserved "patient and sympathetic examination."

17. Cable to Rajeshwar Dayal¹

Your telegram 150 dated May 13.² Korea. We entirely agree with Pearson's views in regard to Chinese eight-point proposals³ and American counter-proposals.⁴ They are serious departure from UN Resolution and contain some points which are clearly unacceptable to Chinese.

I have received fresh message from Chou En-lai, expressing his distress at new development and pointing out that it is impossible for him to accept some parts of American proposals; some other parts, however, being capable of negotiation.⁵

American attitude appears most unhelpful and cannot, unless changed, lead to any settlement, while there was much hope of settlement from the Chinese eight-point proposals.

India is reluctant to send troops abroad; but, if settlement was arrived at on that basis, we might agree. There is no question of our agreeing in present

1. New Delhi, 14 May 1953. File Nos. F-12/62/NGO/52, Vol. I-VI, F-12/64/NGO-52. MEA.
2. In his telegram, Rajeshwar Dayal mentioned his long conversation with the Canadian Ambassador, who conveyed to him Lester Pearson's views on the latest Chinese eight-point proposals and the American counter-proposals.
3. Pearson regarded Chinese proposals as offering solid basis for an armistice, provided United States was "seriously determined" to secure one. Regarding the US counter-proposals, Pearson was "seriously disturbed" at their departure from accepted principles. He was unable to see any objection to Czechoslovakia and Poland being allowed to bring in their troops and took strong exception to despatching latest proposals to Korea without UN sanctions.
4. Provisions of the US counter-proposals, which were unacceptable to Chinese, were: (1) Five Neutral Nations Commission was regarded only as a Commission for custody and not as a repatriation commission; (2) of those prisoners of war not initially insisting on repatriation, all North Koreans (about 50,000) were not to be handed over to Neutral Commission, but to be released in Korea; only Chinese would be handed over; (3) Decision by Neutral Commission would not be by majority but would be unanimous; and (4) only India should provide necessary armed forces and if India had insufficient personnel, US or South Korean soldiers would be made use of and the prisoners of war handed over to Neutral Commission were to be kept within two kilometres of ceasefire line.
5. The other four proposals, which were negotiable, were: (i) Chinese could use only one person for every one thousand prisoners of war for purposes of persuasion and explanations; (ii) those prisoners of war, who wished to return, would be handed back by the Neutral Commission for repatriation by the detaining side; (iii) only two months' time would be allowed for persuasion; and (iv) at the end of two months, those still remaining would be released in Korea as civilians and not be handed over to Political Conference.

context to Harrison's proposal.⁶ In no event could we agree to be associated with South Korean troops, etc., in any task entrusted to us.

We think that only hope of settlement lies in accepting basis of Chinese eight-point proposals with possible variations later on.

6. Dayal had informed that he was being asked for India's reaction to Harrison's proposal regarding employment of only Indian troops, but due to the absence of instructions, he could offer no comments.

18. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Your telegram 111 dated May 13.²

I received only this evening full text of American counter-proposals. Previously, only brief summary was given. Full text discloses many new matters of importance. It is clear that these American counter-proposals are marked departure from the UN Resolution, while latest Chinese proposals are very largely in conformity with UN Indian Resolution.³ This is also view of Pearson, which he has conveyed to US Government. Pearson seriously disturbed at this departure by US from accepted principles.

2. It is evident that UK Government has also preferred Chinese proposals to American counter-proposals as basis of settlement. Hence, attack in US Senate on Churchill.⁴

1. New Delhi, 14 May 1953. File Nos.F-12/62/NGO-52, Vols. I-VI, and F-12/64/NGO-52, MEA. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Raghavan had mentioned that during his two-hour meeting with Chou En-lai on 13 May 1953, the latter gave him a long account of American counter-proposals, which had almost created an impasse and virtually overthrew the UN Resolution. Of the eight main counter-proposals, he classified four as fundamental and substantial and completely unacceptable to Chinese, and four others as of secondary importance, which though still unacceptable might be negotiated.
3. Chou En-lai pointed out that Chinese proposals had taken all "salient points" from India's original draft and the UN Resolution except the one regarding ultimate disposal of residual political prisoners.
4. On 14 May 1953, criticizing C.R. Attlee's speech of 12 May, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Chairman of Senate Committee on Government Operations, said that it was "one of the most insulting speeches ever made in the legislature of a nation that has received aid from an ally," and demanded an apology for such a "fantastic and cheap" attack on American people and President. He criticized Churchill for "sitting idly by" and "meekly nodding his head" during Attlee's speech and said that "the Prime Minister owed the American people a frank statement of the 'Conservative' position." Attlee had criticized the US for shifting position on the Korean issue and had blamed that section of lobbyists who put all the blame at the door of the Communists.

3. Our position is that we would welcome an agreed settlement. We feel that Chinese eight-point proposals offer best chance of settlement and are nearest to UN Resolution. So far as American counter-proposals are concerned, there are certainly some points in them which we do not at all approve of. In no event, would we agree to any association with US or South Korean soldiers in carrying out any task entrusted to us in this connection.

4. If Chinese first proposals were accepted by other side, we would certainly agree. But there is no chance of this happening and, therefore, we feel that it is much wiser to adhere to the eight-point proposals, which have already received large measure of support from other countries.

5. In these circumstances, question of our accepting in India prisoners left unrepatriated hardly arises.⁵ Unless we know numbers involved, it is difficult to say how far we can undertake this responsibility.

6. We are indicating our strong preference for Chinese eight-point proposals to our Missions abroad, who will communicate our views to Governments concerned. We would strongly advise Chinese Government to adhere to these proposals as basis of settlement, though they might suggest that their first proposals also hold. They would be on strong ground in this and have very considerable support. To give up eight-point proposals and revert merely to first proposals would rather weaken their position. I would earnestly suggest to Premier Chou that whatever developments might take place, negotiations should not be broken and should be kept going.

5. Raghavan further observed that given the nature of the US counter-proposals, Chou En-lai had sought Nehru's views on "whether prisoners left unrepatriated could be transported to India as the neutral power and whether India would agree to take them."

19. American Counter-Proposals¹

You will see the telegrams I have sent. I do not think it necessary to go into the details of the American counter-proposals. I think that, now that we have received the full text of the American proposals and formed some opinion about them, we should inform the US Ambassador here. You have, to some extent, done so, but your talk was not based on a full knowledge of these proposals.

1. Note to Secretary General, N.R. Pillai, 14 May 1953. JN Collection.

I suggest, therefore, that you might send for him again. We are partly involved, as we are supposed to send our troops to Korea under the American proposals. You might point out to the US Ambassador that we have given careful consideration to these US counter-proposals. They contain a great deal which was not mentioned in the brief summary given to us and we feel that they diverge greatly from the UN Resolution. That resolution still represents presumably the UN point of view. If so, the closer we adhere to it, the better. Of course, we have no objection to a settlement arrived at on any other basis. But that is unlikely, and we had welcomed the Chinese eight-point proposals because they came very near to the UN Resolution.

The American counter-proposals raise several entirely new points and therefore open out the whole question.² We feel, therefore, that a more profitable line of approach was and is to accept the basis of the Chinese eight-point proposals and try to vary them where necessary. To depart considerably from the UN proposal hardly appears to us to be correct from the UN point of view and little likely to lead to any agreed settlement.

You might express the hope that even though agreement is still far, we earnestly hope that the negotiations at Panmunjon will be carried.

2. On 13 May, 1953, Nam Il described the American counter-proposals as "a step backward...one that threatens the prospects of the whole armistice negotiation."

20. Cable to B.G. Kher¹

Your telegram 2360 of May 20th. Also 2348 dated May 19th conveying Krishna Menon's message. I do not propose to make any approach to Chinese Government at present.

Please convey following message to Krishna Menon. Your telegram about your talk with Selwyn Lloyd.² I am reluctant to make any positive proposal to Chinese Government at this stage.³ This may lead to embarrassments all

1. New Delhi, 21 May 1953. JN Collection.
2. In his telegram of 19 May 1953, Krishna Menon had stated that the US counter-proposals had caused "much concern" in the British diplomatic circles, and that concern had been communicated at the highest level to the US, urging the latter to desist from disrupting negotiations at Panmunjon.
3. Krishna Menon had suggested that Chou En-lai should be confidentially informed that for a viable solution to the "residue" prisoners of war question, the responsibility could be given to the "eleven-power" conference, without a veto. He observed that the Chinese might favourably receive this idea since it was originally suggested by the USSR in November 1952.

round. Just at present I am having talks with Dulles and Chinese Government might well think that this results from those talks. I do not propose therefore to say anything at present but I shall bear in mind what you have suggested.

21. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

We have received aide memoire from American Embassy indicating some important changes in previous UN proposals.² We have not yet seen full text of new proposals made by General Harrison.

I have also received message from Winston Churchill expressing his happiness that revised proposals have been brought in line with Indian Resolution and that they are not being presented as ultimatum.

It is not possible for me to express opinion until I have seen full text. But two important changes among those asked for by Chou En-lai have been made, namely, North Korean prisoners will not be released automatically but will be handed over to Commission and decisions by Commission will be by majority vote. These changes should be welcomed.

It is further proposed in regard to residual prisoners that their case should be considered by Political Conference as provided in Indian Resolution. Composition and functions of Political Conference not yet determined.

What would be Chinese reaction to this Political Conference being on the lines of Russian Resolution last autumn, that is, being on the lines without veto and taking majority decisions? This is my personal suggestion.

We should like to know immediately reactions of Chinese Government to these new UN proposals.

I am leaving for London on 28th morning. I would like you to keep me fully informed of developments and Chinese reactions from time to time. Messages sent to Delhi will be relayed to me. Please inform Chou En-lai that we shall continue our efforts to promote settlement in Korea. Although progress made may not be wholly satisfactory, there has undoubtedly been progress in the right direction and I am sure that Chinese Government will appreciate this and help further in finding solution.

1. New Delhi, 25 May 1953. File Nos. F. 12/62/NGD-52, Vols. I-VI, F- 12/64/NGO-52, MEA.

2. The new proposals, released on 25 May 1953, provided for the transfer of all prisoners to Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission; extension of time limit upto a maximum of 120 days for those prisoners who had not decided about their repatriation; and finally all such prisoners who decided not to get repatriated, were to be released as civilians or another reference about them was to be made to the UN.

22. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram 2398 dated 22nd May.² Have since received aide memoire from American Embassy here pointing out major changes in previous UN counter-proposals. I have not seen full text of new proposals yet. Winston Churchill has sent message expressing his satisfaction that revised proposals have been brought in line with Indian Resolution and further that they are not in form of ultimatum, although they are as far as UN Command are prepared to go.

Major changes indicated are that North Korean prisoners will not be released automatically but will be handed over to the Commission and that decisions by Commission will be by majority vote. Further that in regard to disposition of non-repatriates, their cases will be referred to Political Conference as provided in Indian Resolution.

These changes certainly bring new proposals nearer to Indian Resolution and go some way to meet Chinese objections. Chou En-lai had previously informed us that there were two other proposals which were completely unacceptable to Chinese. These were that Commission will be a Custodial Commission and not Repatriation Commission and that India will be the only member to have an armed force. He had pointed out other objections also but apparently these were not considered so vital.

I have communicated to Raghavan your suggestion about Political Conference being as suggested in Russian Resolution last autumn but without veto and taking majority decisions.

Thus far composition and functions of Political Conference have not been stated anywhere. This will have to be clarified.

1. New Delhi, 25 May 1953. JN Collection.
2. Krishna Menon mentioned that the main proposals by UN Command concerning two principal issues would be: (i) Commission of "Troops" on South Korean territory could only be Indian troops and not of any other four Commission Powers; (ii) voting in Commission would be by majority on all procedural questions and unanimity or near unanimity on major questions; (iii) certain details about procedure of re-education and access, not fully clarified, were not fundamental; (iv) on issue of final disposition two alternatives would be proposed: (a) repeat of terms already rejected namely that all prisoners unwilling to go home should be released where they were; (b) that the "residue" should be referred to the higher level Political Conference as asked by the Chinese or the UN Resolution and the question of the still unresolved residue thereafter would be "referred" to the UN. That was the position reached up to date as a result of discussions in Washington between parties.

Nam Il has also protested previously about numerous restrictions in UN Resolution on functioning of Commission. It is clear that the Commission should be fully independent and should not depend in any way on Military Commanders of opposing forces. Nor would we like our forces to be mixed up with opposing forces.

You can certainly explore other methods informally as suggested in para 7 of your telegram.

23. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Your telegram 129 dated May 27th.² I am glad Chou En-lai's reaction to American proposals is not immediately adverse and that there is some feeling of hopefulness. Although some difficulties and points of controversy still remain, main hurdles have been crossed, and I am sure that if we persist in seeking settlement we shall succeed. I shall of course do my best in London.

If principle of time-limit is agreed to, exact period is not likely to offer difficulty.

1. New Delhi, 27 May 1953. JN Collection.
2. In his telegram, Raghavan mentioned that during his talk with Chou En-lai, the previous night, the latter expressed "hopefulness" over the main features expressed in Nehru's telegram. The main issue appeared to be the ultimate disposition of residue prisoners of war, while American suggestion that if Political Conference was unable to decide within 30 days, the remainder were to be handed over to UN or released on spot, was strongly opposed by Chou En-lai, who felt that Neutral Commission should be in position to deal with and decide what should be done with residue. He was willing to agree to time limit within which such decisions should be taken, and pressed for the eight-point formula, which was similar to original Indian draft.

24. Far East and South East Asia¹

Jawaharlal Nehru agreed that the entire situation in the Far East was governed

1. Minutes of the second meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, London, 4 June 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.

by whether or not a truce in Korea was successfully negotiated.² It was quite clear that neither side would be in favour of the indefinite captivity of prisoners of war who did not wish to be repatriated, but there might well be differences over the method of putting an end to such captivity. The object, therefore, should be to get the principle agreed, leaving it to later discussions to decide how to implement it. The forum in which such problems should be discussed was a difficult matter, since the Chinese People's Government were perfectly entitled to object to such discussions taking place in the United Nations, of which they were not members. The proposed Political Conference would perhaps be the best place in which to settle such problems and he agreed with Mr Selwyn Lloyd that such a conference would be of little value unless Russia and the Chinese People's Government, as well as North and South Korea, were represented.³ It must be remembered by all nations concerned that, until it was settled, the problem of a seat for the Chinese People's Government in the United Nations would continue to be before them, and the recent United States Senate resolution stipulating that under present conditions no support should be given to the Chinese People's Government's claim to a seat was ill-timed, even though it did refer specifically to the present situation.⁴ The Government of the United States were not alone in having to take account of the views of the Parliament, press and public opinion.

As regards the question of introducing armed contingents into South Korea, India had been much embarrassed by the pressure from both sides to provide a contingent.⁵ The fact was that India was reluctant to do so, but she had,

2. Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Minister of UK, had earlier concluded his observations with the apprehension that if the Korean truce negotiations broke down, an entirely new situation would be created in the Far East.
3. Lloyd further observed that if a truce was agreed to, they were pledged to refer the Korean question to the UN. But the General Assembly was not a suitable body to deal with it, and it seemed preferable to transfer the problem to the Political Conference envisaged in the draft armistice agreement. Since the composition of the Political Conference would present some difficulties, in order that it might have a useful outcome, Russia, Communist China, North and South Korea should certainly be represented.
4. According to Selwyn Lloyd, one of the wider problems faced by them was the representation of China in the United Nations and their existing policy was that, while fighting continued in Korea, there could be no question of supporting the claims of the Chinese People's Government. Britain held no dogmatic view about its representation in the United Nations when the Korean war ended. The United States were opposed to it, but a compromise might be found by which, if the Chinese People's Government became a member of the Security Council, the Nationalist Government might also be allowed to remain in the United Nations as representing Formosa.
5. As regards the introduction of armed contingents into South Korea from the nations comprising the repatriation commission, Lloyd believed, they considered it a mistake to bring in troops from Poland, Czechoslovakia or Sweden. Since the Swiss could not provide troops, they hoped that any troops introduced should come from one country only.

nevertheless, intimated that, provided there was general agreement to such a course, she would be prepared to play her part in accordance with her capacity and policy; she would not attempt to send a contingent to South Korea unless such agreement was reached.

Should the present truce negotiations break down, many problems would of course arise, and he agreed that these would call for further careful consultations. But he was afraid that in that event there might be a tendency on the part of the United States to resort to increased and widespread military operations which might well seriously increase our subsequent difficulties.

...Nehru said that in that case he supposed that the United Nations would naturally have to withdraw their political support from South Korea.⁶

...Nehru said an appeal by Siam to the United Nations seemed to have little meaning.⁷ No one was invading Siam and it was very unlikely that the People's Republic of China would invade Indo-China, Siam or Burma.⁸ China had her own internal problems to settle, and invasion would lead to widespread war which she would wish to avoid. The spread of communism by infiltration was another matter; but communism had little hold in a country which was plentifully supplied with rice.

South-East Asia should be examined from a long-term point of view, and we should not continually be thinking only of immediate problems. At the end of the War no country had been so popular in China as the United States and now it was the most hated. The United States must therefore have followed a wrong policy. This was a lesson which should make us examine the broader issues of policy in order to keep the peoples of South-East Asia on our side and to avoid mistakes of which our opponents took advantage. The United States had carried the burden of the Korean war, but this should not blind us to the possibility that their policies might bring the wrong results and entangle

6. Alexander said that if the truce negotiations broke down, the most favourable course seemed to be to hold fast on to the existing UN position and to concentrate on building up the South Korean forces so that UN ground forces could be withdrawn.
7. Selwyn Lloyd who was apprehensive of the security of the Thai frontier asked the Commonwealth countries to "stimulate the Siamese will to resist Communist attack" and preferred not to raise the issue at the UN as this would hinder truce efforts in Korea.
8. Lloyd further said that so long as the Chinese Nationalist troops continued to remain in Myanmar the Communists had an excuse for intervention. So the method of their withdrawal had to be worked out. The most important aim in the Far East, he continued, was to get peace in Korea, and if there were peace, he feared that the Communists would increase their pressure in South East Asia and members of the Commonwealth should concert their efforts to show that they were prepared to meet it. Oliver Lyttelton was of the view that if Indo-China were overrun or Thailand dominated by the Communists, there were two dangers to Malaya: there would be a serious rice crisis, and if Communists established themselves on the northern frontier of Malaya, their efforts to curb the activities of terrorists in Malaya would be made much more difficult.

them more and more in difficulties. The French in Indo-China had failed to take account of political aspirations and they were unlikely to succeed in doing more than hold the position against the Vietminh.⁹ There was no likelihood that they could restore the situation unless they took more thought for the wishes of the people. It was even doubtful whether they could rely on Vietnamese troops, which might go over to the other side if they were not given something better to fight for.

Mr Selwyn Lloyd had referred favourably to the United Nations resolution on the withdrawal of Chinese Nationalist troops from Burma.¹⁰ But it had not yet brought any concrete results. Mr Dulles had told him that Chiang Kai-shek would not take steps to remove the troops and that the United States could not help further. These troops had grown in number from 3,000 to 12,000 in two or three years. They were equipped with new weapons and they were supplied by air across Siam from Formosa. They were stationed near the border of Siam, and could easily leave Burma if they wanted to. They were committing aggression in Burma and looting and killing the Burmese people. They were a constant embarrassment to the Burmese Government and the Communists in Burma were taking full advantage of their presence to further their own cause. This was itself an invasion of Burma. The Chinese Communists might have invaded Burma to attack these Nationalist troops, but they had not done so because they did not want a war. He doubted, therefore, if they were likely to transfer troops released from Korea to Indo-China, Siam or Burma. They had no shortage of manpower and, if they wished to invade Indo-China or Burma, they could easily do so now while they still had an army in Korea.

He did not think that there was any fear of Communist invasion of South-East Asia in the foreseeable future. If, however, we concentrated our attention on the possibilities of immediate war and based our policies on that fear, supporting unpopular regimes, we would lose our grip of the entire situation. We should rather take a longer view. The spread of communism could only be countered by recognizing the dynamic rise of nationalist aspirations among peoples who were now politically conscious, and by taking account in our policies of their desire for independence.

9. Alexander said that the French had 64 battalions in Indo-China, in addition, they had raised 50 Vietnamese battalions. Their tactics were misconceived, and there was danger that they had adopted a defensive mentality based on the fortress points which they had constructed beyond the perimeter round Saigon, while on the other hand, Vietminh maintained light forces in Vietnam and Laos: it was unlikely that they could launch a major attack until after the monsoon.
10. The Resolution, adopted by the General Assembly on 23 April 1953, deplored and condemned the presence, hostile activities and depredations of foreign forces in the territory of the Union of Myanmar, and "declared that these foreign forces" must be disarmed and either agree to internment or leave the territory of the Union of Myanmar forthwith.

25. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Your telegram No. 140, dated 5th June.² I am very happy to learn that parties concerned have come very near to truce agreement. As regards changes proposed by Chinese Government to American proposals, I have no particular comments to make. I earnestly hope full agreement will be reached soon. Please express to Chou En-lai my great pleasure and appreciation of the very statesmanlike attitude of the Chinese Government. So far as India is concerned, we shall endeavour to do our best to fulfil the tasks allotted to us. I presume that, after truce is signed, India would be approached separately by both parties to the truce negotiations.³

1. London, 5 June 1953. File Nos.F-12/62/NGO-52, Vols.I-VI and F-12/64/NGO-52, MEA. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Raghavan had informed that on 4 June 1953, Chou En-lai handed over to him in confidence the revised text of draft Agreement submitted by Chinese at Panmunjon the previous day. He explained that he had basically agreed to the latest American counter-proposals submitted on 25 May 1953, as they came close to Chinese proposals, although, some "necessary and technical alterations and revisions" were to be made in the United Nations' text. He desired Raghavan to communicate Nehru's reactions.
3. India had earlier shown willingness to undertake the task of providing military personnel to take custody of those prisoners of war who did not insist on repatriation.

26. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Received your telegrams Nos. 142 and 143, 7th June.² We shall await formal approach to us by parties concerned after truce agreement has been signed. Presumably this should come from parties represented at Panmunjon, no doubt backed by their respective Governments. We shall then try to obtain assurances

1. London, 7 June 1953. File Nos.F-12/62/NGO-52, Vols. I-VI, F-12/64/NGO-52, MEA. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Raghavan had informed that on 6 June 1953 he had another conference with Chou En-lai, who told him that Poland and Czechoslovakia had already agreed to proposal and Swedish and Swiss Missions were waiting to hear from their Governments. On 7 June, at Panmunjon, UN Command indicated that they would "basically" accept Chinese draft but wished "some technical alterations and clarifications."

from both parties for their full cooperation and for observance of arrangements made by Neutral Commission.

You need not raise question of expenses involved.³ There is no difficulty about this and we can easily come to an arrangement later.

I expect you to keep me informed of every development and of Chinese Government's views on such developments.

3. He further stated that the Swedish Ambassador had said that his Government might, before acceptance, raise the question regarding who would meet the expenses of the Commission and whether Sweden was obliged to release prisoners who might so elect.

27. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Please convey to Premier Chou En-lai my hearty congratulations on the signing of the Prisoners of War Agreement at Panmunjon.² I earnestly trust that this will be a prelude to peace in the Far East and the world.

1. London, 8 June 1953. File Nos.F-12/62/NGO-52, Vols. 1-VI and F-12 /64/NGO-52, MEA.
2. On 8 June 1953, an agreement was arrived at between the two warring groups with regard to the exchange and release of prisoners of war. Nehru sent a similar message of congratulations to the US President, Eisenhower.

28. Marked Turn for the Better¹

...Question: What is your idea about the realization of the plans about Korea of which you are the author?

Jawaharlal Nehru: All I can say is that today's news from Panmunjon has filled us all with pleasure. I think that, with the signing of the Exchange of Prisoners' Agreement in Korea, we can confidently look forward now to the

1. Press conference, London, 8 June 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Also from *India News*, 13 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 106-107, 130, 174, 189-190, 358-359, 396-399 and 407.

truce in Korea. That is not by any means the end of all our troubles in that sphere, but it is undoubtedly a very great step in the right direction. I do feel that the atmosphere is propitious for a further move, not only in Korea but perhaps all over the world. You referred to our part. As a matter of fact, our part has not been dramatic. Perhaps the quiet and undramatic policy that we have been pursuing on behalf of India has borne some fruit. I should like to congratulate on this occasion the great Powers who have had so much to do on both sides.

I think that President Eisenhower has undoubtedly a great deal of credit for this armistice. I think also the Chinese people and the Government deserve credit. I should like specially to say that in these last stages, more particularly, the United Kingdom Government has played a very important part and undoubtedly has helped greatly in this achievement. I should like to congratulate them. I have cabled congratulations to both President Eisenhower and China's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, on the signing of the agreement.

Q: What is the future of Korea and how do you assess the problems in the Pacific?

JN: The Korean question will have to be discussed at some time or other. Korea naturally opened up new possibilities. Other questions not only in the Pacific but elsewhere are easier to discuss now than they were. One must not expect miracles to happen everywhere, but it is good enough that the situation has taken a marked turn for the better which may lead us further.

Q: What are your views on the attitude of President Syngman Rhee?

JN: I have no more information on it than has appeared in the newspapers, but I imagine in view of the attitude taken by the United States Government—a very strong attitude—there should not be any difficulty on that issue.

Q: Will peace in Korea lead the way to wider discussions on the Far East generally?

JN: As to the next step following an armistice in Korea I would like to say that questions affecting the Far East shall naturally come up before the Political Conference that is to be held and at the United Nations. Then there is a proposal for a four-power conference.

Q: What would be the next step in the big Power talks?

JN: Presumably there is going to be a meeting in Bermuda which I hope would lead to the other conference later on. I hope that the coming conference between the Big Three at Bermuda would lead to a yet bigger conference. India has a very embarrassing, difficult and delicate task as a member and umpire on the Korean Prisoners of War Repatriation (Neutral) Commission.

Q: What is the next step following an armistice in Korea? Why do you not interfere and put forward a plan in regard to Egypt? Have you any compromise plan in this situation as you had in the case of Korea?

JN: We put forward a plan with regard to Korea at the last moment. We avoided doing so and what we put forward in fact was piecing together what we had gathered from the other countries abroad. It was not something out of our heads but just piecing together what we thought other people wanted. We have no such plans about Egypt, in fact we are always reluctant to interfere in any matter whether it is Korea or Egypt or anything. If necessity arises we feel we can help better by not trying to interfere than by putting forward plans and resolutions and the like....

Q: What is India's attitude towards rival blocs?

JN: One of benevolent neutrality. Nobody can say what will happen when these things take place in the future because all kinds of new forces come in to play, when anything will happen, we cannot guess.

Q: With the signing of the Exchange of Prisoners' Agreement in Korea, can we look forward to a truce in Korea?

JN: In Korea? I really do not know if this is foreseen. I do not even know what is going to happen after this truce, I mean to say, this Commission. Details are to be worked out. I have no idea at all, not yet, what the Political Conference is going to be. And I do not quite know, unless it means a settlement rather than a role, which is too partisan.

Q: Will peace in Korea lead to wider discussions on the Far East generally? And what is India's role in it?

JN: It is a difficult job of course, delicate, difficult, embarrassing....

29. Need for a Positive Attitude¹

...Question: Do you visualise a united Korea when all preliminary problems are settled? Will it not mean a state of friction between North and South Korea?

Jawaharlal Nehru: These questions are difficult to answer. One wants a united Korea and a united Germany, and probably there will be friction and these questions will remain pending until that occurs. But how and when that takes place depends on so many factors that it is difficult to prophesy. You see the main advantage—and it is a very great advantage—of recent developments in Korea, that is, settlement of the prisoners of war issues which must lead very soon to a regular armistice—to give the right answer, is the creation of an entirely new atmosphere and approach to these problems. That does not make the problems less difficult, but if you do not remove that hostile approach of the parties it makes even a simple problem difficult.

Q: Is India being approached to be associated with the Middle East Defence Organization?

JN: I am telling you, nobody has even mentioned this to us at any time. This is the first time I heard this, and there is not a shadow of doubt that India will not send any troops anywhere. We have, well, in a sense, accepted the proposal, or rather, if I may say so, we have indicated that we will accept it relatively (when it is made) in regard to Korea. That is a very special case and we have made it clear that we accept it only when the authorities concerned invite us to do so, and that is a temporary phase in regard to the prisoners of war camp.

Q: Have you seen the recent statements of Syngman Rhee?²

JN: South Korea is a party, but a party functioning very much under the United Nations Command. It is for the United Nations Command to invite us

1. Press conference, London, 10 June 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Also from *India News*, 13 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 174-175, 289-290, 327-329, 400-402, 408-411 and 489-491.
2. On 7 June 1953, Syngman Rhee declared extraordinary security measures, recalled all ROK officers on leave to duty, and sounded a call for national support in driving into North Korea. It came at a point when the Allied and Communist negotiators were close to an accord over the POW issue.

on that side and to give us assurances. If they give us assurance, we presume that they can look after those under their Command.

Q: Have you faced any difficulty about expenses of your troops there?

JN: No, we have not, I do not think there is any difficulty about that. Nobody is going to haggle about these matters. The other countries concerned are perfectly prepared to bear their share of the burden and India is not going to haggle about it.

Q: Do you think President Rhee should be forcibly restrained in any way in case of emergency?

JN: Well, first of all, it is not quite clear what President Rhee actually said, because many things have been reported which are self-contradictory. But in the final analysis, it is not for me to answer but for the United Nations Command to consider that question. If the United Nations Command cannot control the situation, then we have to consider our position....

30. Aide-memoire to Chinese Government¹

The Government of India have received the invitation² of the Chinese Government to participate in the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission as laid down in the Agreement in regard to Prisoners of War signed at Panmunjon on 8th June 1953.³ They have received a similar invitation from the US Government also.

1. London, 11 June 1953, File Nos.F-12/62/NGO-52, Vols. V-XII, F.12/64/NGO-52, MEA. A similar aide memoire was sent to the Government of USA.
2. Received through Ambassador N. Raghavan on 10 June.
3. The Agreement which set forth the terms of reference of the NNRC also provided that "in order to ensure all Prisoners of War have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be requested by both sides to appoint a member to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those Prisoners of War who, whilst in custody of the detaining Powers, have not exercised their right to be repatriated...."

The Government of India welcome the Agreement arrived at Panmunjon and would be glad to place their services at the disposal of parties concerned to further the cause of peace in Korea. They are prepared, therefore, to appoint a Member to serve on the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. They presume the parties concerned will give full assurances of their cooperation in the work of the Commission and ensure that peaceful conditions will prevail in Korea for this purpose. In this belief and in the context of such peaceful conditions, the Government of India are prepared to accept membership of the Commission, subject to such suggestions as they might have to make when the armistice in Korea has been finally agreed upon.

31. Cable to M.A. Rauf¹

...We have informed American and Chinese Governments that we are agreeable to accept position on Neutral Commission and also to send troops for guarding Prisoners of War and that we presume that peaceful conditions will prevail for this purpose.²

1. London, 12 June 1953. File NOs. F. 12/62/NGO-52, Vols. V-XII and F. 12/64/NGO-52. MEA. Extract.
2. Rauf informed Nehru that at an informal meeting, General Mark Clark apprised him of Syngman Rhee's attitude towards truce talks, and stressed that "expression of anti-Indian sentiments" by Rhee should not be taken too seriously, and added that five to six thousand men would be required from India to take over the custody of the prisoners. He informed that Chinese prisoners would not cause much difficulty, as they were on an island under Americans. Efforts were being made to get agreement of Rhee to collect Korean prisoners, scattered over nine camps under South Korean guards, and put them on an island which would be easy to control.

32. Communication with Polish Ambassador¹

You might send the following answers to the questions put by the Polish Ambassador:²

- (1) We have not yet decided as to who should be the representative of India on the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea. He may be either a military or civil person. In either event, we feel he must have diplomatic status.
- (2) The question of armed forces for guarding POWs who remain over has to be separately considered from the staff of the Indian member of the Commission. We cannot give the figures till we have further particulars. But from such information as we possess at present, we are likely to require about 6,000 officers and men for the guarding of the PsOW.

There will be no other armed forces to assist the Indian member of the Commission. He will however have an adequate staff which may consist of both civil and military advisers plus assistants. We think that the senior members of the staff should have diplomatic staff.

- (3) Our arrangements are still in a preliminary stage. We have informed our army authorities in India to keep in readiness to send the troops that may be found necessary. As soon as the armistice is concluded, we shall proceed with the other arrangements to be made. This will involve shipping arrangements. We cannot provide the ships and we shall have to ask other countries to help in their transport.

We cannot say at this stage how soon the Indian forces or the advisers team will be in Korea. But we shall try to avoid delay.

You might add that we have been in touch with the Chinese People's Government on this subject as well as with the US Government. Further that we should like to keep in touch with the other Governments whose representatives will be on the Commission. As we have unfortunately no direct contacts with the Polish Government we should like to know what is the best method to maintain touch with them on this subject.

1. Note to Secretary General, MEA, London, 12 June 1953. JN Collection.

2. Eugeniusz Jan Milnikiel, in London.

33. Cable to G.L. Mehta¹

Your telegram No. 257 11th June.²

(a) We accept the entire Prisoners of War Agreement of 8th June in so far as it applies to us, that is, we are prepared for provision of troops, to take custody of prisoners pending final disposal.³

(b) We referred to suggestions we might make in future, as a number of minor matters have apparently not been settled yet. Insofar as they might concern us, we might have to make some suggestions. This is not meant as a qualification limiting our responsibility in any way.⁴

1. London, 12 June 1953. JN Collection. A copy was sent to Ministry of External Affairs.
2. G.L. Mehta had stated that the Indian aide-memoire accepting the invitation to serve on the NNRC had been handed over to the US Government which had sought clarifications on certain points in the aide-memoire.
3. The US Government had asked that while India had signified her willingness to serve on the Commission, she had not expressed her complete acceptance of the Agreement of 8 June. The US was therefore anxious to get confirmation from all the five members of the Commission so that the Agreement became "effective" without being subject to any further change.
4. The US also sought clarification on India's acceptance of membership of the Commission "subject to such suggestions as they might have to make" when the armistice in Korea had been finally agreed upon.

34. Cable to M.A. Rauf¹

US Government informs us that informal talks are taking place between our Military Attache, Sen,² and United Nations Command regarding our taking

1. London, 14 June, 1953. File Nos. F. 12/62/NGO-52, Vols. V-XII, F. 12/64/NGO-52, MEA.
2. Lionel Protip Sen (b.1910); commissioned in the Indian Army, 1931; fought in Second World War and in Kashmir, 1947-48; GOC, Bihar, 1948; attended the Imperial Defence College, London, 1950-51; Military Attache to the Indian Embassy in Japan and Liaison Officer with the UN forces in Korea, 1951-55; Director, Army Headquarters, Military Training, 1955-57; Master-General of Ordnances, 1957-58; Chief of General Staff, 1958-61, GOC in C Eastern Command, 1961-63. Author of *Slender was the Thread, Kashmir Confrontation 1947-48* (Delhi, 1969).

over custody of prisoners of war in Korea and wants us to authorise to have formal talks. Sen may continue his informal talks but any formal talks or decisions can only take place when a similar position arises in regard to other side also. No commitments should therefore be made and we should be kept informed. We have at all times to function consistent with our position as a Member of Neutral Powers Commission.

35. To Robert G. Menzies¹

Berne

June 16, 1953

My dear Mr Menzies,²

...I have a strong feeling that something vital has happened in the world situation, that we have turned a corner, and that if we act wisely and with patience, we might be able to serve with some success the cause of peace and freedom all over the world. This feeling is not caused merely by the probability of an armistice in Korea, highly important as that will be, but a variety of other factors also. This new turn seems to me to require a new mental approach. We have been too long in the same ruts which have led us nowhere.

India is being asked to shoulder heavy responsibilities and I feel rather overwhelmed by this prospect. We have, however, decided to accept those responsibilities and we shall function to the best of our ability. As Switzerland is also likely to be a member of the Neutral Commission in Korea, I have taken advantage of my visit here to discuss matters with members of the Swiss Government. We found ourselves in agreement about our general approach in this matter and we shall have no difficulty in cooperating fully.

Probably a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations will take place in four or five weeks' time. It is important that at this meeting, the right lead should be given, which can take full advantage of the new situation that has arisen.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Prime Minister of Australia.

36. Cable to R. K. Nehru¹

In view of new responsibility devolving upon us on conclusion of armistice in Korea, we have to keep in constant touch with principal countries concerned namely USA, UK and China and also with countries represented in Neutral Commission. All decisions have naturally to be by agreement and cannot be taken unilaterally. We have always to remember our neutral status. I have had full talks with Swiss Government and they agree generally with our approach.

I would like you to keep in touch with Heads of missions of these countries in New Delhi and suggest to them to keep you informed of developments as well as of any suggestion they have to make. I propose to see myself Ambassadors of USA and China soon after my return.

As Poland is not represented in Delhi, we have to find out some other way of contacting them. I have been in touch with Polish Ambassador in London.²

1. Berne, 17 June 1953. JN Collection. A similar cable was sent to N. Raghavan.

2. See *ante*, p. 454.

37. Cable to M.A. Rauf¹

As you are aware, Prisoners of War Agreement imposes some special responsibilities on Indian Red Cross. We are examining question of personnel, etc., which Red Cross may have to provide. We need information on the following points:-

- (a) What are the essential Red Cross Services to be provided under Clause 12 of the Agreement?
- (b) Number of personnel at present employed for general service duties in camps which are to be handed to Repatriation Commission and the nature of their duties?
- (c) What is the minimum number of personnel needed for performing

1. Berne, 17 June 1953. File Nos F. 12/62/NGO-52, Vols. V-XII, and F. 12/64/NGO-52. MEA.

Red Cross functions after prisoners insisting on repatriation have been repatriated?

2. Please obtain this information informally from appropriate authorities of UN Command.

38. Cable to G.L. Mehta¹

Please inform US Government that, immediately on my return to India, I would finalise arrangements about sending our Member of Neutral Commission and staff as well as troops to Korea. When should we reach Korea? We should like to know number of troops required and date when they should arrive in Korea. Also, if small number of them are required to precede main party. If so, what number? How many camps are there likely to be of POWs requiring to be guarded? Regarding transport arrangements for troops, we shall try to send some by Indian ships; but this is not certain. What other arrangements are suggested? Any other suggestions to elucidate position and facilitate steps to be taken will be welcomed. We are sending similar message to Chinese Government.

1. Berne, 18 June 1953. File Nos F. 12/62/NGO-52, Vols. V-XII and F. 12/64/NGO-52-MEA. Similar cable was sent to B.G. Kher.

39. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Your telegram No. 159 18th June.² We are keeping in touch with other neutral nations. In view of reported release of North Korean prisoners by Rhee new

1. Burgenstock, 18 June 1953. JN Collection.
2. Raghavan had informed that Chou En-lai had been repeatedly stressing on the need for close contacts between India, China and the envoys of other neutral nations.

situation has arisen.³ This will not affect our attitude. But I should like to know Chinese reaction and what they think will be result of this. Apparently Swiss Government have been disturbed by this news. I shall confer with them before I return.⁴ In any event if large numbers of prisoners released question of guarding them becomes much more limited. I am enquiring from American and UK Governments also about their appraisal of new situation.

3. Syngman Rhee had released 34,000 North Korean prisoners of war on 18 and 19 June in direct contravention of the Agreement of 8 June 1953.
4. See the following item.

40. To Max Petitpierre¹

Burgenstock
June 19, 1953

Dear Monsieur Petitpierre,²

I am grateful to you for your letter of the 18th June and for the information you have given in this letter.³

Since we met and discussed these matters, fresh developments have taken place. The sudden release of the North Korean prisoners, under the orders of President Syngman Rhee, appears to me to be a clear breach of the conditions of the armistice which was on the point of being signed. Even the ceasefire line had been determined and nothing else really remained for discussion. It is not clear to me yet how this new situation will be met and what the consequences of President Syngman Rhee's action will be. This action has embarrassed the United Nations Command greatly, for they were finally responsible for the safe custody of these prisoners.

I have been in communication with both the US Government, as representing the UN Command, and the Government of the People's Republic

1. JN Collection.
2. Max Petitpierre (1899); a Radical; Swiss barrister, 1922; Doctor of Law, 1924; notary, 1925; President of the Swiss Chamber of Watchmakers, 1943-44; Deputy to the Council of States, 1942-44; Member of Federal Council, Head of Federal Political (Foreign Affairs) Department, 1945-61; Chief of Federal Political Department; President, Swiss Confederation, 1950, 1955 and 1960; member, Committee International Red Cross, 1961-74.
3. Petitpierre had informed Nehru of the status and composition of the Swiss delegation which was to leave for Korea on 25 June. He thanked Nehru for his cooperation and observed: "Our attitude will, no doubt, be influenced by yours."

of China, and I am awaiting their replies in regard to these new developments. I still think that the armistice will be signed, though there might be some delay.

I propose to wait for the answers of the two Governments before taking any further step. In any event, I would prefer to take these steps on my return to India. I hope to reach New Delhi on the night of the 26th June, that is exactly a week from today. As soon as I arrive there, we shall take immediate steps to fulfil the obligations that we have undertaken in regard to the Korean armistice. By that time, I hope, the situation will be somewhat clearer.

I entirely agree with you that the Members of the Prisoners of War Repatriation Commission should enjoy the same immunities and privileges in North and South Korea as the Commission for the surveyance of the armistice. They should have diplomatic status and such prerogatives as flow from it. This should apply not only to the actual members of the Commission but also to their principal advisers. Facilities for communicating with their Governments through telegrams in code should be given to them. We shall address the Governments at Washington and Peking on these lines. It would be desirable, as you suggest, for a joint demarche on behalf of the Members of the Commission to be sent to these Governments. Or else, a demarche in identical or similar language might be sent separately by each Member.

We shall give diplomatic passports to the chiefs of our Delegations as well as their principal advisers.

As I have indicated above, we have not yet decided about the composition of our delegations. If the Head of the Delegation is a military officer, he will be given senior civil advisers.

I do not know by what route your Members of Delegation will go to Korea. Probably they will have to go via India. If so, it might be advantageous if they, or some of them, could break journey in Delhi en route to Korea to enable us to have the advantage of a consultation with them there.

India has an additional responsibility to discharge, that is, to send troops for the guarding of prisoners. It is difficult to estimate what number of troops will be required for this purpose. We were told that 5,000 or more might be necessary. Whether the same number will now be necessary, after the release of a large number of North Korean prisoners by President Rhee, I do not know. I am enquiring about it from the Governments concerned. The question of their transport arises. We shall try to send them, as far as possible, by Indian ships. But perhaps this may not be wholly feasible and, in that event, we shall have to rely on other ships. I have enquired from the Governments of the United States and of China what suggestions they have to make in regard to this problem of transport of troops.

I am anxious, as you must be, to act in a manner which preserves our neutral status strictly and does not give rise to any criticism or suspicion on either side.

I have instructed our Minister at Berne to keep in close touch with your Government and I shall myself communicate with you, through our Minister, whenever necessary. It is important that there should be the fullest cooperation between the various members of these Commissions and the countries whom they represent. In this I entirely agree with you. The task that has been entrusted to us is a difficult and delicate one, but I have every hope that our efforts will succeed.

May I express my deep gratitude to you and to the President for their courtesy and hospitality during our brief visit to this beautiful country, to which I am greatly attached!

Please accept the assurance of my highest consideration.

I am,
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

41. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Rhee's action in releasing prisoners has shocked all Governments and all delegations to UN. USA and UK are particularly concerned at serious situation that has arisen. Secretary-General, UN, has issued strong statement in condemnation.

1. Burgenstock, 19 June 1953. File Nos F. 12/62, NGO-52, Vols. V-XII and F- 12/64/ NGO-52, MEA.

42. Cable to Prem Krishen¹

You must keep in continuous touch with Czechoslovakian Government about Korean situation. We have agreed to undertake certain responsibilities as consequence of armistice in Korea. Although situation has changed because of Rhee's action in releasing North Korean prisoners which we consider deplorable and most objectionable, we shall abide by our undertaking and carry out responsibilities insofar as this may be possible in changed circumstances. We should like to remain in contact with Czechoslovakian Government and know their views of changing situation so that we might cooperate in the largest measure. Please inform Government accordingly.

1. Berne, 19 June 1953. File Nos F. 12/62/NGO-52. Vols. V-XII and F. 12/64/NGO-52, MEA. Prem Krishen was India's Ambassador in Czechoslovakia.

43. Cable to Rajeshwar Dayal¹

Message from Peking² indicates intense mental agitation. Syngman Rhee could not have taken action he did without connivance of United Nations Command who must shoulder full responsibility for it. Also, that events have shown that Americans are undependable. Further releases of prisoners took place from Inchong on 19th June, completing 34,000, which is figure Americans had previously given of those who would not agree to repatriation. Thus, by this subterfuge, effect has been given to American demand.

Chou En-lai considers position very grave and serious and says Armistice Agreement cannot be signed till full satisfaction obtained from United Nations side. This satisfaction means: (a) return of all released prisoners, and (b) United Nations guaranteeing against future violations. Otherwise, signing of Armistice meaningless. Either United Nations Command is in control of

1. Burgenstock, 21 June 1953. File Nos F. 12/62/NGO-52. Vols. V-XII and F. 12/64/NGO-52, MEA. It was repeated to the Indian delegation, New York and the High Commissioner, London.
2. Raghavan had apprised Nehru of the Chinese position regarding Armistice Agreement and release of North Korean prisoners in his telegrams of 18 and 20 June 1953.

situation in Korea and, if so, should act as indicated above, or it is not in control and not in a position to give effect to Armistice terms.

Chou En-lai's argument is logical and we cannot press for signing of Armistice unless satisfaction and guarantees asked for are given. It is clear that full responsibility rests on United Nations Command or United States. In particular, fact of incorporation of released prisoners in South Korean Army, which holds three-fifths of line and which threatens war, can in no way be fitted in with Armistice.

Please convey substance of above in suitable language to US and UK Governments and suggest very early and effective steps should be taken to set right this matter. Delay is likely to create further difficulties and Syngman Rhee might commit further violations.

44. Cable to Rajeshwar Dayal¹

Your telegram No. 191 June 19th.² I appreciate attitude taken up by Secretary-General in regard to Korean issue and Syngman Rhee's action. I have no doubt that unless UN Command which means US Government takes up strong line even more serious consequences will follow and credit of both US and UN will suffer greatly.

Attention of Secretary-General as well as US Government might be drawn to following facts (1) Hong Kong press of 13th June carried Reuter's message from Seoul on rumour current there of attempt by South Korean guards to free prisoners. (2) According to Chinese News Service Rhee in announcing order of release of prisoners said on 18th June "all military authorities on UN side with whom I have talked expressing our hope to release these prisoners of war expressed their sympathies to me and agreed with us in principle."

In view of this and Rhee's previous aggressive and defiant statements it appears surprising that adequate precautionary measures were not taken.

1. Burgenstock, 21 June 1953. JN Collection. A copy of this telegram was sent to R.K. Nehru.
2. Dayal had reported his discussion with Dag Hammarskjöld regarding the Korean situation. The Secretary-General appreciated India's decision to continue on the Repatriation Commission and hoped that India could influence the Swiss and Swedish views in that regard, and pointed out that as the Communists were bound to ask for guarantees that undertakings would be implemented, the US should be asked to "bring Rhee to heel."

We shall continue to adhere to our undertakings but will send no one to Korea until situation is cleared up.

Regarding Political Conference as China and North Korea are equally concerned with us any resolution by UN can only be basis for negotiation unless negotiations have been done beforehand. No final resolution can be passed by UN without negotiations. Probably it might be advisable for Assembly to pass resolution in general terms regarding the composition of Conference.³

Regarding terms of reference it would be advisable to limit them to question of Korea alone to begin with. That is difficult and important enough. If all Far Eastern issues are included no progress will be made.

As you know we stand for inclusion of China in United Nations but this should be treated as separate problem and not mixed up with Korea.

We intend to send Krishna Menon to next General Assembly meeting to deal with Korean and like issues. He will probably go some days earlier to contact delegates.

3. Dayal had informed that Australia and Canada were anxious to be included in the Political Conference on Korea and that Brazil had floated the idea of drawing the UN team from the sixteen nations with troops in Korea thereby trying to keep India out of it.

45. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Your telegram No. 164 of 20th June.² I can well understand Chou En-lai's mental change and doubts. Although Syngman Rhee's action has created great difficulties politically it has certainly put Chinese and North Korean Governments in strong position and UN Command's credit has been much shaken. Practically everybody excepting McCarthy and his crowd in America has strongly condemned Syngman Rhee and many including Secretary-General United Nations Organisation have criticized weakness of United Nations Commander whose explanations not considered wholly satisfactory. In view

1. Burgenstock, 21 June 1953. JN Collection.
2. Raghavan had mentioned that Chou En-lai had expressed his misgivings about signing the Armistice since he suspected American connivance in the release of 34,000 prisoners of war which happened to be one of the demands put forward by them on 13 May 1953.

of this it is obviously desirable to cast whole burden on United Nations Command which means United States Government and for Chinese Government not to take any step which might give excuse to Americans that Chinese and North Koreans had backed out of Armistice.

I am sure American Government had no part in this but it is quite possible that local officers in Korea connived. Full responsibility should certainly be cast on UN Command.³ We are pressing our views on US and UK Governments. Although position has taken this grave turn I repeat that it is advantageous to Chinese as other side has admittedly committed wrong and Syngman Rhee has been completely isolated from all others. It is inconceivable now that Rhee can undertake fighting on his own behalf as he will be stopped from doing so by UN Command and no supplies will be given to him.

I agree Armistice cannot be signed till these matters have been clarified.⁴ I hope however that Chinese will not back out of Armistice but will press for guarantees of fulfilment of Armistice terms.

I am proceeding to Cairo tomorrow. I have just received your telegram 165 20th June.⁵ Nam Il's questions to Americans are pertinent.⁶ It is desirable to clear up these matters before Armistice is signed.

3. Chou En-lai had said, "we consider this an extremely serious matter and the UN Command should shoulder full responsibility."
4. Raghavan had mentioned that the Chinese would insist on "(a) Rhee being ordered to return all prisoners and (b) UN guaranteeing against future violations," before Armistice could be signed.
5. Raghavan had stated that Chou En-lai had agreed to "consider" Raghavan's suggestion that China might consider signing Armistice despite release of prisoners by Rhee subject to American reply to the Chinese demand of "UN guarantee against future violations."
6. In his letter of 19 June to Mark Clark, Nam Il had asked whether UN Command would be able "to control differences in Korean Government and army", and if not, whether Armistice in Korea included "Syngman Rhee clique", and added, "your side must be responsible for recovering immediately all prisoners who are released and those detained under coercion to be ganged into South Korean Army."

46. To V. K. Krishna Menon¹

Burgenstock
June 21, 1953

My dear Krishna,

Your airgraph of 17th June reached me two days ago,² I am leaving early tomorrow morning for Geneva and Cairo. After spending two days or so in Cairo, I proceed to Bombay, reaching Delhi on the 26th night.

Whatever you have written to me in the airgraph is helpful, but it has no immediate importance.³ We have got stuck up in other matters. Owing to Syngman Rhee's release of North Korean Prisoners, it is clear that the armistice is not going to be signed until this other matter is cleared up. Politically, Chinese are on strong grounds and the credit of the UN and the USA has suffered greatly. How can there be an armistice if there is no assurance or even likelihood of the terms being carried out? The Chinese, therefore, insist on the released prisoners being brought back and on adequate guarantees for the future. This appears a reasonable and logical demand. At the same time it is by no means clear to me how America is going to get back these prisoners or even going to try to do so. They have already hinted that this is very difficult.

We cannot take any step about sending our member of the Neutral Commission or any troops till this matter is completely cleared up and the armistice is signed. I presume that the British as well as the Americans realize the gravity of the situation and that they cannot go ahead with the armistice unless they make it clear that they can deliver the goods. The Chinese do not appear to think Eisenhower strong enough to do so.

On my return to Delhi, I shall proceed with our arrangements in regard to Korea. But no further step will be taken till we know how the situation develops.

In Egypt, a change has taken place recently, which has some significance.⁴

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Krishna Menon had suggested the possible course of action to be taken by the UN, once the armistice agreement in Korea was signed. He observed that most probably the First Committee of the UN might convene a meeting in early July, in which the agenda would include the composition and terms of reference of the proposed Political Conference. He further detailed the course open to the UN and possible objections thereto and sought Nehru's instructions for the Indian delegation on the Korean question.
3. Soon after Krishna Menon's letter, Syngman Rhee had released North Korean prisoners greatly discrediting the US and UN in the negotiations.
4. On 18 June 1953, Egypt was declared a republic and General Nguib and Abdel Nasser assumed power as President and Vice-President respectively. The change in the political system jeopardised the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over the Suez Canal.

I think that this change will make it somewhat more difficult for an agreement with the British. From another point of view, the bargaining power of the Egyptians has been reduced, as there does not appear to be much stability in the country. The question arises of our recognising the new changes in Egypt. We shall, I suppose, inevitably do so. But I want to see things for myself.

I have bad news about developments in Kashmir and the Nepal situation is also not good.⁵ All these problems will envelop me as soon as I reach Delhi. Just about that time the Mount Everest Party will be reaching Delhi too and they will take some time. So I am likely to be pretty well occupied.

My five days here have been, on the whole, pleasant, though not very restful. I have had to work till late at night. Charlie Chaplin⁶ came here today at my invitation and is staying for the night. Tomorrow I will take him back to his house at Vevey and proceed then to Geneva.

Indira is leaving tomorrow morning for Prague and will then go to Russia. Before returning to India, she will pay another visit to London with the children.

Love,

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

5. An all-party Government, led by M.P. Koirala, leader of the National Democratic Party, assumed power in Nepal on 15 June 1953.
6. Charles Spencer Chaplin (1889-1977); one of the outstanding film personalities of 20th Century; gave up his American citizenship protesting against McCarthyism in 1953.

47. Message to Lester B. Pearson¹

I venture to address you on subject which no doubt has been engaging your earnest and anxious attention. This is the new development in Korea resulting

1. Cairo, 24 June 1953. File Nos F-12/62/NGO-52, Vols. V-XII, and F-12/64/NGO-52, MEA. This message was sent through the High Commissioner in Canada and copies were also sent to representatives in London, Washington, Paris, Moscow, Peking, Tokyo, Cairo, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Myanmar and Indonesia and shown to members of the Arab-Asian Group.

from President Syngman Rhee's action in releasing large numbers of North Korean prisoners in contravention and defiance of terms of Prisoners of War Agreement already signed and of terms of Armistice. In view of this action, Armistice terms become unrealistic, and UN have been put in a most embarrassing position which will undoubtedly affect their credit and capacity for future action. Chinese and North Koreans can, with reason, object to signing any Armistice terms which have not been and are not likely to be carried out. Position of UN Command in Korea becomes completely anomalous and question arises whether UN policy must be subordinate to President Rhee's policy. Are there to be three sides in the conflict in Korea and three separate Commands—Chinese and North Korea on one side and UN and President Rhee's? Rhee's present policy, if accepted or tolerated, makes it futile to have proposed Political Conference after Armistice. In fact, there can be no effective Armistice on Rhee's terms or if Rhee is not fully controlled by UN Command.

2. If Armistice is delayed or does not take place, the whole question of the continuance of war in Korea has to be reexamined on new basis.² Obviously, it cannot be continued as hitherto when definite split has occurred between UN Command and South Korean Army, and UN was not in a position to implement suggested Armistice. UN Command thus becomes unable to implement UN policy and principle as contained in UN Resolution.

3. These are vital questions which arise and which can only be authoritatively considered and answered by General Assembly.

4. In any event, General Assembly will have to be convened soon. In terms of resolution passed by Assembly at time of recess, it is to be convened if circumstances so demanded. If Armistice is concluded, Assembly has to meet to consider this. If it is not concluded, then it is all the more important for it to meet to consider the new situation that has arisen. I venture to suggest to you, in your capacity as President of UN General Assembly, that you should convene a very early meeting of the Assembly to consider this serious situation which is full of dangerous potentialities.

5. Situation appears to be deteriorating, and no adequate action has thus far, to my knowledge, been taken to control President Rhee. Any delay might lead to a complete break with little possibility of resumption. An announcement that General Assembly will meet at an early date will at least make such break unlikely and may prevent it. Therefore, the need arises for urgent action in this respect.

2. R.R. Saxena, in his telegram of 25 June 1953, replied that he had conveyed Nehru's message to Lester Pearson, who agreed that "regardless of whether Armistice in Korea materialises or not, position must be reviewed by General Assembly."

6. Not only are vital issues in Korea and elsewhere at stake but, if I may say so, the whole future of the UN is jeopardised. It is because of this highly critical situation that I am taking the liberty to address you and to request you to take urgent action in the matter.³

I am returning to Delhi on 26th June.

3. Saxena further wrote that Pearson felt that no happy solution of "Korean imbroglio" was in sight. He was pessimistic about the US endeavour to secure Rhee's cooperation in implementing Truce Agreement and hoped that finally the US might propose a modified form of Truce Agreement for acceptance by Chinese and North Koreans.

48. Cable to B.G. Kher¹

I appreciate what Selwyn Lloyd says.² But things have gone too far for mere concern to remedy them. I do not understand what I can do with Chinese when person to be tackled is Syngman Rhee. Apparently nobody is prepared to tackle him effectively. If that is so, then indeed disaster is inevitable.

Only alternative now appears to be summoning of UN General Assembly, which might strengthen forces of peace. I have despatched your telegram about this separately. I hope UK Government will support proposal. Situation is too critical for any Government to watch supinely for events to happen. This fact should be brought to the notice of UK Government.

1. Cairo, 24 June 1953, JN Collection. Copy of this telegram was sent to R.K. Nehru.
2. Selwyn Lloyd had asked Kher to request Nehru to exercise his influence on the Chinese to prevent them from taking up a fixed and rigid position "which would preclude constructive negotiations".

49. A Prelude to a Big War¹

... Jawaharlal Nehru: Take this matter which has been agitating our minds—the conflict in Korea. Now, I am not going into the history or background of the conflict, except to say that all the time it has not merely been a war in Korea but something which might have led or might lead to a much wider conflagration. The importance of it has been that it might become a prelude to a big war which might engulf the world. Therefore, the world was interested in it. Of course, remember that the Korean war was not such a small war, even from the point of view of casualties—I believe the casualties were three million. In the old days even a great war did not have so many casualties. And I am not referring to the people who died from hunger and starvation in Korea, which run into many millions. But leave out the humanitarian aspect. In cold blood the importance of the Korean war was lest it spread and become a world war. Therefore, every effort has been made during the past many months or year or two to arrive at some settlement or, to begin with, an armistice, to be followed, I hope, with a settlement.

Now you know the history, but with great difficulty all the hurdles were surmounted. One major hurdle which had lasted nearly a year was in regard to the prisoners of war. Ultimately even that hurdle was surmounted and agreement reached at between the UN Command and the other party consisting of the North Koreans and the Chinese. We thought everything was over by the signing and the shouting. Just then occurred President Syngman Rhee's action in releasing a large number of these North Korean prisoners. Now again I am not going to enter into this matter, except to say that it was clearly something in breach of the agreement signed on behalf of the UN Command and it put the UN Command and the United Nations in a very embarrassing position, because they just signed an agreement and somebody, may be without their knowledge—it does not matter—did something upsetting that agreement. Now the question arises, if an agreement like that can be upset, who controls the situation in Korea? Does the UN Command control it or not? If it does, who does one deal with? If it does control it, then why do these things happen? So these difficult questions and problems arise. And that has delayed the signing of an armistice and brought some discredit to the reputation of the United Nations. It is not the fault of the United Nations, but nevertheless they cannot escape this embarrassing position.

Now what is to be done about it? One cannot have an armistice with, let us say, one-third of an army and not two-thirds, or with two-fifths of an army

1. Press conference, Cairo, 25 June 1953. *Jawaharlal Nehru, Press Conferences*, 1953. Press Information Service of India, New Delhi, 1954. Extracts. For other parts of the conference see pp. 79-83, 215-216, 361, 416-418 and 526.

and not three-fifths. An armistice is for the stoppage of fighting between two forces. You cannot have an armistice on one front and on an adjoining front fighting continues. That is fantastic. So, how do you meet the situation? Ultimately it is a question of the United Nations, the UN Command backed by the United Nations and more especially, of course, the United States of America, making it perfectly clear that the UN Command is the master of the situation and nobody else, not President Syngman Rhee; because if the UN Command is not master of the situation, then that is a confession of weakness for a great organization like the UN which is rather difficult. Well, admit it, and all kinds of consequences flow from it injurious to the future of the United Nations.

So these are difficult questions. I do not know how they will be solved. I think that the questions are far-reaching not only in regard to Korea but in regard to the whole future and, not only in regard to the question of war and peace, but in regard to the whole future of the United Nations. But I think it is desirable for the General Assembly of the United Nations to meet to consider these matters. Let them consider it calmly, all these aspects. It is too great a burden to be cast on the UN Command. They are soldiers after all. These are high political questions that have arisen. And the soldier's opinion is valuable, but he should not be asked to decide difficult political questions. Therefore, I think, I hope, that a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations will be held fairly soon to consider these matters, because remember that the United Nations' last resolution on this issue, I think, asked for a reference back to the UN as soon as necessity arose or a major step was taken.² Suppose an armistice was signed tomorrow, it would immediately be the duty of whoever is responsible to convene a meeting of the General Assembly to consider the armistice, to consider the import in the armistice and even in the armistice it says about the appointment of a Political Commission and all that. Who is going to do it? The United Nations, of course.

So if an armistice was signed, the UN General Assembly would have to meet to consider it, inevitably. And soon. If an armistice breaks down, it is all the more reason why they should meet to consider—or if it is on the verge of breaking down, it is all the more reason that they should meet to see that it does not break down and what steps should be taken. So I think that it would be desirable from the point of view of all countries concerned, and more especially from the point of view of the United Nations, that the General Assembly should meet and calmly and collectively consider these matters and give directions as to what should be done....

2. The resolution, passed on 19 April 1953 confirmed the agreement signed between the Allied and Communist forces for exchange of sick and wounded prisoners and proposed immediate reference to the General Assembly in the event of an armistice agreement being signed.

Question: Should the war in Korea stop right now? Would you consider that as victory for either side?

JN: It is obviously not a resounding victory for either side—that is, it depends on what you call a victory. If victory is when victors impose their terms, then it is not that. It will be settled between the two taking the position as it is now.

50. Towards Armistice and Repatriation¹

Question: What have you brought for us?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I have brought myself back.

Q: Have you received any reply from the UN General Assembly President to your suggestion for an early session of the Assembly to discuss the latest Korean developments as a result of Dr Syngman Rhee's behaviour?

JN: I have not received any yet unless one has been received here. The Korean situation looked greatly improved when I left for Europe, but recent developments have been upsetting. My demand for an early UN Assembly session on Korea cannot be rejected. The Assembly is bound to meet to consider the issue. It is only a question of a few weeks earlier or later.

Q: What will you like to do with Dr Syngman Rhee?

JN: That is a matter of individual choice.

Q: Will India still send troops to Korea even if Dr Rhee does not agree to an armistice, in view of the threatened hostility to them from Dr Rhee?

JN: Indian troops are not going to Korea to fight anybody. We will send them when conditions are ripe there for them to function peacefully.

1. Press conference, Palam airport, New Delhi, 27 June 1953. From *The Hindustan Times* and *National Herald*, 28 June 1953. Extracts.

Q: Do you visualise truce in Korea without Dr Rhee?

JN: Truce must be with persons who can deliver the goods there. That is obvious. I have not referred to Korean truce. But I have been referring to world peace in general at the present moment. I said that peace situation is much better now than it was some years before. India's responsibilities as Chairman of the Repatriation Commission can only begin after the armistice is signed. As a matter of fact, the prisoners have to be sorted out first before the Commission can function.

Q: Can you comment on the United States' objection to your suggestion to the UN President for convening an early UN General Assembly session to discuss Korean developments?³

JN: It is not a question of acceptance or rejection. The assembly is going to meet in continuation of its last session to discuss the Korean issue. It is only a question of fixing a suitable date. It is advisable to convene it as early as possible. In any case the Assembly is bound to meet to consider the question. It is only a matter of a few weeks earlier or later. There is no question of my demand being rejected. The proposed session will not be a new session but only a continuation. But it will only discuss the Korean issue.

Q: Will it be enough if the session is called after the Bermuda conference?

JN: I do not know about it. But the UN Assembly has to meet at an early date to consider the situation.

51. Cable to Prem Krishen¹

Your telegram 41 dated June 25.² We shall adhere to our undertakings in

1. New Delhi, 28 June 1953. File Nos F. 12/62/NGO-52, Vols. V-XII, F. 12/64/NGO)-52, MEA.
2. Prem Krishen had informed that the Swiss and Swedish Charge d' Affaires at Prague were called by the Czech Foreign Minister on 24 June and were informed that "owing to Syngman Rhee's action, the Government of Czechoslovakia had decided to consider once again their position regarding the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission." While earlier the Swiss, Swedish and the Indian Charge d' Affaires were "definitely" told that the release of prisoners made no difference to Czech attitude, the change in position, Prem Krishen felt, could only be attributed to pressure from Moscow and Peking.

regard to Korea. But, obviously these depend on settlement of problems which have newly arisen there since release of North Korean prisoners. We shall, therefore, await further developments and meanwhile continue our preparations here.

52. Message to U Nu¹

I have received your message about Korea and am grateful for it. I agree with you that there are certain elements who are inciting Syngman Rhee. I do not think that US Government is doing so, because that Government has been gravely embarrassed by Syngman Rhee's action. But some elements in US, and possibly even some senior officers in Korea, have been encouraging him. In any event, we have to be careful. Our sending an observer at this stage would not be helpful, as he would meet with difficulties. At a later stage, we might send him.

1. 29 June 1953. The message was sent through K.K. Chettur, Indian Ambassador in Myanmar. File Nos F. 12/62/NGO-52, Vols. V-XII, and F. 12/64/NGO-52, MEA.

53. Message to Lester B. Pearson¹

I am grateful to you for your message which your High Commissioner here has passed on to me.² I appreciate what you have said. It was not my intention

1. New Delhi 30 June 1953. JN Collection. The message was sent through High Commissioner in Canada. A copy of this message was sent to Rajeshwar Dayal, New York.
2. In his message of 29 June 1953. Pearson had stated that it would be prudent to convene the General Assembly when situation in Korea became clearer. Further, as Eisenhower had given assurances that he would do everything possible to obtain armistice, it became necessary to give the US some more time to negotiate with Rhee to secure his cooperation.

to embarrass the US Government in any way or not to give them adequate time for carrying out negotiations with President Rhee. In suggesting an early session of the General Assembly I had in mind that this would in any event take some time. Before the Assembly met there would either be an armistice in Korea or the attempts at negotiations would not have succeeded. In either event the General Assembly had to meet.

I felt also that the fact that the General Assembly was likely to meet soon might strengthen President Eisenhower's hands in dealing with this situation in Korea and might also prevent any possible step on behalf of the Chinese Government which might come in the way of a settlement.

I presume that President Eisenhower's representative in Korea will soon report on the situation there. The latest news appears to be that there is some improvement and a possibility of Dr Syngman Rhee being induced to agree. The next and equally difficult question will be to get the Chinese Government to agree to something which necessarily must be a variation of the original terms accepted by them.

I am anxious, as you are, that President Rhee should be brought in line and his cooperation secured for the armistice. I trust however that this will not involve any commitment which might later come in the way of a peaceful settlement.

I leave it to your judgment as to when to convene the General Assembly. I am only anxious that any delay on our part might not lead to a deterioration of the position. You are in the best position to judge of this.³

Kind regards,

3. In a secret telegram to David A. Robertson of the Department of State on 26 June, Dulles stated: "In view of Nehru's reported statement calling for early meeting UN Assembly on Korean situation I telephoned Lester Pearson today urging him not to call such a meeting.... Pearson promised me he would take no early action in this matter and would not act at all without prior consultation with me. I authorise you to inform Rhee in confidence of my action if you believe it would be helpful."

54. Work in Repatriation Commission¹

It is possible that the armistice might be signed in Korea before long. Till then, we shall take no step insofar as sending any one there is concerned. But we should continue with our preparations. The moment the armistice is signed, we shall send appropriate messages to the parties concerned as well as the four Powers who will be represented in the Repatriation Commission.

2. Our work in this connection will fall under three heads:

- i. *Repatriation Commission*: Choice of member who will be chairman and executive authority. Alternate and other advisers. Staff.
- ii. *Armed forces to be sent for guarding the prisoners of war in terms of the armistice*: It is not clear yet what the number required will be. I understand that our Army Headquarters have made provisional arrangements to send two Brigades with complementary staff. The choice of the senior Officer Commanding these forces will have to be carefully made by Army Headquarters.
- iii. *Red Cross work*: This will be principally the concern of the Indian Branch of the International Red Cross. They will have to be helped in this by our Army Medical Personnel.

3. So far as financial arrangements are concerned we should adopt the general formula that we shall pay all our officers and men who go from here their salaries, etc. as heretofore. We shall pay our Member of the Commission as well as his principal Advisers. So far as staff is concerned, if they are at present in Government service, we shall continue to pay their salaries. This will apply to the Armed Forces also. Transport charges and special local expenditure will have to be provided for by the belligerent parties concerned. We can deal with this matter in greater detail later after reference to the other Members of the Commission and the belligerent parties.

1. Note to Secretary General, N.R. Pillai, New Delhi, 30 June 1953. JN Collection. A copy of this note was sent to Foreign Secretary.

4. The staff attached to our Member and Chairman of the Repatriation Commission will have to be carefully selected and steps should be taken now to note down their names. If the Member of the Commission on our part is a military officer of high standing, as it is at present intended, he must have one alternate who can take his place when necessary. This alternate should be of the status, of an Ambassador. Naturally, he will have to be chosen with care, having regard to his experience and particular aptitude. There should be one other senior Adviser also. Two other Advisers of Counsellor status might also be provided. These two Advisers might provisionally be P.N. Haksar, who is in India House, London, at present, and Bahadur Singh, who is in our Mission in Washington. P.N. Haksar has been dealing with the political aspect of this matter and is likely to prove useful. Bahadur Singh's special knowledge of China, Korea, etc., will also be useful. London and Washington should be informed that we might possibly require the services of P.N. Haksar and Bahadur Singh for this purpose, but final instructions will be sent later.

5. As for the rest of the staff, I find that the Swedish Repatriation Delegation will consist of experts: (a) with experience of refugee work, (b) from among those who participated in the Geneva Conference on Conventions regarding POWs in 1949, (c) experts in international law on the subject of POWs, (d) some doctors, and (e) some of their nationals who have been working with the UN in Korea on relief and rehabilitation work.

6. We need not wholly follow the Swedish lead in this matter. So far as doctors, etc., are concerned, we shall have our Red Cross establishment and our Ambulance Unit. Perhaps it might be desirable to send some one with experience of refugee work and rehabilitation. It might also be desirable to have some one with knowledge of international law on the subject of prisoners of war and of the Geneva Convention on POWs.

7. The rest of the staff will be secretaries, stenographers, interpreters, etc. We should try to provide some Chinese interpreters. As for Korean interpreters, we have to rely on others. We shall, therefore, have to rely on both parties so that there may be no complaint of bias of interpreters of one side.

8. As soon as the armistice is signed, we should send a small party to Korea by air to report to us on the situation there and to discuss details with the belligerent parties there. This small party should consist of representatives of the three groups mentioned above, namely, (1) our Repatriation Delegation, (2) Armed Forces, and (3) Red Cross.

9. Our Military Attache in Tokyo should continue there as he can be of help to us in his present capacity.

IV. COMMONWEALTH

1. To Alexander Clutterbuck¹

New Delhi
April 6, 1953

My dear High Commissioner,

Thank you for your letter of the 3rd April with which you have forwarded a personal message from Mr Churchill dated 2nd April.²

I agree to the provisional time table which has been indicated in your letter as well as the general subjects for discussion. As is usual at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences, no detailed or rigid agenda is prepared and any subject can be considered in its wider aspects.

I shall be grateful if you will convey my thanks to Mr Churchill for his personal message and indicate to him that I am agreeable to the suggestions he has made.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Churchill had suggested a tentative agenda for the forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, under the headings: the policy of the new Soviet Regime, Western Europe, Far East, South-East Asia and Middle East.

2. India and the Commonwealth¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: I should like to say a few words about the subject which has been put in by the honourable Member Prof Mukerjee in regard to a provision in the budget for the payment of Rs 10,20,000 to the United Kingdom Government towards the expenses of the Commonwealth Relations Office.² I confess I was surprised to see this question crop up in this way. Prof Mukerjee possibly thinks that this is somehow connected with our being in the Commonwealth. It has nothing to do with our being in the Commonwealth or not.

1. Reply to the debate in Parliament, 8 April 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People) Official Report*, Vol. III, Part II, 30-March-21 April 1953, Cols. 3959-63.
2. H.N. Mukerjee had asked what exactly was being done by the Government of UK in regard to the Commonwealth Relations Office for which the sum was given.

This item relates chiefly to certain pensions and other things which we have been trying to wind up. In the old days, of course, a vast number of activities were undertaken by the old India Office. Now all those activities, or nearly all of them, have been either ended or taken over by the India House, that is by our High Commission in London. Some minor activities do remain there, chiefly payment of pensions, and they perform a kind of agency function on our behalf to pay these things. We are, in fact, trying to wind up these things in two ways: one is by taking them over and the other is by coming to an arrangement with the United Kingdom Government so that they may deal with the matter and we have no contact with them on that subject. I cannot say how long these calculations may take. But this will be ended. Anyhow, this has nothing to do with our being in the Commonwealth or not being in the Commonwealth. It is only a question of certain liabilities in regard to pensions, etc., that we have, a large part of which we are discharging directly and some through them. Probably these agency functions they are doing on our behalf will end fairly soon, at any rate at not too long a time.

Now, over the larger question of our Commonwealth relationship; I spoke the other day in this House³ and I do not know if it is necessary or worthwhile for me to take the time of the House again on that subject, because it is a little difficult by any arguments that I might advance to do away with some kind of lurking suspicion that some honourable Members opposite might have in their minds. But I should like to beg of them to think of it from a different point of view. That is to say first of all, the Commonwealth relationship has nothing to do with any economic activities of ours in relation to the Commonwealth. The two are entirely separate. There are many countries, in Europe and elsewhere, for instance, which are in the Sterling Bloc, but which are not in the Commonwealth. Now it is up to us to determine whether we should remain in the Sterling Bloc or not. We have naturally to think of that matter in terms of our national advantage. We can come to any decision any day that we should no longer be in the Sterling Bloc. There the matter ends. We can come to that decision. It has nothing to do with our being in the Commonwealth or not. It is quite apart from that. There are countries with economic relationship with England but not in the Commonwealth and there are countries in the Commonwealth, but not in the Sterling Bloc and having some other relationships. The two are entirely apart and both should be judged apart from each other, naturally and entirely from the point of view of our national advantage in the matter. This relates to a certain payment of pensions, etc., a hangover from the old days. We had to pay them, unless we repudiate them which we have no intention of doing. We can pay of course directly.

3. On 17 March 1953. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, pp. 476-491.

And we do pay directly most of our pensions. But there are certain minor items where it will be a greater burden and we pay for the agency functions which are gradually fading out.

Having put aside the question of any economic contact we may have with the United Kingdom or with the Commonwealth, and chiefly with the United Kingdom and not with the rest of the Commonwealth, which has to be judged again on the merits, so far as the political matter is concerned, I discussed it on the last occasion. I should like the House to remember that this, if I may repeat, our being in the Commonwealth puts no kind of strain upon us, no limitation upon us. It is not binding us, in the slightest, politically or economically. I should like honourable Members to object to any particular policy or any action or step we might take because of that. We can consider that, whether it is a right step or not. But merely to imagine that our being there leads to something, I do not think, is justified. I think that our being in the Commonwealth—it is an odd thing to say, but I say after fully thinking—in a sense gives us a larger freedom in international activity than otherwise, to a certain extent. And we have utilised that freedom and we propose to utilise it. The honourable Member might think that by being in the Commonwealth or because of other pressures and the rest, we are afraid of dealing with this country or that.⁴ Well, we are not. We decide about our trade policy entirely on the merits, and not because of what other countries think or of what other countries may have decided—whether it is some countries deciding about blockade of China or preventing China from getting this or that, or any other country.⁵ We are not bound by anything they do. We decide the matter entirely from the point of view of our own relations with other countries and of our own national advantage.

At this hour I do not wish to repeat what I said previously on that day. But I would say this that in the balance—if you leave out one factor, some honourable Members may feel sentimentally attracted towards something or may have some suspicion lurking about something else, it is difficult to deal with that kind of thing—looking at the question practically, this our being in

4. Mukerjee had cited a Reuter report from London of 23 March 1953 which said that Britain was consulting India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka about her latest decision to tighten restrictions on British shipping which had been trading with Chinese ports. And that the same day Sri Lanka banned the transshipment of rubber and other strategic material to China, despite a recent commercial agreement with China for exporting rubber in lieu of rice.
5. Following a statement made in the House of Commons by Anthony Eden on 17 and 18 March 1953, the British Ministry of Fuel and Power, announced on 29 April 1953 that merchant ships carrying strategic cargoes to Communist China had been barred from refuelling in British controlled sources, east of Suez. This decision was in accordance with the UN resolution of 18 May 1951, banning supply of strategic material to Communist China, to which India was not a party.

the Commonwealth after we became a Republic was, I submit, not only good in itself but a good example to others of the type of relationship that should subsist between nations without binding each other down at all in the slightest. It is not a question of the Commonwealth only. I am prepared to have that type of relationship with other countries. I am prepared to join other groups on that basis, friendly groups. It does not prevent me from doing that. As I pointed out, with some countries our relations are closer than with the Commonwealth—with some countries outside, lately. Take Burma, our neighbour country. That is not in the Commonwealth. But our relations with Burma in many ways are far closer than with any Commonwealth country. So it does not come in that way, I think there are no precedents for this kind of thing. For this kind of being associated not constitutionally, not legally, but in a vague kind of way of understanding, there is no precedent. You cannot judge and all your experience in international law cannot help you. It is only a friendly understanding when we want to continue it. I think that it has been to our advantage. It does us good both in the international sphere and in regard to certain other matters of development activities, supplies, training, etc. which we get more easily in that way, but that does not limit us from going to other countries.

Then again remember another factor which must be borne in mind, and that is, a large number of Indians overseas. It helps us to deal with them. I am not talking about Indians in South Africa, Indians in Ceylon, because Ceylon and South Africa are presumed to be independent countries. They are different but there are a large number of Indians in all kinds of places, Mauritius, Fiji and East Africa, here and there spread out. Now it is very helpful for us to deal with their questions. Otherwise, a very difficult problem would arise for them. They have to choose what to do; whether to have any connection with Indian nationality or to break away and become nationals in Mauritius and Fiji, etc. So taking all these factors into consideration, we came some years ago to this decision. But in the main I think it has been to our advantage and it has not led to our doing anything which we objected to. It has not led to any pressure being exercised on us in the slightest. If we have decided something it may be right or wrong, but it is not due to our being in the Commonwealth. You can discuss the matter independently but it certainly does not flow from our being in the Commonwealth. I would put it to the House that it is a little difficult to carry this argument further but this type of association itself is a good type of association with any country. Any alliance that we may have, any treaty that we may have always binds you down to a certain extent. It is a give and take affair. It may be a treaty, may be an alliance but inevitably it is a give and take affair. If it is a military alliance you are very much tied down, otherwise you are tied down to a certain extent. Even take the Charter of the United Nations. We have accepted

that. By accepting that, we do make some commitments, we accept certain responsibilities and obligations. We gladly do so. Here we are accepting being in the Commonwealth and that not even legally or constitutionally but by friendly arrangement without the slightest binding factor which any treaty or any alliance might do. I do submit—if I may use that word—it is a very good arrangement for us and for other countries. I am not talking of the Commonwealth Ministers who may come together in that way. In any event, the larger question does not arise here in Mr Mukerjee's subject, other than just a kind of hangover of payments for certain agency functions and pensions.

3. Cable to B.G. Kher¹

Your telegram 2411 dated May 26th.

I fully appreciate what you have said and have kept this in mind. Krishna Menon's presence in London in special circumstances and his being associated from time to time in diplomatic activities can prove embarrassing.² As a matter of fact, he is likely to leave London soon as he has become a Member of Council of States here.

He is, however, now functioning as an important member of our UN Delegation. He has dealt with Korean and other matters there and is likely to go there again next month. The whole Korean position now revolves round Indian Resolution which Krishna Menon handled most efficiently. Principal matter for discussion in Prime Ministers' Conference will be Korean position and connected matters. Constant reference to him in regard to this will probably be necessary.

It is not unusual for UN Representative to be present at these conferences. Krishna Menon was invited, and was present at Colombo Prime Ministers' Conference three years ago.

You will appreciate that most vital matter in world situation today is Korean situation and all that flows from it. In fact, this affects most other problems of war and peace. Whether Krishna Menon attends every session or not is a small matter, but he should be present to begin with and for most of

1. New Delhi. 27 May 1953. JN Collection.

2. Kher had requested Nehru not to take him along to those sessions of the Prime Ministers' Conference at which he desired to take Krishna Menon, since "for nearly a year what Krishna Menon has done has resulted in undermining the position of the High Commissioner a great deal and this will add to it."

the sessions. India is playing vital role in these matters and we must have all possible assistance in dealing with them.³

I shall be seeing you in another two days and we can discuss this matter further then.

3. Kher appreciated Nehru's anxiety to consult Krishna Menon on the Korean issue, but observed: "I had endeavoured to eliminate personal equation in urging you to reconsider your decision...the position of the High Commissioner must not be undermined, which will be the inevitable result of your taking him with you on the opening session which is not discussing Korea. If you must take him to the opening session the High Commissioner should not be present at the time."

4. To Winston Churchill¹

Camp: Claridges Hotel
London, 8th June, 1953

Dear Mr Prime Minister,

...3. We have discussed a number of subjects of high importance at the Prime Ministers' Conference. Naturally, the first subject at present is that of the Korean truce.² I think that we may say with some assurance now that a truce settlement will be reached soon. I have had two or three messages during the last three or four days from Premier Chou En-lai through our Ambassador in Peking.³ These messages also indicate not only the desire of the Chinese Government for an early truce but also their expectation that this will materialise very soon.

4. This truce will mark the end of a war, which, though called petty, has, I believe, resulted in nearly three million casualties on both sides. Judged by this number of casualties and the enormous suffering involved otherwise also, it has been a major war. Its consequences on world affairs have been very great. The conclusion of this truce is thus a matter of high importance not only for Korea but for all the world. I think that the parties concerned deserve

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. An agreement was signed on 8 June 1953 providing for exchange of prisoners of war within sixty days and those refusing repatriation to offer "explanations" to their home governments in the presence of the representatives of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission within ninety days. A decision in their case was to be taken by a Political Conference within the next thirty days. After this period of 120 days, the still unrepatriated prisoners were to be declared civilians and the NNRC was to help in their rehabilitation.

3. N. Raghavan.

congratulation on ending this very unhappy episode. During these last stages, President Eisenhower and his Government as well as the Chinese Government have undoubtedly shown a great spirit of accommodation and desire for a settlement. But I feel sure that, without your personal efforts, success might have been much more difficult to achieve. I would, therefore, like to congratulate you on the success of your efforts for peace. I earnestly hope that this first great step will be followed by other steps which will ensure peace in the world. I do not underrate the difficulties that will have to be faced. But I feel that there is no difficulty which cannot be surmounted. In this great world drama in which the fate of millions and the future of the world is at stake, you will inevitably play a leading part and I wish you success with all my heart.

5. You mentioned to me that you would like to talk to me about Egypt.⁴ I shall welcome this because I feel that it would be a tragedy if there was no settlement there. We are not directly concerned and we have no desire to interfere. But indirectly we are all concerned and it is our good fortune, if I may say so, to have friendly relations not only with your Government but also that of Egypt. If in any way advantage can be taken of this position of ours, we are willing to offer our services. But I want to make it clear that there is no wish on our part to interfere in any way.

6. As far as I can see, the actual differences are very little.⁵ Unfortunately hot words have been spoken and this always makes it difficult to deal with any problem. General Neguib and his colleagues have undoubtedly come into power by a military coup. But I think that they do represent the people of Egypt at the present moment and are likely to endure. I feel sure also that any possible alternative Government in Egypt will be much more difficult to tackle. Therefore, I hope that the present opportunity will be seized. The Korean truce creates an atmosphere here, as elsewhere, which should make settlements easier.

7. You have a wide and varied knowledge of world affairs. But perhaps I might draw your attention to the extraordinary changes that have come about

4. During the Prime Ministers' Conference Churchill gave a note to Nehru containing the British proposals to the Egyptian Government. These were (a) a phased withdrawal of British Armed Forces, (b) the maintenance of the Canal Zone by the British for its earliest possible use in the event of war, (c) an arrangement for air defence of Egypt, (d) Egyptian participation in the MEDO, and (e) a programme of military and economic aid to Egypt by UK and the US.
5. Egypt had been insisting that the British should, in advance, accept the principle of Egyptian control and management of base installations. But Britain wished to retain technical management and control of some installations in which British equipment were to be handled. Churchill felt that Britain would be failing in her international obligations if she did not insist upon maintenance of an efficient base in the Canal Zone and an adequate air defence system, which (according to him) were central to the defence of the Middle East.

Asia and even Africa during the last few years. I am not referring to the political changes, which are great, but rather to the changes in the psychology of masses of men. There is an upsurge of the human spirit in these great continents, a dawning of political consciousness, a demand for economic betterment and an intense nationalism. Much is said about communism and an attempt is made to divide the world into the communist group and the non-communist group. For some purposes that might be helpful. But this ignores certain other vital factors and that is this revolutionary upsurge in Asia and Africa. I think that this is one of the dominant factors of the age and many of our difficulties are caused by a lack of awareness of this dynamic situation in the countries of the east. This upsurge has not always worked for good and it has sometimes resulted in evil consequences. But the fact to recognize is that Asia and, to some extent, even Africa are changing rapidly, in so far as men's minds are concerned. The situation is not only dynamic but, to some extent, explosive. All kinds of new forces have been released, which are partly good and partly bad. One might perhaps help by encouraging these good forces and discouraging the bad. By lumping them together and trying to discourage both, we only increase our difficulties and function artificially.

8. The situation in Indo-China demonstrates this. I think it was quite easy for the Indo-Chinese problem to have been solved more or less satisfactorily if it had been recognised as a nationalist problem, which it undoubtedly is. It is difficult of solution now. But there can be no solution unless this basic fact is recognized. The same applies to Morocco and Tunisia.⁶

9. I am gravely disturbed at events in the whole continent of Africa. The only bright spot appears to be the Gold Coast and, to some extent, Nigeria.⁷ In Northern Africa, in the French colonial possessions, the situation is a bad one and progressively deteriorating. No amount of repression by the French Government will solve it. From the larger point of view, masses of people in Africa are becoming exceedingly bitter and frustrated and they will naturally look to others and more undesirable people for help.

10. I do not wish to raise the question of racial discrimination in South Africa. But this is no local matter and it has very far-reaching consequences all over Africa and Asia.

11. In East Africa, more especially in Kenya, horrible things have occurred and everyone must condemn the murders and other outrages that have occurred

6. In May 1953, the French colonial authorities ruthlessly suppressed the pro-democracy nationalist movements in Morocco and Tunisia by arresting almost all their top-ranking leaders.

7. In June 1952, the British Government had approved of a constitution for Ghana (Gold Coast) proposing devolution and finally transfer of power, which evoked positive popular response. Similarly, elections to regional Assemblies took place in Nigeria under the new Constitution adopted in June 1951, which paved the way for its independence in 1960.

there.⁸ But, if I may venture to say so, the situation there is progressively deteriorating and affecting the rest of Africa. I have been in a way connected for the last 20 years or so with important leaders of the Africans in East Africa as well as with leaders of the nationalist movements in Morocco and Tunisia. I am, therefore, in some position to judge of what is happening there. Practically everyone I have known there is in prison.... My own information is that there is terrible bitterness in Kenya among nearly all classes of Africans and that this is spreading to other areas in Africa. There can be no solution of this problem merely by law and order methods, which of course are necessary. Every important leader of the Africans in Kenya is in prison⁹ and there is no one even to tell them what they should do and what they should not do. I fear that this is not only producing a situation of grave peril but is affecting masses of people in Asia.

12. Quite apart from the immediate situation there, the land question is of paramount importance.¹⁰ All over Asia it is the land question that is the first. In China the revolution was based on agrarian changes. In Japan the Americans recognized that basic land reform was necessary and they took a big step to that end. In India we have always considered this our major problem and we have gone a good way to solve it, though much remains. In Africa it is basically the land question.

13. Apart from this, there is the question of racial discrimination and the openly avowed object of racial domination. You will appreciate that much that was tolerated in the past is not tolerated today and every little incident adds to the basic discontent. Not only in South Africa but in East and West Africa there is widespread discrimination in petty matters as well as big. Africans of course are affected by it. But all Asians are almost equally affected.

14. It is in this background that recent developments in certain parts of Africa have to be seen and the effects of it on vast masses of human beings all over Asia judged.

15. I am perhaps going out of my domain in writing to you as I have done. But I have ventured to do so because I feel sure that with your wide

8. In a spate of violence, attributed to the Mau Mau, several thousand people died in Kenya between 1950 and 1952. The worst ever outrage took place in March 1953 at Lari, where 74 Kikuyus, mostly women and children, were killed, 51 were reported missing and 50 others were wounded.

9. On 21 October 1952, almost all the top leaders of the Kenya African Union, including Jomo Kenyatta, Richard Achieng, Fred Kubai, Bildad Kaggia, King Kurumba and Paul Ngei, were arrested and later prosecuted for treason and for inciting disaffection against the Government of Kenya.

10. The most contentious issue in East Africa and most of the colonies was that of land. The colonial Government increasingly dispossessed the natives and, with the help of law, reserved the best lands for the whites. In Kenya they created reserves for the native tribes restricting their mobility and right to possess land elsewhere.

vision you will understand this and not mind my writing. We appear to be turning a corner in world history and the turn is for the better. At this stage the lead you give is of very great importance. That lead, I hope, will cover all these problems which afflict humanity.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Multilateral Trade¹

...Jawaharlal Nehru said that India had been able to do well in the matter of the balance of payments and had not drawn on her sterling balances.² Her food position had improved beyond expectation, but there was great pressure for more rapid development, and India's five year development plan would proceed, either with external aid or by means of austerity and restrictions. It was clear to him that the American approach to the problem of multilateral trade was different from that of the Commonwealth.³ He gathered that there was no hope of a change in the American attitude for six months and that, even after that, the hopes were rather vague. Not only was there a conflict of economic policy, but it was also the fact that the United States permitted political considerations to intrude into economic problems. There was, for example, the American objection to trade with China.⁴ Difficulties and trouble

1. Minutes of fifth meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, London, 9 June 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. R.A. Butler had mentioned that the sterling area's surplus was £550 millions in the first quarter of 1953, implying that Britain was in a state of economic balance. But if the demand for imports did not increase, it could adversely affect the balance of payment situation. Thus, he proposed, the economies of the Commonwealth countries needed to be strengthened by an increase in competitive production, mutual trade and by removing restrictions on import of sterling goods.
3. Emphasising the need for a collective approach for multilateral trade, Butler pointed out that the Commonwealth countries would be adversely affected in case a recession were to develop in the US economy. Hence there was an urgent need for multilateral trade by breaking down trade barriers and economic protectionism. Earlier St. Laurent had mentioned that while the US wanted to protect the Canadian economy, it agreed in principle that "nothing should be done to discourage the need to increase free world trade."
4. In March 1953, Harold Stassen, Director of Mutual Security Agency, outlined a programme aimed at tightening up controls on the shipment of strategic goods to Communist countries, in accordance with the UN resolution of 18 May 1951. Most of the major Western bloc countries came out in support and pressurised those having trade relations with Communist countries to abandon them.

had fallen upon Ceylon when, for perfectly justifiable reasons, she had found herself obliged to sell rubber to China.⁵ Trade should be governed by geography, and it was unnatural and wrong that the pattern of trade should be distorted by the particular political and economic interests of one country. It was, of course, right that every effort should be made to convince the Americans that their attitude was wrong. But if these efforts failed, what alternatives lay before the Commonwealth?

The pressure for more rapid development in India presented grave problems. There was a large gap between their needs and the resources available. This gap had in some part been filled by American aid, for which he was grateful. At other times American aid had been offered on conditions which the Indian Government could not accept. There was always a danger that the receipt of aid on conditions might make a country too dependent politically and economically upon the donor country, but India would never vary her political and economic policies in order to attract aid. She would seek other methods of continuing with her development plan or go without. Nevertheless, the demands for more rapid development were insistent since various countries of Asia had gained their independence, and it was not possible continually to refuse requests for higher standards of living, etc. It was, therefore, important to have an alternative plan by which the Commonwealth could stand on its own feet, if the Americans were not converted to the wisdom and rightness of the proposals for multilateral trade and payments which had been put to them....⁶

...Nehru said that he could not accept paragraph 5 on Western Europe as it was now drafted.⁷ India was not associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and she was not in the European system. He was deeply interested in the general peace of Europe, but he could not commit himself to a hope that the European Defence Community with its proposed German contingent

5. An agreement signed on 18 December 1952 between Communist China and Sri Lanka provided for trade in Sri Lankan rubber for Chinese rice for a period of five years. In view of the American pressure, on 24 March 1953, Sri Lanka prohibited her private businessmen from importing strategic goods for shipment to Communist China. The order affected re-export of Malayan rubber and Japanese steel but did not affect Sri Lanka's own commitment to export rubber to China.
6. Senanayake replied that the immediate action required as a result of the Commonwealth Economic Conference in December 1952, was for each Commonwealth country to take internal measures in support of the balance of payments and to promote development for the saving or earning of dollars.
7. In the final Communique, the paragraph on Western Europe read: "The Prime Ministers reviewed recent developments in Western Europe. The Commonwealth countries associated with or interested in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization expressed the hope that the European Defence Community would be established at the earliest possible date."

would be established at the earliest possible date. This would involve a change in India's policy of non-alignment. India did not wish to be dissociated from Europe, but she felt that there were other ways in which she could better help Europe than by lining up with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization....

6. Economic Activities of the Commonwealth¹

...Question: What are the proposals to enlarge the economic activities of the Commonwealth so as to include other East European countries?² What are India's views on it?

Jawaharlal Nehru: These matters were really discussed at the last Commonwealth Conference when some Finance Ministers came to London,³ some months back, and the matter was not discussed this time in any detail. Some references were made to it.

If you are thinking in terms of any kind of financial arrangements between these countries, what used to be called imperial preference, well, there is no such talk at all. No question of that kind. But, as you know, all kinds of developments have taken place in the last few years in which the United States has played a very important part, with the result that the economy of some countries has become partly dependent on aid etc. received from America and the desire has been in these countries for, well, greater opportunities of trade with America, more normal dealings and all that, to which thus far the American Government have not agreed, or the Commonwealth or whatever it is and this created difficulties between these countries, European countries and the United States and there is a desire for less dependence in that respect and more standing on one's own feet.

1. Press conference of the Indian Journalists' Association in UK, India Office, London, 10 June 1953, AIR tapes, NMML. Also from *India News*, London, 13 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see pp. 174-175, 289-290, 327-329, 400-402, 408-411 and 451-452.
2. The Conference paid particular attention "to the need for stimulating economic developments, for expanding exports, and, consistently with the maintenance of adequate reserves, for removing progressively restriction on trade over as wide an area as possible."
3. The Commonwealth Economic Conference was held at London from 27 November to 11 December 1952.

Now, so far as India is concerned, it is not exactly in the same position. We come into the picture because we are in the Sterling Bloc. We are in the Sterling Bloc because of the balances, because it is to our advantage to be in it not because of any legal pressure or anything, and naturally we propose to continue so long as it is to our advantage, a natural thing. Now, I do not remember the details, but, broadly speaking, at the last Finance Ministers' Conference it was decided to try not to depend so much on America.⁴ Well, that is a thing which you agree independently apart from any decision here. As a matter of fact, we have done rather well for the last few months or so in regard to our balance of payments position, foreign exchange, etc. We have not drawn fully from these sterling balances, and so the pressure on us is not great. In fact, it is important. And we hope we shall go on improving. So that paragraph deals more with the position of some other Commonwealth countries than with India. Though, of course, in a sense because we are in the Sterling Bloc, it affects us also. As for the general proposition, apart from it, in India naturally we require as much. Well, we want to develop rapidly....

Q: Can you tell us about the prospects of a four-power conference?⁵

JN: What I can tell you, is that this conference of Prime Ministers was wholly in favour of such an approach being made and we hope it will be made, for the prospects of it are dependent on so many factors. But, looking at conditions as they are developing today, they are developing very favourably on all sides, so one may expect some good results from the four-power conference. One should not expect too much suddenly.

Q: Would you like to say anything in general about the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference from the Indian angle?

JN: If you think of it, these conferences, the Prime Ministers' Conferences, are rather remarkable, in the sense that people representing different viewpoints, different approaches, sometimes, in some matters, widely different approaches—meet together and have friendly talks, trying to explain their respective approaches in passing resolutions or arriving at conclusions. And, no doubt, that has a great effect, because the normal official conferences are much more rigid and have many more inhibitions. One does not want to

4. The Conference decided on the priority being accorded to the development of the Sterling area through projects financed mostly by the UK to improve their balance of payment with the rest of the world. Further it was decided to seek the cooperation of the US to facilitate the expansion of production and trade.
5. A conference between the USSR, UK, USA and France proposed by Churchill in May 1953, finally took place in January-February 1954 at Berlin.

commit oneself to this or that. Countries treat each other in that way. Now, this kind of informal, frank, and rather friendly approach, in spite of differences, is a slightly novel feature in international developments, the background being really a frank and friendly approach, not giving up the differences in viewpoint. It helps in appreciating other viewpoints. I value this Commonwealth association chiefly from that point of view. If you forget this Commonwealth association I would like this type of association, this type of meeting together informally in a friendly way, to develop with other countries too for the discussion of international questions.

Q: As regards your statement that you do not want the Commonwealth to develop into a super State, would it not be better to take problems like the South African issue in such conferences as a family matter rather than referring them to the UNO?

JN: I cannot develop on that more than as I did on the previous occasion. You see, inevitably you go to the UNO as a world forum, may be with no sanctions behind it or adequate sanctions, but nevertheless a power to affect world opinion and create that type of sanction. Now, we do not want to convert this Commonwealth Conference into that, one of the reasons being what you have just said, that it becomes or tends to become some kind of a tribunal, the second being, once we treat it in that way, that informal or friendly nature of our talks would be affected. We would become stiff dealing with problems affecting too much and as rather advocates appearing before a tribunal. It will change the whole nature of it.

Q: To what extent in these informal talks are the differences sublimated or suppressed for the purposes of informality and friendliness, because, reading the Communique and from discussions yesterday and today, there seems to be a unanimity of platitudes? Almost all that the Communique would suggest is that it is a long distance to come to talk about very obvious things. To what extent does the Communique accurately reflect the actual level of conversation, and to what extent do you learn something new which you do not learn through ordinary diplomatic channels?

JN: If you read through the Communiques issued at previous conferences in the last five years, the same criticism could be applied to every such Communique. In fact, whenever two or more countries get together, the type of Communique issued is rather a vague document and a kind of lowest common measure document. That is inevitable. Therefore it does not reflect, naturally, all the points raised, all the discussions, and all the approaches. It does not, and cannot....

V. UNO

1. Election of Secretary General, UNO¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: You will permit me to explain what happened, Sir.²

Before this name was proposed, there was a good deal of talk as to who will be elected and there was a great deal of difficulty in finding a suitable name, as the House knows. Among the names suggested by various Delegations was Mrs Pandit's.³ Thereupon, a reference was made to us whether in case the name was proposed the Government of India would be agreeable or not. An answer was given that no effort should be made on our part but, if ultimately it was found to be the general desire of the Assembly there, then we might consider it as a proposition to solve the deadlock but, no effort on our part should be made. This was made clear to the various Delegations there. That is how the matter stood.

Then in the Security Council, it appears, Mrs Pandit's name was suggested; as far as I know, it was not formally proposed but was suggested as a name to be considered by the USSR representative.⁴ Thereupon, it was pressed by some other Delegates that immediate votes should be taken. The USSR Delegate said: "I have suggested this name, let us wait. There are other nominations also." Nevertheless, on the insistence of others, a vote was immediately taken. There was no time for reference to either our Delegate or to the Government of India and the voting was rushed through at that stage. That is how the matter stood.

1. Intervention in Parliament, 6 May 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (Council of States) Official Report*, Vol.III, Nos.43-51, 6 to 16 May 1953, Cols. 4990-4993.

2. C.G.K. Reddy had asked whether Vijayalakshmi Pandit was nominated for election as the Secretary General of the UNO, if so, whether the Government approved of the nomination and whether other Governments were consulted before agreeing to the nomination.

3. At its 612th to 617th meetings held in camera between 11 and 31 March 1953, the Security Council considered the question of appointment of Secretary General. At the 612th meeting three names were proposed; the US proposed Carlos P. Romulo; the USSR proposed Stanislaw Skrzyszewski; and Denmark proposed Lester B. Pearson for the post of Secretary General. When none of these candidates could secure the required number of votes, on 19 March 1953, at the 614th meeting, Vyshinsky proposed Vijayalakshmi Pandit's name which received 2 votes in favour, 1 against and 8 abstentions and was rejected.

4. Andrei Vyshinsky.

C.G.K. Reddy: ...when the Government said that they could agree to this nomination, if it was made to solve a deadlock, does it mean the Government indirectly but actively accepted some of the principles of the UN, such as veto and also the permanency of the five nations on the Security Council?

JN: We have already accepted those principles not indirectly but directly.⁵ We have accepted them and I am surprised at the honourable Member's question. These are the fundamental bases of the UN which we had accepted already.

C.G.K. Reddy: ... Am I to understand that the Government of India accepts the principle of veto and also accepts the permanency of five members in the Security Council which more or less means five nations ruling the world?

JN: The honourable Member is going rather too deep but may I say that it is not largely a question of our accepting every little thing that happens there or even every procedural detail of the United Nations? But, it is functioning in that way and I think there was reason for the original decision for the veto. Keeping in mind the circumstances and the realities of the situation not logically correct—it so happens that the five nations may come to fight. One of them does not count really but some of the nations do actually, in fact, dominate world politics. It is no good saying that half a dozen nations which have no importance in world affairs should out-veto a few nations which definitely will not be realistic enough although it may be logically correct in some other way. So, this decision was made in San Francisco many years ago⁶ that there should be this veto because without that veto it would have meant that every activity of the UN would provoke a world war. It was because one of the major nations was against the others that this was suggested. It was a lesser evil. It is not a happy system. All the same there are the Big Five Powers on the Security Council each having the power of veto, and when some of them obviously do not like to agree with the others they apply the veto. Possibly they do play a very important part in world affairs.

5. Article 27 of the UN Charter provided that decisions of the Security Council in all matters except those pertaining to procedures would be made by "an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the five permanent members." India was one of the fifty original signatories of the Charter.
6. The UN Conference on International Organisation was held from 25 April to 26 June 1945 at San Francisco, which drew up and on 26 June 1945 signed the UN Charter, on the basis of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals of 9 October 1944.

2. Cable to Abul Kalam Azad¹

Your telegram No. 18095 of 15th June about Director Generalship of UNESCO². There has been and is no question of our putting up any Indian candidate. But repeated attempts to select a person as Director-General have failed and a deadlock has been reached. Thereupon proposals have been made by France and a number of other countries to set up Malik³ themselves. Question for us to consider is not putting him up or anyone else but whether we should come in the way of other countries who wish to put up his name.

I consulted Dr Radhakrishnan who has replied that we should not put up any candidate, but if other countries put him up and generally endorse him, we should not oppose this. There is no chance of Syrian candidate or anyone else getting through nor would any Indian candidate, not fully known in UNESCO, have much chance. Therefore it is clear that we should not put up any candidate. But if other countries wish to put forward Malik and in circumstances there is general approval of him, it would seem odd for us to object.

1. 16 June 1953. File No.42(2)/48-PMS.
2. Azad mentioned that since India did not accede to the Syrian Government's request to support their candidate for the post of Director-General of the UNESCO, it would be "ridiculous" to put up Malik for the same. Further he did not consider Malik as the best available Indian candidate for such a prestigious post.
3. H.S. Malik, India's Ambassador to France.

3. To Sidney G. Holland¹

London

June 16, 1953

My dear Mr Holland,

I have also received your letter of the 11th June in which you mention that New Zealand is likely to put up a candidate in the Security Council this year.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.



PLANTING A TREE AT TAVISTOCK SQUARE, LONDON,
IN MEMORY OF MAHATMA GANDHI, 13 JUNE 1953



WITH HEADS OF INDIAN MISSIONS IN EUROPE AND USA,
BURGENSTOCK, SWITZERLAND, JUNE 1953

I shall look into this matter on my return to Delhi. Generally speaking, we would of course welcome the presence of New Zealand in the Security Council and we appreciate what you did in 1949.² But I am not quite sure what the position is at present and I should like to verify it after my return.

I was happy to meet you again at a moment when all kinds of new and rather exciting things are happening in the world. It may well be that we are turning a corner in world history. We must not be too optimistic for fear of disappointment. But there is no reason why we should be afraid of having some faith and optimism. In any event we should try our utmost to take advantage of the new situation that is developing.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. During the elections for the non-permanent members of the Security Council in 1949, New Zealand stepped down from the contest in favour of India. India, Ecuador and Yugoslavia were elected to replace Argentina, Canada and Ukrainian SSR for a term of two years beginning with 1 January 1950.

4. Membership of the Security Council¹

There will be a vacancy in the membership of the Security Council of the United Nations and the question has arisen as to which country should fill it. The vacancy will be caused by the term of the membership of Pakistan expiring. It has been suggested that this should be filled by some other country of the Commonwealth. New Zealand has, we understand, offered itself for this purpose.

2. We have no objection whatever to New Zealand having its representative

1. Draft of the aide memoire forwarded to the US Ambassador and the UK High Commissioner in Delhi and heads of Indian Missions in these countries. 28 June 1953, JN Collection.

in the Security Council. We have friendly relations with New Zealand and would therefore normally welcome any such move by her.

3. But there are certain wider considerations which, we feel, should be borne in mind. The Security Council at present consists of eleven members of which five occupy permanent seats. The other six are usually divided up as follows: two members from South America, one from Eastern Europe, one from the Middle East and one from the Commonwealth countries. At the present moment Middle Eastern countries are represented by Lebanon.

4. In the event of Pakistan going out and no other Asian country taking its place, the only representation that Asia will have will be by Lebanon. The Formosan Government, which has a permanent seat in the Security Council at present, can hardly be said to represent any country but itself. Certainly it is not a representative of Asia in any way. Lebanon is also hardly in a position to represent or give expression to the many and varied problems of this great continent of Asia. Thus, at a moment when Asia's problems are of high importance and affect world problems as a whole, Asia has practically no representation at all in the Security Council. This is an unsatisfactory position and the Security Council, as constituted, is over-weighted in favour of certain groups and geographical areas.

5. The position of India has become of increasing importance recently and the burden of giving expression to what might be called the Asian viewpoint has often fallen on her. Fresh responsibilities are being cast upon her and it would normally be in the fitness of things for India to be a member of the Security Council.

6. Apart from the question of India, the question of Asia has to be considered and it would be unfortunate if in fact Asia has hardly any voice in the Security Council.

7. It is said that a convention has arisen to the effect that one seat in the Security Council should go to a Commonwealth country in rotation. India would welcome the presence of a representative of a Commonwealth country in the Security Council, but if India's role is to be limited in this way, then she would only be represented in the Security Council once in fourteen years. This does not appear to be satisfactory from any point of view.

8. India has no desire to contest a seat in the Security Council unless she has the active concurrence of the other important Powers concerned. But the Government of India desires to point out, more especially to the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, the anomaly and the lack of balance created by the present system of distribution of the seats in the Security Council and to express the hope that some way out would be found to remedy this.

VI. GENERAL

1. Moral Rearmament Group¹

I gather that the MRA team of 200 or more persons, who came to India some months ago, is continuing to stay in this country indefinitely. I believe at present they are in Kashmir in full strength. I am also told that they are trying to get a big house in Delhi, more particularly the Jaipur House, as some kind of a permanent headquarters in India.

I do not fancy this at all. We have not interfered with their visit to India in any way and in fact have given them some facilities. But we have made it clear at every step that they are not connected with Government and Government as such has kept aloof. It is true that some Ministers and some senior officials have associated themselves with the MRA people rather closely. Most of them had previous associations with them and I did not wish to come in the way. But I did throw a hint to my colleagues that Government should in no way be involved.

In Europe the MRA movement is supposed to have a definite political content and there are strong feelings both in favour and against it. A large majority of the team in India are Americans and some of them no doubt are good people. But I do not like the idea of these crowds of people remaining in India indefinitely. There is undoubtedly a political aspect to their visit and their stay. I am told that among them is an official of the State Department of the US, by name of John McRootes.

I do not wish anything done to these people, but do want some vigilance to be exercised in regard to them and certainly there should be no question of our providing any house for their headquarters in Delhi.

I am told that our Ambassador in Washington spoke warmly on some occasion in favour of the MRA movement. That was unwise. Many of our people are apt to be taken in by the pious approach of the MRA. I think that we should send some kind of a note to such of our Missions abroad as might be concerned with the MRA, for instance, to Washington, London, Paris, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and perhaps one or two others you might think of. I give below the purport of this note:

A team of the Moral Rearmament group, known as the MRA, has been in India for some months. There have been about 200 people in it. They have been welcomed here by individuals, some of them

1. Note to Secretary General, N.R. Pillai, New Delhi, 19 April 1953. JN Collection.

prominently placed, but Government has not associated itself in any way with their activities. They have, however, utilized every opportunity to give publicity to their work in India and, wherever possible, used the names of important persons.

As this might lead to misunderstanding we wish to make it clear that Government cannot in any way be associated, formally or informally, with the activities of the MRA. Many of their activities may be desirable. But, as is well-known, there has been much difference of opinion in foreign countries about their work. This work is supposed to have a definite political trend, though this is not kept in the forefront. We should like you and members of your Mission, therefore, to avoid any participation in the activities of the MRA.

2. Reciprocity in Invitations to Attend Military Exercises¹

On arrival here in Ludhiana to witness the military exercises that are taking place, I have found that the only two Military Attaches who have been invited are those from the UK² and the USA.³ I enquired why these two have been specially selected and others had not been invited. I was told that this was the custom and that it was believed that Government policy was behind it.

2. I was not aware of any such policy and I dislike this kind of differentiation between the UK and the USA on the one hand and other countries on the other. Indeed there should be no differentiation between Commonwealth countries and non-Commonwealth countries in this matter. The only rule to be followed is one of reciprocity, politically and other. Any other arrangement is undesirable.

3. There has been in the past some reluctance to invite the Military Attache of Pakistan. That was due largely to the fact that Pakistan did not give us any like facility. Applying the rule of reciprocity, we can certainly refrain from inviting him.

4. I do not quite know how many foreign Missions have Military Attaches in Delhi. Apart from the UK and the USA, I understand that these countries

1. Note to Secretary General, MEA, 25 April 1953. Mahavir Tyagi Papers, NMML.

2. Brigadier H.G.M. Dunn.

3. Colonel Harold J. Pearson.

are France, China, Pakistan, Burma and Siam. Perhaps there might be others also. I am quite clear that we should treat all of these on the same level as the UK and the USA, of applying the rule of reciprocity.

5. In regard to China, I should like to take some step towards this. I remember that our Ambassador in Peking was reluctant to have our Military Attache posted there.⁴ I do not know if one has gone now. In any event, the Chinese have their Military Attache here.⁵ I think you should send for the Chinese Ambassador⁶ and tell him that we have been having our military exercises and we would have gladly welcomed the presence at those exercises of the Chinese Military Attache but that, as we have been following the rule of reciprocity, we had not invited him. If the Chinese Government is agreeable, in future we can give these facilities to each other in our countries. You might further suggest that we would like some contacts and friendly relations between our respective armies. Sometime in the future, we might send a small military mission, consisting of two or three of our officers, to China to make these contacts, if the Chinese Government were agreeable.

6. You need not press for an answer. It is enough to throw out the hint and to find out what the reactions are going to be.

7. Copies of this note are being sent to MDO⁷ and Defence Secretary.

4. In 1953, India had no Military Attache posted in Beijing.

5. Colonel Chu Kai-yin.

6. General Yuan Chung-hsieu.

7. Mahavir Tyagi.

3. Closure of Mission in Lisbon¹

In view of the attitude of the Portuguese Foreign Office to our latest note, it is obvious that we shall have to take the next step, that is, to close our Mission in Lisbon.² I think we should give them a clear fortnight after the receipt of our note and then inform them formally that we are closing the Mission.

1. Note to Secretary General, N.R. Pillai and Foreign Secretary, R.K. Nehru, 4 May 1953. JN Collection.

2. On 10 June 1953, the Government of India decided to withdraw her legation from Lisbon and stated that she had made repeated attempts since 1950 to discuss the matter of "an early negotiated settlement of the future of the Portuguese possessions in India", but the Portuguese Government "categorically" maintained their earlier refusal to enter into any negotiations.

Meanwhile our representative in Lisbon³ might be warned about the step we intend taking.

Regarding the attached telegram from Bombay Government, I think we might issue the instructions asked for.⁴

3. Kewal Singh. India's decision to withdraw her legation in Lisbon did not amount to breaking off diplomatic relations with Portugal.

4. The Portuguese Government had also decided to continue its Embassy in New Delhi.

4. Discrimination Against Indians in Aden¹

I received a letter from Indira Gandhi from Aden on her way westward. In this letter,² she refers to our Consul there, Thadani.³ He told her that the Indian community in Aden is very backward, especially the women. He further said that there was a lot of discrimination and it is growing. Indians are not allowed in the cinema, or swimming pool or club, where Europeans go. At first Thadani was given a diplomatic pass, but as he was the only Asian, they did not like the idea much and have now withdrawn all diplomatic passes and diplomats—they are only at the Consular level of course—have been asked to apply again. Thadani says that he has been in Aden for full three years. When K.P.S. Menon passed through he mentioned that he (K.P.S. Menon) would write to External Affairs about his transfer.

2. The above is a quotation from Indira Gandhi's letter to me. The question of Thadani's transfer might be considered but, more important still is the question of discrimination against Indians in Aden. This must be taken up.

1. Note to Secretary General, N.R. Pillai and Foreign Secretary, R.K. Nehru, 10 May 1953. JN Collection.

2. Of 21 April 1953. Indira Gandhi was on her way to London to attend the Coronation ceremony of Queen Elizabeth II.

3. A.D. Thadani; Commissioner of India in Aden, 1952-53; First Secretary, High Commission of India, Karachi, 1955.

5. Communists' War in Indo-China¹

You may reply as follows to the enquiry from Hicomind, London (telegram No. 2206, dated May 7.)

Your telegram 2206, dated May 7. Our general approach to Indo-China was correctly stated in Haksar's note. While Communists are undoubtedly exploiting the position there, essentially the question must be considered from the point of view of a colonial war of liberation. By supporting colonial authorities, all nationalist-minded people are driven into the opposite side. During past six years military approach has not succeeded. It is still less likely to succeed in future. It must be remembered that this war in Indo-China was started before success of Chinese Revolution. It was independent of it, though later there might have been some affiliations. We cannot suggest an easy solution, but we are convinced that a purely military approach in aid of a colonial power cannot solve this problem and might make it progressively worse.

Recent indications that Viet Minh offensive in Laos has stopped and troops withdrawing, may have some significance.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, R.K. Nehru, New Delhi 10 May 1953. JN Collection.

6. Towards a Brotherhood of Nations¹

Mr Chairman, since the last occasion when this House discussed foreign affairs, much has happened in the international sphere and many important developments have taken place. No major problem has been solved, but it may be said that for the first time in several years large numbers of people have hoped that solutions might be found. The "cold war" has somewhat toned down.

Many evidences of this new approach have come from the Soviet Union and, however some people might view them, they must be welcomed as helping

1. Statement in Parliament, 15 May 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (Council of States) Official Report*, Vol. III, Nos 43-51, 6 to 16 May 1953, Cols. 6040-6045.

in lessening the tension of the world.² In China also there has been evident a desire for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

This House will remember that some months ago a Resolution regarding Korea was sponsored by India in the United Nations and was passed by the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority.³ That Resolution, as I stated in this House, was no mandate but an earnest approach to find a basis for a settlement. The President of the General Assembly of the UN communicated it in this spirit to the Chinese and the North Korean Governments. Unfortunately, both the Soviet and the Chinese Governments rejected that Resolution and our hopes of a settlement suffered a serious setback.⁴ Recently, however, new proposals were made by the Chinese Government in regard to Korea which opened the door again for a fresh approach to this problem, which was, to some extent, in line with the Resolution passed by the UN. Shortly afterwards, the Chinese Government put forward fresh proposals, referred to as the 8-point proposals, which were a very close approximation to the Indian Resolution passed by the General Assembly of the UN. We welcomed those proposals because they seemed to afford us a promising and solid basis for a solution of the immediate problem, which was in line with the accepted policy of the UN. Many other powers also welcomed these proposals.

Two or three days ago, the United Nations Command in Korea put forward certain counter-proposals. Any constructive approach to this problem is always to be welcomed. We were glad therefore that these attempts were being made to solve a problem which had given so much trouble in the past. On a close examination of these counter-proposals, it appears that they diverge considerably from the General Assembly's Resolution to which the UN stands committed. It appears that the Chinese and North Korean Governments have expressed their disapproval of some of these proposals and stated that they cannot accept them as they are.⁵

2. In a series of concessions announced in mid-March 1953, the Russian Premier declared the need for resolving the East-West conflict through peaceful negotiations, supported the Chinese proposal for resumption of negotiations and exchange of sick and wounded prisoners and, the release of British, American and French civilian prisoners in North Korea, accepted a British invitation to send warships for the Coronation fleet-review rescinded earlier order for shifting of British and American embassies to a new site in Moscow, exonerated 15 doctors alongwith the nine accused of plotting to kill senior Soviet leaders and admitted use of illegal methods to obtain confessions and eased restrictions on traffic into east Berlin from the West.
3. On 3 December 1952.
4. While the Soviets termed the Indian Resolution as a cover for "forcible detention" the Chinese rejected it as "nothing but a revamped version of the 21 nation proposal."
5. On 13 May 1953, Nam Il termed the US counter-proposals as "a step backward," but later agreed to negotiate on 4 clauses.

So far as India is concerned, we would welcome any solution which is accepted by the parties concerned. We feel, however, that such a solution is much more likely to be found on the basis of the UN Resolution, and the Chinese eight-point proposals approximate so nearly to this Resolution that they should form the basis for discussion and we hope a solution. It should be possible to amplify them or to vary them by agreement where necessary. We earnestly hope, therefore, that this avenue of approach will not be given up but will be pursued. In any event, we trust that the negotiations at Panmunjon will be carried on, even though there might be occasional setbacks.

The House is aware that India has often been mentioned in some of these proposals and it has been suggested that this country should undertake various responsibilities. We are reluctant to assume any distant responsibilities.

But if an agreement is arrived at between the parties concerned and the task suggested for us is within our competence and not opposed to any policy that we pursue, we do not wish to escape that responsibility. That responsibility is all the greater because it is India's good fortune to have friendly relations with the great powers who on either side are parties to the dispute. If India can serve the cause of peace in any way, we shall gladly offer our services. But such services can only be offered if there is an agreement as regards the solution.

I have referred to the new hopes that have been raised in the minds of innumerable people, hopes that the fear of war, which oppresses humanity, will diminish and the cold war, the horror and burden of which was described recently in eloquent and forceful language by the President of the United States, might end. There is undoubtedly a new atmosphere in the world and the outlook is brighter than it has been for a long time. It is for the statesmen of the world, and more especially those shouldering heavy responsibility in the great nations, to seize this opportunity with courage and wisdom, and lead humanity towards peace. I am very glad that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom has recently suggested a conference on the highest level between the leading powers of the world to meet informally in privacy and without a rigid agenda to tackle the problems that afflict mankind and to make every effort to rid humanity of the fear of war. I would earnestly commend this suggestion. The stakes are the highest that the world offers and a war-weary and fear-laden humanity will bless those who will rid it of these terrible burdens and lead it to peace and happiness. President Eisenhower is not opposed to the idea of such a conference but has said that the time for it is not ripe.

In the Middle East, I regret to say that the situation has gravely deteriorated. India is deeply interested in these countries of the Middle East and has the friendliest ties with them dating back to long ages past. It will be a misfortune, not only for the countries concerned but for the world, if these problems of the Middle East are not solved peacefully and cooperatively.

The great continent of Africa, from its northern Mediterranean coast to

the far south, is in process of dynamic change and eruption. In the extreme south, as is well known, a racial policy of gross intolerance and arrogance has shocked the world. In other parts of Africa also, in various shades and degrees, this racial policy is in evidence. It comes into conflict with the rising nationalism and consciousness of African nations. Unfortunately there has been a great deal of violence on all sides and repression, which has brought misery to vast numbers of people. No solution of the African problem can be based on racial discrimination or on the suppression of the African people, who have suffered so terribly for centuries past, who must command our sympathy. I earnestly hope that methods of violence will cease there, for this can only bring misery to all concerned.

It has been our misfortune during the past five or six years, to have strained relations with our neighbour country Pakistan. Any calm and dispassionate consideration by India and Pakistan will lead to the inevitable conclusion that there must be friendly and cooperative relations between them. Geography, past history, common cultural background and innumerable individual contacts lead to this conclusion. Any other conclusion is fraught with unhappiness and disaster for both. I am happy to inform the House that, during recent weeks, there has been a marked improvement in these relations and many friendly gestures have been made to us from Pakistan which we welcome and reciprocate. We shall make every endeavour to dispel the clouds that have darkened our respective horizons and caused unhappiness to so many people.

The Governor-General of Pakistan recently stated that the independence and sovereignty of Pakistan must be fully recognized and no attempt should be made to interfere with them. I am surprised that this obvious proposition should have been put forward. There is or can be no desire on the part of any reasonable persons to interfere in any way with the freedom and independence of Pakistan. Certainly India does not wish to do so and desires friendly relations with its neighbour and sister country, each recognizing the other's freedom and integrity. I am sure that there are some misguided persons in India as well as in Pakistan who have continually sown the seeds of hatred and ill will against the other country and who talk wildly about conflict and interference. But this Parliament and the country have denounced and repudiated this mischievous outlook and false ideology.

In recent months, a domestic agitation, which influences our foreign relations, has demonstrated how utterly irresponsible and mischievous this outlook is.⁶ I refer to what is known as the "Jammu agitation" which has

6. Following the announcement of the Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad that they would launch a civil disobedience campaign in Delhi and Pathankot in support of the complete accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union, the agitation was conducted by 5,000 people in Delhi on 6 March 1953. Mookerjee and two other leading members of the Jan Sangh were arrested on 11 May 1953 at Lakhampur near Jammu.

demonstrated to what lengths irresponsible behaviour, harmful to the nation, can go. This agitation has not only injured our cause internationally but has made the very solution, which it seeks, much more difficult of attainment. It has been a challenge to the authority of Parliament and an attempt to upset by unlawful and often violent means the decision of our Parliament. It has been a matter of peculiar regret that those whose primary duty it must be to uphold the Constitution, and have respect for the laws made under the Constitution, should be guilty of inciting people to violate those laws.⁷ I am not merely concerned with the moral aspects of this matter, but also with the evil consequences, both national and international, that flow from it.

The world is full of problems and a tortured humanity seeks anxiously for some relief from its fears and burdens. In this tragic drama, a measure of responsibility comes to us in this great country. We have enough of our problems here and they consume our thoughts and energy, but we cannot isolate ourselves from the great brotherhood of the nations and from the common problems that affect humanity. Whether we wish it or not, fate and circumstances have cast this responsibility upon us and we must discharge it. In the manner that we, in common with other countries, discharge it will depend whether our generation and the next will live in peace and bring about the progressive happiness of mankind or, suffer irretrievable disaster. That responsibility we can only discharge if we are united and hold together, remembering always our high ideals and objectives and not allowing ourselves to be swept away by the fear or passion of the moment.

7. Mookerjee had previously announced his intention of visiting Jammu "to explore the possibilities of creating conditions which may expedite a peaceful settlement", and had maintained that if Kashmir was a part of India, as Nehru claimed, he had a right as a Member of Parliament to enter it.

7. Congress Resolution on Foreign Affairs¹

The Working Committee welcome the change for the better in the international situation and the lessening of tension between the great powers. They earnestly hope that the negotiations for armistice and a peaceful settlement in the Far

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru for the Congress Working Committee, New Delhi, 16 May 1953. JN Collection.

East will soon come to a successful conclusion. Every major obstacle to such a settlement has now been removed and only procedural difficulties appear to remain. Such minor difficulties should not be allowed to come in the way of a settlement.

The Committees hope that the proposal put forward for an informal meeting of the leaders of the great nations to discuss world problems with a view to find a way to their solution, will find acceptance and will be given effect to.

The Committee have noted with deep regret the deterioration of the situation in the Middle Eastern countries and the acute and disastrous conflicts that are going on in some parts of Africa, resulting in the furtherance of racial antagonism and in the suppression of large numbers of people. The Congress has always attached the greatest importance to the recognition in theory and practice of racial equality and to the growth of freedom and free institutions in colonial countries. Any assertion of racial domination will inevitably meet with resistance and no stable or peaceful society can be based on the theory of a dominating race or of colonial control.

The Committee earnestly hope that peaceful methods will be employed in the solution of these great problems that afflict Africa today.

The Committee welcome the improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations and trusts that this will lead to a solution of such problems as have come in the way of better relations between the two nations.

8. Talks with John Foster Dulles¹

I met Mr Dulles several times.² On two occasions I had long private talks with him when nobody else was present. In all, I must have had these talks for about three and a half hours. We discussed a wide variety of subjects. I am only giving here a very brief summary.

2. Mr Dulles began by saying that he had not come to discuss any particular matter with me but rather to try to learn and understand how we felt about things in general. That was the object of his tour in Asia and he was particularly interested to understand the Indian viewpoint and the background of our thought because of the important role that India was playing in international affairs. I

1. Nehru's minutes of his discussions with John Foster Dulles, New Delhi, 22 May 1953. JN Collection.

2. Dulles was in Delhi from 20 to 22 May 1953.

told him that I attached more importance to our understanding each other, even though we might not wholly agree about some matters. There was nothing surprising about our approaches to certain problems being dissimilar because our background, our geography, our history, etc., had been different. We had grown up in a certain set of circumstances and were naturally influenced by them. But whether we agreed or not, it was our business to seek to understand the others' viewpoint and, where possible, to appreciate it, even though we could not wholly agree. We attached importance to friendly relations with United States.

3. In the course of our talk, we discussed India's general approach to the USSR and China, recent developments in Russia, the proposed Big Four Conference (Four had a point of interrogation in front of it), Korea, attempts at armistice etc., Indo-China, Burma, Near East problems, Pakistan and MEDO, the situation in North Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, in South Africa and in East Africa, and Kashmir.

4. About Kashmir, very little indeed was said. There was not much time left as he had to catch his plane. He just mentioned that the US was naturally interested in a settlement of this issue but had no desire to interfere. He was glad that I was going to meet the Prime Minister of Pakistan to discuss this and other issues. I told him that so far as we are concerned, we would make every effort to settle outstanding issues between India and Pakistan. But I was clear that outside interference would not help at all and indeed had thus far come in the way. It would be far easier to settle the problem if India and Pakistan dealt directly with each other and no one else intervened. He said he agreed. He added that he felt that all this talk of plebiscite had little point. Such plebiscites had failed elsewhere and only created bad blood. It would be much better to settle the problem on some ad hoc basis, say partition.³

5. In regard to our relations with Pakistan, I had previously pointed out the basic difference between our respective outlooks, that is, the secular outlook and the communal outlook. Kashmir did not represent just a patch of territory to us, but it was a symbol of that particular outlook of ours and on no account whatever would we approach that question from Pakistan's communal point of view. That would be fatal to our entire position in India. I added that I was glad to see certain attempts at change in regard to this bigoted outlook in Pakistan. The further these changes went, the easier it would be for India and Pakistan to deal with each other.

3. *The New York Times* of 5 July 1953 published a report from its New Delhi correspondent, Robert Trumbull, that Dulles had placed before the Indian Prime Minister, a new plan of an "independent" Kashmir envisaging a "special status for the Kashmir valley, ... and partition of the rest of the state along lines now occupied by the opposing armies under a ceasefire agreement." On 10 July, a Government of India spokesman dismissed this report as "based on rumours and surmises."

6. He referred to MEDO as something that the British had sponsored, although it had little relevance today.⁴ Certainly the US would like some kind of defence organisation in the Middle East for obvious reasons. But they wanted this to grow out of the Arab countries and not to be superimposed upon them. In any event, this was not a present issue.

7. Mr Dulles was much perturbed about the situation in Egypt and said that there was every chance of a conflict there. He appeared to indicate that both sides, that is, the British and the Egyptians, were unreasonable. On the whole he seemed to think that the British were more unreasonable or, at any rate, had been too rigid. He had pleaded with the British to tone down their attitude. Possibly if Eden had been there, this might have happened, but Churchill still believed (according to Dulles) in the old colonial methods of the strong arm. The Egyptian leaders had promised him not to take any aggressive step till at least he returned to the US and had some chance of dealing with the matter. This meant roughly till the middle of June. He felt that the differences between the British position and the Egyptian were not really very great and ought to be capable of bridged over, as the Sudan issue had been settled by Eden.⁵ But then Eden had lost face in his own Party by that settlement and the rank and file of the Conservatives were angry with him.⁶ Hence he dared not go far on the Suez Canal issue. Unfortunately he was ill and Churchill was dealing with this matter directly and very rigidly. His idea of dealing with a situation was to send more troops. As a matter of fact, Dulles said, the British had no legal justification for keeping a large army in the Suez area. Such justification as they had was for a force of 10,000

4. The four-power proposals on Middle East defence envisaging the setting up of a new Allied Middle East Command (Middle East Defence Organisation) with Egypt as an equal partner, were presented to the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Saileh ed-Din Pasha, by the British, US, French, and Turkish Ambassadors on 13 October 1951 in lieu of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The proposals also provided for the formal handing over to the Egyptian Government of the existing British base in the Suez Canal on the understanding that it would at once become an Allied base with full Egyptian participation.
5. The problem of the Egyptian claim to the Sudan, which had been a major difficulty, was resolved by the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 12 February 1953, which promised Sudanese self-determination after a three-year transitional period of self-government. In the parliamentary elections of 1953, the National Unionist Party won a majority and formed a government in January 1954.
6. Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, announced in the House of Commons on 22 October 1952 that the British Government had informed the Governor-General of Sudan, Robert Howe, of their approval of the draft Statute, which had been submitted to them and to the Egyptian Government on 8 May 1952, proposing self-government for the Sudan. Eden announced the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement in the House of Commons on 12 February 1953, describing it as "a reasonable settlement of this question which has for so long bedevilled our relations with Egypt."

while now they had round about 80,000. He said that he would try his best for a solution, but evidently he was not hopeful. He hinted darkly at the possibility of the British taking possession of Cairo and Alexandria. I said, that of course was not very difficult. But what then? How did the British solve the problem? They would get more and more entangled like the French in some places. He said, yes, that was no solution.

8. In an interesting interlude, Mr Dulles referred to Saudi Arabia. There was some dispute between Ibn Saud⁷ and the UK about the territory belonging to some Shaikh under UK's influence or control. No importance had been attached to this piece of desert previously and there was no marked boundary. Now that it has been discovered that a sea of oil exists under the desert, every square yard of it has become very important. The Shaikh under British inspiration had spread himself out over the desert and Ibn Saud took the strongest objection to this. Dulles said that throughout his conversation with Ibn Saud, the latter went on demanding that the USA should throw out the British from that area. What was the good of Ibn Saud making friends with the US and giving them all that oil if they could not help him in such an obvious case where his rights had been interfered with by the British? Dulles told me that probably this matter would go to arbitration.

9. I referred to the present dangerous state of Africa. In the North, there was French colonialism functioning with harshness, in Tunisia, Morocco, etc. In the South, there was Malan's racial policy which was most dangerous for the peace of the world. In between in East Africa etc., there was very grave trouble and the way the British was dealing with it seemed to me to be completely wrong. I was prepared to admit for argument's sake that some African tribes in Kenya had misbehaved badly. But, however that might be, the British official reaction was bad. As for the European settlers there, their behaviour had been atrocious. Merits apart, how could this problem be settled in this way? It was based on the deprivation of land. The Africans, as a matter of fact, were not very extreme in their claim. But, even so, the official response was one of extreme repression.

10. Mr Dulles expressed his great sorrow at the continuing colonial tendencies of the UK and France, more especially, the latter. He said that 99% of Americans were opposed to colonialism and they had been constantly pressing this upon their Allies. Britain had acted well in regard to India, Burma and Ceylon, but was following a different policy in Africa, in the Middle East and he regretted it. France was functioning in an even worse way. They had brought the greatest pressure on France and would continue to do so, but they could

7. Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud (1880-1953); founded the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and was its ruler from 1932 till his death.

not break with France in view of the world situation. France took advantage of this position and threatened them.


11. Mr Dulles made a brief reference to the KMT troops in Burma. He said that they tried their hardest to get Chiang Kai-shek to agree to withdraw them. They had failed and Chiang did not agree. The real fact is, he said, that Chiang had little authority over them and he did not wish to demonstrate this lack of authority. So there was this deadlock and he did not see how to end it, though of course they would go on trying.

12. He asked me about our general philosophy in regard to the USSR and China. I replied rather briefly and said that our general approach was Indian and not pro or contra anybody. That approach had been conditioned by our entire background and our objectives. As a matter of fact, almost all our entire attention was concentrated on India because we wanted to make a good job of our work here. We wanted to strengthen India politically and economically. Politically we wanted to make it a closely integrated and united country, not merely in the narrow political sense but in the real sense of the word. Economically, we wanted our standards to go up and hence the Five Year Plan etc. That Plan I thought was good, but I would like to go further than that Plan. Apart from my liking to do so, there was continuous pressure of events. The coming of independence had released numerous forces which had long been suppressed and one could not ignore these forces which were both good and bad. Properly directed they could be exceedingly useful in accelerating our pace, otherwise they would be a hindrance and would create difficulties. Therefore, our minds were largely taken up by this building up of a new India and we were very reluctant to get entangled in external matters. Hence also our basic desire for peace which of course arose from our whole outlook. Hence also our wish not to be tied up with any other country and to retain our independence of action.

13. Dulles referred to the early history of the United States and said he could understand the desire to avoid "entangling alliances" as Washington had said. I further pointed out to him the effects of geography. Both Russia and China are our neighbours. China much more so with nearly a 2000-mile frontier. We are going to continue to be neighbours and therefore we had no desire to fall out with each other and leave trouble for the indefinite future. There was also of course our past history and cultural associations with China which drew the two countries towards each other to some extent. With Russia, it was somewhat different. We really had very few contacts with Russia in regard to trade, commerce or other economic matters. But we wanted to be on friendly terms for a variety of reasons. We had no fear whatever of any invasion of India by Russia or China. The facts of geography were against it. But we had naturally to look after our frontiers much more effectively now than was necessary previously.



WITH TENZING NORGAY AND FAMILY, PM HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 28 JUNE 1953



AT THE INDO-BURMA TRADE TALKS, NEW DELHI, 29 JUNE 1953

14. From this I went on to say that it was much more possible and, in fact, easy for China to invade Burma. Why had they not done so? They had a sufficient excuse with the KMT troops there. They had not taken advantage of it. This showed that they would avoid any such invasion or aggression unless there was some general war when anything could happen. I was myself fairly certain that the Chinese People's Government had no intention to invade the South East Asian countries. They were full of their own problems which were terrific and there was no point at all in their indulging in these rash adventures, unless a new situation arose because of spread of war.

15. Even in regard to Indo-China, I said it was clear to me that the Chinese Government did not have much hand in it. After all the Chinese Republic came into existence only less than three years ago while the Indo-China's trouble had started 6½ years ago. Obviously, therefore, the commencement of this trouble in Indo-China had nothing to do with China. Later on it must have received moral support from China and possibly some supplies or some training but it was clear that there were no Chinese forces involved. Dulles agreed that this fitted in with his own information also.

16. I pointed out that whatever the communist influence in Indo-China might be, and no doubt it was considerable at the top, the war there must be looked at from the nationalist point of view. It was essentially nationalist though under communist control. To suppress it or to suppress nationalism was to set up people there against those who suppressed it. The recent invasion of Laos appeared to me to be basically a local nationalist upheaval and, so far as my information went, it was under the leadership of a young Prince who was the nephew of the Prime Minister of Laos. He had been the leader of the resistance movement against the French at the end of 1945. Thus merely to talk of communism in Indo-China was to make a wrong appraisal.

17. I could understand the US apprehension, from a military point of view, of certain areas going out of their control whether in South East Asia or in North Africa. They sought, therefore, to hold them in a military way, but in trying to do so, they were losing something far more important, and that was the cooperation and support of the people concerned. That was a bad bargain. If they wanted to win the people, they must appear in the guise of liberators from foreign colonial control. Dulles said that he agreed with much that I said and he was opposed to colonialism and they were impressing the French all along to make much further advances, but, he repeated he could not break up with the French or take the risks of just withdrawing and leaving the field clear to the enemy.

18. Dulles referred briefly to Sir Winston Churchill's proposal for a Big Four Conference and asked me about it.⁸ I said that I was all in favour of this

8. Churchill made the proposal on 11 May 1953.

kind of informal meeting. Perhaps it was a little difficult to have it till a truce had been arranged in Korea. I hoped however that there would be such a truce soon and that this would be followed by such a Big Power conference.

19. In the course of our talks, news was received by us about the proposed meeting of President Eisenhower with the Prime Ministers of the UK and France. I had a message to this effect from Sir Winston Churchill before this appeared in the press. Dulles also heard from Washington. This conference had been arranged very hurriedly and obviously to help in saving the French Prime Minister from defeat in the Chamber of Deputies.⁹ It did not succeed in that and a heavy defeat came. Dulles expressed his disapproval of the way French politics were run.

20. We discussed Korea and generally the proposals for an armistice. Dulles, apart from repeating some of the main arguments usually put forward on behalf of the US, said that the real difficulty was President Syngman Rhee who was a very temperamental and obstinate person. It was at his instance that they had put in some of the conditions in their recent proposals. Syngman Rhee did not want any kind of a settlement and threatened to withdraw. What are we to do, said Dulles, if the South Koreans withdrew? The UN forces would then be simply swept away by the Chinese and the North Koreans. Alternatively, even if we agreed to a settlement, Syngman Rhee might decide to fight on.

21. I said that this was an extraordinary position. Syngman Rhee, as was well known, was not a popular person or much admired. By some people he was considered a liability. In any event, was the world going to be held to ransom by Syngman Rhee? It was clear, as Dulles himself had said, that if there was no armistice and settlement about Korea now, there would be an inevitable tendency for war to spread.¹⁰ So we were faced by the two alternatives of settlement or war on a much wider and more intensive scale. If these talks for a settlement failed, American opinion and sentiment would demand stronger action. Dulles agreed. So, are we going to plunge in war because Syngman Rhee thought that desirable in his own interest?

22. I told Dulles that I felt pretty sure that neither Russia nor China wanted

9. Rene Mayer, whose Cabinet had been in office for four and a half months, resigned on 21 May 1953 after the National Assembly had refused him a vote of confidence by 328 votes to 244. The adverse vote was given in response to a proposal by Mayer that he should be given powers to carry out a widespread administrative reorganization.

10. A story was circulated in the American press to the effect that China had come round to a position of settlement because of a threat conveyed through Nehru, that if truce negotiations failed this time, the US would enlarge the war. But Nehru, in a note recorded on 16 September 1953, denied this.

to have a major war. Also that a major war would obviously be a disaster of the worst kind and no one could predict the results. Victory itself would not much matter. Therefore, this disaster had to be avoided. Vaguely Dulles agreed.

23. I referred to the various proposals for an armistice and the UN decision. I enquired if the UN decision could still be said to be the UN policy. There was no clear answer from Dulles. Anyhow I said that the only way to proceed was to treat that Resolution as a basis and try to vary it here and there if necessary. The chief virtue of the Chinese proposals was that they came very near to the UN proposal. In fact, we had really got over the big hurdle—the argument about voluntary or compulsory repatriation of PsOW. This had held us for a long time. Now nothing important remained and it would be sad indeed if over secondary matters these talks failed. I could understand the apprehension of the US about the possible indefinite retention of prisoners. But that was highly unlikely and surely some way could be found. Dulles referred to what the Indian Resolution said about it and the UN being put in charge of them finally. I pointed out that there was considerable justification for the Chinese Government not to agree to this particular proposal. They were not members of the UN, and the UN was actually a party to the dispute and a combatant. However, it should not be difficult to find some way to prevent an indefinite retention of prisoners. Dulles said that fresh proposals were likely to be put forward soon on behalf of the US and UN at Panmunjon and these would indicate a considerable advance.

24. Our talks, though dealing with controversial subjects; were not carried on in an argumentative way. There was no attempt to argue out any matter to the end. Opinions were expressed and then we moved on to another subject. The whole purpose was, as Dulles had stated right at the beginning, to make each other's position understood.

25. I might mention that Dulles suggested that I might help, in the course of my visit to London, in softening the UK Prime Minister in regard to Egypt.

9. Strong Foundations for Bigger Role¹

High Commissioner and Friends,

I am very glad to meet you, but I must say that I do not feel comfortable at

1. Speech at a meeting of the members of staff of the High Commission of India, London, 8 June 1953. AIR tapes, NMML.

this kind of meeting. It is not very satisfactory, but perhaps there is no other way to meet large numbers of people at one time. If I had the time and leisure I would have liked to visit your separate offices and departments and meet some of you individually, not only to find out about your work but to get to know you somewhat more personally. Unfortunately whenever I come here, I come for a few days only and I almost always come in connection with the Prime Ministers' Conference, which takes much time, not only the conference but the personal meetings. So I am compelled to give up the idea of that individual meetings with you which I would have preferred.

As the High Commissioner has said I have come here after two and a half years. Much has happened in these two and a half years, and in many ways our country has assumed, even reluctantly, heavier responsibilities. We have received news today, this morning, about the signing of an agreement about prisoners of war in Korea, which is not the actual truce agreement but a prelude to it. Now this agreement, obviously, has been the result of the efforts of many countries and we should pay our tributes to the efforts of these statesmen of those countries who have brought about this agreement. I think this country, the United Kingdom, and its Government and Prime Minister, played a very important part in it. They deserve congratulations. I think that President Eisenhower has also shown his keenness for this agreement by the special step he took. I know personally that the Chinese Government has worked to this end and made all efforts, and I have no doubt that the Soviet Government though not directly in the picture has also done a great deal. So all these countries played a part. It is a good thing. Then through their cooperative and joint endeavour, this result has been achieved. It is a major result, for anything that puts an end to killing of men on a large scale is good. People do not realise perhaps that this Korean war, which is called a small war, because we are used to the World Wars now, has involved three million casualties on all sides, quite apart from subjecting a very large number of Koreans to hunger and starvation. From any standard it is a major war. Therefore, it should be regarded as a very considerable event in the history of our times. It is considerable in any sense but it is even more considerable from the world point of view because it might be looked upon as the turning of the corner towards the light from darkness. Of course there are numerous difficulties in the way, but it is something to have turned the corner. Well, it is not for us in India to say much about the part India has played in these efforts for truce or for the peaceful settlement. It is not right for us to lay stress on it. It is much better to congratulate the other countries who have played their effective part. But I do say that the general policy we have pursued in the last few years has not been a dramatic policy; it has not been a pushful policy or an interfering policy and it has been criticised by many people who did not like our adopting an independent attitude which always sought to be friendly towards all countries.

Well, that policy which we have pursued has, I think, plainly justified itself. And I think most people, who have been our critics will recognize it today, and will perhaps do so to a greater extent later. The world powers have thrust an important role on India from time to time. Major events bring very heavy responsibility upon people working on behalf of India. Sometimes I am a little terrified by the new responsibilities that come to us. They may bring prestige no doubt. They raise India in the eyes of many people. That is a matter for satisfaction. But they bring heavy responsibilities when we might not be completely capable of discharging them as well as we would like to.

During these past years we have talked a great deal about foreign affairs in India and taken interest in them. Some people thought that I laid greater stress on foreign affairs than I ought to. As a matter of fact, I have always tried to avoid too much entanglement in foreign affairs because our problems in India are tremendous. Why should we get entangled in others' problems? But there is no escape, because India is a great country by virtue of its size, its population, its geographical position, and by virtue of the fact that it comes on the world stage as an independent nation. This inevitably brings to us responsibilities from which we cannot escape. We have not sought to escape them. And now the new responsibilities mean that we must fit ourselves to discharge them as best as we can, wherever we might be working, in India or outside in our foreign missions. Freedom itself is a responsibility. It is a right we claimed and which we achieved. It brings heavy responsibility. The moment we forget those responsibilities the essence of freedom will also be whittled away. More especially democratic freedom, in which that sense of responsibility is spread out or should be spread out over almost all fields in the country. A sense of discipline and cooperative working and shouldering of obligations and responsibilities accompany freedom. Those of our people who work abroad in our missions or elsewhere naturally have to shoulder a very special measure of responsibility because, in a sense, every Indian abroad, apart from the work he does, is an ambassador of our country abroad. Our country is judged by his acts. If a person behaves well or badly in our country, it does not make much difference. But it does make a lot of difference how any Indian student or other person behaves in a foreign country, because he becomes a symbol of India and the whole country is judged by his acts. Now, more especially when the world's eyes are more directed towards India and what India and Indians do, it is like a spotlight on all of us and we have to be more particular that we do not do anything which might bring discredit to our country. I should like you to bear this general proposition in mind.

What has been our general policy, positive and negative? We have tried to avoid discrimination among nations. We do not approve of any country that practises discrimination. When we dislike something done by others, we do not, however, go out of our way, to condemn it. Condemnation of a country,

instead of solving a problem will increase ill will and bitterness, in its people's minds. So what India has done is to evaluate events with an objective and dispassionate mind, a peaceful and friendly mind. This does help tremendously. Many of you know that Gandhiji always laid the greatest stress on what he called the means, not so much on the ends. People today are talking about ends without concerning themselves with the means, although it is self-evident that the ends are conditioned by the means you adopt. The start of a journey is not enough. If you want to reach the end of the journey you have to map out the route of the journey. You may go on saying you want to go to Spain but if you go by another route you land somewhere else. So means are important.

Now, in order to understand the role of means in the international sphere, in behaviour between nations, you must know the behaviour of groups or individuals. Five and a half or six years ago we became independent and then we became a dominion of the Commonwealth. Two or three years later India developed into the Republic of India, but we decided, entirely of our own free will, to continue our association with the Commonwealth even if we were a Republic. That was a decision which many people did not understand or appreciate. Some people do not understand it even now, even in India. I think it was a right decision, both from the larger point of view of the world, if I may say so, and from the narrow point of view of India, for after all a country's policy should be in its national interest. We may have ideals, we should have ideals, but it is very difficult to give up the national interest. An individual may give up his own interest but to give up the national interest in favour of some ideal is a difficult thing to do. We just wanted to see how to combine an idealistic approach with the national interest, which is the problem of statesmen and politicians. Of course, an idealistic approach, if it is worthwhile at all, should be an approach with long-term national interest. I do not think an idealistic approach is a casual approach, with no relation to facts. That, of course, would be silly. The difference, therefore, between a so-called idealistic approach and a narrow nationalist approach is a difference between looking ahead some distance, having a long-term view of the problems along with some immediate short-term gains. So we decided to remain in the Commonwealth as a Republic. The United Kingdom and the other countries in the Commonwealth also adapted themselves to this new development and accepted us as a Republic. What is the position now? Many persons in Europe or America do not understand our position in spite of every explanation, because there is no precedent for it. We are not tied by any constitution of Commonwealth countries, but we are tied to them by just some friendly bonds, if you like, which have no legal significance, but nevertheless are there and which enable us to cooperate with each other. Personally, I think that the development was not only good for our country, as also for the Commonwealth

and the United Kingdom, but in the larger interest. From the world point of view, that is a type of association we should encourage in the world, instead of military alliances and commitments. We are completely free in India to follow any policy, internal or external, subject to, of course, the limitations of our capacity. Everybody in the Commonwealth is free. We confer together. It is absurd to say that we agree on everything. We do not. Nevertheless we agree to such an extent that we confer together to try to find out a path for cooperation. Sometimes we follow a policy different from that of the Commonwealth, and that I think is the encouraging aspect of this type of association.

Now how does that affect the working here of India House? Essentially our mission here in London is a kind of a link in that cooperation. Since our policy is completely free, we do things as part of our foreign policy or domestic policy which might not be approved by the United Kingdom Government, or the other Commonwealth countries. I am not referring to domestic policy, which is more or less our lookout, but of foreign policy where we do not approve so many things that are happening in other countries. To the Commonwealth countries, our disputes with the South African Union Government are well known. A vast gulf separates us from the South African Union and the policy which the South African Government is pursuing seems to us, apart from the fact that the persons of Indian descent are affected, very wrong and disastrous from the world's point of view. A special responsibility is cast on this mission of ours in London, because of this Commonwealth relationship and because of this basic policy of ours of developing a cooperative and friendly relationship with nations even though we might not agree with them. It is easy enough to cooperate when you agree. The test is to cooperate even when we do not agree. The test of tolerance is not tolerating a person who agrees with you, but tolerating a person who does not agree with you; that is tolerance, whether in religion or other matters. And we have to introduce that larger measure of tolerance in our affairs, in public life and in our domestic life too.

A country like India, by virtue of its very bigness, carries certain responsibilities. It is a country which may through our weakness collapse and play no effective role. That would not happen. There is no middle stage for a country like India. It either plays a big role or it just doesn't play any role at all. Well, for a long period we played no role at all, practically speaking. Now, we are playing a role and against our wishes, we are pushed into playing a more and more important role. If we live up to that role, well and good. But if we do not, our mere numbers won't count. We become a second-rate or third-rate country. I do not think we will fail. I feel that, there is enough strength of character and ability and capacity in India for us to make good. I think we are making good, perhaps not as fast as many of us would like but

nevertheless on a sure, sound foundation I should like this progress to be faster, particularly the economic pace, because it is the economic factor that ultimately governs political factors and decisions.

I appeal to you to apply yourselves to your work on the sound principles on which the nation is founded and work for the good of India and for the furtherance of good relations between India and Britain.

10. Dynamics of India's International Relations¹

The Prime Minister opened the meeting by calling attention to the fact that India was getting ever closer to the centre of international affairs. Heavy and ever-increasing responsibilities were devolving on her. This was a reflection of India's position and her importance. There was no escape from this situation. For, by virtue of her size and position, India would either be a country of primary importance or become weak and ineffective. There was no middle position she could occupy. Consequently, India must discharge effectively the responsibilities devolving on her. This meant, among other things, that Indian representatives abroad must have a keen appreciation of the forces at work not only in their own particular areas but everywhere in the world.²

Korea was the most pressing international problem of the moment. India's position as an umpire enjoying the confidence of the principal contestants of war was a reflection both of her importance and the success of her foreign policy. This policy could not be easily defined. For it was not just one policy but rather a set of policies deriving from our basic desire to contribute positively to the settlement of international disputes.

India's policies should be thought of in dynamic terms. It was erroneous to call them 'neutral', for India was neither neutral in her beliefs nor negative in approach. Her contribution was positive, particularly in promoting a proper understanding of Asian affairs. This was evident even in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference where Indian and, for a different reason, Canadian contributions were the most significant.

1. Report of the Conference of Heads of Indian Missions in Europe and the USA, Burgenstock, 17 June 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Officials who attended the meeting were N.R. Pillai, B.G. Kher, K.P.S. Menon, H.S. Malik, G.L. Mehta, B.R. Sen, S. Dutt, B.N. Chakravarty, P.A. Menon, Y.D. Gundevia, Prem Krishen, P.N. Haksar, J.S. Mehta, K.S. Bajpai and M.O. Mathai.

In understanding international developments, it was important to bear in mind that these were generally the outcome of conflicts between certain basic factors. Economic factors were of very great importance. Nationalism was equally important particularly in Asia and Africa where people were not prepared to tolerate old conditions. There was consequently a tremendous upsurge of human spirit which could not be understood in such simplified categories as "communism" and "anti-communism". In addition to these facts, there was also the further fact that there were today three countries—the USA, the USSR and, with many important qualifications, China, which had expansionist tendencies, not necessarily in a territorial sense, but in the sense they wished to make their influence decisive in lands beyond their borders. In the resultant conflict, the USSR and China had recovered the initiative in Europe and in the world generally. Other countries felt uncertain.

It was evident that there was change in the policies the USSR had hitherto pursued. Whatever may be the factors contributing towards this change, it was clear that Russia felt that she could probably attain her ultimate objectives better through peace than war.

The USSR may also be desiring to detach one or the other of western European countries from the USA. By reducing international tension, she may be hoping to play upon the divergences in the policies of the United States and of the west European countries. Those divergences were noticeable, particularly on matters of economic policy. There was a desire to put an end to the dependence on the United States. With this end in view, the United Kingdom and other European countries wanted a lowering of US tariffs and an expansion of East-West trade. But response from the USA had been disappointing....

Prime Minister summing up the individual reports, said that it had clearly emerged that problems of different parts of the world were interrelated. It was necessary to understand the nature of this interrelation. Indian missions must be sensitive to the developments which were taking place at a fast pace. Vast forces were at work. There was nationalism; there was a vast upsurge in Africa and Asia; there was also communism. One had to understand all these things and not adopt a crude attitude such as the Americans were inclined to adopt in an endeavour to fit in everything in a simple formula of communism versus anti-communism. It was impossible, for instance, to explain what was happening in Africa in terms of this simple and crude formula. Human beings there were no longer tolerant of the old conditions. This was not communism. No doubt Communists would exploit it just as they turned to their own account thwarted feelings of nationalism.

It was clear that communism was a force to be reckoned with. It had attracted many fine minds. The recently published articles by John Strachey on "Marxism Revisited" in the *New Statesman and Nation* were interesting.

They showed to what extent Marxism was still valid. A certain amount of acquaintance with some of the main writings of Marx would be found useful. Keynes³ was also useful; his ideas on 'Full Employment' were of importance.

It was also necessary to have a sense of historical perspective. The Great War of 1914-18 reduced France to the status of a second-rate power. The Second World War had done to Great Britain what the first did to France. And today the United States and the USSR had emerged as the strongest powers. This was outstanding fact in international affairs today. The conflict between these two countries was complicating every problem and made its solution difficult.

Side by side with the emergence of the USA and USSR and the relative decline of other European powers, it was also interesting to see the emergence of a spirit of defiance in Asia and a refusal to be coerced. Thus Iran and Egypt, though weak in terms of purely military strength, had acquired a purely negative strength derived from their refusal to be coerced. The war in Korea also illustrated this new factor.

The Western Powers had not sufficiently realized the importance of this situation. In Britain, no doubt, there was a certain amount of awareness of this. Bevin, for instance, once said: "For God's sake let us not do in China what we did in Russia and create antagonism." The American attitude was, however, crude. It was not realized that one could not, without a major war, impose a way of life on those who refused to be coerced.

The way China was being treated showed how unrealistic and fallacious the American approach was. It was as unrealistic to treat China as a mere Soviet vassal as it was to endeavour to detach her from the Sino-Soviet alliance. The Chinese People's Government naturally had many points of contact with Russia, but it was fully independent, practising its own distinct ideology and pursuing its own distinct purposes. The American policy had cut China off from normal contacts with the rest of the world and had thereby increased her dependence on Russia. This policy brought painful consequences to everyone concerned.

The Prime Minister then referred to the specific position of the United States and said it has not merely emerged as the strongest power in the world but was also a tremendous creditor nation. Its economy was such that it had constantly to throw up vast sums of money. This situation partially explained the various aid programmes and the staggering amounts of money given away

3. John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946); English economist on the staff of the Treasury, 1915-19, and its principal representative at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919; Editor, *Economic Journal* from 1912; author of *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1919), *A Tract on Monetary Reforms* (1923), *End of Laissez Faire* (1926), *A Treatise on Money* (2 vols., 1930) and *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936).

by America. Inevitably, dispensation of aid brought political control, and bred a sense of dependence in the recipient nation. At best it meant creating certain moral obligations. India has avoided this.

Most of the countries of western Europe were thus driven to accept American leadership even against their better judgement. This accounted for the almost universal anti-American feelings particularly in those countries where American bases had been established.

At the last conference of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, it became clear that while the UK felt that American policies, both political and economic, had been wrong in many ways and that while the UK would have liked to exert greater pressure on Washington, they could not risk a break. But if the general fear of war receded and the prevailing tensions were reduced, the UK would assert herself better. An expansion of East-West trade will also help in reducing tensions and decreasing dependence upon the United States. In this connection Butler's observations were interesting. He said that in his talks in Washington he had acquainted the Americans with "facts of life."

Great Britain was clearly acting under different pulls which could not be explained in too simplified a manner. Although her influence and power had declined, as stated previously, she still occupied a position of importance by virtue of her geographical situation, her resources, which were still considerable, and the sense of discipline of her people.

If India wished to speak to America, it was often found useful to do so through Great Britain, or better still through Canada. This was one of the advantages of India's membership of the Commonwealth.

Referring to the changes effected in the policy of the Soviet Union the Prime Minister said that these appeared to be genuine. Russia and China did not want a war if only to avoid terrible destruction. Avoidance of war may also be based on the consideration that continuance of peace may bring greater success for their ideology.

There was no doubt that in America, too, people generally did not want a war. But there were some sinister elements who were so conscious of American superiority in arms, that they felt that issues of world politics should be settled by resort to force while this superiority remained indisputable. It was nevertheless, clear that America needed allies and was conscious of the need for carrying world opinion and fearful of being isolated. This was clearly brought out when India put forward her very carefully drafted resolution on Korea. The Americans at first rejected it out of hand. Later, realizing that the opinion in the UN was hostile to their stand, they veered round and accepted the resolution. This incident also showed the importance of India's initiative in Korea as also the general correctness of her policy which was not daunted by fear of criticisms. In point of fact, this criticism had been transformed into an appreciation of her role.

This was inevitable when one considered India's position in South and South East Asia and in the Middle East. She provided a picture of stability which no other country enjoyed. It was, however, necessary that India should conduct herself with humility and be particularly careful in avoiding boastfulness.

In this connection, the Prime Minister pointed to the importance of the manner in which Indian representatives should conduct themselves. When Dulles visited India he was treated with cordiality. And though one could not hope to convert him to India's point of view, he certainly left with a feeling that India was sincere in her approach, and he understood her position a great deal better. More recently, the Prime Minister's telegram congratulating President Eisenhower for success in Korean armistice negotiations, appeared to have created a good impression.

11. Neighbours, Foreign Settlements and Tribals¹

...The Prime Minister, at this stage, intervened in the discussions to sum up India's position in regard to the foreign settlements and the colonies generally.

While India would continue to strive for the incorporation of the foreign settlements into India, it must be recognized that her position was weakened by the absence of strong popular movement. The leadership was corrupt and self-seeking. India could not resort to economic sanctions. For, these would work more against the people there than against France or Portugal. The only pressure which would tell would be the military pressure. But India was determined to avoid this. India could afford to wait in the knowledge that sooner or later, these settlements must revert to her.

In point of fact, colonialism as a whole was doomed in Asia. It might last a little longer in Africa. Britain was anxious to hold on to Africa as a means of securing economic compensation for the loss of India and Burma. Britain was also badly advised by some of her old type civil servants and representatives. (In Nepal, for instance, British representative had advised his Government to recognize the infant as the King of Nepal). There was also the fact that the settler community was intransigent. The result was that in East Africa terrible things were being done and a whole generation of young Africans was being decimated.

1. Report of the third meeting of the Conference of Heads of Indian Missions in Europe and the USA, Burgenstock, 18 June 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.

There were, however, certain redeeming features in the situation. The political developments in West Africa were encouraging. There was also the fact that the British were trying to adapt their thinking on colonial matters so as to fit in with the aspirations and desires of the African people.

If the developments in West Africa proceed smoothly, there was every chance of African dominions growing up and becoming members of the Commonwealth. This would lead to an increase in the influence of Asian and African opinion within the Commonwealth....

There was little doubt that there was considerable amount of discontent in Pakistan. The anti-Ahmediya agitation was a reflection of this discontent. The situation had become so grave that if the declaration of martial law had been postponed by another hour or so, there would have been a complete breakdown of Government. Inevitably, people in Pakistan compared the progress made in India in constitutional, scientific and economic developments with the complete stagnation in their own country. This added to the restiveness there. Another factor was that the US appeared to have changed their attitude. They had been pro-Pakistan because they expected support from Pakistan than from India. Precisely because of this they felt that continued hostility between India and Pakistan was preventing them from making use of Pakistan. It was, therefore, felt that an improvement of relations between India and Pakistan would make Pakistan more effective and useful. Viewed in this light, the dismissal of Nazimuddin and the appointment of Mohammad Ali showed the working of American influence and a diminution of that of the UK. The UK was aware of this and did not like it.

The situation in Nepal was extremely unsatisfactory.² India was reluctant to interfere in any way but she could not obviously remain indifferent to the continuance of the instability there. After the fall of the Ranas, it had been exceedingly difficult to form a stable Government in Nepal. There was also considerable amount of rivalry, for instance, between the Koirala brothers. More recently, the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that Indian troops had to be kept in readiness to come to the assistance of the King who would have sought such assistance.

India was naturally anxious to assist these States [Sikkim and Bhutan] in their development as they were closely associated with her by treaties. It was on the whole easier to deal with Sikkim. In regard to Bhutan the greatest difficulty was that the Maharaja³ would not allow any of the Indian

2. The law and order situation in Nepal was deteriorating due to labour and agrarian unrest in the *terai*. New officers were in conflict with the Rana regime's district personnel. An attempt was also made at staging a coup d'état with the help of Raksha Dal. The Nepali Congress threatened to launch an agrarian movement in the eastern *terai* to improve the lot of landless labour. There was no stable Government and there was a tussle for power.
3. Jigme Dorji Wangchuk (1929-1972); King of Bhutan, 1952-72.

administrators or technicians even to enter the State. There were, however, signs that this exclusiveness would be diminished. If this were to happen, India would assist in every way both Sikkim and Bhutan in the realisation of a progressive Government....

These exceedingly independent tribesmen [Nagas] had to be handled with great care so that they should not fear for their own culture and ways of life. However, they were Indian citizens and India was anxious to give them the same advantages as they were offering or attempting to achieve for other Indians. Inhabiting a very important and strategic State, the loyalty of Nagas was of great importance and every effort would be made to overcome the anti-Indian sentiments instilled into some of the tribesmen by certain disingenuous missionaries. There was however, for the moment at least no fear of the tribesmen adopting any extra-territorial loyalties.

As a result of discussions which took place in London between the Prime Minister of India and the Prime Minister of Ceylon, certain progress had been made in resolving the question of the future of 9½ lakh people of Indian origin. The Prime Minister of Ceylon had declared his readiness to accept 4 lakh as full citizens, 2½ lakh as residents with permits who would be ultimately absorbed, and the balance to leave Ceylon. While there was no difficulty in accepting the first two suggestions, it was difficult to accept the last suggestion.

12. Korea, Egypt, Kashmir, Myanmar and Indonesia¹

Referring to the news of Syngman Rhee's obstructive tactics the Prime Minister said that Rhee was committing acts of folly.² His action had lent colour to Chinese and Russian suspicions of the West, and had placed the United States in an embarrassing position. The Chinese had behaved with moderation and

1. Report of the fourth meeting of the Conference of Heads of Indian Missions in Europe and USA, Burgenstock, 19 June 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. On 18 June 1953, Rhee struck at the June 8-agreement under which all prisoners unwilling to return home were to be handed over to a Neutral Nations' Repatriation Commission, and set free 25,000 PsOW in the custody of South Korea.

appeared to be anxious to break the deadlock. The United States too appeared to meet them halfway. All this was being put in jeopardy by Rhee. However, despite the obstacles put in the way, India would not back out of the undertakings given by her and would discharge her obligations as Chairman of the Repatriation Commission. It was, therefore, necessary to keep in constant touch with the Governments who were members of the Commission. The Prime Minister directed the Heads of Missions concerned to do this when they returned....

The Prime Minister had pressed on the British Government the necessity of continuing negotiations with the Egyptians.³ The differences between the two sides had been considerably narrowed. The threatening tone of speeches delivered in Cairo, from time to time, had made Churchill very angry. It was necessary that a better atmosphere should be created. The Prime Minister said that he would advise General Neguib to be more tactful as he had advised Sir Winston Churchill about resumption of negotiations.

The situation in Kashmir had been rendered difficult by the Mahasabha agitation. There were also rifts between members of the Kashmir Government. There was quite a crisis there which had been postponed until the Prime Minister's return.

Referring to the usual propaganda against India that she was spending too much on defence because of Kashmir the Prime Minister said that the argument was absurd. Firstly, it was surprising that this argument should be used against India by countries who were themselves spending vast sums of money on armaments. Secondly, India was the only country which had begun a reduction of her armed forces. India's army, having regard to her vast frontiers particularly in the North-East, was not too large. One of the considerations in not proceeding too hastily in reducing the armed forces was the difficulty of finding alternative employment for the men released.

While relations with Burma were close and friendly, those with Indonesia had deteriorated after the initial period when India helped her in her struggle for independence. Several factors had contributed to this. The Masjumi and the Islamic Brotherhood had, to some extent, coloured Indonesia's outlook; there was an element of jealousy; and finally, the American influence there was not a factor conducive to friendship towards India. In dealing with a country like Indonesia, it was of the utmost importance that nothing should be done or said which might hurt their susceptibility. Our representatives very often ignored this when talking to the Indonesians. They were apt to tell the Indonesians how their culture was derived from India. This did not contribute to a growth of friendship of which there were now signs of revival.

3. The Anglo-Egyptian negotiations broke down on 6 May 1953.

13. Recognition of Israel¹

...Question: What is India's attitude towards Israel? Is she prepared to withdraw her recognition of Israel until Palestine goes back to the Arabs?

...Jawaharlal Nehru: Now about Israel. Well, I need hardly say that nothing would please me better than a solution of this problem which has, from the humanitarian point of view, caused immense misery to large numbers of refugees and is causing misery to them, which has been an explosive factor preventing any normality in the Middle East, in the Arab countries especially. And for other reasons, the question again becomes of how you are to tackle and solve this problem. It is suggested. Are you going to withdraw your recognition of Israel. I say no, I am not going to withdraw it. Definitely and clearly, because, I say, that does not help in the solution of the problem. It was after the fullest consideration, after several years of it, that we decided to recognize Israel, because it would have been not in consonance with the policy we were pursuing in China and elsewhere. We had to have a uniform policy. We shouted from the housestops that we would recognize a country regardless of our agreement or disagreement with it, regardless of whether we liked it, if it fulfilled certain conditions in the United Nations....

1. Press conference, Cairo, 25 June 1953. Extracts. For other parts of the conference, see, pp. 79-83, 215-216, 361, 416-418 and 470-472.

14. Asia, Africa and the West¹

Question: What are the prospects of a Far Eastern settlement now?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Better than they have been at any time before. Now, everyone wants a settlement. The agreement of Panmunjom marked a great step forward. There are probably many difficult stages ahead, but if we can get the fighting ended, then the whole atmosphere will have changed; at present everyone wants to bring that about—except Mr Syngman Rhee and perhaps Chiang Kai-shek.

1. Interview to Sylvain Mangeot, London, June 1953. *Picture Post*, London, 27 June 1953.

Q: Assuming a truce in Korea, is it possible to proceed to a Far Eastern settlement without the immediate admission of Communist China to the UN?

JN: The fact that the main powers concerned will be dealing with China over any settlement in Korea is in itself a very effective form of recognition. If you are dealing with people, you cannot ignore them. Sometime or other official steps to recognize the operative China will have to follow.

Q: Again assuming a Korean truce, how do you envisage representation at the international conference called to work out political settlement? Do you see the UN represented collectively or through individual powers?

JN: I am no prophet, but I imagine it will be a meeting of individual powers, if only because China is not recognized by the UN and must attend. Russia will presumably be present in her capacity as a Far Eastern power who must be consulted when political decisions affecting that area are being worked out. All forms of conference have their advantages and disadvantages, but large conferences tend to become much too vague and formal. So, whatever countries are represented in the discussion of the settlement, it will probably be useful to have a smaller and more informal conference of interested powers as well.

Q: Do you expect India to play a leading role in such a settlement?

JN: If we are asked, we would gladly make ourselves available. Not otherwise. We are in the rather special position of being friendly with all the parties involved in this dispute.

Q: What has been the Chinese part in the recent easing of tension in the Far East?

JN: As I see it, China always wanted to avoid involvement in the Korean war. It was more fear of invasion—and expectation of attack when the US forces went towards Yalu—that brought them in. Having become involved, one step led to another. But the Chinese are so concentrated upon their internal problems that they do not want entanglements outside. To my mind there is no doubt that during the last two months the Chinese have actively tried for a truce.

Q: How much do you think Mao Tse-tung's position and policy have been affected by Stalin's death,² and how much has Peking's relationship with Moscow been modified by his disappearance?

2. Joseph Stalin, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the USSR died on 5 March 1953.

JN: It is rather difficult to get to the back of other people's minds. All we can say is that there has been a marked change both in Russia and in China lately. Just how much these changes are interconnected, I do not know; but obviously to some extent.

Q: To achieve a peaceful settlement of affairs, what is your list of priorities in tackling the various obstacles?

JN: First, get a truce in Korea because fighting is actually going on there. Secondly, tackle the political aspects of the Far East. Third, settle European problems, but they will be hard. By the political aspects of the Far East, I mean such questions as the future of Korea and the question of China's inclusion in the UN.

Q: After the fighting is stopped do you think it will be possible to unify Korea into a single country?

JN: It is desirable. And it may be possible but not, I would say, in the near future.

On European problems I hesitate to offer any ideas. Europeans know more about them than I do, although I do have some theories of my own.

In a general way, in casting about for a practical approach to world problems, I would observe that certain factors are apt to get forgotten. One is geography. You cannot get rid of geography. For instance, China, Japan and Russia are all contiguous. In a normal situation trade should develop. They should work together and help each other. At the moment we are living in a highly artificial world—not only in the Far East—but in the long run geographical factors must be accepted if we are to get a workable peaceful solution.

Take another factor nearer my own doorstep. India has a common frontier of 2,000 miles with China. Now it makes all the difference in the world whether that is a friendly or a hostile frontier. I want it to be a friendly one. I cannot help thinking that when that sort of problem is being looked at from Europe or America, it is sometimes discussed as something very remote and unreal.

As far as India's role is concerned, our main problems are internal ones. Our hope is that we shall be left free enough from outside entanglements to cope with what needs doing at home.

Q: Outside the areas already mentioned, what do you see as the most important international problems?

JN: There is no adequate awareness of the strong forces at work in Africa, as

in Asia and the Middle East. Of course, Governments are aware of these forces, but I am deeply distressed by the turn events are taking in all parts of Africa. Wherever you look—in North, East or South Africa—the great questions of economic reform, land distribution, the upsurge of nationalism and racial discrimination, cry out for urgent attention.

It would be a terrible thing if this rising of political consciousness in Africa becomes bitter, frustrated and angry. There may be political remedies for the present troubles, but the main remedy is psychological. I feel it would be very easy to get goodwill in Africa by the right sort of friendly approach. Of course, you can continue to impose things on the local populations by force but, however physically weak a country or people may be today, they are simply not in the mood to accept impositions and in the long run they won't work.

Q: Have the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' talks in London made it possible for Sir Winston Churchill to speak for the Commonwealth at the coming three-power conference in Bermuda?³ And do you feel that the Commonwealth can make any special contribution to the settlement of world problems at this stage?

JN: By telling each other fully of our ideas and intentions, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers have, broadly speaking, provided Sir Winston Churchill with our viewpoints. All agree that an approach to peace should be attempted.

In the way of special contributions, I feel that Pakistan and India because of our special awareness of the state of opinion in Asia and Africa, can sometimes add to understanding between the parts of the world which most often are in danger of misunderstanding each other. Sir Winston Churchill's proposal for a four-Power conference⁴ shows that the UK is anxious for a settlement of the wider issues as well as in Korea. This has certainly made it easier to find a new working approach to break the existing deadlock between the world powers.

3. In a statement at the House of Commons on 21 May 1953, Churchill announced that President Eisenhower had expressed a wish for a personal meeting with the French and British Prime Ministers to discuss common problems, which, he felt, "could only be of advantage at the present time", and that it was hoped to hold the three-power conference in Bermuda at a convenient date shortly after 15 June 1953. On 27 June 1953, the Bermuda talks were postponed as Churchill had been advised rest for one month.
4. A two-day debate on foreign affairs was opened in the House of Commons on 11 May 1953 by Churchill, who, in the course of an extensive review of the international situation, suggested that a conference of the leading powers, should take place with the minimum of delay.

LETTERS TO CHIEF MINISTERS

1. To the Chief Ministers¹

New Delhi
April 8, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

For eight days I was absent from Delhi touring our North Eastern Frontier regions and crossing over to the Burma side. U Nu, the Prime Minister of Burma, was with me for the greater part of this tour. During this period, I was largely cut off from news. On my return I am rather overwhelmed by many developments. A succession of events have taken place in the international sphere, which have, rather suddenly, changed the whole aspect of the present situation. The initiative in this change has come both from the Soviet Union and from China.² There has been much speculation and even some apprehension as to the real reason for this change in policy.³ Whatever the reason, change is for the good and I do not see why we should not welcome it as such. We cannot allow our fears to overwhelm us at every step. For the first time after a long period, there appears to be some reasonable hope of breaking the deadlock in Korea.

2. International events, however important, are distant and a personal tragedy affects us much more. We have had a double tragedy in quick succession. Asaf Ali, our Ambassador-Minister at Berne, died suddenly early on the 2nd April. On that very day, Shafiq-ur-Rahman Qidwai,⁴ a Minister in the Delhi State Government, also died. Asaf Ali's body was brought to Delhi and his funeral took place yesterday. The State honoured him in every way, but the significance of that funeral came from the multitudes of the citizens of Delhi who mourned him.

3. Asaf Ali occupied many high offices of State during the last six years. He was a Cabinet Minister, our first Ambassador in Washington, the Governor of a State, our Ambassador-Minister in Berne, Austria and the Vatican. But his position in India's public life transcended even these high offices, for he

1. File No. 25(6)/53-PMS. These letters have also been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.) *Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol. 3, pp. 273-316.
2. In March 1953, the Soviet Union agreed to open the Berlin canal, seek release of British civilians in North Korea, and resume armistice talks in Korea. Chou En-lai, on 30 March, requested the UN to break the Korean-truce deadlock by making a neutral nation responsible for prisoners refusing repatriation.
3. The US described it as part of a design to stave off defeat in Korea and create differences between US and its European allies.
4. (1900-1953); Professor at Jamia Millia, New Delhi; close associate of Zakir Husain; Minister for Education & Development, Delhi State, 1952-53.

was one of the old band which was associated with the struggle for India's freedom ever since the end of the First World War. His loss is great from every point of view but, more especially, for those who have been his colleagues and comrades during these several decades.

4. He was in a sense symbolic of the old variegated culture of Delhi, which unfortunately, is rapidly becoming a thing of the past. He was essentially of Delhi and, therefore the people of Delhi were greatly attached to him. A true representative as he was of Delhi's culture, yet his was essentially a modern and active mind. Sensitive and fastidious, brought up in the tradition of the old leaders of Delhi and India, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. M.A. Ansari, he was deeply pained at the occurrences in Delhi and elsewhere of August and September 1947. All that he and Delhi had stood for seemed to have been denied in those terrible days. And so, he, like many others, while rejoicing in the freedom that had crowned our efforts, carried many a wound hidden away in the recesses of his heart. He was a fine writer both in English and Urdu and some of his poems and dramatic pieces in Urdu were notable. For nearly three years he and I and some others lived in the most intimate companionship in Ahmednagar prison. There can be no better way of getting to know a person than by being in prison with him. All our virtues as well as our failings come out in the strain and abnormal atmosphere of close confinement. Asaf Ali was ill for some time there and later, on transfer to a Punjab prison, he suffered severe illness which shook him up. He recovered gradually, but evidently he never quite got over that attack. Because of his considerable absences from India, during this formative and changing period of our national life, and even more so, from the shock of Partition and after the changes this had brought about in the texture of life in Delhi, Asaf Ali, though fitting in, had a somewhat lost look as if he was missing something he was used to. I believe he liked his latest assignment at Berne, Vienna, and the Vatican and he sent us long and interesting letters and reports. He was looking forward greatly to a conference we intend having at Lucerne in Switzerland in June next.⁵ This conference is meant for the Heads of our Missions in Europe. We are having these regional conferences and find them very helpful. Asaf Ali was particularly in charge of the Lucerne Conference and was taking a personal interest in the arrangements for it. I was myself greatly looking forward to this visit to Lucerne where I would meet him and others and discuss this changing scene in international affairs and try to understand it. He died suddenly with practically no advance warning and when he appeared to be in tolerable health. His wife had joined him only the

5. A conference of Heads of Indian Missions was held at Burgenstock, Switzerland from 17 to 20 June 1953.

day before. Perhaps it is better to die that way and not after a lingering and painful illness. The shock and the sorrow is for others.

5. Shafiq-ur-Rahman Qidwai had this long illness and for the last two months or more he lay in hospital. He was not an all-India figure like Asaf Ali, but perhaps few men were loved and respected so much in the circle of their acquaintances. In Delhi, Shafiq-ur-Rahman was immensely popular, quiet and modest and devoted to his work, more particularly to education, which was his special subject. He was that rare type which is the salt of the earth. All his life he had served the Jamia Millia on a bare pittance. He was one of that noble band who had helped Dr Zakir Husain⁶ to build up the Jamia and made what it is. All his life was a long and continuing record of self-sacrificing labour and smiling devotion to duty. There was no fuss about him or ambition for office. When a ministership in Delhi State came to him, he hesitated for long and it was no easy matter for me to induce him to accept it. Yet having taken this responsibility, he put his heart and soul in the work.

6. So, I return to Delhi from my North-Eastern tour rich in many new and valuable experiences, but feeling rather desolate and the poorer for the loss of two friends and comrades. The old generation passes and we who belong to that generation, begin to feel a little lonely occasionally. We carry on with our work because it is that which gives some meaning and function to life.

7. My visit to the frontier areas gave me a further insight into the problems of these tribal people whom I like so much, even though sometimes some of them are troublesome. I wish I could make our countrymen in the rest of India realize the importance of these areas and the fine quality of many of the people who live there. They are a challenge to us. How are we going to deal with them and how are we going to benefit them? Not by treating them as museum and anthropological specimens as the British used to do, and not by ignoring their distinctive character and trying to merge them in the common sea of Indian humanity, where they would lose many of the virtues that they possess, without perhaps gaining other virtues.

8. The mere fact that the two Prime Ministers of India and Burma jointly toured these tribal areas on both sides of the frontier had great significance. I rather doubt if this kind of thing has been done previously anywhere. It brought out the friendly and cooperative character of our relationship. Our frontier with Burma, though a difficult one and sometimes even an undemarcated one, offers us no political problem of any magnitude. I wish our other frontiers were equally fortunate.

9. Apart from tribal problems, U Nu and I discussed many matters, for there is much in common in our views of international affairs and even in

6. Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University.

regard to domestic policies. U Nu and the Burmese Government are specially exercised at present about the presence and the depredations of the Kuomintang troops in North-East Burma.⁷ These troops have been there for the last two or three years. One would have thought that without outside help and supplies they would fade out. Instead of this, they have actually grown in numbers and have got new equipment. They tried to commit raids into China but were driven back with heavy loss. Nevertheless, they have grown and lately they have committed all kinds of atrocities on the Burmese. It is clear, therefore, that they have been receiving supplies from abroad. Those supplies can only come via Thailand and probably from Formosa. Who is directly actually responsible for this, it is difficult to say. Possibly some foreign adventurers are responsible. But it is a legitimate inference that the Formosa Government has helped in this matter and that the Thai Government has connived at it. There are stories of some Americans helping in the gun running and indeed having airlifts. The US Government has denied responsibility and we should accept their denial, but that does not absolve individual Americans from being parties to this business.⁸

10. It is absolutely clear that the presence of these Kuomintang troops in Burma is an offence by every kind of law, national or international. Their misbehaviour makes it worse. The Burmese Government have been extraordinarily patient about this. For the last two years they have been thinking of taking this matter to the UN and have often consulted us on the subject. They have repeatedly drawn the attention of the US and UK Governments to it, who have promised to do something.⁹ What they did, I do not know, but it produced no results whatever. Now, at last, the Burmese Government decided to make a complaint of KMT aggression before the UN. This woke up the US Government to the seriousness of the situation and they have been trying ever since to get this discussion postponed so that some transfer of the KMT

7. Patrick Soong, Charge' d' Affaires of the KMT embassy at Bangkok, admitted in a statement to *The Times*, London, that the KMT troops, which numbered around 12,500, were directly under the command of the Military Headquarters in Formosa and that their operations in Myanmar were an extension of the struggle against communism in Korea, Indonesia and Malaya.
8. On 23 January 1953, Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, denied Myanmar press reports that the Kuomintang forces in Myanmar were being aided and led by American officials. On 28 January 1953, H.B. Day, the Acting US Charge'd' Affaires in Myanmar, stated that the USA "had never aided those troops in any way and is not doing so now" and that "to the best of American official knowledge" there were no Americans with them.
9. The US Government agreed to cooperate in investigating the presence of KMT troops in Myanmar and represented to the Chinese Nationalist Government regarding Myanmar's complaint.

troops elsewhere might be arranged. If the matter comes up for discussion in the UN, it will be difficult for the US to come out free from all blame. After all, the Formosa regime is entirely a client State of the US, helped and financed by them.

11. The Burmese Government have felt so strongly in this matter that they have decided not to accept any more technical aid assistance from the USA. This was a brave step, because undoubtedly Burma was profiting by this assistance and wanted it. But it was said that they were tolerating the presence of KMT troops in order to get assistance from the US. They were too proud and sensitive to put up with this charge and they felt also that by giving up this aid, they will force attention to this issue, which indeed they have done. There can be no doubt that the Burmese case in this matter is a strong one from every point of view. We have assured them of our full support.

12. Just before I left for the frontier, we held a regional conference in Delhi of our Heads of Missions in Western Asia.¹⁰ For several days we met together and discussed not only the problems of each individual and country, but even more so the larger world situation, more especially in relation to the Middle East.¹¹ These talks were very profitable and instructive. It is clear that these regional conferences do much good. Our next such conference as I have indicated, will be held at Lucerne in Switzerland in June next. This will be for our European Missions.

13. The position in the Middle Eastern countries might perhaps be described in somewhat contradictory terms as one of static semi-crises. In Iran, the deadlock with the UK continues and there appears to be no prospect of a solution.¹² Meanwhile, internal difficulties have arisen and there have been some differences between Prime Minister Mossadeq and the Shah.¹³ Every crisis that develops there leaves Prime Minister Mossadeq firmly in the saddle.

10. From 25 to 27 March 1953.

11. The conference discussed the prospects of expanding India's trade with East and West Asian countries against stiff Japanese competition. It also underlined the need to encourage cultural exchanges and provide correct and adequate information about India in these countries.

12. On 19 March 1953, Iran rejected fresh Anglo-American proposals for settlement of the oil dispute.

13. Serious differences developed in January 1953 between the Majlis and the Government when Mossadeq sought extension of his plenary powers for another year. Differences became acute following the Government's decision to tax the royal estate and due to the Shah's alleged involvement in security matters and his links with the Government's opponents. Clashes took place on 1 and 2 March between the rival groups when the Shah's leaving the country on health grounds was suspected by his supporters to have been forced on him by the Government. Later, a committee of eight deputies was appointed by the Majlis to effect a reconciliation between Mossadeq and the Shah.

There appears to be no doubt that he is the dominating personality in Iran both with the people and with a large section of the army.

14. Developments in Egypt are more interesting and of wider significance. The Sudan issue, though not finally settled, is on the way to settlement,¹⁴ and our Chief Election Commissioner, Shri Sukumar Sen, is functioning as the Chairman of the Sudan Election Commission. He has not only to arrange for the carrying out of the election but has to give some important political decisions as to the number of seats that should be set aside for nomination and the number to be elected. This decision will make a difference. The UK Government is anxious to have a fairly large number of nominated members; the Egyptian Government prefer more elected members. The principal issue now in Egypt is that of the Suez Canal where the UK Government has got enormous installations. It is in fact their principal centre for the whole of the Middle East region and they will suffer very great loss if they have to give it up and yet there seems no other way but for them to give it up. Even from a military point of view, it cannot be of much use to them unless there is agreement with Egypt. Because of this lack of agreement, there has not been any progress made in regard to the proposed Middle East Defence Organisation.

15. The outstanding development in the international situation during the last few days has come from the Soviet Union and, to some extent, from China. Internally, in Russia, the sudden release of the Jewish doctors and the punishment of those who were instrumental in sending them to prison, has been a strange and wholly unexpected development which it is not easy to explain.¹⁵ In any event, it indicates a change in internal policy. That should not lead us to think that the basic policies laid down in Stalin's time are being varied. But this, as well as other events, do indicate that the Soviet Union is putting forward a conciliatory approach and would like to create an atmosphere of peace. The reactions to this in other countries have on the whole been good, but there is much apprehension, especially in the USA, as to the motives behind all this. There are also some people in the USA who do not particularly like a sudden cessation of the "cold war" as this might

14. The draft statute of Self-Governing Dominion, was submitted by Sudan to the British and Egyptian authorities on 8 May 1952. The British Parliament approved it on 22 October 1952. The democratic process thus started, culminated in Sudan's freedom in 1956.

15. On 4 April 1953, the Soviet Union exonerated 15 doctors including the 9 accused of plotting murder of senior Soviet leaders—and in an official communique, Malenkov admitted error and use of illegal methods by the State to obtain false confessions to implicate the accused.

have certain internal and external consequences which they might not approve of.¹⁶

16. The Chinese Government, no doubt with the approval of the Soviet, have also put forward proposals for an armistice in Korea. These proposals begin with an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners and are being extended to cover other matters. In effect, the Chinese Government has come very near the Indian Resolution on Korea.

17. Dr Graham has presented another report about his talks on Kashmir.¹⁷ This report does not carry us any further. Meanwhile, there has been much talk of my meeting Khwaja Nazimuddin, the Pakistan Prime Minister, to discuss various matters in issue between us including Kashmir. I had suggested to him that there should be a meeting at official level to consider most of these matters and it is likely that such a meeting will take place fairly soon. He has invited me to go to Karachi, but it is very difficult for me to find the time for this in April or May, that is before I leave for England. I would also like to wait for the result of the official meeting before I fix any visit to Karachi.¹⁸

18. Conditions in Pakistan have not wholly settled down yet, more specially in West Punjab where the anti-Qadiani troubles continue to some extent.¹⁹ On the whole however, the Central Government of Pakistan has functioned with strength and Khwaja Nazimuddin has, for the first time, come out as a man of some strength and decisive action.

19. You know of the decisions we have thus far made regarding the Andhra State which is to be established on the 1st October, 1953. The principal points have already been decided, others are being attended to. One relatively minor matter, namely that relating to the Bellary Taluk, is still under consideration. It has been a matter of surprise and distress to me at the way violent agitation is taking place about this Taluk. Rails have been uprooted, trains stopped and generally an attempt made to force the hands of Government in making its decision. We shall come to a decision about the Bellary Taluk very soon. We have been waiting for detailed figures about it and we have now received

16. The Soviet and Chinese gestures drew widespread suspicious reactions from the western world. While Dulles considered it as inconsequential to the basic threat posed by the Soviet Union to the free world, some others saw it as an effort to isolate the US from its Allies.

17. The report, presented on 27 March 1953 to the UN, contended that since both India and Pakistan had refused to accept the previous proposal regarding the number of troops to be stationed on either side of the ceasefire line, there was no ground left to continue the negotiations. The report, however, suggested that the two countries should sort out their problems through direct negotiations.

18. Nehru visited Karachi from 25 to 27 July 1953.

19. Anti-Ahmediya riots in major cities of West Punjab led to promulgation of Martial Law till 15 May 1953.

them. It is a bad thing for some of our people to take to these totally unnecessary and highly objectionable methods in matters of this kind. What is regrettable is that some otherwise responsible persons encourage this kind of thing. At a moment when all kinds of vital developments are taking place in the world and in India we are facing major problems for some people to try to make a small issue like that of the Bellary Taluk the first issue in India, does not show either wisdom or vision.

20. I have been asked to draw your attention to the questionnaire issued by the Press Commission of which Justice Rajadhyaksha²⁰ is the Chairman. The work of this Commission has been held up by the delay in obtaining replies to their questionnaire. This questionnaire was sent to all the State Governments also. It is a long one and it may not be easy to answer all the questions. But whatever answers can be given should be sent as early as possible. I would request you to have this done.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

20. G.S. Rajadhyaksha.

2. To the Chief Ministers

New Delhi
April 19, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

The international situation has continued to develop since I wrote to you last eleven days ago and many notable events have taken place. One might almost think that peace is going to break out in the Far East. There is definitely a possibility of ceasefire there. The first practical step agreed to was the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners.¹ This is on its way now. In the UN, the Brazilian Resolution regarding Korea was adopted and the Polish Resolution was withdrawn. This was an additional gesture on the part of the Soviet group in the UN in favour of a peaceful settlement.

2. Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of China, made a proposal some days ago about the exchange of prisoners which was very near the Indian Resolution at the UN. This proposal was communicated more formally by the North

1. On 11 April 1953.

Korean General Nam Il at Panmunjon. I think it might be said that this was partly the result of the Indian Resolution on Korea at the UN, which was so much condemned by the Soviet and China at the time. It is interesting also to note that the proposal for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners was originally made by our Health Minister at an International Red Cross Conference last year.² It was passed at that Conference but not accepted by the Soviet representative there. We have no particular desire to take credit for these developments, because they are really due to many other factors and forces at work. But it is some satisfaction to know that we have been moving in the right direction and that others have gradually come into line.

3. Whatever the reasons might be for the change in policy in the Soviet Union and in China, there can be no doubt that there has been a marked change and the change is for the good. As such we must welcome it. In America, even more than elsewhere, there is a good deal of apprehension about this change and a feeling that this is some subtle intrigue which has to be guarded against. The outbreak of peace, though obviously welcomed by large numbers of people is viewed with apprehension by some, who think that this might lead to even more difficult problems. Persons who believe in the inevitability of war can only view any immediate armistice as a postponement of the inevitable. It is thought that a truce in Korea will be advantageous to the North Koreans and Chinese and will enable them to build up their forces there, without interference from hostile air or sea power, and to wait patiently for a future opportunity for aggression. Hence military opinion in the US does not view the possibility of a truce with much favour.

4. On the other hand, there is obviously a passionate longing for peace and President Eisenhower delivered an important speech three days ago,³ in which he called for peace and world disarmament. He further made a proposal for a world reconstruction fund to be built up out of the savings from the armament programme and to be used for the development specially of the undeveloped areas of the world. This proposal is not a new one and representatives of India have in the past suggested it. But, coming from the President of the US, it is obviously important. President Eisenhower's speech is certainly a great improvement upon the recent American approach, to these

2. At the meeting of the executive committee of the League of the Red Cross Societies in December 1952, Amrit Kaur had appealed for the ending of hostilities in Korea and suggested immediate repatriation of all sick and wounded prisoners as a gesture of goodwill.
3. In his speech of 16 April 1953, Eisenhower, while welcoming the Soviet desire for peace, asserted that the "sincerity of peaceful purpose" should be "attested by deeds", and "clear and specific acts", such as signing of the Austrian treaty, release of thousands of prisoners held since Second World War, peace in Asia, and disarmament as "signs of sincere intent."

problems which afflict Asia and Europe. There is, however, still an element of apprehension in it and lack of faith in the sincerity of the Soviet Union's desire for peace.

5. These world developments have been accompanied by somewhat friendlier relations between India and the Soviet Union and China. Unfortunately, in China especially these relations had become distant and tense after the passing by the UN of the Indian resolution on Korea and many hard things have been said in China about India.⁴ Gradually that stopped and now there have been definite approaches to us again. While we are always willing to help, it is natural for us to be a little cautious for fear of getting entangled and causing embarrassment all round. So we move warily, but we move, I hope, in the right direction. The Chinese and the North Korean proposals envisaged a neutral power to take charge of such prisoners as do not immediately seek to be repatriated. It is not clear whether these prisoners will be kept in Korea under the supervision of that neutral power or are expected to be transported to the territory of that power. The presumption, I suppose, is that they should remain more or less where they are or in some place nearby which might be declared neutral for the purpose. There is no indication about the neutral power. The US have suggested Switzerland. We are not at all anxious to be nominated as such neutral power.

6. So, events are moving fairly rapidly and we may be faced one of these days with the outbreak of peace, as it is called, in these days when war seems to be the normal state of affairs of mankind. What will be the consequence of this when it comes? It will naturally lead to the consideration of political problems. In the Far East this means the future of Korea itself, Formosa and the question of the People's Government of China becoming a member of the UN. All these are difficult, more especially the problem of Formosa. American strategy is based on Formosa being a base for action in case of war and there is little chance of their giving this up, although some eminent soldiers think that it is of no great importance from that point of view. In Europe the principal problem is that of Germany. President Eisenhower has made a statement in regard to Germany which is more helpful than previous statements.⁵ A smaller problem of Europe is that of Austria.⁶ This small and

4. The Beijing Radio accused India on 5 December 1952 of allying herself with the West in "hostile actions" against the Communist nations.
5. On 16 April 1953, Eisenhower had said that the United States was keen to "press forward with present plans for the closer unity of nations of Western Europe...conducive to the free movement of persons, trade and ideas. This community would include a free and united Germany with a Government based upon free and secret elections." He appealed to the Soviet Union for a political settlement.
6. The Soviet Union had insisted on "demilitarization and denazification" of Austria prior to signing of a peace treaty by the Allies and in February 1953 demanded withdrawal of the treaty proposed by the United States, Britain and France.

unfortunate country has suffered greatly because of the political rivalries of great powers. By itself it means little to either, but, as a possible base for action in case of war, it has importance. It should not be too difficult to arrive at a settlement about Austria. If this happens, that would undoubtedly create a very good impression and relieve the tension in Europe.

7. Apart from the political problems, there are economic consequences of peace. We do not know the internal conditions of the Soviet Union or China. Undoubtedly China has been geared up to war conditions. But its economy is such that probably it will not be difficult to face the challenge of peace and convert their military apparatus towards peaceful reconstruction. It should be still less difficult in the Soviet Union which has apparently undergone no great change during the last two or three years in this respect. In the United States of America and, to some extent, in the Western European countries, the economic consequences are likely to be far more considerable. America has been geared up to war production on a colossal scale. Probably, if peace comes, there will have to be a shift over from this and it is likely that prices of many articles may fall owing to a glut in the market. This might specially apply to defence equipment which is flowing out of American factories at a tremendous pace. There is a certain fear of some measure of economic upset because of this possible change-over in America.

8. But all these are relatively minor matters, if the main objective of peace is gained and the world tension lessened and efforts directed to peaceful reconstruction and development. If the present atmosphere of fear and suspicion that pervades the world changes into something better, then the gain is immeasurable and the whole world will profit by it.

9. The UN General Assembly is now considering the Burmese complaint about the presence of Kuomintang troops on the Burma-China border. I have referred to this in my previous letters. Subsequent information made public has made the position of Burma stronger. There can be no doubt that these forces have committed aggression and the Burmese Government are entitled to deal with that forcibly. The US Government have denied any active assistance to them and we should accept their denial. But there can be little doubt that they could not have remained there if the US Government had taken a strong line with the Formosa Government. We are giving our full support to the Burmese complaint.

10. The recent developments in Pakistan, leading to the dismissal of the Prime Minister, have come as a surprise everywhere.⁷ As this news reached

7. The Governor-General of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammad, dismissed Khwaja Nazimuddin's Cabinet on 17 April 1953 and asked Mohammad Ali Bogra to form a new Government.

me, I was actually reading the last letter from Khwaja Nazimuddin to me.⁸ In this he expressed his regret for the behaviour of *Dawn* newspaper in giving publicity to a false statement.⁹ The change came suddenly but obviously there must have been a good deal of what is called palace intrigue behind it. This was not the result of any popular upheaval. It is not clear whether the Army Chiefs or the Civil Service heads had any hand in it. We had been informed that Khwaja Nazimuddin's stern handling of the West Punjab situation had enhanced his prestige. Now we are told that he had no prestige left. It seems that these changes represent a struggle for power at the top plus, of course, grave dissatisfaction in the public mind at the way the situation in Pakistan had been deteriorating during the past year or so.

11. Mr Zafrullah Khan had said sometime ago that Pakistan was a middle-eastern country, closely allied to the other countries of Western Asia.¹⁰ This was a novel idea because nobody had ever thought of this middle-eastern region, as it is called, extending to and including Pakistan. But, in a sense, Pakistan has indicated that, politically speaking, it is in line with the Middle East, where changes take place by sudden coup. I cannot say whether the new Government is likely to be better or worse than the last one. The new Prime Minister, Mr Mohammad Ali, is rather an unknown quantity and it is possible that he may not occupy that post for long, unless he remains there as a kind of balancing factor between powerful rivals. All this indicates the political instability of Pakistan in addition to the economic distress which the country is suffering from. Mr Abdul Qayyum Khan, the strongman of Pakistan, has left his Chief Ministership of the Frontier Province and has now become a Minister in the Central Government. He is hardly likely to play second fiddle there. Meanwhile, an interesting consequence is that a new person will be Chief Minister in the Frontier Province.¹¹

12. In South Africa, Dr Malan has secured a victory in the General Elections.¹² He went to the polls on the clear issue of apartheid or racial segregation and he has won. This means an accentuation of the situation in South Africa and probably additional measures to suppress the Africans and the Indians there. From the governmental point of view, this can no doubt be

8. Of 15 April 1953.

9. The *Dawn* had reported on 12 April 1953 that Nehru had "refused to discuss" Kashmir and the Canal Waters dispute with Nazimuddin.

10. On 24 July 1952, Zafrullah Khan declared: "It is to be hoped that, in the first instance, law and order in all Middle East territories in which Pakistan is also included, will be impartially, firmly and, if necessary, even ruthlessly maintained."

11. Abdul Rashid, Inspector-General of Police of NWFP, took over as Chief Minister on 23 April 1953.

12. In the elections held on 15 April 1953, Malan's National Party defeated the United Party.

done and the movement against racial discrimination suppressed. But no one can imagine that Dr Malan's victory will put an end to the passionate demand of the African people. Possibilities of peaceful settlement are being eliminated and the chances of greater and more widespread conflict increased. This, I believe, is being increasingly recognized in other parts of the world and the conscience of Europe and America, such as it is on these issues, is troubled. But this pricking of conscience is not enough to make these countries change their policies.

13. In other parts of Africa also there is trouble more especially in Kenya where, according to the statement of a UK Minister, there is some kind of civil war going on. There have been horrible murders committed by some Africans of the Kikuyu tribe and there has been equally horrible mass repression by the government and, even more so, by the European settlers. On both sides deep passions have been roused and the future is very dark. The conviction of and the sentence passed on Jomo Kenyatta¹³ has added to the fire that is gradually spreading in those areas. We must condemn, not only for moral but also for practical reasons, the murder campaign of the Mau Mau society, or whatever it is. That puts the Africans there in the wrong and gives a strong pretext for stern action to be taken against them. The European settlers have taken full advantage of this. But we have to remember that these Africans have suffered terribly in the past and have been deprived of their lands. Gradually they have begun to make demands which are perfectly legitimate. The refusal to attend to any of these demands has led to deep frustration. And now the terrible repression on a mass scale that is going on in Kenya cannot possibly solve this problem. The sympathy of other African tribes is gradually being attracted towards the Kikuyus, who are the main sufferers at present. Whatever the faults and the sins of the Kikuyus might be, they have become the champions of reform. The passion for education among them has been extraordinary. They built up, almost with their blood and tears, thousands of schools. All these schools have now been closed by Government decree.¹⁴ I cannot understand how any government can expect to solve this tremendous problem of Africa in this way.

14. The proposal to have a Central African Federation has also been

13. On 8 April 1953.

14. The Kikuyu Independent Schools Association (KISA) and the Kikuyu Karinga Educational Association (KKEA) were started in 1929. In 1939, the Kenya Teachers Training College was started in Githunguri, Kiambu, to provide teachers for these schools. By 1952 the Independent Schools had an estimated enrolment of 270,000 students. On 14 November 1952, these schools were closed on the ground that they were being used for Mau Mau activities rendering them as "dangerous to the good Government of the colony."

passed¹⁵ in spite of the united opposition of the African leaders there.¹⁶ This means the creation of another white European settlers dominion, which is much worse than direct colonial administration. The only relieving feature of the scene in Africa is the progress made in Gold Coast and Nigeria. The UK Government (the last Labour Government in the UK) took a definite step in advance there and there is some measure of self-government. But even in Nigeria, there is some trouble now and the Ministers have resigned.¹⁷

15. In the course of a public speech, I made on April 13th in Delhi, I referred to this African situation. I tried to do so in restrained language because we have always to be careful in referring to the domestic politics of other countries. Nevertheless, what I said has given some offence in the UK as well as, of course, to the Europeans settlers in Kenya.¹⁸ I am sorry for that, but it would be absurd for me to remain silent when issues of vast importance are facing us. Africa is one of the major world problems of the day and if that leads to racial conflict on a big scale, the whole world is affected. We in India have stood uncompromisingly for a racial equality and have believed that that is one of the basic pillars of which peace can be established. Indeed, the United Nations Charter proclaims this fact also.

16. One disturbing factor in Africa is the attempt being made, with some success, to establish European settlers' dominions. This means having the kind of countries like South Africa with its racial policy. The Central African Federation has already been decided upon. The demand is made for an East African Federation also.¹⁹ This means petrifying racial domination, in a much worse way than the older forms of colonialism. From the larger point of view of India and of Asia, this is a most undesirable development.

17. We have recently had a conference of Development Commissioners

15. On 23 March 1953. It was to have among other things a federal constitution, a central government for the settlers controlled area and civil service.

16. In all the three territories, opposition to the federation scheme grew intense and on 13 April 1953, the chiefs in Nyasaland and the Nyasaland African Congress decided to appeal to the United Nations against the proposed scheme.

17. On 31 March 1953, four Ministers resigned protesting that "they could not associate with those who have not the guts to say when we should have self-government."

18. The European Electors' Union referring on 15 April 1953 to the "mounting evidence of Indian interference in Kenya's affairs", charged Nehru and the Indian Government with encouraging it.

19. It was reported that a scheme for an East African Federation comprising Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika on the lines of the Central African Federation was being prepared by Oliver Lyttelton, the British Colonial Secretary.

in Delhi.²⁰ This Conference considered not only the work done by the Community Centres, but also the new proposals for an Extension Service, which is intended to cover a very large part of India in the course of the next few years. Reports of work in Community Centres are generally satisfactory. One might say that 25 per cent of them have done very well indeed, above expectation. Another 25 to 30 per cent have done well. Another 30 or 25 per cent have done fairly well. About 10 per cent have not done well at all. As a whole, it might be said that the progress made has been very satisfactory, more especially in the response that it has evoked in the people. As I have written to you previously, the Community Centres are going to be a test of the States in the future. The Extension Scheme is something much more widespread and ambitious. It is thought of in a less intensive way, but it is going to be a permanent feature and we attach the greatest importance to it. It is peaceful method, but the approach is a revolutionary one and if we succeed in it, as we must, we shall have brought about revolutionary change all over India of tremendous significance.

18. Some months ago a very eminent expert in Public Administration, Dr Paul H. Appleby, was invited by the Government of India to advise us on Public Administration. He spent some months here and presented a report.²¹ I am having a copy of this report sent to you separately. This report is a document of outstanding importance. It is an evaluation and an appraisal of our Administration and the work we are doing; it is also a criticism of our failings. I would invite your particular attention to this report for it comes from one of the greatest authorities on this subject. I feel that the recommendations he makes deserve our earnest consideration and action thereon. I would suggest that this report might be read by your Ministers and your senior Servicemen. Dr Appleby deals with the necessity of change in the whole outlook and methods of our administrative apparatus. That, indeed, has been said by many people previously. But we have been hesitant in dealing with this matter. We have worked too much in the ruts and carried on old traditions which have little significance today. If we are to work for a Welfare State, the whole of our Administrative Service has to function somewhat differently and, indeed has to think differently. Dr Appleby points out how 'class' divisions form such an intimate part of our Service Organisation and vitiate it to some extent. As he says, 'there are too many forms of class, rank and prerogative consciousness'. He also refers to our governmental procedure

20. From 16 to 19 April 1953.

21. In his report submitted in January 1953, Appleby criticized "the structure which subordinates the national government to state, district, and municipal control, making implementation of programmes of national importance difficult" and suggested some basic changes.

which is cumbersome and wasteful and dilatory. In particular, he lays stress on the difficulty of fixing responsibility. I think that one of the major issues that we should face, and face soon, is a reorganisation of our administrative structure.

19. Some days ago I was in Burma. I was interested to find out the salary scales there. I was told that the average village teacher got a salary of Rs.125 a month. In fact, the minimum salary in Burma appeared to be at least Rs.100/- a month and the average daily wage Rs.3/-. The top most salaries were that of the President and of the Supreme Court Judges. Apart from these, the highest salaries were those of two Financial Commissioners who got Rs.1,800/- month. For the rest, the highest salary was Rs.1,600/-. Thus, the difference between the lowest salary and the average highest salary was 1 to 16. The differences in India are far greater and are thought of in terms of class and status. That is a bad approach.

20. I have been much distressed at the strikes of primary school teachers in some States.²² I know the difficulties of the States concerned and that they have increased these salaries considerably during the past few years since independence. Nevertheless, the teachers' salaries are woefully low. What can we expect our next generation to be if we pay our teachers less than our peons and chaprasis? The contrast between these salaries and the higher ones that we pay is very marked. We must give thought to this matter.

21. I visited Roorkee the other day to attend the opening ceremony of the Central Building Research Institute.²³ This is the last of our eleven National Laboratories and it was a great satisfaction to me to feel that we had completed this part of our programme.

22. The proposed formation of the Andhra State has led to demands elsewhere and some people seem to imagine that the best way to realise their wishes is to go on hunger strike. India today stands as the one politically and economically stable country in a great part of Asia from West to East. But the disruptive tendencies are there as is evident from the mischievous communal agitations going on and these demands for linguistic States and the like. It surprises me that responsible people should not appreciate what first priorities are in India or should deliberately create trouble such as the communal organisations are doing in regard to Jammu. That shows a narrow and bigoted mentality which, if it succeeded, could only bring ruin to India. Fortunately there are wiser people in India and the general public had got a

22. For example, the Uttar Pradesh Adhyapak Mandal had intensified its agitation on 8 March 1953 for increased pay and dearness allowance.

23. The Institute was set up to study and suggest methods to improve construction of buildings and the use of building material.

good appreciation of the situation. But this requires constant touch with the public and explanation to them of what is happening.

23. I feel that after the establishment of the Andhra State, we should consider this whole problem of reorganization of state boundaries in a realistic and dispassionate way, such as has been suggested at the last session of the Congress.²⁴ The purely linguistic approach is obviously not good enough. It is hoped, therefore, to appoint, towards the end of the year, some kind of a high-powered commission to go into this matter fully without fuss. We could then have the entire picture before us of what is feasible and what is desirable and what the consequences are likely to be. This picture will be not only before Government, but before the people so that they might know of these consequences and not decide some question by itself regardless of its effects.

24. The Railway Centenary Celebration and Exhibition have attracted much attention.²⁵ A hundred years is a long time but the exhibition shows a record of progress which is creditable. I hope that many of you will be in a position to see this exhibition and to realize not only what we have done, but what we intend doing.

25. The big changes that have taken place in Soviet and Chinese policies have naturally led the Communist Party in India to think furiously. I have an idea that they are trying to take a more realistic view of the situation both in the world and in India and are likely to indulge less in adventurist tactics.

26. I intend touring the scarcity areas in Maharashtra. I shall leave Delhi on April 28th and return on May 4th. I expect to visit Belgaum, Ratnagiri, Ahmednagar, Sholapur and a number of other places.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

24. The Hyderabad session of the Indian National Congress took place in January 1953. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol.21. pp. 247-249.

25. 16 April 1953.

3. To the Chief Ministers

Camp: Srinagar
May 24, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

I feel very guilty in beginning this letter to you for I am writing to you after nearly five weeks since I sent you my last letter. That is a long gap and I have felt unhappy at my inability to write at the usual time. But I have been struggling hard against heavy accumulations of work. Parliament sat for most of this time and then I went away on a tour to Maharashtra.¹ Since my return from that tour, I have not fully succeeded in keeping pace with either events or important work, hard as I have tried to do so.

2. Every time I go out of Delhi for a few days, this means an accumulation of work. When I returned from the Maharashtra tour, I found that much had happened in the international sphere which demanded my instant and earnest attention. You must know of these developments and the change they have brought about in the international scene. But, even before I could deal with these matters, I had to face a curious and unhappy situation that had arisen between the two Houses of Parliament.² That is old history now and the events have obtained a good deal of publicity. I shall not repeat them except to say that I was distressed to notice how relatively small matters can become big issues of conflict and absorb our time and energy, apart from the sense of ill-will and disharmony that they create. Any democratic constitution or structure demands a great deal of accommodation and cooperation from all concerned. Indeed, democracy cannot work at all without self-help and cooperation. Laws and constitutions are necessary, but no set of laws or constitutions can cover the whole field of human conduct. And it would, indeed, be most unfortunate if they did, for life would then become a purely routine and dead affair. The best of constitutions will fail if there is not the spirit to work them in the right way. I hope, therefore, that this unhappy incident in Parliament will make us all think about these vital matters which are so important although they might not be written down in the articles of the constitution.

3. The House of the People adjourned on the 15th of May; the Council

1. From 28 April to 3 May 1953.

2. Questions regarding the powers, privileges and rights of the Council of States were raised on 1 and 2 May 1953 when the Deputy Speaker took exception to the Law Minister's statement in the Council of States questioning the authority and competence of the Speaker to certify the Indian Income Tax Amendment Bill as a Money Bill. The Law Minister's refusal to be present in the House of the People during the discussion on his statement evoked sharp criticism and protest amongst the members.

of States went on working for another two days. On the 16th and 17th May, we had a heavy session of the Congress Working Committee which dealt with important matters. You will have seen the resolutions passed and I would particularly draw your attention to those on social and economic policy³ and the Jammu agitation.⁴ Since then, I have been trying to get through as much work as possible before I leave for England. I shall do so on the 28th of this month and I expect to be away for about a month. This letter, therefore, will not be followed in the usual course and the next one will have to be sent to you after my return to India.

4. As a sense of fatigue stole over me and I did not wish to leave India carrying this burden of tiredness, I have come here to Kashmir for two days and I am writing this letter from Srinagar. It is perfect weather here and the air is exhilarating. I have no doubt that even two days here will make a difference to me.

5. My tour in Maharashtra was a great experience for me and I came back full of admiration for the sturdy peasantry of those areas who have faced scarcity and difficulty with courage and without complaining over much. They are a fine people and I felt then, as I have often felt before, how the peasants of India form the backbone of our country. My respect and affection for them grows and it has been the highest privilege of my life to experience the abundance of their faith and affection. A sense of humility seizes me at my own inadequacy in the face of this faith and affection. Whatever I can, I try to give them; but how far am I fulfilling our heavy duty and responsibility cast upon me? We sit in our chambers in New Delhi and work hard and try to think of the problems of India. Those problems come to us in notes and summaries and in statistics, all of which are important, and yet I sometimes feel that they miss out the human element. I said at a place in Maharashtra that there were 360 million problems in India, for each individual was a problem for us and his well-being our concern. That is rather a terrific way of looking at India's problems, and yet I think that it has a good deal of truth in it. For then we think of human beings and not of statistics.

6. I have visited, from time to time, various areas of scarcity where semi-famine conditions prevailed in Assam, in Bihar, in the UP, in Rayalaseema, in Madras and lately in Maharashtra. There are, of course, others also and notably in certain parts of Rajasthan. Whenever I go to these areas, a sense of urgency fills me when I see human beings not getting their due

3. See *ante*, pp. 172-173.

4. See *ante*, p. 186.

from life. More particularly, I am distressed to see bright young children of India lacking food or clothing or shelter, not to mention education and health. Each such case produces a sense of failure in me, though I know that it is not possible to change the Indian scene by some magic and to produce plenty out of poverty. It is not possible to solve the 360 million problems of India within any reasonable compass of time. But are we moving fast enough in that direction? If this generation is condemned to large-scale poverty and low standards, must the next generation also suffer in this way?

7. Immediately, of course, the problem of relief arises where distress is most obvious. There is a great difference in our dealing with this problem now from the way the old British Government dealt with it. Without meaning any ill to that government, it must be recognized that its outlook in social and economic affairs was a very limited one. It took things as they were for granted and if famine occurred, it functioned in a routine way and set the old famine code in motion and gave some relief. We can never forget the death by starvation of 35 lakhs of persons in the Bengal famine ten years ago.

8. What a difference there is now! We have had to face calamities and earthquakes and floods in an abnormal measure during the last six years. We have not been able to give all the relief that we should, but we have at least saved people from dying of starvation. We have given them food and work and at least prevented that type of major catastrophe which used to occur previously. That is some achievement, I think, and it indicates the new social conscience of the nation. Where such need arises, we must help to the utmost of our capacity and in this matter we have to think of India as a whole each part helping the other.

9. This we have followed no doubt, but is the pace sufficient? Is it enough just to keep people from dying from starvation? Surely not. A Welfare State, about which we talk so bravely, expects much more to be done. How then are we to do it? There is the Five Year Plan which, I am convinced, is a magnificent achievement and which must lay the foundation of all our future Plans. And yet, while the Five Year Plan gradually works itself out, human beings in large numbers, including helpless little children, drag on their miserable lives with little hope in the near future. Everywhere I have gone, they ask for work and there is a positive dislike to the dole. That is a healthy sentiment which I have admired, for it is through work alone that they can go ahead and the nation will prosper. Work has been provided to the utmost capacity of the States concerned. Yet a large field remains uncovered and there are no resources left to deal with it in the present or in the near future.

10. Even the Five Year Plan shows us that our estimated resources do not cover the expenditure we have to incur. There is a big gap which, we hope, will be covered by foreign loans or some internal effort, or both. There is no reason why we should not accept the foreign loans if there are no conditions

attached. But for every benefit received, there is some moral obligation and living on benefits from outside tends to develop a sense of dependence on others, which is not a good thing. We have to strike a balance. It is clear that we must fulfil the Five Year Plan and, if possible, go further, whether foreign help comes adequately or not. If our present methods do not yield the resources needed, we shall have to think of other methods. If our present social and economic structure comes in the way of finding these additional resources internally, then we shall have to think seriously of changing that structure.

11. The mass of unemployment in India rather terrifies me. What share have these unemployed in the Welfare State that we are building up? And how can they have a sense of partnership in it? There is no lack of people willing and able to work and to produce if only we give them the opportunity to do so. The enthusiasm shown in many States in doing voluntary work has been surprising and most heartening. But voluntary labour, good as it is and to be encouraged, does not provide the purchasing power which those people need. It is only greater purchasing power leading to greater consumption which will ultimately help production. The problem then is how we can marry the unemployed to productive and preferably developmental work.

12. Recently some members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives visited India. They have produced a report of their tour to India, Pakistan, Thailand and Indo-China.⁵ Quite apart from the correctness of their appraisal, it is interesting to note the reactions of foreign observers on our structure and policies. In describing the governmental structure, they referred to the powers of the States. They go on to say: "The extent of popular participation and control at the State level of government varies widely. The main pressure groups are landed interests, commercial groups, and language groups. The first two have the greater influence, as most members of State Legislatures hitherto have represented landed, industrial or commercial interests. As a result, the State Governments have tended to be conservative in character, sometimes resisting the implementation of reform measures included in the platform of the ruling Indian National Congress Party."

13. I do not think this is a correct appraisal, but nevertheless it is significant that rather conservative Members of the US Congress should describe our State Governments in this way and call them conservative in outlook and governed largely by pressure groups from landed interests and commercial groups. It is often a good thing to try to see ourselves as others see us. We get so used ourselves to our environment that we do not notice any peculiarity in it. How far is it true then that our governments, Central or

5. This report was presented to the US Congress on 6 May 1953.

State, are influenced much by what might be called the conservative or vested interests in our society? We talk of the people. What are the people? The vast mass of peasants and industrial workers and landless labour appear somewhere in the background while special interests come to the front and make themselves heard. It would be a tragedy if we forgot the principal urge of the national movement that we are supposed to represent. That urge was always in favour of this vast mass of the common people and we have repeatedly declared that no private or vested interest should come in the way of progress of these people. Do we act up to that declaration and assurance? Or are we gradually slipping away from it and forgetting our main task?. It is a painful thought that foreigners should think that our governments resist the reforms advocated by the Congress. Our governments exist because of the Congress and are therefore called Congress governments. Governments have to be more realistic than popular organisations. But if they slide away from our basic platform and pledges, they will lose their influence and be accused of a betrayal of those pledges. The old cry of *swadeshi* is hardly heard now, although it supplied not only an economic, but a psychological need. So also old slogans fade away. It is for this reason that I asked for your special attention to the resolution on social and economic policy recently passed by the Congress Working Committee. That resolution is rather general and perhaps rather inadequate. But it does point to a certain direction and we must never forget to look in that direction. There is a tendency to look upon industrial labour as something rather hostile to the State and to be guarded against. It is true that sometimes organized labour is troublesome. But if we cannot carry organized labour with us and give it a sense of partnership in all our undertakings, we shall not go far. That would be so in any democratic State, but much more so in our State with our background.

14. Generally speaking, the interests of the Services are kept before us. That is right. But the lower ranks of the Services perhaps are not considered in the same way. In the British period, one might well say that the State was essentially a Service State or rather a State in which the Services played a predominant part and where their interests were specially safeguarded. We have continued those guarantees, though they hardly fit into a democratic structure and they produce that sense of class division which is the bane of all our social structure. Even Dr Appleby, to whose report I drew your attention, has pointed out how bad this system of division into horizontal classes is. There has to be a division of responsibility according to merit and capacity. There should be no other division or classification.

15. During the last month or more, in fact since Stalin's death, there have been new and sometimes surprising developments both in Soviet Russia and, in China. Russia has taken many steps internally, and, to some extent externally, which clearly indicate her desire to lessen the world tension. China,

after rejecting our Korean Resolution in the UN, has gradually veered round to almost that position. There is much speculation as to what all this means and what the motive behind it is. That motive is anybody's guess, but the fact of an effort to ease tension and to go towards a settlement is clear enough and there appears to be no reason whatever why we should not take advantage of that fact and not be led away by fears and apprehension.

16. The turn that international events have taken has brought India more into the picture and cast a heavy responsibility upon her. The independent policy that we have pursued and our constant attempts to remain friendly with all countries have borne fruit. The great powers look upon us with respect and realize that what we say will be listened to by many. Hence, they have to listen to it also. We remain the principal link between these rival blocs. The fact of our political and economic stability and the earnest attempt that we are making to better our conditions by the Five Year Plan and other methods has also impressed the world. The result, no doubt, is pleasing to us, but it is also disturbing, because of the additional responsibility cast upon us. In the Korean deadlock, attempts are made on both sides to utilize India's services to help to resolve it.

17. The Chinese Government, after a brief period of cold and distant relations with us, because of our resolution at the UN, has gradually become more and more friendly again and recently has approached us in the friendliest way, seeking our help in the cause, as they put it, of peace and freedom. Their new proposals⁶ are a very near approximation to our own resolution and one would have thought that a settlement in Korea was very near. But just then the US Government put forward a new set of proposals⁷ which opened up the question anew. In moderate and friendly language we pointed out that the latest Chinese proposals, being so near the UN position, should form the basis of a settlement, with such variations as might be needed.

18. You will remember that the main stumbling block for many months in the way of a Korean armistice was the argument about compulsory repatriation of PsOW or of voluntary repatriation. The Chinese insisted on the former, while the US and other countries were equally firm about the latter. The Geneva Convention, on the whole, supported the Chinese contention. Our resolution at the UN, while adhering to the Geneva Convention, gave scope to the voluntary principle in the sense that no one should be forced to go against his will. The Chinese have now practically given up their position in this respect and, therefore, the main stumbling block is gone and only a few relatively minor differences remain. If there is a will to peace, there is no difficulty in overcoming these remaining obstacles.

6. Submitted on 7 May 1953.

7. On 13 May 1953.

19. It seems that, apart from some internal opinion in the US, what is called the Chinese lobby there, the real obstruction comes from Chiang Kai-shek of Formosa and Syngman Rhee of Korea. Both these persons evidently think that war is the only solution, if any, of their problems and therefore they are averse to any peaceful settlement. President Syngman Rhee issues all kinds of threats to withdraw his forces from South Korea⁸ and the US Government is rather frightened by them. At the same time, obviously, Syngman Rhee has no chance whatever without the effective support of the UN and, more especially, the US. It is an extraordinary situation that world war and peace should depend on the wishes and personal fortunes of persons like Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek.

20. Considerable pressure is being exercised by a number of European and other Powers in favour of accepting the recent Chinese proposals as the basis.⁹ I believe that this pressure is having some effect, though how far this will go, I do not know. Probably, in the course of a day or two fresh proposals will be put forward by General Harrison at Panmunjon.¹⁰

21. Another anomaly in the international scene can be witnessed in Indo-China as well as to some extent, in French Northern Africa. In both places the USA are supporting French colonial administrations against powerful movements seeking freedom. They do so because they say that in Indo-China the alternative is the spread of communism and, secondly because for other reason, they do not wish to break with the French. The US authorities go on saying that they are entirely opposed to colonialism and yet, in practice, circumstances have led them to support it. The result is that they have been outmanoeuvred and the liberation movement in Indo-China, which is essentially nationalist, is controlled by communist elements. The recent incursion into Laos had, undoubtedly, a nationalist origin, though it might have been helped by other elements.¹¹ In Morocco¹² and Tunisia,¹³ there are no Communists to

8. On 24 April 1953, Rhee threatened to withdraw the South Korean forces from the United Nations Command if the proposed armistice allowed Chinese forces to remain in Korea.
9. For example, on 16 May 1953, Churchill stated that the Communist peace plan deserved "patient and sympathetic examination."
10. The UN Command's new proposals providing for the transfer of all prisoners to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission were put forward on 25 May 1953.
11. Viet Minh troops cooperating with the Laotian guerrillas entered Laos in mid-April 1953.
12. The Muslim Religious Brotherhood Party and the other conservative political groups, opposed to the reformist activities of Sultan Sidi Mohammad ben Youssef, petitioned the French authorities on 21 May 1953 to depose him. The Sultan was already disliked by the French Government for supporting the nationalist movement in Morocco.
13. The demands for political reform in Tunisia, conceded partially by the French in December 1952, led to an intensification of the campaign.

speak of and there is purely nationalist movement and yet the French are crushing it with all their force.

22. It is these contradictions that weaken very greatly the policy of the Western Powers. While speaking in the name of freedom, they have sided in many places with colonialism and reaction. Chiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee and Bao Dai have a past; they have no future. To try to give them a future is to try to reverse the current of history.

23. In Egypt, the situation is very bad and we appear to be on the eve of a military conflict between the British forces and the Egyptian Government. Both have dug their toes in and yet the basic differences now are not very great. There is just a chance that some accommodation might be reached. It is a feeble chance. It may well be that after a few weeks or so there might be a flare up in Egypt. How that can solve any problem, it is not easy to say.

24. Britain recognized the new world that was growing up and dealt wisely with India, Burma and Ceylon. But somehow that exhausted that particular stock of wisdom. She has been in trouble in Malaya for six years now, has been in trouble all over the Middle East and is now facing a severe crisis in Egypt. In Kenya, the situation is a most painful one with murder and massacre going on on either side. Of course, the capacity of the State for this is greater than that of the poor Africans. In particular, the European settlers there have lost all sense of perspective and so trouble continues and is likely to do so, for no amount of repression would put an end to the powerful urges which influence the African people.

25. For a variety of reasons, the relations of India and Pakistan are more friendly or less unfriendly than they have been at any time during the past five or six years. We must welcome that and take advantage of it. I shall meet the Prime Minister of Pakistan in London, but we cannot obviously discuss anything in detail there. That will have to remain till our return. Meanwhile, arrangements have been made for official discussions to take place in India or Pakistan, or both alternately, over the whole field of Indo-Pakistan affairs. I earnestly hope that this will yield results.

26. Three distinguished Americans have recently visited India and I have had long and frank talks with them. These were Mr Adlai Stevenson, Mr Dulles and Mr Stassen.¹⁴ In some places demonstrations were organized against Mr Dulles the American Secretary of State, and he was asked to "go back." Anything more foolish and misguided than this I find it difficult to imagine. Some of our people do not seem to realize that we are a free country dealing

14. Harold Stassen, Administrator of the Mutual Security Agency, 20 January to 1 August 1953; thereafter, Director, Foreign Operations Administration.

with representatives of other free countries on an equal basis. They suffer still from the hangover of the past and think in terms of the Simon Commission and the like. They talk of a Big Power conference and even suggest that India should invite this. That surely means that eminent statesmen of other countries should confer among themselves and possibly with India. If we refuse to confer with any of these important representatives, then there is no question of any conference or even of any diplomatic talks on a high level. To talk with others does not mean agreement with them. In fact, such talks usually take place because there is a difference in outlook. These demonstrations against Mr Dulles were organized by the Communist Party. I have little to say to them because their objectives and methods are completely alien to us. But I was surprised to find some other persons joining these demonstrations.¹⁵ This indicated complete immaturity of political thinking. We are, and recognized to be, a mature nation and we should function as such.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

15. To protest against the visit of Dulles, a public meeting in Delhi was addressed on 15 May 1953 among others by Syed Ahmed, a Congress Member of Parliament.

LETTERS TO INDIRA GANDHI

1. To Indira Gandhi¹

Camp:Ludhiana,
25th April, 1953

Darling Indu,

I am writing to you from an odd place—Ludhiana. It is easier to write or dictate from such places than from Delhi where I get immersed in my normal work. I have come to Ludhiana for a day and a half to see some military exercises that are going on here. I am here, therefore, in my capacity as Minister of Defence.

I do not quite know where you are at present. I imagine you should be round about Port Said. I hope the voyage has been pleasant. In any event, the unpleasant part in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal must be over. I gather that you are travelling in great luxury in some kind of a royal suite. This letter is timed to reach you when you arrive in London.

Padmaja came to Delhi soon after you left. A day or two later Papi's² birthday was celebrated and we were made to dress up for the occasion. Of course, it is easy to dress up when I can provide gowns in various shapes and colours to any number of persons. Padmaja has decided to accompany me during my Maharashtra tour. I shall be glad to have her of course, but I am a little nervous about her capacity to stand the strain of this kind of touring. I am going to travel more than 200 miles a day, apart of course from meetings and speech-making. Padmaja says that she will rest while I am attending meetings. I am rather looking forward to some parts at least of this tour as I have not been to that part of the West coast before. This includes Ratnagiri, Kolhapur and Ahmednagar. In Ahmednagar I shall, of course, visit the old fort and have a look at the place where I lived with others for nearly three years.

We have changed the venue of our conference in Switzerland from Lucerne to a place near Lucerne (about fifteen kilo metres away) which is much quieter and, I am told, very beautiful. In fact, it is specially meant for quiet conferences. I forget the name. I think it is called something like Burgenstock. You can find out the actual name from Mr Kher. I think this place will be better than Lucerne which will be crowded with the ordinary tourists. It will be easy for us to go to Lucerne when we want to.

The chief piece of news is that Rita has got engaged to Avtar Kishen Dar

1. Sonia Gandhi (ed.) *Two Alone, Two Together: Letters Between Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru 1940-1964*. (London, 1992); pp. 579-590. All the letters to Indira Gandhi have been reproduced from this book.
2. Leilamani Naidu.

of our Foreign Service. Rita broke the news rather suddenly. I suppose she was hurried into some kind of a decision by the fact that Dar is being transferred in about a month's time to Cairo. *Puphi* is giving us all a party to relatives and others soon to announce the engagement formally to them. Dar appears to me to be a good boy, quiet, rather retiring and shy. He is hard working.

Last night, I saw the puppet dance show. This took place at Rashtrapati Bhavan and a large number of people were invited to it. I liked the show and I think that we should encourage this kind of medium both for our children and adults.

The military exercises here are on a large scale. The idea is that two hypothetical countries have had a quarrel and one of them invades the other rather suddenly. In these exercises, they name these countries Nark and Swarg and a third country nearby is Sansar. Nark is an unfortunate name to give to any country. I tried to get it changed, but it was too late for it. So now the armies of Nark, and Swarg are supposed to be locked in armed conflict. There is, of course, a great deal of make believe about it all. But it is rather fun. We have press communiques being issued by the respective Governments in justification of their action and we have, in a small way, all the paraphernalia of war without any actual firing. There is also a good deal of make believe in another sense. A motor truck may represent half a dozen tanks, the reason being that, as far as possible, we want to save our tanks. Large numbers of umpires move about and declare that a certain tank is out of action or that somebody is a casualty. Aircrafts hover above and are supposed to bomb. The umpire declares that a place has been bombed.

In spite of all this make believe, there is a good deal of reality about the organisation and it is very good practice and experience for the officers and men. Headquarters officers with all their paraphernalia as well as Division or Brigade Headquarters suddenly move backwards and forwards and establish themselves in a new place. They are camouflaged, telephone lines have to be laid quickly and a constant supply of news has to come from various fronts. An amusing incident took place. One tough NCO refused to retire when, by all the rules of the game, he was surrounded and ought to have retired with his men. He said that he would not retire and that if he was disabled, his men would fight on. The General had to tell him that he would declare him a casualty and have him carried away if he did not retire.

The general level of our younger officers seems to be quite good. Some of the foreign military attaches present here have been impressed by them.

You will see Betty and Harsha. Please give my love to Harsha and tell him that, by the time I come, I hope he will be fit and strong.

I have received a special invitation to visit the Indian section of the Victoria and Albert Museum. I should like to go there if I have the time. Try

to go there yourself and take the children. Take the children also specially to the South Kensington Museum. I am sure they will enjoy it.

If Isobel Cripps is within reach, you should try to see her; also Mrs Laski.

My love to you and Rajiv and Sanjay.

Papu

2. To Indira Gandhi

Camp: Ahmednagar,
1st May, 1953

Indu darling,

I am writing this letter to you from Ahmednagar. I have just completed four days of my Maharashtra tour. Two more days remain and then I go to Bombay, and thence to Delhi, on the 4th May.

As usual, the tour has been a heavy one and my average journey for the day works out at over 200 miles by road, with a number of meetings roped in. In addition, I have to stop my car every few miles because a crowd gathers there. The meetings have been on a big scale. Yesterday I had a very big meeting at Sholapur, estimated at nearly two hundred thousand and three other meetings each going up to a hundred thousand. I suppose, at a moderate estimate, during these six days, I shall have covered about a thousand miles by road and directly addressed about a million people, apart from those I pass on the roadside. I never cease to be astonished at this response of the people and their excitement at seeing me. Naturally, I am deeply moved. The Maharashtrians are not supposed to be demonstrative, but they have been quite excited about my visit, not only the urban people, but perhaps even more so the rural people.

My main purpose to come here was to see the scarcity areas and the works undertaken there. On the whole, the Bombay Government has dealt with the situation with promptitude and more or less effectively. There are a large number of works. The people working there did not seem to me to be emaciated at all. Only in some free kitchens where the old go to are there signs of emaciation.

My first day landed me at Sawantwadi, a small State which is now merged in Ratnagiri district. Sawantwadi was the original hometown of Ranjit Pandit's father. The ex-ruler of the place, an attractive young man, was our host. His mother is the sister of the Maharaja of Baroda who was recently pushed out

in favour of his son. His wife is the daughter of the same ex-Maharaja, which is rather an odd combination for India. Sawantwadi was a pleasant little place in the hills, not far from the sea, but rather stuffy.

The next day we went on to Ratnagiri and later to Kolhapur. This was my first visit to this area. Ratnagiri, by the seaside, is the real home of the Alphonso mango. Unfortunately I have been unable to do full justice to the Alphonso, because I have not yet completely recovered from the little upset I had even while you were here. However, the situation is well under control.

Apart from some tour on the hills on the first day, we have been mostly moving about in the plains and it has been pretty hot, the temperature usually being 110 in the shade. There was very little shade in some of the arid plains we passed through. Occasionally, however, there was the Gul Mohur all aflame. That reminds me that Delhi at present is full of bright flowering trees. Mathai took me specially to see them in Connaught Circus, which was a blaze of colours because of the Gul Mohur trees. Elsewhere the Acacia or Laburnum are in bloom, and then there is the Jacaranda (I do not know the spelling correctly). Our garden is not showing off any of these trees particularly well, but elsewhere they are in full glory. Padmaja has thus far kept up to the mark, although the pace of this tour is hard on her. Our hosts have been interesting folk. The first night the Raja of Sawantwadi; the second, the District Magistrate of Kolhapur, a young Muslim with an intelligent wife; and the third night at Sholapur the District Magistrate who is a Parsee. Here in Ahmednagar, the District Magistrate, who is also a Muslim, though he has rather a Hindu name...

Love to you and the children,

Papu

3. To Indira Gandhi

Dhulia,
West Khandesh,
2nd May, 1953

Darling Indu,

Yesterday at Ahmednagar I dictated a letter to you. I forgot to mention in it the very thing that had impressed me most and rather moved me. This was my visit to the fort where I had spent over two and a half years of my life. Inevitably all kinds of memories assailed me and I stayed on rather longer than was intended and upset my subsequent programme.

To my amazement I found a board up in the wrong room indicating that I had stayed there. This was not a slight mistake. They had put me as well as the others in a different wing altogether. Why? I was told that they had done this on the best authority! Indeed they were reluctant to accept my evidence! I realised how very easily history and even the most obvious facts are likely to be distorted. If I had not gone there, the wrong room in the wrong wing would have been permanently fixed as my place of residence.

There was a pomegranate tree also which was described as having been planted by me. I did not plant it.

Today I completed my fifth day of tour and I am feeling somewhat worn out. It has been hard going and the heat and the dust and the frequent stops at almost every village have exhausted me—another day and then I go back to Delhi

Love to all of you from,

Papu

4. To Indira Gandhi

Prime Minister's House,
New Delhi,
8th May, 1953

Indu darling,

Mathai will send you the revised version of my programme in London. This is getting filled in. I am anxious to keep a good deal of time free because I shall have to see many people there, individually and separately. There are a number of Prime Ministers. I shall have to give a good deal of time to the Pakistan Prime Minister. Also to the Ceylon Prime Minister and, of course, Sir Winston and St Laurent,¹ apart from others.

As you perhaps know, I shall proceed on arrival in London direct to Mr Kher's house. From there I shall go to India House for a couple of hours or so, returning for an early dinner with Mr Kher. After dinner I intend going to Broadlands. Probably Edwina will come and call for me at Kher's house.

I hope you will be coming to Kher's house for dinner that evening, if not earlier. I should, of course, like you to come to Broadlands. I am sure Edwina

1. Louis Stephen St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada. 1948-57.

will love it. But it is for you entirely to decide what you would prefer to do during that weekend. I shall return from Broadlands on Sunday night.

I understand that we shall be staying at Claridges. I shall therefore go to Claridges on Sunday night and you can also come there then.

The Mountbattens will probably reach London a few days before I do. I think you should pay them a visit. Edwina wants to fix up some theatres to go to. I know nothing about the places at present.

During the next few days in London, you will be accompanying me to many functions. To some, like Prime Ministers' Conference, you will not of course go. You can fix up your own programme for those occasions.

I suppose you will accompany me to Spithead to the Naval Review. I intend going on board our cruiser *Delhi* at that time. Probably before I go to the *Delhi*, I shall visit for a while Lord Mountbatten's flagship.

Krishna Menon must have met you. I need not tell you that he requires a friendly and affectionate approach. He feels rather out of it and frets a great deal. I have fixed no time to see him. Probably I shall see him on arrival for a little while and then I can fix up other times when I am in Claridges.

I have been terribly busy since my return from the Maharashtra tour. Among other things, our honourable two Houses of Parliament nearly came to blows with each other over a relatively trivial matter. However, I have succeeded in pouring oil over these troubled waters! I am likely to be hard-worked right to the last moment of my departure from Delhi. I had hoped to go to Allahabad for a couple of days, but that seems difficult now. I also wanted to go to Kashmir for a weekend ... That too seems difficult for a variety of reasons.

I received your letter from somewhere *en route*, probably Port Said, and I was glad to know that the children had been enjoying themselves. I do not know where you are now and where you will be when this letter reaches London. Perhaps you might have gone to Switzerland. I shall not see them till I reach Switzerland myself. Give my love to them and tell Rajiv that I got his card and liked it.

I have noted what you have said about the Consulate at Port Said and I shall enquire about it.² ...

Padmaja is here and will stay on, I suppose, as long as I am here.

2. In her letter of 21 April, Indira Gandhi had mentioned that during her short stay at Aden, she met the Indian Commissioner, A.B. Thadani, who complained that there was a lot of discrimination against Indians. Apparently Indians were not allowed into clubs, cinemas and swimming pools, where Europeans went. Indira Gandhi suggested to Nehru to look into the matter.

The big Jaipur lamp has been shifted to its place just above the stairs. This is very effective and, in the evenings, the light and shade effect on the stairs and the surrounding walls is very attractive indeed. It looks like a piece of tracery. I am very fond of this lamp and it cheers me up whenever I see it.

Love,

Papu

5. To Indira Gandhi

Prime Minister's House,
New Delhi,
19th May, 1953

Darling Indu,

Thank you for your letters. Your account of the beauty of the English countryside now makes a strange contrast with Delhi in May. I am rather looking forward to getting away from this treadmill and breathing some fresh air for a while. Meanwhile, I am trying my hardest to get through as much work as possible. I have a slight feeling of apprehension as to what will happen here during my absence. There is so much petty trouble and always a chance of its growing.

Anyway I shall be with you in just ten days from today and I am greatly looking forward to seeing you.

On the 29th when I arrive I shall be going to India House in the afternoon. I would like to visit Harsha also that day.

I have decided to spend the next weekend in Srinagar—Saturday & Sunday. Padmaja will probably go there also—she has never been to Kashmir.

When I was in Maharashtra I got a message from the Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge informing me that the Senate had decided to confer an honorary LL.D. on me. But my presence on June 4th morning was essential. This clashed with the P.Ms' Conference and so regretfully I had to tell the V.C. that I could not come. There the matter ended. Two days ago I learnt that Winston Churchill had heard of this and in order to suit my convenience, he has postponed that session of the P.Ms' Conference. So I shall be going to Cambridge on June 4th morning—will you come with me? It will be a rush by car there and back, but the countryside will be pleasing.

All my love,

Papu

1. The Railway Centenary¹

I am happy to send a message of greeting on the occasion of the celebration of the centenary of the first railway line in India, which was opened from Boribunder to Thane on April 16, 1853. These hundred years have seen many changes, and our railways have developed as a great national undertaking serving the people. I hope that they will progress still further, and will ever keep before them the ideal of service to the people to whom they belong.

1. Message to the Railway Board on the occasion of the centenary of the Indian Railways, New Delhi, 16 April 1953. From the *National Herald*, 17 April 1953.

2. To Inait Ullah¹

New Delhi
April 17, 1953

My dear Khwaja Inait Ullah,²

Your letter of the 14th April informing me that you have decided to form a World Democratic Peace Congress.³ I really do not understand what such an Organisation can do or is likely to do. In any event, the name itself is very pompous. It seems rather absurd for a few persons to meet together in Delhi and organize a world organization.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 32 (195)/49-PMS.
2. (b. 1899); participated in the freedom movement; member of, Bihar PCC, 1939-49, AICC, 1947-48, Provisional Parliament, 1950, and of Rajya Sabha, 1952-54.
3. On 12 April 1953, some leading Congressmen of Delhi formed the "World Democratic Peace Congress" under the convenorship of Inait Ullah with the avowed objective of popularizing Indian foreign policy and organizing peace efforts.

3. All India Local Bodies Conference¹

I send my good wishes to the All India Local Bodies Conference which is going to be held in Madras. I have always felt that the basis of democracy is the proper functioning of our local bodies and indeed our panchayats. It is important, therefore, that we should try to improve the functioning of all our local bodies.

1. Message to the All India Local Bodies Conference, 18 April 1953. File No. 9/148/53-PMS.

4. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
April 24, 1953

My dear Krishna,

I have not written to you for a considerable time. During this period, I have received two or three letters from you. One letter came today dated the 12th April.

I did not write to you because for the last two or three weeks at least, I have been unsure about your programme and when you were returning to London.

Many things that you wrote to me about are past history now and I need not deal with them. You will remember my writing to you about the Vice-Chancellorship of Delhi.² Your answer made me somewhat reluctant to press this matter and I allowed it, therefore, to go ahead.

Your letter that I received today naturally deserves from me the most careful and earnest attention. I do not treat it casually and I want to assure you that you can write to me as frankly as you like without the least hesitation.

In effect, your argument is that our present economic policy, as well as perhaps other policies, are likely to lead us to ruin and subservience to other powers, more especially, the US. You are alarmed at our looking forward to

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.

2. On 10 March 1953. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, pp. 609-610.

more and more loans or grants from the US and our increasing dependence upon them.³

These matters naturally have caused me the greatest concern even without your writing to me. Your writing increases that concern. Nevertheless, I feel that you take much too exaggerated a view of what has happened here or what is likely to happen. An odd statement or some reference in the press leads you to conclusions, which are not necessarily correct.⁴ I know fully the dangers of dependence on others and of relying too much on financial help from outside. I have referred to this often enough. As regards our policy, I do not think it is so based, as you imagine, on foreign loans, etc., though sometimes there is reference to them.

On the whole, I think that we are in a better position now than we were previously. I do not attach much importance to this because these are temporary phases. Nevertheless, it is a factor to be remembered. I do not myself see any crisis ahead of us in the near future. At the same time, I realize it that conditions are dynamic and nothing is more dangerous than complacency.

You repeatedly warn me of danger and suggest a complete reversal of what we do. I do not quite know how you expect me to reverse everything. I am prepared to do anything that is clear to me and that I feel I can do. But it must be clear to me and it must not be so risky as to upset possibly the applecart.

There are obviously innumerable factors in a situation, including the human factor. I am probably a much better judge than you are of the human factor in India and of the people, both in small numbers and big numbers, that I have to deal with. I have to carry them with me. I cannot function in isolation. I can, I believe, give a trend to events in a particular direction and even carry people with me. The advice you have often given me is not precise and you seem to indicate that the only worthwhile thing to do is to reverse engines completely. It is not even clear to me how this is to be done.

I am writing to you briefly now. Perhaps, I might write to you a little more fully later. In any event, I hope to have full talks with you when I am in London.

I expect to reach London on the 29th May afternoon. I shall be staying with Kher for that day. I intend going to India House that afternoon and after

3. Krishna Menon had observed: "It will be found that the present policy, owing to its basic unsoundness, will not even meet present purposes in a short-term context." He felt that it would be disloyalty on his part not to warn Nehru of the "daily recurring symptoms of the expansionist tendencies and policies in respect of Asia."
4. Menon had written: "I believe we stand the risk of losing the independence that came to us six years ago.... It can come about by the pressure of external and internal factors that flow...as consequential to our economic and financial policies."

an early dinner go to Broadlands for Saturday and part of Sunday, returning on Sunday evening.

You wrote to me about the Prime Ministers' Conference.⁵ I have thought about this a great deal. As far as I can see, it will be embarrassing to you and to Kher if I ask you to accompany me to the meetings of that Conference. It would be unusual for the High Commissioner and the ex-High Commissioner, not to mention one or two others, accompanying me there. None of them can participate, though they will be in a position to judge of what is happening. On the whole, therefore, I feel that you should not go with me there. But I would very much like your advice in regard to the subjects that are raised there. We can consider the situation further when we meet.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

5. In his letter of 1 March 1953, Menon had sought Nehru's permission for accompanying him to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. See also *ante*, pp. 482-483.

5. To B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya¹

New Delhi
May 8, 1953

My dear Pattabhi,

Your letter. The PTI report of my visit to the fort at Ahmednagar contains fantastic nonsense. As a matter of fact, I contradicted the whole report. But at the moment I forgot to indicate specially the passage you have referred to. Of course, I never said this. What I said was that sometimes we used to have long discussions. The word discussions has been made into quarrels which is ridiculous.²

Do you think it worthwhile for me to issue a statement about this? A general contradiction has already been made by me.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. On 6 May Pattabhi Sitaramayya had invited Nehru's attention to a PTI report quoting Nehru's remarks regarding frequent quarrels between Pattabhi Sitaramayya, P.C. Ghosh and Shankerrao Deo, during their incarceration. He clarified that Deo and Ghosh were his neighbours and all three of them had "particularly cordial relations" and had "never exchanged a harsh word, why speak of quarrels."

6. To Fazl Ali¹

New Delhi
May 18, 1953

My dear Fazl Ali,²

Thank you for your letter of the 15th May.

It would be a good thing if you could put through your proposal about the house in which Subhas Bose was born and convert it into a hospital.³ As you perhaps know, Amiya Bose is in great difficulties about his father's arrears of income tax, which amount to Rs.40,000/- or more.

I am not aware of any negotiations being carried on with the Government of India about this house, apart from the original letters written by Amiya Bose.

I read about your visit to Hirakud. We have to be strict about these matters of course, but I am afraid many of our people are terribly petty-minded and do not see the wood for the trees. I think that we are doing a fine job not only at Hirakud but in the Damodar Valley and Bhakra Nangal.

Do not ask me about the steel plant. It is becoming a sore point with many of us because of the repeated delays. Now we are in communication with some big firms and it is possible that something may be decided before long. I cannot say what site will be chosen, but the general inclination appears to be in favour of a site in Orissa. We shall have to wait for the opinion of the foreign experts.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 2 (658)/53-PMS.

2. Governor of Orissa.

3. Janakinath Bhavan at Cuttack was the birthplace of Subhas Chandra Bose.

7. To Rathindra Nath Tagore¹

New Delhi
26th May, 1953

My dear Rathin Babu,

Thank you for your letter of May 20th which I received yesterday on my return to Delhi.²

I am very sorry to learn of your ill-health which has been troubling you for some time now. If it is not possible for you to undertake the duties of your office, then I can very well understand your desire to be relieved of it.

I have just received your telegram in which you have asked me to reply by wire.

While I am desirous of acceding to your wishes in this matter, you will not surely expect me to deal with an important matter of this kind in such a hurry. You can rest assured that if you so desire, your wishes will be carried out. I am just on the eve of going away to Europe for a month. I would have suggested to you to keep your resignation pending till my return from Europe at the end of June. In effect you say in your telegram that you wish to be relieved before the third week of June.

You will appreciate that your resignation from an Institute so intimately connected with you is not a small matter. However, if your ill-health does not permit you to continue, there is nothing more to be said about it and one must defer to your wishes.

I would still suggest that the formal acceptance of your resignation might be deferred till I come back from Europe, that is the beginning of July. Meanwhile you can take short leave, if you are not at all well.

If, however, you insist, then I can accept your resignation at a somewhat earlier date. But I hope this will not be necessary.

I am sorry indeed that your ill-health should have come in the way of your serving this great institution which you have served for a greater part of your life.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharal Nehru

1. File No. 40(117)/50-PMS.
2. Rathindra Nath Tagore had requested Nehru to relieve him from the responsibilities of the Vice-Chancellorship of the Visva-Bharati. He expressed his inability to even carry on the routine work of the institution after a severe heart attack had left him almost an "invalid".

8. To the Aga Khan¹

New Delhi
May 27, 1953

My dear Aga Khan,

On the last occasion when you came to Delhi, I was greatly looking forward to meeting you, but unfortunately you fell ill and our meeting could not take place. I was glad to learn that you have recovered and I hope that you are keeping well now.

I am writing to you about a small matter which came to my notice because of some questions put in Parliament here . This was in relation to a pension of Rs.12,000/ per annum which apparently was originally granted in 1844 to your grandfather in consideration, it was said, for services to the East India Company.

This pension has evidently continued since then for over a hundred years. It struck me that, in present circumstances, this was rather anomalous and hardly befitting your dignity. The East India Company ceased to be long ago and even its successor, the British Government in India, has become a thing of past history. Such a "pension" has no meaning now and I suppose it has continued by some oversight on your part as well as ours. The sum is a trivial one for you, but the question is not that of the amount as the desirability, in present circumstances, of continuing this. I do not like your name to be dragged in Parliament here in questions or otherwise. I would, therefore, suggest that this payment should now be stopped.

I am sure you will appreciate this and agree with me.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. K/53/10216/41, MEA.

9. Conquest of Mt Everest¹

I send my hearty congratulations to Sherpa Tenzing² and E.P. Hillary³ on their great feat in climbing the Mt. Everest. It is a gallant and most difficult achievement. I am specially happy and proud of Tenzing's part in it.

1. Statement to Reuter on Tenzing Norgay and Edmund P. Hillary's success in climbing Mount Everest, London, 3 June 1953. From *The Statesman*, 4 June 1953.
2. Tenzing Norgay (1914-1986); high altitude Sherpa in British mountaineering expeditions to Everest, 1935, 1936 and 1938; took part in expedition to Karakoram, 1950. Nanda Devi, 1951; and in two Swiss expeditions, 1952; sirdar and full member of John Hunt's British expedition; with Edmund Hillary reached summit of the Mount Everest, 29 May 1953; Director of Field Training, Himalayan Mountaineering Institute, Darjeeling, 1954-76; accompanied Hillary on jet boat expedition up the Ganges, 1977; author of *Man of Everest*, the autobiography of Tenzing, told to James Ramsay Ullman, 1955, *Tiger of the Snows*, with Ullman, 1955, and *After Everest* as told to Malcolm Barnes, 1977.
3. Edmund Percival Hillary (b. 1919); mountaineer and explorer from New Zealand; conquerer of Mount Everest along with Tenzing on 29 May 1953; participated in the Antarctic expedition, 1956-58; High Commissioner to India, 1985-89.

10. To Charles Spencer Chaplin¹

Burgenstock
June 17, 1953

Dear Mr Chaplin,

Fate and circumstance have brought me to a place which is not very far from where you are at present. It would give me great pleasure to seize this opportunity to meet you if that is possible. I am here with my daughter for the next four days. I shall be leaving on the 22nd forenoon. If it was possible for you and your wife to come here for lunch with us on any of these days while we are here, we would be very happy. I do not know if you will be able to manage it. But I hope it will be possible. My daughter joins in this invitation to you and your wife as well as to any other members of your party.

I shall be grateful if you could telephone to me or to my daughter, Mrs Gandhi, and let me have your answer.

I enclose a letter from Lady Mountbatten.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

11. To Edwina Mountbatten¹

Burgenstock

June 18, 1953

My dear Lady Mountbatten,

I am enclosing an article which might perhaps interest you and Dickie. Modest as I am (at least I hope) I might have hesitated to send anything in praise of me. But then there is a secret desire to add to my credit in your eyes and I have succumbed to this.

But the personal equation apart, the article is well-written and is interesting. The significance of it comes from the writer. He is a man named Rosinski. I do not quite know what nationality he belongs to. But he is supposed to be a very high authority on certain defence matters and high strategy from the historical and geopolitic points of view. He used to function in Germany and served Hitler also in his early years as an adviser and Professor in some geopolitic institute. Then he fell out with Hitler, before the war, and, I believe, went to America. During the war he was an important adviser to the American Government and I have an idea that on some occasions he advised the UK Government also.

Some two years or more ago, he was invited by our Defence Ministry in India and he spent a couple of months there. I did not know much about him. On the eve of his departure, someone suggested that I should see him. I fixed a few minutes for this purpose just before dinner one evening. As I talked to him, however, my interest in him grew. I asked him to stay on to dinner and we talked afterwards till midnight, practically a four-hour sitting. I found his talk fascinating with his wide knowledge of the sweep of history and the interrelation of defence with political and other developments.

I am mentioning this to indicate that the man is rather a special type. I wonder if Dickie or you have ever come across him. He is still in America. He sent this article to our Embassy in Washington. I do not know if it has been published or not.

Tonight, after dinner, we saw a film of the Swiss Everest Expedition of 1952. This has not been released yet and it was shown for the first time to us especially by the Swiss Alpine Society which organized this Expedition.

This film was one of the most exciting and moving of this type that I have ever seen. It was of course a good colour film. But it was something more than that and it brought out the tremendous conflict between human beings and Everest and, even though Everest was not reached by these people, it was a triumph of the human spirit.

1. JN Collection.

Blizzards attacked these people and we could hear the hissing noise of the wind as it enveloped them. All of us who saw this picture, were considerably affected. Tenzing played an important part in it together with the Swiss, Lambert.² These two reached within 800 feet of the summit and had then to come back. If you have the chance, see this film when it comes out.

As I saw this film, a feeling of sadness came over me that I would never be able to climb these mountains or reach these heights. Age and shortness of breath and feebleness of feet have become insurmountable barriers. I am greatly attracted to these wild regions of snow and blizzard, but my body, I suppose, is no longer capable of enduring them. I suppose that we must contend ourselves with trying to utilize such strength and energy as we have got in other types of human endeavour. There are many Everests in this world, perhaps more difficult of conquest than even the mountain of that name.

I have just heard that the British Everest party will be reaching Delhi on the 27th June and leaving for London on the 1st July. I shall be able to see them in Delhi³, as I reach there on the 26th midnight.

I received the telegram you, Dickie and Pammy sent from Nice. Thank you for it and my love to you all.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Raymond Lambert, a Swiss mountaineer and member of Swiss Everest expeditions of May and October-November 1952.
3. Nehru cabled to R.K. Nehru on 19 June: "I should like to invite entire Everest party to some function at my house. You may fix suitable date preferably evening reception before dinner."

12. Cable to Abul Kalam Azad¹

Your telegram No. 10898 dated 18th June. I entirely agree that we should honour Tenzing and give him a special medal as we have no regular order for this purpose at present. I think however, that we should also give special medal to Hillary. It would be graceful gesture on our part to joint conquerors

1. Burgenstock, 19 June 1953. File No. 2 (655)/53-PMS.

of Everest. British Government might be asked if they have no objection. I am sure they will not object. Please consult President also.

As you know Queen has expressed wish to give George medal to Tenzing. This is not a title and in circumstances I think we should raise no objection. We may consider this a special case. If you agree I shall inform the Queen accordingly.

13. To the Aga Khan¹

New Delhi
June 29, 1953

My dear Aga Khan,

...You refer in your letter to some controversy you have had with our Income-tax people.² I do not know the details of this controversy, although I remember your writing to me once about it. But you will agree that it is the function of the Income-tax Department to do their work to the best of their ability. That is what they are there for. The Income-tax law has many safeguards to prevent a wrong assessment. I do not know if you took advantage of these safeguards. That you are taxed on the highest level is not surprising not because of your high position but because, presumably, your income is of that standard.

As you yourself say, the so-called pension goes very largely towards payment of income-tax or super-tax.³

So, the question of money hardly arises. It was more a question of principle that we were worried about and I felt that, both from your point of view and ours, it was hardly fitting that a pension of this kind should continue.

You refer to the case of several Afghan princes.⁴ As a matter of fact, the pensions of nearly all of them have been stopped. Those pensions were given

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. The Aga Khan had complained that the Income-tax authorities had "most unjustly" estimated his income on American columnist standards, whereas his actual income did not amount to even one and a half per cent of that "absurd figure".

3. He had informed that since he was taxed at the highest level, only an anna out of a rupee remained for him.

4. The Aga Khan wrote that the reason he did not give up his political pension was that there were still some Afghan princes who came to India under similar circumstances as that of his grandfather and received political pension. "Nobody seems to mind their political pension because they are poor. The fact that they are poor and I happen to be a rich man should not make a difference in a matter of principle as the original circumstances of the bestowals are the same", he added.

because at the instance of Afghanistan Government certain restrictions were placed on the activities of these Afghan princes. Because of these restrictions it became necessary to help them in some way. We felt that it was not proper to have any restrictions on these people and removed nearly all of them. It became open to them, therefore, to engage themselves in any activities or to go out of the country if they so chose. The necessity for a pension no longer remained. Therefore, you will observe that the same principle has been applied.

I do not think this question of pension has anything to do with the evacuee property business.⁵ Nor do I see why you should be considered an evacuee from any point of view. I do not quite know what your legal nationality is at present, though I have read somewhere that you consider yourself now an Iranian national. That does not make any difference to any property that you may hold in India. Certainly you do not and cannot come under the definition of an evacuee. I hope, indeed, that this evacuee property business will end before long. But it does not apply to you in any event.

Nor is there any question of your being in the bad books of the Government of India or of the people generally having any prejudice against you.⁶ You are the respected head of a large community and, therefore, even apart from personal reasons, you are respected by the Government and the people.

It seems to me that the continuation of this petty pension does not and cannot add to your status which is high for other reasons and I think that it would be better from all points of view to discontinue it. That would be in keeping with the policy we have adopted in all such cases. Perhaps the best course would be for you to indicate in a friendly way that you yourself do not desire it to be continued.

The matter need be given no publicity at all from either your side or ours. If, however, some question is asked in Parliament, we shall deal with it briefly.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. The Aga Khan was afraid that if he gave up his pension, then the Income-tax authorities might take over some of his properties in India and then the whole thing would be considered by the public as "part of the evacuee property business."

6. He further wrote that the last thing he wished for was that he should be considered, especially by the ignorant masses "as an evacuee, or be in the bad books of the Government of India without any rhyme or reason."

14. To David Hardman¹

New Delhi
June 30, 1953

Dear Mr. Hardman,²

I have received your letter of the 3rd June about the Stafford Cripps Memorial Appeal.

I am very glad that this appeal has been issued on behalf of a number of distinguished persons. It was my privilege to have the friendship of Sir Stafford Cripps and to get to know him fairly intimately. His integrity and nobility of character impressed large members of people in India, as they did elsewhere.

I shall indeed be happy to give such assistance as I can to this appeal.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. David Rennie Hardman (1901-1989); Secretary, Sir Ernest Cassel Educational Trust, 1935-84; Secretary, Stafford Cripps Memorial Appeal and Trustee; Justice of the Peace, Cambridge, 1941-47; Member of Parliament (Labour), 1945-51; Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Education, 1945-51; author of *What about Shakespeare?* (1939), *Poems of Love and Affairs* (1949) and *History of Holiday Fellowship, 1913-1940* (1981).

GLOSSARY

dhoti	a long piece of cloth used as a lower garment by men
goseva	care of the cows
gram sevak	voluntary village worker
gram vikas yojana	village development scheme
jagir	a tract of land and its revenue
Jai Hind	victory to India
Jhum	shifting cultivation
karma	action / consequences of the deeds of previous birth
mansab	designated office
mantra	an invocation / chant
nark	hell
patwari	a village level revenue official
puphi	father's sister
rashtra	nation
sarf-e-khas	personal jagir
satyagraha	truth force or soul force
swadeshi	indigenous
swarg	heaven
yajna	religious sacrifice and oblation
yoomia	daily allowance

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This volume of the *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, covering the second quarter of 1953, deals with several seminal events and crucial initiatives which marked, on the one hand, an increase in the pace of social and economic developments within India, and on the other, an increasing involvement of the country in matters of outstanding significance in the world community.

Yet it is truly remarkable that in the midst of the pressing tasks of statecraft, Jawaharlal Nehru was able to tease out of a busy schedule the time to reflect upon the larger issues which engaged humankind in India, and elsewhere, in the middle decades of 20th century. In an interview with Dorothy Norman, the American author, he spoke of the distinctive worldview of the people of India, which shaped their attitudes towards this world and beyond. This conferred upon the people a certain detachment towards the phenomenal world, and an ability to view men and events with a commendable sense of tolerance and equanimity. Moreover, the culture of the Indian people also endowed them with great freedom in interpreting the past as it impinged upon the present. "I always thought of India, in particular, as something in the nature of a palimpsest — a manuscript first written upon long, long ago. And then, over the original writing through the centuries... people have attempted to trace what they thought was there to begin with. So that by now there has been so much writing... that no longer can one be entirely certain that what is offered to one as the original tradition is, in fact, identical with what existed in the beginning."

In Nehru's perception of India in the 20th century, Mahatma Gandhi stood as a towering figure, who had not only shaped the social and moral content of the struggle for freedom; but also held out to the people a sense of the objectives they were to pursue in the future. The secret of the Mahatma's greatness was his firm belief in the transformative power of Truth and Non-Violence. "In this age of utmost violence, it is strange to think of the man who talked always of Non-Violence. In this age of consuming fear, this absolutely fearless individual stands out...."

That the vision of Gandhi, filtered through the discourse of modernity, guided Nehru in the steps he took to impart a new dignity to the people of India is vividly illustrated in what he had to say on various occasions in the period under review....

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